

**HUMAN SECURITY INTEGRATION INTO BANGLADESHI
NATIONAL POLICY: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE LINKS
BETWEEN HUMAN SECURITY, MILITARY DISENGAGEMENT
AND DEMOCRATISATION**

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THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
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
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Shekh Mohammad AltafurRahman

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ABSTRACT

This thesis analyses three links: first, between democratisation and human security integration; second, between military disengagement and democratisation and third, between Bangladesh Armed Forces (BAF)'s human security involvement and military disengagement. This research argues that the national policy of the democratic governments in Bangladesh results in human security outcomes that are essentially associated to human security principles and objectives. This thesis argues the integration of human security into Bangladeshi national policy is distinctly linked to the BAF's involvement in non-combative activities.

The thesis also shows the strengthening of democracy in Bangladesh is due to the BAF's disengagement from politics. It is argued that the continuation of democracy and military disengagement is mutually re-enforceable. This research also explains the BAF's involvement in disaster management and UN peacekeeping is positively influencing the democratic institutions, leading to political disengagement. Besides the secondary literature, the researcher used a number of semi-structured interviews and case studies to complement the findings. Through three case studies of the BAF's involvement in disaster management, protection of internal security in CHT and UN peacekeeping, this thesis identifies that the BAF's involvement modality with the civil-political authority is the crucial factor that determines the outcome of human security objectives. This thesis explains that in one case study, the protection of internal security in CHT, the extended and independent involvement of the BAF in nontraditional security activity weakens the civil-political authority. However, in the other case studies, the thesis shows that involving the BAF in non-combative activities enhances the capacity of the civil-political authority to implement the national policies associated with human security principles and objectives.

The key finding of the thesis is that the BAF's human security involvement leads to military disengagement which is a critical factor in democratisation.

**KEY WORDS: HUMAN SECURITY/ BANGLADESH ARMED FORCES/
BANGLADESH NATIONAL POLICY/ /MILITARY
DISENGAGEMENT/ DEMOCRATISATION**

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ABBREVIATIONS

BAF	Bangladesh Armed Force
CHT	Chittagong Hill Tracts
CRI	Climatic Risk Index
GDP	Gross Domestic Products
GoB	Government of Bangladesh
IDEA	Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNPKO	United Nations Peace Keeping Operation

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

The link between the appearance of human security principles and human security objectives in Bangladeshi national policy to the factors promoting such appearance has been in a complex dynamic; this dynamic can be traced through three stages. First, prior to 1990, apart from some constitutional pledges the Government of Bangladesh (GoB) had done little to associate human security principles and objectives with national policy addressing long term socio-economic needs of the people. Second, following the popular uprising which ousted the last military regime in 1990, post 1990 democratic governments have shown a willingness to introduce human security principles and objectives into national policy although not expressly using the term 'human security'. At the third stage, since the mid-1990s, the GoB has explicitly used either the term 'human security' or terms associated with human security in several national policies. For example, GoB has taken formal steps to address food security under the National Food Policy Plan of Action of 2008-2015 (GoB, 2008). Food security can be considered a component of human security according to the UNDP definition (UNDP, 1994). The GoB ensures food security as the core objective of the National Food Policy by harmonising supply and distribution with demand (GoB, 2008). Another example of the policy association with human security principles and objectives is the major poverty reduction policy of the GoB. In the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP)¹ of 2005, the GoB has contemplated poverty reduction by addressing economic insecurity caused by the poverty, which is considered a major component of human security (GoB, 2005a). Sensitivity to human

¹ PRSP is a major policy document advocated by the World Bank. This document essentially explains the poverty reduction strategy of the country with specific goals and approaches. As a long-term policy document the principles of the PRSP are implemented by short-term three year Rolling Plan and Five Year Development Plan.

security principles and objectives can also be found in other GoB national policies such as the National Environment Management Action Plan 1995, the National Plan for Disaster Management 2010-2015, the Bangladesh National Child Policy 2010, the Bangladesh National Women Development Policy 2011, and the National Health Policy 2011.

Not only have human security principles and objectives appeared in national level policies, the GoB is also proactive in pursuing human security principles at regional and international level. Bangladesh has been an active party in formulating human security based conventions and agreements through the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), the regional inter-governmental body of South Asian countries. The GoB has taken an active role in forming the SAARC Convention on Preventing and Combating Trafficking on Women and Children for Prostitution 2002 (GoB, 2007), the SAARC Convention on Regional Agreements for the Promotion of Child Welfare in South Asia 2002 and the SAARC Agreement on Establishing the Food Bank 2007. These regional agreements are the reflection of the GoB's position on human security principles and objectives at its national policies. For example, the provisions related with personal security at the national policy, namely the Prevention of Repression against Women and Children Act of 2000, collaborate with the SAARC Convention on Regional Agreements for the Promotion of Child Welfare in South Asia 2002. In the same way, GoB's position in international policies also aligns with human security principles and objectives. For example, during the 66th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, the Prime Minister of Bangladesh has proposed the 'peace model' for people's empowerment, which was unanimously adopted by the United Nation General Assembly. The weekly *Blitz* reported that the peace model can prevail under a multi-dimensional democratic approach with six mutually reinforcing multipliers. The six multipliers are: eradication of poverty and hunger, reduction of inequality, mitigation of deprivation, inclusion of excluded people and acceleration of human development and elimination of terrorism (Blitz, 2012). Linking peace with eradication of poverty, hunger, inequality and development is a clear sign of GoB's position: its policy has the potential to meet human security principles and objectives.

In this thesis the integration of human security into Bangladesh national policy means that the national policies are sensitive towards the human security principles and objectives. Referring to such an association, this thesis outlines that though the national policies do not necessarily explicitly mention the term ‘human security,’ nor do they classify themselves as ‘human security’ policies, the outcome and output of these policies are essentially emphasising the components of human security, such as the food security, environmental security, health security, personal security and even the cultural security (a selected list of such provisions of the policies is given in Chapter 2). The policies are human security in principle but not in name. Although several policies are naming some of the components of human security in national policy, it is not explicit evidence of the GoB’s adoption of human security in national policy. This thesis explains that the ultimate outcomes of the policies are human security principles and objectives. Without questioning the GoB’s intent for the integration of human security principles and objectives, this thesis is focusing on the meeting of human security objectives by the national policies of Bangladesh. For example, ‘food security’ is a key component of human security framework offered by the UNDP. It is also a principle tool of the human right to food by the FAO and the World Food Program. In this case, GoB’s inclination towards food security cannot be claimed as the adoption of human security in its national policy. Rather, the presence of food security goals can bring about the same outcome that human security principles and objectives intend. Thus this thesis explains the association to human security principle and objectives to Bangladeshi national policies as a way to address the cross-cutting challenges of human survival, livelihood and dignity. There is hardly any consensus over the concept of human security; however, a recent resolution of the United Nations (UN) carries quite similar perception that Bangladeshi national policies approach human security objectives, though they may not explicitly be human security policies. The UN General Assembly Resolution on Human Security of September 12, 2012 provided the first definition for the consensus on human security. The resolution states that “human security is an approach to assist Member States in identifying and addressing widespread and cross-cutting challenges to the survival, livelihood and dignity of their people” (UN, 2012). In this thesis it is argued that the national policies of Bangladesh are bringing the concern of the people’s survival,

livelihood and dignity, which in another way of associating the national policies to human security principles and objectives.

The policies associated with human security principles and objectives have been formulated by the democratic governments in Bangladesh since the demise of the last military regime in 1990. It may be argued that the post 1990 governments have interpreted security ideas progressively, which has enabled them to approach human security principles and objectives to address the people's needs. The need and desire to maintain and support democracy may be an obvious stimulus for associating human security principles and objectives with national policy. What inclines democratic governments to promote human security is a different discussion, but an important reason is that such governments have to be responsive to the needs of their citizens, which is also the principle of human security (Jolly, & Ray, 2006). Becker and Raveloson argued that as a system, democracy encourages governments to incorporate human security principles and objectives into their policies (Becker, & Raveloson, 2008). Democratic governments seek mandates from their electorates. Their formal political programmes, therefore, must acknowledge and attempt to address the crucial needs of their electorates, one of which is the need for human security (Chen, 1995). Several scholars such as Halperin, Siegle, and Weinstein, (2010), McFaul, (2010), Diamond, (1996), and Carothers, (1999) have viewed human security as necessary for democracy promotion. In another words, human security allows the maintenance of essential democratic conditions. Their writings explain how democratic systems incorporate human security to bring concrete benefits to the people by reducing poverty, expanding educational opportunities and building the conditions for lasting peace in developing societies. Thus, the GoB's response to the national needs by increasing association to human security principles and objectives with national policies should lead to more democratic characteristics in Bangladeshi politics.

Although the national policies are increasingly sensitive towards the human security principles and objectives, the BAF has intervened on several occasions in national politics since the country's independence in 1971, and the possibility of the BAF's intervention in national politics remains a key challenge to Bangladeshi democracy. However, since the last popular democratic uprising in the 1990s, military disengagement from politics has become a *fait accompli*, and, with the progression of

time, the organic growth of democracy in Bangladesh is maturing. Military disengagement, therefore, is becoming more accepted as a norm within the security establishment. Although military disengagement has not yet become a total or permanent feature of Bangladeshi politics, it has not interrupted politics for quite some time. On the other hand, the disengagement of the Bangladesh Armed Force (BAF)² from politics and increasingly associating of human security principles and objectives with national policies by the democratic governments are simultaneously present. This thesis argues that military disengagement in Bangladesh is shaping the sustenance of democratic governance, which ultimately is resulting in the association to human security principles and objectives with national policies. This relationship between military disengagement and association to human security is a mutually re-enforcing cause-and-effect relationship, where both the military disengagement and the association to human security acts as the cause and effect for each other. In doing so, this thesis also explores how the association to human security principles and objectives with national policy results with the sustenance of democracy in Bangladesh.

The growing involvement of the BAF in non-combatant activities in some ways is orchestrated by the democratic government and necessitates the BAF it to be informed about human security. This thesis discusses the involvement of the BAF in several examples of noncombatant activities which serve to inform and influence the military about human security. It is argued that ‘nontraditional security’³ involvement

² The Bangladesh Armed Force (BAF) is the state agency primarily responsible for the protection of the national sovereignty. The affairs of the BAF are meticulously defined by the constitution of Bangladesh and those are not limited by defense work only. Assisting the civil administration in the peace time and helping the GoB for implementing development activities and maintaining law and order is the works prescribed by the statutes. Detail at Chapter III.

³ The historic end of the Cold War, combined with the rising tide of globalisation, environmental degradation and international terrorism, has opened new facets of security, which is known as Nontraditional Security or NTS. Mely Caballero-Anthony defined nontraditional security threats as “challenges to the survival and well-being of peoples and states that arise primarily out of nonmilitary sources, such as climate change, cross-border environmental degradation and resource depletion, infectious diseases, natural disasters, irregular migration, food shortages, people smuggling, drug trafficking, and other forms of transnational crime.” The few common characteristics are these are

has been orienting the military establishment to disengage from politics. Military disengagement encourages democracy by stronger civil administration, civil society and political society, which eventually results the national policies associated with human security principles and objectives. In same way, with the maturity of democratic practice in Bangladesh, the GoB is showing sensitivity towards human security and involving the BAF as an implementing agency. By being involved in the nontraditional activities, the BAF is familiarised with the idea of human security and oriented to the importance of civil-political institutions; this process influences the BAF to disengage from politics. Without negating the presence of either of these two trends, this thesis analyses three core issues explaining the presence of the mutually re-enforcing causal relationship between the military disengagement and the association to human security principles and objectives. The three issues are:

i) Under democracy the BAF's growing involvement in nontraditional security based activities informs the BAF with democratic values, which is potential to influence for military disengagement,

ii) Military disengagement from politics is acting as a precondition for the sustenance of Bangladeshi democracy, and

iii) The sustenance of democracy is encouraging the GoB to integrate human security into national policy and involving the military in nontraditional security activities.

1.1.1 National Needs and Human Security Sensitive National Policies

As stated above, from the mid 1990s the GoB has sought to make several national policies, where human security principles and objectives are appeared. A key example is provided by the GoB's policy regarding the impact of climate change which is threatening the development of the entire country. The World Bank has stated that "Bangladesh is one of the most vulnerable countries to climate risks, both from

generally non-military in nature, transnational in scope - neither totally domestic nor purely inter-state and are transmitted rapidly due to globalization and communication revolution. This implies that these nontraditional threats are much more intimidating than the traditional ones as they require the national leadership to look not only outwards to cultivate international cooperation, but also inwards, with an open outlook to execute internal socio-economic and political reforms (Chaudhuri, 2011).

existing variability and future climate change” (World Bank, 2010: 3). Earlier, the World Bank had suggested climatic challenge as a major development issue for the country and that “it is clear that climate change is a key sustainable development issue for Bangladesh” (World Bank, 2000). The GoB has taken steps to formulate policies addressing climate change in its Climate Change Strategy and Plan of Action of 2008, where human security principles and objectives appeared as its perspective (GoB, 2008d). The plan, as is detailed in Chapter II focused on the need to improve six aspects of human security to ensure safety of the people from the impact of climate change and natural disaster (GoB, 2008). Although the formulation cannot be claimed as an appropriate human security integration but its formulation is sensitive towards the human security principles and objectives.

The GoB’s changing view towards security has encouraged it to be sensitive towards the human security principles and objectives to address poverty. For example, the National Development Plan, the PRSP and the Five Years Development Plan have incorporated provisions and approaches sensitive towards human security principles and objectives. (Described in detail in chapter II) The PRSP is a key guiding policy document of the GoB. In the revised PRSP, *National Strategy for Accelerated Poverty Reduction II, Five Years Plan 2009-11*, the Prime Minister of Bangladesh has viewed that “[o]ur government’s aim is to achieve *Vision 2021 . . . ‘National Strategy for Accelerated Poverty Reduction II’* is in consonance with *Vision 2021* of a middle income Bangladesh with qualitative change in the lives of the people” (GoB, 2009), which is another way of saying that the PRSP is a core policy document of the GoB’s poverty reduction. The first PRSP, which identified poverty as a threat to development and hence a threat to security, considered the human security approach to address several poverty issues under Section 1 A, where human security is identified as the approach to address the poverty (GoB, 2005a). Such an approach to poverty and development has been endorsed by various human security scholars, one of which is Professor Sen. He has argued that security is no longer only the concern of defense and humanitarian actors. Security matters have their formidable share in rights and development paradigm (Sen, 2000). Security is now closely associated with development and “[i]n the aftermath of the Cold War, the security debate has become part of the international development agenda” (Karim, Donata, & Julia, 2004: 9). In

the context of Bangladesh, “poverty and unemployment are the greatest concerns for most people. Poverty underlies many other problems. Limited resources make it harder to access basic services” (Safer World, 2008: ii). Poverty and limited access to resources lead to unfair competition and are a potential cause of social instability. In turn, they threaten the country’s economic and social development. In the PRSP, the GoB has recognised the security threats such as food security, personal security, cultural security, economic security and health security, arise from poverty and has addressed them through policy measures associated with human security principles (GoB, 2005a).

This thesis describes how in implementing policies to ensure the rights and security of the people, the GoB is increasingly involving BAF in human security related activities. Ms. U,⁴ a member of the Parliament of Bangladesh and involved in the Parliamentary Defense Committee has stated:

“the extraordinary measure of bringing the BAF for increasing civilian aid is a democratic practice. This is a response to the constitutional requirement to fulfill the rights of the people. The constitution has provided directives to ensure the rights of the people. In doing so government takes support from the BAF”
(Interviewed on September 23, 2010).

Ensuring the cooperation between the civil authority and the BAF is an important aspect of implementing the development policies in Bangladesh. Involving the BAF in human security activities has been possible because of the moral authority of the democratic government over state agencies, including the BAF. The Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies suggested that “the collective conscience [between civil and military] of our nation has greatly matured in terms of the firm commitment to democratic order” (Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies, 2009). Thus, this thesis argues that the process of involving the BAF in human security sensitive development activities that boosts the BAF’s understanding about the civil-political entities of the state. In the same way, civil-political entities of Bangladesh also gains confidence to ensure civilian control over

⁴Due to the sensitivity of the research subject the interviewee requested anonymity.

the BAF under the democratic system. The entire process eventually encourages the democratic government to associate national policies with human security principles and objectives, hence responding to the needs of the people.

1.1.2 Sustained Democracy and Human Security Sensitive National Policies

The level of human security sensitive national policy for particular situations depends on the functionality of the democracy, which may be assessed by the level of public administration efficiency, the strength of civil society's or peoples' participation, and the practice of good governance by the local governments. Cheema has equated strengthening democracy with efficient public administration, public participation and good governance (Cheema, 2005). These three factors, therefore, are analysed as the characteristics of a better democracy. Three case studies are considered and demonstrate that once the BAF engages in nontraditional activities under the democratic GoB, instead of pushing the democratic characteristics negatively, it provides confidence within that democratic institution enabling it to perform better.

Reaching human security objectives through national policy relies on the existence of a functioning democratic government. If the civilian government remains uninterrupted, meaning the military disengagement from politics remains effectively in practice, democracy takes its natural route. Such organic growth of democracy ensures the sustenance of the political system. This thesis analyses how military disengagement has been practised in the context of Bangladeshi politics. The process has been anything but ideal and politics has always been overshadowed by the military influence. This thesis describes the various stages of military disengagement from Bangladeshi politics, where the turning points are marked by specific circumstances. In addition to the institutional weakness, the circumstances include the presence of weaker civil and political society as a reason for military coups, which is suggested by Stepan as the reason for the military in politics (Stepan, 1988). The other circumstance was the emergence of a coercive state apparatus when governing the country without accountability (Gramsci, 1971). Since Military disengagement and the human security policies re-enforce each other, an understanding of the circumstances of the military

involvement with politics will allow the BAF's human security impact and military disengagement to be put in perspective.

If military disengagement strengthens democracy a clear impact will be that the military moves away from national security centric activities to more human security activities. From a theoretical angle this argument matches with the view of Professor Stepan, whose analysis of the stronger presence of the civil administration, civil society and political society as the factors for military disengagement from politics (Stepan, 1988), can be demonstrated in the BAF's involvement in human security activities. For example, when the BAF involves in nontraditional security activities it increases the capacity of the civil administration as well as empowers the local government, which are the characteristics of strengthening democracy. Kauzya explained that "empowerment of local government can be done by decentralisation and transferring some authority from center to local government" (Kauzya, 2005: 4). This thesis explains empowerment by answering how the BAF's involvement strengthens local government by improving good governance. It is argued that if good governance practice improves the standard of local government, then the local government gains more confidence. On participation issue, Thomas and Cayford have argued that "popular democracy theory stresses the importance of the act of participation, not only in influencing decisions but also in strengthening civic capacity and social capital" (Thomas, & Cayford, 2002). The people's participation through civil society features a vibrant democracy and influences military disengagement from politics.

In this thesis, these factors are used to assess the impact of the BAF's political disengagement due to its involvement in human security activities. BAF's involvement in human security helps the internalisation, as chapter III shows, of human security and eventually shapes its value about democracy. It is not argued that the BAF has empowered, or is empowering, democracy. Rather, in a stronger democratic environment of Bangladesh, military disengagement receives a more normative recognition by the BAF, which in turn generates confidence in the democratic system. Although democracy is widely accepted by Bangladeshis; the quality of democratic governance and intra-party democratic practice is very poor (Quadir, 2011). The challenges to the functioning of essential democratic conditions

remain where democracy is yet to root fully. However, under the existing democratic system, the BAF's involvement in 'aid-the-civil-authority' activities is helping to strengthen democratic practices. As a result, the democratic governments are increasingly associating human security principles and objectives with national policy.

1.1.3 Military Involvement in Human Security and Political Disengagement

The military inclination to pursue a hardcore national security approach is a challenge to the association to human security with national policy. The BAF's primary responsibility is to protect the sovereignty of Bangladesh, if necessary, through force. As a professional and discipline force, the BAF is usually not involved in development activities. However, that is changing and the BAF is becoming an active influence for implementing several development agendas both nationally and internationally. Policy makers explicitly mentioned in a roundtable meeting organised by the Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies that "Bangladesh is also fortunate to have an armed force that has not just been in great service to our own nation, but also to the community of nations" (Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies, 2009). Increasingly, the BAF is engaging in activities to support the civil administration. "The Bangladesh Army accepted the dominance of the successive democratic governments (Bangladesh Nationalist Party government 1991-96/2001-2006 and Awami League government 1996-2001/2009-still continuing)" (Bhattacharjee, 2010). In the past, the military used to try and dictate the political discourse of the country but that has changed and it now acknowledges the political leadership (Qudir, 2011). Its role has evolved due to the changes in institutional attitudes, rather than as the result of a particular event. Over time, the BAF's involvement with the civilian authority, growing international exposure, and growth under democratic government has assisted the transition. Against this background, this thesis assesses the extent to which the BAF's human security involvement has been a contributing factor influencing institutional mindsets in Bangladesh.

This is illustrated by the BAF's participation in the United Nations Peacekeeping Operation (UNPKO), which is presently an ideal human security involvement. In peacekeeping, the transitional assistance provided by the military

links the short-term achievements and long-term peace building goals. “The human security perspective places great significance on the tasks that can be categorised as transition assistance functions” (Uesugi, 2004). In providing transitional assistance through peacekeeping the BAF’s involvement in peacekeeping is a human security involvement. In turn, this invites discussion about how such involvement impacts on the democratic outlook of the BAF and facilitates its disengagement from politics. Dr. Barman and others have claimed that “most of these (UNPKO) missions have been directed to keep warring parties apart with the goal of promoting peace and democracy” (Barman, *al. et.*, 2002). Since the BAF’s involvement in peacekeeping is intended to promote democracy, the UN mission outcome has influenced the BAF’s values orientation towards democracy and changed the BAF’s response to political governments at home. Such orientation inspires the military to be disengaged from politics. As a result both the political government and the military can exercise their respective responsibilities within the specified national space (Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies, 2009). This is one factor that influences the BAF not to be involved in domestic politics and has allowed the process of democratic evolution in Bangladesh to remain uninterrupted since 1990. The BAF’s involvement in human security as an informed process that shapes its attitude towards democratic governance is analysed in this thesis. This thesis explains the BAF’s three distinctive involvement in human security activities: i) responding to emergencies, ii) maintaining internal security, and iii) supporting development. The offered analysis of these areas of involvement assesses the impact of the involvement of the BAF and its orientation towards politics.

Another crucial aspect of ensuring military disengagement from politics is the degree of civilian control over the military, which needs to be ensured by strengthening the political society in a country (Stepan, 1988). This thesis offers the argument that strengthening of civilian control has been shaped under the democratic practice in Bangladesh. Involving the military in human security allows the political government to consolidate its control. In doing human security activities the BAF has to serve under the direct control of the civilian authority. In addition to that the human security based policies have defined the military roles and limitations in human security involvement. Since the political authority sets the mechanism for the human

security activities of the military it provides certain leverages to ensure civilian control over the military. This thesis argues the BAF's human security involvement creates not only the essential confidence for the democratic institutes but also solidifies the civilian control over the military, which is instrumental to ensure the military disengagement from politics.

The BAF's human security involvement is primarily nontraditional security activities, which functions as an informed process helping the internalisation of human security. Such internalisation has varied depending on whether the BAF's involvement has occurred during peace time or an emergency. In emergency situations, the BAF's involvement has varied according to whether national security was threatened, or not. Thus, for example, in responding to disasters, the BAF has assisted the civil administration and worked under local civil administrations. However, in emergency situations when national security is threatened, such as in the counter insurgency operation in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT), the BAF has worked under its own direct operational command and supported the civil administration in specific development tasks. Peace time involvement requires task specific duties for the BAF to aid the civil administration. The BAF is becoming an active part of human security implementation in all three above stated situations. This raises the question about how the BAF's development engagement helps to internalise a human security approach, and how it is impacting on national level policy association. In reaching a conclusion, the influence of democratic governance on the BAF due to its involvement in human security and the impact of such influence on military disengagement from politics are explained. In this regard, these three examples of the BAF's human security involvement will be analysed to show that the critical scope of military disengagement accelerated due to institutional internalisation of human security, and the link between the BAF's human security engagement and its institutional impact on shaping military disengagement from politics.

1.2 Research Problem

The introductory discussion shows that in the present context of Bangladesh three facts concerning the research areas are present. First, there are

increasing signs of human security principles and objectives sensitive national policies in Bangladesh under the democratic government. Second, the democracy in Bangladesh is remaining uninterrupted by the BAF. Third, the BAF is more involved in human security activities. However, the interrelationships between each of these facts are not sufficiently discussed. This thesis is an attempt to analyse the links between each of these facts.

The reality of the sustenance of democracy in Bangladesh and the growing appearance of human security invites a discussion about whether democracy stimulates human security association or whether such association is a normal consequence of policy development. In this regard, political scientist Chowdhury has suggested that “[t]he functionality of human security requires a favourable political environment” (Chowdhury, M., 2008: 71). If a favourable political environment is a precondition for the functionality of human security, the question arises about whether the specificity of political system ensures a favorable environment. The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) has argued that democracy matters for human security because well-designed and inclusive political institutions and processes are the keys to maintaining security (IDEA, 2006). IDEA’s argument shows that democratic systems prevent threats to security of the people and ensures human security as a proposition of the system itself. King and Christopher have suggested that indicators for “measuring human security would be income, health, education, political freedom, and democracy” (King, & Christopher, 2001). Both arguments emphasise an obvious affirmative relationship between democracy and human security. The close proximity between democracy and human security suggests that a democratic political system provides an ideal environment for the association to human security principles. The reality of human security appearance in policies in Bangladesh, uniquely under democratic governments, demonstrates how democratic governance has been instrumental in associating human security.

The question is what matters most for democracy in Bangladesh. History suggests that after independence in 1971, Bangladeshi politics suffered from military interventions (with some brief exceptions) until 1990. (Detail about the history of military coup is provided in Annexure E) According to Hakim, “the coup of August 1975 marked the beginning of an era of militarised politics which continued until the

overthrow of President Ershad by a concerted popular movement in 1990” (Hakim, 1998). Frequent military coups were a feature of Bangladeshi politics until 1990. In those days, the relationship between the BAF and political government was never easy. Importantly, changes took place in the 1990s and are still continuing without any major interference from the BAF. Such military disengagement from politics has certainly changed the dynamics of the civil-military relationship. In this context, this thesis offers a critical analysis to ascertain whether the BAF’s disengagement from politics ensures the sustenance of democratic government.

As a recent phenomenon, military disengagement is increasingly becoming a reality in Bangladeshi politics. What has caused the change in military orientation about political disengagement is a critical factor. Of course, the democratic uprising of 1990 re-instituted democratic government in Bangladesh (Quadir, 2011). Since then, the BAF’s role of peace time engagement has changed significantly because it is more involved in human security activities. Security researcher Islam has explained that, under a democratic system, strong public opinion is created in favour of civilian government. The BAF has been oriented with such perception once it has been involved with activities aiding civilian authority (Islam, 1999: 3). Human security activities, therefore, have helped to shape the BAF’s political perspective. Mr. Mazher, a senior Bangladeshi researcher, who has been researching several issues including the BAF and its involvement in peace time activities, stated:

“the BAF has been growing involved in the nontraditional security since the early 1990s. Though such involvements are never named as human security but the very characteristics of BAF’s peace time activities are nothing but human security based engagement”
(Interviewed on April 11, 2011).

It is also crucial to understand whether the nontraditional security engagement associated with civilian administration has had any impact on shaping the attitude of the military establishment to the civilian government. This thesis describes the analogy between the BAF’s involvement in human security activities and its changed attitude towards democratic governance as a crucial phenomenon that helps sustenance of democracy in Bangladesh.

1.3 Research Objectives

The initial description of the importance of the military role in the sustenance of democracy triggers the hypothesis that military disengagement from politics and the appearance of human security principles and objectives in Bangladeshi national policies are linked. It also generates discussion about the modality of the BAF's engagement in human security, which encourages military disengagement. It focuses on the sustenance of democracy as an obvious link between these concepts. Thus, the primary objective of this research has been to identify, describe and assess the influence of the BAF's nontraditional security involvement in appearing human security in Bangladeshi national policy. To address this central research objective and explain the potential and limitations of the BAF's engagement in human security, therefore, specific subsidiary objectives are:

- i) To trace and describe the appearance of human security principles in Bangladesh national policy;
- ii) To explain the interrelationship between the BAF's involvement in human security, the process of military disengagement, and the appearance of human security principles in national policy;
- iii) To analyse the impact of the BAF's involvement in emergency response situations, internal security, and development activities respectively on military disengagement from politics; and
- iv) To assess the intermediary importance of democratic governance with respect to the BAF's nontraditional security involvement and the appearance of human security principles and objectives in national policy.

1.4 Research Questions

To address the research objectives the following question is selected as the primary research question. How does the BAF's human security activities influence the appearance of human security in Bangladeshi national policies? Since human security association with national policy requires a functioning democratic government, the state of military disengagement from politics is a key factor in the sustenance of democracy. This research question, therefore, is intended to reveal

whether the BAF's nontraditional security engagement has helped it to disengage from politics or even strengthen democracy in Bangladesh. In addition to the primary research question, the following subsidiary questions are also considered:

i) What are the characteristics of the relationships between the BAF's involvement in human security and military disengagement respectively with the appearance of human security principles and objectives in national policy?

ii) What impact, if any, has the BAF's involvement in emergency response situations, internal security and development activities respectively had on military disengagement?

iii) To what extent, if any, does the existence of democratic governance promote the BAF's nontraditional security involvement and appearance of human security principles and objectives in national policy?

1.5 Theoretical Framework

The democratic governments of Bangladesh are apparently adopting national policies to address the country's need; those are seemingly displaying human security principles and objectives. There is also a popular manifestation of democracy through such policies. The association to human security principles and objectives remains idealistic, often selected and inconsistent in its application. Confusion regarding the scope and extent of the human security approach hampers the pace of its implementation. On the other hand, the socio-political background of Bangladesh has been dominated by the conservative notion of nationalism, which has been the hardcore military approach regarding security matters. However, two factors in the recent political and security discourse have changed the traditional military approach to security challenges. Democratic governments are encouraged to interpret security in a humanitarian manner, in which development challenges are considered as security concern for its nationals. At the same time, after the reinstatement of democracy in Bangladesh in 1990, security agencies, especially the BAF, have been introduced to nontraditional security activities aiding the civilian authority and under its supervision. The involvement in nontraditional activity works as an extraordinary initiative of GoB. Through such engagement, the BAF has been informed with the functionality of the

civilian administration. While the BAF is working in human security it hardly acknowledges such engagement as human security activity. Believing such involvement is merely nontraditional security, the BAF actually works in accordance with the human security framework pursued by the GoB, which is the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) framework. (Detail in Chapter II) Thus the nontraditional security engagement allows the BAF to become familiar with and accustomed to the concept of human security.




Figure 1.1: Theoretical Framework

The human security engagement of the BAF familiarises it with the ideal role of the security forces under a democratic system. By learning how the civil administration, local government and civil society function, the BAF has been oriented to keep its distance from the politics. In other words, the BAF's involvement in human security shapes and allows the evolution of a culture for disengaging from politics. It could even have a snowball effect. Growing military disengagement can be the inspiration for accelerating the association to a human security approach with national policy. Thus the association to human security principles and objectives with policy and military disengagement can both be cause and effect, depending on the strength of the democratic government.

Uncertainty regarding whether military disengagement from politics influences human security integration or whether human security involvement influences military disengagement is critical to the whole gamut of this research. For the purpose of this research, the conceptual understanding accepts the facts over the ideals. The general attitude of the military to the political government never allowed

independent performance of its duty. Rather, acting as guardians of the country has significantly shaped the civil-military relationship. However, both the democratic revival and military engagement with nontraditional security activities have begun since the early 1990s. This thesis explains that military involvement in human security activities helps to shape the institutional orientation towards a political and not a military government. At the same time, the disengagement from politics allows the sustenance of democracy in Bangladesh. Eventually the democratic governments respond to the people's needs and integrate human security principles and objectives into policies.

Involvement of the BAF in implementing human security policies reemphasises their acceptance of their disengagement from politics. Thus, it is hypothesised that despite the military's traditional role of protecting national sovereignty, it can also serve as an active agency, although unintentionally, promoting human security thereby is effectively assisting and empowering the democratic system in the country. It is not suggested that the only effect of disengagement is reinforcement of democracy. It is argued that there is parallel positioning of both reinforcing and organic relationships between military disengagement and human security association in which democratic maturity is also an obvious link. However, this thesis is based its analysis on the cause and effect relationship between the military disengagement and human security integration in policy.

A democratic political government can only be in a stronger position once it reflects the wishes, aspirations and interests of its citizens. Ideally, the level of democratic practice in any particular model of governance can be determined from its response to the people's needs and that also operates to encourage military disengagement. One major aspect of military involvement in human security oriented activities is the 'public confidence' factor. Since popular consensus about the political system allows an overwhelming acceptance of strong democratic government over the military, the government's ability to successfully involve the military for civilian aid helps to boost public confidence in a democratic system and demonstrates that the military is subordinate to the government. This process ultimately allows democracy to evolve and be sustained, and allows association to human security principles and objectives with national policies.

1.5.1 The Mutually Re-enforcing Cause-and-Effect Relationship

The critical aspect of the relationship between military disengagement and human security association can be identified as both organic and mutually re-enforcing cause-and-effect. In other words, the mutually reinforcing relationship is between military disengagement and human security association, where maturity of democracy remains the critical intermediary. This thesis accepts that the sustenance of democracy in Bangladesh is due to military disengagement from politics and is accelerated through military involvement in human security activities. The continuation of democracy and military disengagement from politics could be explained from various different factors. There are also several theories to explain such relationship those advocates for factors ranging from influence from international events to economic crisis. Marx's view about military engagement in politics for the coercive protection of the bourgeoisie is equally echoed in Gramsci's view on military involvement in politics for the hegemonic state (Gramsci, 1971). Thus erosion of such conditions raises the possibility of military disengagement from politics. In the context of Bangladesh the strength of democratic movement has provided powerful political and civil society who gradually pushed the BAF from politics.

This thesis also recognises that democratic governments are increasingly involving the BAF in human security activities. Though this thesis does not reject the influence of other associated factors in keeping the BAF disengaged from politics, but it focuses on the impacts from its involvement in human security activities. Thus, this thesis has accepted the mutually re-enforcing cause and effect relationship between military disengagement and human security association with national policy while simultaneously accepting that the growth of democracy is an organic process, which is gradually rooting in the system. Simultaneously, democratic government is involving the military in human security implementation as it offers an efficient means of implementing certain human security activities. Eventually, such involvement influences the mindset of the military about politics and results in political disengagement. Thus, this thesis accepts the parallel presence both the mutually reinforcing and organic relationship between military disengagement from politics and human security association but considers the mutually re-enforcing cause and effect relationship for analysing other links.

1.5.2. Military Disengagement and Democracy

A key confusion about the relationship between the military disengagement and the democracy is like the chicken and the egg questions: which one has generated what? It is important to note that every case of military disengagement or even re-democratisation has its own unique character. Unlike Stepan's argument about the re-democratisation where military reaches the civil sector for allies in its struggle against the growing influence of the intelligence community (Stepan, 1988), in Bangladesh the BAF was brought by the government to the civil sector to assist. The positive exchange between the civil and military sector in Bangladesh took place under the democratic governments. However, Stepan's argument about stronger civil society and political society as the factors for the military disengagement has evolved in Bangladesh under the democratic government. Although military disengagement has encouraged democracy to be sustained in Bangladesh, but exact reason for the military disengagement cannot be claimed with its single character. Importantly, the factual evidence suggests that in Bangladesh the military disengagement and the re-democratisation started at the same time, where popular democratic uprising of 1990 is marked as the deciding event. This thesis, however, is not dealing with the reasons for the beginning of military disengagement rather focusing on its impact on democracy on the association to human security principles and objectives with national policies.

1.6 Hypothesis

The practical need of the GoB to address poverty, create economic opportunity, or even an effective response to emergencies has inspired people to demand changes in policy approach. Human security principles and objectives address the causes of poverty, food shortages, health crises and threats to all aspects of personal security. These challenges are both structural and non-structural in nature. Institutionalisation of democracy is vital to address the challenges and adopt the desired policy. The BAF's engagement in politics works as an intervention to the democratic system and is the biggest challenge to the sustenance of democracy suggested by the numerous coups prior to 1990. The main reason behind such military

interference is the gaps of mutual understanding between the civil and military agencies. However, the BAF's involvement in human security has both external and internal impacts contributing disengagement from politics. The external impacts are the enhanced capacity of the civil authority, improved people's participation through civil society and empowered local government. Whereas the internal impacts are the improved civil-military relationship, enhanced mutual confidence and amplified knowledge about human security. Thus the BAF's human security involvement allows a mutual understanding about the importance of both civil and military agencies and works as a catalyst for disengagement from politics, which is vital for the democratisation.




Figure 1.2: Functioning Links between Human Security Involvement, Military Disengagement and Democratisation

The above figure is the elaborated form of the research framework that shows the links between the BAF's human security involvement, its disengagement from politics and continuation of democracy in Bangladesh. The framework emphasises on three relationships. These are: first, relationship between the human security association and favored political environment; second, relationship between

military disengagement and sustenance of democracy, and third, BAF's human security involvement and the military disengagement. In all these relationship the crucial intermediary is the 'civilianisation' or involving civilian concern in the process.

The positive outcomes those mentioned in the figure depend on the functional modality of the BAF's involvement in human security. The BAF's engagement could take the form of either working with or under the civil administration as an additional agency, or working under direct military command in parallel with the civil administration. Depending on the modality of military involvement in human security activities, military orientation to politics varies. The military working with or under the civilian authority has been a positive functional modality stimulating military respect for democratic institutions as well as increasing confidence in the democratic process. As a result the human security adoption is taking place with the growing grounding of democratic governing system in Bangladesh. The BAF's disengagement from politics is strengthening democracy in Bangladesh. Thus the political space for the people and pro-people policies is gradually getting wider. In other words, human security based policies are increasing at the national level. The BAF's involvement in emergency response situations, maintaining security in the CHT, and preserving peace in UN peacekeeping activities have provided better understanding about civil administration and the functioning of democratic institutions. Giving space for the democratic development is an issue of value or orientation for the military institutions. The BAF has been gaining moral and institutional strength to respect democratic values as a result of its better knowledge about civil operations through its involvement in human security. The BAF's involvement in human security is instrumental in orienting the military to disengagement from politics. Thus, under Bangladesh's democratic governments, the BAF's growing involvement in human security operates to allow democracy to endure and evolve.

1.7 Outline of Case Studies

This thesis offers a theoretical basis to explain the association to human security principles and objectives with national policy of Bangladesh. The human security approach is facing multiple challenges including the domination of the national security approach within a portion of the political and military leadership. Traditionally, national security has played the central role in policy formation ignoring human security. Previously, the BAF was also only concerned with a national security approach. The GoB was eager to gain support from the military emphasising national security as its central policy focus. This has now shifted to a new approach where democratic governments are embracing the concept of human security and involving the military as an essential agency for its implementation. This thesis investigates whether such military involvement in human security by aiding civilian authority changes its values orientation, or perspective, about the civil political system. Importantly, although the GoB has incorporated human security principles and objectives in some of its policies where the military is involved as an essential agency, the military still considers such involvements as nontraditional security and has not yet specifically acknowledged that it is involved in human security. In this thesis, it is argued that the characteristics of nontraditional security activities are firmly consistent with human security objectives and principles pursuant to which the military performs a non-combat human security role.

The cases studies focus on the idea of military disengagement from politics in the context of sustaining and strengthening democracy, and the BAF's growing involvement in nontraditional security activities to aid civilian authority. They show how the BAF is becoming increasingly involved in human security by the democratic governments. This process is shaping the BAF's values and perspectives regarding political government and it apparently remains disengaged from politics. Analysis of the case studies reveals how nontraditional security engagement acts as a human security informing process for the military. It is argued that through nontraditional security engagement the BAF is working with civilian authority and that makes it aware of the functional modality of civilian authority and its importance. Growing military understanding and acceptance of the functioning of civilian and political authority is essential to minimise the existing gaps between the differing

perspectives of civil and military agencies. Mutual respect and confidence between the agencies helps a democratic system continue intact. The case studies reveal that human security involvement enables the BAF to enhance its working relationship with the civilian authority and orients the military with its appropriate position in a democratic state. This thesis also focuses on the structure and impact of civilian command and control over the military in Bangladesh. It investigates whether the BAF's engagement in human security enables democratic government to exercise effective control over the military. This thesis assesses the impact on the BAF resulting on their involvement in human security activities. This impact can be characterised by more transparency and control by the civil authority over the BAF's affairs. As a result, the likelihood of military intervention in politics is reduced which, in turn, ensures military disengagement from politics and helps to support, maintain and strengthen the democratic system in Bangladesh.

Since, the democratic government is ultimately responsible for any policy formation and deciding its association, the BAF's influence on the democracy plays an indirect role in the policy formation. The case studies of the BAF's nontraditional security involvement are analysed in terms of the extent and nature of its impact on the prevailing capacity of the civil administration, people's participation through civil society and good governance practice of the local government. The examples are typical because previously the BAF did not get involved in such human security activities in their regular routine. Post 1990, the BAF has been brought to act as an associate agency for implementing several human security based policies. Analysis of the case studies provides a basis for assessing the BAF's influence on the civil-military mutual understanding, and on the overall democratic governance of Bangladesh. Engagement in nontraditional security has become more usual after the democratic governments have introduced regulatory measures in this regard. The examples of the BAF's engagement in nontraditional security can be defined by three cases, namely:

- i) Emergency responses or disaster management in Bangladesh;
- ii) Responding to internal security challenges in the CHT; and
- iii) Engaging in development activities with a view to establishing and maintaining a sustainable peace.

Table 1.1: Three Situations Divided by Issues

Engagement	Critical Issues to Analyse	Tentative Outcome
Assisting in relief, rescue and rehabilitation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Working under the civil authority provides mutual respect - Increases people <u>participation</u> - Strengthens the <u>capacity</u> of the civil authority 	Positively influences on BAF's attitude towards civil-political authority
Assisting civil administration for law and order	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - BAF serves parallel with civil authority - Military involvement does not allow locals to be <u>empowered</u> - Does <u>not improve the governance</u> of the local authority 	Negatively influences on the capacity of the civil and political authority
Assisting peace and humanitarian activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Working to <u>support democracy</u> and civil authority - Post mission positive attitude towards democracy - Assists the <u>empowerment</u> of the political authority 	Positively influences on the military for disengagement from politics

There are four main reasons for selecting these three types of engagement for analysis. First, in addition to the BAF's regular or traditional routine duties and responsibilities, the BAF is also increasingly called upon to undertake the types of nontraditional security engagements outlined in Table 1.1 above. Other types of nontraditional security involvement are event specific actions rather than regular military engagements. Such event specific actions include preparing voter identification cards, controlling traffic on special occasions, open market food sales, and conducting immunisation. By contrast, the three types of engagement selected for examination are now frequent nontraditional security responsibilities for the BAF. Second, in contrast to usual military combat oriented responsibilities and duties,

engagement in the nontraditional security types of activity indicated above do not involve combat. Third, these three types of nontraditional security engagement are based on specific policies and are guided by national legislation passed by post 1990 democratic governments. Finally, these forms of involvement have the potential to affect the system of local government, civil administration, and people's participation through civil society, and, therefore, the operation of democracy and democratic practices generally in Bangladesh. The analysis of recent forms of military engagement in nontraditional security offers an opportunity to assess their impact on democracy in Bangladesh due to military involvement in human security activities. It also allows an assessment of the manner and extent of the understanding of the BAF about the civil administration and functional democracy. Interestingly, the operational modality of the BAF's nontraditional security engagement can occur under the direct authority of the civil administration or in parallel with the civil administration. These types of engagement allow the BAF to develop its understanding of the importance and attitudes of the civil authority, thereby reducing the gap between the civil and military establishments. On the other hand, as a regular and regulatory human security involvement, these cases show the applicability and importance of human security to the military and shape its understanding about the functioning of human security under supervision of the civilian and political authority. Thus, these forms of nontraditional security engagement serve as the context to analyse the BAF's understanding and perspective of human security and military disengagement from politics.

1.7.1 BAF's Involvement in Disaster Management in Bangladesh

The BAF's engagement in responding to natural disasters or emergencies is well-recognised. The BAF has been involved all three components of disaster management activities, namely: mitigation, recovery and preparation. Though disaster management work is characterised as human security involvement there is also scope to respond to long term military threats caused by disasters and emergencies. Thus the BAF's involvement in responding to emergencies potentially serves both national defense and human security needs. However, for the purpose of this thesis, the analysis of the BAF's disaster management activities focuses principally on their non-combative involvement assistance of the civil administration, which is clearly nothing

less than a nontraditional security involvement of the military. It also focuses on the recent acceleration of military involvement in disaster management. (Detail in Chapter IV) This has now become part of its regular recognised legal responsibilities and duties such that basic training for the BAF has recently incorporated a disaster management training component.

As to understanding the impact of such engagement on the orientation of military disengagement from politics, this thesis focuses on the BAF's working modality with the civil administration during emergency responses. The BAF becomes involved in emergency responses after being requested by the civil administration. The working modality is also defined by the National Disaster Management Act 2010, which has caused the GoB to change its approach to address the long-term vulnerability of the people. The BAF works under the civil administration to assist and meet the immediate and long-term needs arising from disasters. However, there is still a check and balance mechanism to ensure efficiency of both agency's activities. The thesis explains the inter-agency working relationship and how that influences the BAF's orientation to politics. Importantly, the thesis explains the human centric shift of disaster response has allowed the BAF to contribute positively in its operational scope and its mindset towards the democratic institute. The operational changes are better capacity of the local administration in service delivery, increased local participation in the disaster management efforts, and improved transparency and accountability of local government. Such changes are revealed as contributing factors that shape the BAF's values orientation and perspective of the democratic process.

1.7.2 BAF's Internal Security Role in Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT)

Officially, the BAF's current involvement regarding the CHT is to maintain internal security and peace in that region. This is a shift from its previous mandate of conducting anti-insurgency operations. After the signing of the historic Peace Accord in 1997, also referred as the CHT Accord, the BAF's engagement is to assist the civil administration to maintain law and order in the CHT and participate in development activities. (Detail about the BAF's legal mandate in CHT is provided in Annexure D) Practically, this is not a dramatic shift from its earlier role. Besides its regular role assisting the civil authority to preserve law and order, the BAF's

engagement now also extends to ensuring development activities in the CHT. Obviously, supporting development activities to win the hearts and minds of the locals was part of the pre Accord counter-insurgency military strategy. However, more recently, the scale of this style of engagement has risen considerably. According to the GoB's explanation the BAF's present involvement in activities associated with human security does not combine any combative approach. But there are various arguments suggested that the BAF's development involvement in CHT is not merely for promoting the needs of the people but to pursuing its long term national security needs.

The BAF's influence on the democratic governance of Bangladesh can be determined from the nature of its engagement. In its working modality, the BAF is under direct military command and is not accountable to the civil administration in the CHT. Even the BAF's role in supporting nontraditional security activities is controlled by its local military command based in the Chittagong cantonment. This working modality is clearly disconnecting the BAF from civil-political authority. As a negative example, this case shows the BAF's pseudo anti-insurgency activity is constantly creating confusion about its role in the CHT, which does not provide wealthy elements for better civil-military relationship. In this thesis it is argued that instead of creating better understanding between local civil and military entities in the CHT each works mostly independently of each other. This modality is neither promoting civilian participation in development activities nor improving the environment conducive to political disengagement of the military.

1.7.3 BAF's Engagement in Development for Sustainable Peace

The GoB perceives that the BAF has stepped into world peace initiatives by successfully participating in UNPKO. It argues, the BAF's peacekeeping role is evidence of their expertise and diligence in creating a sustainable peace by adopting alternative tools. However, critic tends to view the peacekeeping as a venture for economic benefit for the BAF. GoB's enthusiastic approach to peacekeeping provides the clue to understand the reasons of its extended support to facilitate the process. Nevertheless, peacekeeping has been experiencing enormous changes in approach and has been extended to include a wider range of humanitarian activities. Military

involvement in humanitarian activities is replacing the traditional military role in peacekeeping for the sake of sustainable peace. The BAF as the leading troop provider has quickly adapted to such changes and has shown its engineering capability to interpret the mission mandate with flexibility. (Detail about the BAF's peacekeeping mission is provided in Annexure F) The research explains that assisting local populations in development and community support programmes is the core strength of BAF's engagement. This role is non-combative and is totally consistent with a human security approach.

The BAF's engagement in peacekeeping activities is explained within the parameter of the BAF's internalisation of the human security principles and objectives and democratic values due to its non-combat involvement. This thesis shows that the post peacekeeping mission impact on the BAF remains essentially with the individuals and limitedly at organisation level. The BAF has to work to assist the civilian authority in the peacekeeping mission that promotes the military to better function under the democratic government. It is argued that peacekeeping has enabled and encouraged the BAF to remain disengaged from politics. Since the BAF has learnt quite extensively and practically about the importance of a democratic system of judgment tends to provide a significant moral and institutional inspiration for military disengagement. In addition, supporting democratic governance helps to reshape its institutional outlook.

1.7.4 Issues beyond the Scope of the Thesis

This thesis does not address several issues that clearly arise out of the BAF's nontraditional security role. While it has analysed the GoB's position regarding human security association, it does not consider budgetary issues but has rather focused on the policy aspect. Nor is there any attempt to conceptualise the national security and human security understanding of the government in a comparative paradigm, for example this thesis does not explain the national development allocation vis-à-vis defense budgeting. Similarly, this thesis makes no attempt to promote the role of the armed forces in human security implementation but rather assesses the influence of human security involvement on the BAF's political disengagement. The same argument also serves to emphasise the research questions involve not merely a

human security policy analysis but a structural assessment of the BAF's political disengagement vis-à-vis sustenance of democracy in Bangladesh.

The influence of BAF's involvement in human security application is analysed linking the system of democratic government in Bangladesh and changes within the military establishment. This thesis accepts the argument that the democratic government offers an ideal enabling environment for integrating human security principles and objectives into national policy as a response strategy to meet the needs of the people. In discussing the military's disengagement this thesis neither suggests the BAF to adopt human security as its approach nor advocates to abandon its core mandate of protecting national sovereignty. Rather, it considers the BAF's balanced involvement in maintaining its traditional national security approach to defending national interests and sovereignty on the one hand, and progressively participating in non-combative human security activities on the other hand. This research does not claim BAF's role as a permanent agency in applying human security. Rather it explores the existing parameter of GoB's attempt to involve the BAF in human security activities. The research assesses the BAF's human security involvement ultimately creates a favourable attitude towards the political government and hence inspires military disengagement from politics.

1.8 Research Methodology

The research upon which this thesis is based involves an assessment of the BAF's disengagement from politics and its effect upon the sustenance of the democratic system in Bangladesh, which system is eventually responding the people's needs by integrating human security into national policies. This assessment includes a documentary analysis of the available secondary literature. Since the subject is sensitive and has not been extensively researched, the volume of secondary literature is not sufficient. Accordingly, selected semi-structured interviews have been conducted to support the outcomes and fill the gaps suggested by the document analysis. In addition to the document analysis and semi-structured interviews, six examples of BAF's involvement in human security have been included. The thesis is structured to assess the BAF's influence on the sustenance of democracy due to its

disengagement from politics. Three major case studies of three different human security involvement of the BAF have used to analyse the influence on the factors of military disengagement from politics.

To limit the research scope this thesis has accepted three key characteristics prior to the assessment, namely i) the efficiency or capacity of the civil administration, ii) extent of people's participation through the civil society, and iii) the performance of local government or state of good governance. These are the external factors indicating the influence on the democracy at the local level due to the involvement of the BAF in nontraditional security activities. Selection of these factors is based on prominence and convenience.

To avoid confusion the thesis has also accepted specific definitions of several key concepts. Firstly, this thesis considers the definition of the human security according to the definition given by the UNDP. It is well-matched with the overall research objectives. Secondly; this thesis has accepted GoB's public development and thematic policies as the national policy of Bangladesh. Specifically, this thesis does not include analysis about military policy responding the human security association. Finally, the association to human security approach does not mean naming of human security in the policy documents. Inclusion of the human security principles and objectives in the policy is the essential feature indicates the association. At all stages of this research and in following this methodology, relevant ethical considerations have been considered. In particular, the anonymity of the interviewees has been preserved.

1.8.1 Construction of the Research

Human security association with Bangladeshi national policy has been taking place because of the functioning of a democratic government. This thesis considers sustained democracy as the precondition for the human security association. But the sustenance of democracy depends on the military disengagement from politics. Thus, this thesis has assessed the degree of democracy functioning with the state of military disengagement from the politics. This thesis uses data from both historical and theoretical sources to show that the BAF's disengagement from politics assists the sustenance of democracy. The research covers the BAF's role in implementing human

security contributes to the military attitude for the disengagement. Three types of BAF's human security involvements are analysed in the research to understand the relationship between the BAF's human security involvement and its disengagement from politics. This research traces the chronological linkage explaining the BAF involvement in these human security activities. The following chart shows that in the three case studies, the BAF's involvement is related to either one or more of the seven types of human security concerns⁵ proposed by the UNDP framework. Thus the involvement is considered as human security involvement. This research also analyses the BAF's engagements referring concerning military, national and generic policy issues. The security situations have further categorised as immediate or progressive. These discussion points are linked as follows:

Table 1.2: Linkages with Different Security Areas of UNDP Human Security Framework and Concerned National Policies

Case Studies	Types of HS	BAF's Policies	Specific Policies	Category of HS	Generic Assessment
i) BAF's involvement in disaster response	Personal, Food, and Environment Security	Bangladesh Army Act and the SOD	Disaster Management Act (GoB, 2010e)	Immediate	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP)
ii) Protecting Internal Security in Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT)	Personal, Community and Political Security	<i>Operation Uttaron</i>	CHT Peace Accord	Immediate and Progressive	Three Years Rolling Plan Bangladesh Constitution National

⁵ A detail on the UNDP human security framework and the seven types of human security it proposed is provided in chapter II.

iii) Post UN peacekeeping development activities	Economic and Cultural Security	Military Academy Module	Banglade sh Armed Force Ordinanc e	Progress ive	Commitmen t to MDG
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This research has made a qualitative analysis of the three distinctive security situations, where the BAF's engagement is based on human security approach. The secondary data sources are secondary, tertiary documents, and necessary solicited references. Since the research deals with the BAF's disengagement from politics it reflects the positive reality. As of interpretative aspect, the research has brought the corresponding descriptions from interviews. The research is a critical analysis of the associate concepts and factual incidents. In doing so, it explains the relationship between the social actors and the BAF, specifically within the parameter of the civil-military relationship.

1.8.2 Data Analysis

Data obtained from both the document research and interviews have analysed in compliance with the hypothesis. The documentary research is a secondary analysis which has considered the outcome from case studies. The secondary research and case studies provide an efficient way to understand the influence of BAF's disengagement from politics. It is always wise to begin any research activity with a review of the secondary data (Novak, 1996). The initial portion of the research is the combination of literature review and arguments accordance with the research hypothesis. The outcome of the secondary analysis has provided the direction to cross-check the hypothesis with the result from the interviews. Such cross-analysing allows understanding the fact and the reason behind the fact. However, additional attention has been given about the statistics and numerical data. Since the official statistics are often "characterised by unreliability, data gaps, over-aggregation, inaccuracies, mutual inconsistencies, and lack of timely reporting" (Gill, 1993), it has been critically analysed for accuracy and validity. The secondary data has clustered into three categories according to the three case studies. Data has assessed in its qualitative

merits with a single focus of the BAF's influence on the sustenance of democracy due to its disengagement from politics.

Throughout the research a triangulation method has been used to ascertain the real impact of the BAF's disengagement and human security association. The triangulation has used three types of data; first, secondary data from the document analysis; second, data revealed from interviews; and finally, the outcome from the independent examples of the case studies. In this way the researcher has minimised the gaps in each of the methods used for the research. As it has provided a scope for cross-verification the data obtained from each method remains independently supportive to the overall findings of the research. The triangulation has helped to analyse the critical relationship between the association of the human security approach with the policy and the influence of the BAF involvement in human security activities as implementing agency though those two are remotely connected.

1.9 Research Tool

This research is a qualitative one has used documentary analysis from secondary sources, including selected policy analysis. This is complemented by semi-structured interviews and the three case studies. To analyse the case studies this research has used six independent examples of the BAF's three types of human security involvement. Specifically, the researcher has used following tools in the research:

- i) Document Analysis,
- ii) Case Study,
- iii) Semi-structured Interview,
- iv) Examples or Independent Case Study, and
- v) Policy Analysis

1.9.1 Document Analysis

This research has mainly used the data from the document analysis. However, there is little literature related to the human security association with national policy. It is also very difficult to find any significant literature about the BAF's disengagement from politics and its impact on the sustenance of democracy in

Bangladesh. So the literature reflecting the crucial relationship between the BAF's human security involvement and military disengagement is rare. However, the documentary analysis is used to analysis the other two relationships; namely, the relationship between the human security association and democracy, and the relationship between military disengagement and sustenance of democracy.

1.9.2 Case Study

The case study is the situation analysis of the BAF's three types of human security involvement. It is the key tool of the research to understand the impact of the BAF's involvement in human security and its result of disengagement from politics. Since the BAF's generic activities are not within the scope of the research the researcher has to choose three dominant situations or cases, where the BAF has been involved in human security activities.

A. Why the Case Study: The BAF's ordinary engagement is military in nature. The war time and peace time engagement is to protect the national security. The analysis of ordinary role does not provide any significant explanation that can explains the impact from human security involvement. Thus only the extra-ordinary involvements is where human security approach can be brought into discussion. There are very few literatures on the relationship between the BAF's human security involvement and its disengagement from politics. Using other tools would not provide sufficient data about this relationship. The research has selected three major kinds of extra-ordinary engagement as case study, which are the BAF's human security. These three cases have provided scope to analyse the internalisation of the values of human security. The case studies linked the modality of the BAF's engagement in nontraditional security and its orientation for military disengagement, which helps to sustain democracy in Bangladesh.

B. How the Case Studies are Conducted: This research has explained three major cases of the BAF's human security involvement. Those are narrated in chapter IV, V and VI. In each of the chapter a brief account of each situation has been provided along with the legal and security composition. In every case the outcome is described squaring with its influence on the BAF's orientation towards respecting the civilian authority. Crucially, it describes the BAF's role and its influence on the

administration, civil society and overall governing system. The outcomes from the literature review and the interviews have analyzed squaring with the research hypothesis.

1.9.3 Semi-structured Interview

To give a comprehensive shape to the research, the researcher has taken selective semi-structured interviews. The interviews are considered as the important source of data. The interview outcomes are the primary information those verify the findings from the document analysis.

A. Why the Interview: The subject matter of the research is sensitive. Due to the sensitivity attached with this issue very few literatures have developed. Moreover, the number and availability of the secondary literature is very limited. The interview outcome fills the gaps from the document analysis. A primary account of the BAF's engagement is vital to link the outcome with the literature review. Interviews also provided critical explanations regarding the BAF which are very unlikely to be published otherwise. Variety of stakeholders have given their account about BAF's involvement in human security approach and its disengagement from politics. Such extended information from interview has worked as the key strength of the thesis.

B. How Conducted: The interviews are semi-structured and based on specific theme explained in the hypothesis. As structured interviewed proceeds with questions and defined process the semi-structured interview is guided by the major themes. In this case, the interviewees were provided elaborated response on the themes and not answering to the pre-fixed question. Since, the primary information was not very elaborate the interviewees have provided responses from varied angles. This was possible by semi-structured interviewed. The guided questions are the three research questions. There were also supplementary questions raised from the answers. In its flexible operation mode the interviewees have allowed to explain the associate facts. Often the interviews have provided insights of the facts and reality of the BAF's involvement in human security tasks. The interviews were individually conducted.

C. Who Interviewed: A total of twenty six individuals were interviewed. All the interviewees have either theoretical or practical knowledge about this thesis issues. Four of them involve in the policy process of Bangladesh and the rest are

practically experienced with the human security application. To ensure diversity the interviewees are selected from eight different categories. Those are; i) member of the BAF, ii) reputed security specialist, iii) member of civil society and researcher on military, iv) academician has specialisation on the BAF, v) civilian involved in the BAF's nontraditional security activities, vi) member of the Parliament who involves in the Parliamentary Defense Committee, vii) member of Local Government who worked with the military during emergency, and viii) bureaucrat working with the GoB on military and security issue. The following list is anonymous provides the age, sex, relevancy, profession, institute of the interviewee and the interview date.

Table 1.3: List and Details of Interviewees

No	Name/ Age/ Gender	Relevancy	Professi on	Institute	Interview Date
1	A/ 38/ F	Joined UNPKO and served in CHT	Security Force	Banglades h Army	12 th February 2010
2	B (Mr.Alam)/ 63/ M	Security Researcher	Academi cian	Banglades h Law Commissi on	15 th February 2010
3	C/ 43/ M	Commander of the BAF	Security Force	Banglades h Army	16 th February 2010
4	D/ 45/ M	Joined UNPKO and served in CHT	Security Force	Banglades h Army	18 th February 2010
5	E (Mr.Razi)/ 54/ M	Expert on security and military	Security Specialis t	European Union	23 rd February 2010
6	F/ 56/ M	Scholar on BAF and Constitution	Research er	Banglades h HR Commissi	03 rd March 2010

				on	
7	G (Dr. Siraj)/ 51/ M	Bureaucrat at the defence ministry	Deputy Director	Banglades h Governme nt	09 th March 2010
8	H/ 48/ F	Regular columnist on BAF	Academi cian	BRAC University	10 th March 2010
9	I (Mr. Ahmed) / 65/ M	Leading expert on democracy & BAF	Research er/ civil society	NGO	08 th Sept. 2010
10	J (Mr. Mazumder)/ 55/ M	Expert on military law & constitution	Lawyer	Banglades h Supreme Court	09 th Sept. 2010
11	K (Mr. Haque)/ 48/ M	Security Researcher	Research er	North South University	10 th Sept. 2010
12	L (Ms. Lubna)/ 51/ F	Leading activist for democracy	Research er/ civil society	BRAC	11 th Sept. 2010
13	M/ 42/ F	Expert on military law & PIL	Military Lawyer	Banglades h Supreme Court	11 th Sept. 2010
14	N (Ms. Fatima Begom)/ 48/ F	Aid receiver from military	Civilian	Residence of Borisal District	13 th Sept. 2010
15	O (Ms. Shreen Begom)/45/ F	Aid receiver from military	Civilian	Residence of Potuakhali Dist.	14 th Sept. 2010

16	P (Mr. Polash)/ 65/ M	Aid receiver from military	Civilian	Residence of Potuakhali Dist.	14 th Sept. 2010
17	Q (Mr. Mong)/ 65/ M	Victim of violence in CHT	Civilian/ Jumma	Senior Residence of CHT	19 th Sept. 2010
18	R (Ms. Chak)/ 23/ F	NGO activist in CHT	Civilian/ Jumma	Residence of CHT	20 th Sept. 2010
19	S (Ms. Banu)/ 51/ F	Victim of violence in CHT	Civilian/ Bangali	Residence of CHT	20 th Sept. 2010
20	T (Mr. Abdur Rahman)/ 57/ M	Worked with military in ER	People's Rep.	Local Government	22 nd Sept. 2010
21	U/ 52/ F	Parliament Defence Committee	People's Rep.	Member of Parliament	23 rd Sept. 2010
22	V (Ms. Chowdhury)/ 32/ F	Joined military run project	Civilian	Residence of Chittagon g	17th Mar. 2011
23	W/ 39/ M	Joined UNPKO and served in CHT	Security Force	Member of Bangladesh Navy	18th Mar. 2011
24	X (Mr. Goni Mia)/ 21/ M	Joined military run project	Civilian	Residence of Manikgonj	02nd Apr. 2011
25	Y(Ms. Puba) 21/ F	NGO activist in CHT	Civilian/ Settler in CHT	Residence of CHT	05th Apr. 2011

26	Z (Mr. Mazher)/ 64/ M	Senior Columnist on BAF	Researcher	NGO	11th Apr. 2011
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All the interviewees are above 18 years. They have given their consent freely and willingly. Due to the sensitivity of the topic and security reasons some of the interviewees requested anonymity. The anonymous interviewees in few cases have provided some information that they considered sensitive. Keeping the anonymity for one opinion makes to keep the interviewee anonymous in the whole thesis. However, other interviewees have given their consent to name them and their name is mentioned in the thesis. To avoid the biasness the number of interviewed military personnel was kept to four and policy makers to three interviewees, which was much lower than nine stakeholders and ten civil society members. Top of that there was a clear attempt to bring enough female interviewees. The female interviewees were 11 individuals out of total 26 interviewees.

D. How Selected: The interviewees were not identified on the basis of preference. Selection of the interviewees was based on their expertise, knowledge in the research subject, availability, familiarity and trustworthiness. The researcher has close contact with the above interviewees in Bangladesh through his long working association, which helped to approach them and obtain fruitful interview outcome. To avoid partial or bias information individuals having very assertive opinion about the BAF or against the BAF have been avoided. A balanced participation of stakeholders, members of the BAF, policy makers, professionals and stakeholders is a feature of the selection. Three stakeholders were selected for each of the three cases totaling the number of stakeholders to 9. Among the selected 4 members of the BAF, 3 individuals have active experience of UNPKO and all has the experience of emergency response and operation in CHT. The safety of the interviewees and the researcher was considered in identifying interviewees.

E. Modality of Interview: The interview subject was flexible but within the research scope. The three research questions were used as a generic query to understand the responses. Depending on the background of the interviewee the follow-up questions were made. From the general perception about the subject to the specific

political issues were discussed. There were two to four sessions of interview for each interviewee depending on the need and relevance of their response. Each interview session took 20-40 minutes. In a casual and flexible mode the interviews have focused on the three stages- i) BAF's engagement in human security application, ii) BAF's disengagement from politics, and iii) internalisation of human security leading for democratic promotion in Bangladesh. During the interview the research questions were dealt squaring with the stages.

1.9.4 Examples or Independent Case Studies

To understand the context and impact of the BAF's human security involvement, real example or independent case is a useful tool. These are the examples of the BAF's engagement in three types of nontraditional security activities. Six examples have used to explain the impacts of the three case studies referring to the individual's experience. The examples introduced the factual side of the case studies. Linking the theoretical aspect of human security application with the practical the example of the BAF's involvement in human security refers the points of analysis.

Ease case study has two examples. The BAF's involvement in disaster management to assist the civilian administration is the first case. Two examples are included in the first case. The first example details the victims' perception about the involvement of the BAF during the emergency response. The second example is about a member of the local government, which elaborates the role of the BAF during emergency and its impact on the local government. The second case study has two examples. The first one is about the BAF's role in anti-insurgency and the second one is about its post Accord role for protecting law and order in CHT. Both the examples are of the victims of the BAF's action in CHT, where it is shown that the military has an independent working modality, which is adversely affecting the democratic institution. Finally, two examples have given on the impact of the BAF's peacekeeping. The examples show the BAF's orientation with human security approach helps it to be restrained from engaging with politics and identifies its space in a democratic system.

Table 1.4: List of the Stakeholder of the Case Studies

Theme	Stakeholder No	Stakeholder Scope
Related with Emergency	Stakeholder One	Disaster Affected Individual
	Stakeholder Two	Civil Authority Involved in Disaster Management
International Conflict Related	Stakeholder One	General Member of Jumma Community of CTH
	Stakeholder Two	Alleged Negative Political Member
UN Peacekeeping	Stakeholder One	Member of UN Peace Keeping Force
	Stakeholder Two	Country Success of Bangladeshi Peace Keeping Force

A. Types of the Examples: A total six examples or independent case studies have done, of which, two for each three major cases studies of the BAF's human security involvement. The examples have explained the issue from an individual's perspective and his/her experience. The independent case studies include the experience of the individual member of the BAF and the civilians, who are the stakeholder of the BAF's human security task. In one instance a single mission has taken as subject to understand the wider impact from the BAF's involvement.

B. Selection of the Examples: The selection of the examples is based on access and relevance. Since most of the three cases of the BAF's engagement in human security activities are sensitive the examples have to be based on well-founded facts. In the context of the BAF's involvement for internal security in CHT, getting access to the independent person is risky. The researcher had to depend on the well-recognised independent example to analyse the BAF's influence. Contrary, the example of emergency response was easily accessed but limited by period. Examples about the BAF's participation in peacekeeping include both individual and mission level experience of to understand the holistic influence of the UNPKO. It is worthy to mention that the researcher has selected the examples from stocks, where other examples also explain consistent narratives. Thus the researcher has randomly selected two examples for each case study of the BAF's human security involvement. Rather

than using any specific criteria the researcher adopted approach of convenience to select the examples.

1.9.5 Policy Analysis

Policy analysis is the part of the wider document analysis where a specific focus has given on the relevant policy and legislation. The policy analysis has squared the BAF's legal mandates in three types of human security tasks. In its reverse impact the policy analysis introduces issues those change the policies and provides an account for military disengagement from policies. A number of selected development policies have been referred time to time with relevant issues to clarify the theoretical ambiguity. All three cases studies of the BAF's involvement in human security have referred by policy provisions. The policy analysis has given an account of the policy direction and impacts of military disengagement for such direction. Policy analysis has helped to identify the gaps between the practical situation and the existing policies. It has expedited the comprehensive analysis of the research subject.

1.10 Ethical Consideration

Since this is a social research the ethical consideration such as non-biasness, secrecy, anonymity has been maintained. Ethical consideration as those "ethical decisions necessarily involve one's personal morality" (Taylor, & Bogdan, 1975: 29) has been maintained for the trustworthy research outcome. This research has the objective related with the boosting pro-people policy but never promised any solution. In data collection an academic process has been followed in identification and maintaining integrity. Besides, flowing strategies have observed for maintaining ethical standards.

i) Total sensitivity has maintained in explaining the examples of the impacts of the BAF's human security involvement. The personal feeling of the subject has been carefully dealt.

ii) In data collection and analysis the researcher has strictly avoided the biasness. There is a balanced and proportionate selection of interviewees. Besides, the triangulation method has minimised any chance of misleading analysis.

iii) Throughout this research all the sources are clearly cited, referred and quoted. All the reproduction of literature has been clearly marked.

iv) The researcher has never disclosed the name of the interviewees. Clear attention has been given to protect the cultural and professional sensitivity.

1.11 Limitations of the Research

The research subject is relatively new and very little study has been done so far. Any issue related with the BAF is treated as highly sensitive. Due to such scope the research has faced some inherent limitations. The limitations are given bellow:

i) **Lack of Data Availability:** There is no example of academic works about the impact of the BAF's involvement as implementing agency of human security activities.

ii) **Limited Scope for Comprehensive Data Analysis:** The analysis of human security association with policy remains partial. The totality of the policy application cannot be ascertained within in a single research scope.

iii) **Insufficient Real Examples:** The human security has not been integrated at exemplary level in the Bangladeshi policies. There is a vacuum in ascertaining its affects and possibilities.

iv) **Frequent Changes in Policies:** The ever changing political and institutional arrangement of Bangladesh possesses threat to policy process. Lack of continuity of certain policies at the national level has kept the researcher in dilemma in referring those.

v) **Access to Documents and Interviewees:** The informed individuals are either higher in position or not allowed to comment on the BAF. Particularly the military personnel are not allowed to discuss the policy matters because of the sensitiveness of the subject.

1.12 Structure of the Research

The research is divided into seven chapters. It has described the BAF's disengagement from politics is influenced by its nontraditional security involvement

that is pushed by democratic GoB. It also focuses that military disengagement keeps the democracy sustain. Such functionality has been squared with the relationship of reinforcing one component by another. It is also emphasised the fact of organic growth of democracy causing military to be involved in human security. However, the central synthesis focuses the factual reality of military disengagement and its influence on sustenance of democracy in Bangladesh, which is progressively integrating human security principles and objectives into national policy, is a cause and effect phenomenon. Though the association is anything but ideal, the very orientation of the BAF's human security based engagement keeps military in its own space in a democratic country. In doing so a systematic approach is flowed. First three chapters are introduction, methodology and review of existing literatures. The initial chapters explain the concept of human security approach, scope of human security association, influence of democratic governance for the association to human security and BAF's changed approach towards politics due to its involvement activities associated with human security. In doing so, chapter II analyses the relationship between the human security association and democracy. Chapter III explains the relationship between the BAF's disengagement and sustenance of democracy in Bangladesh. The third relationship between the BAF's involvement in activities associated with human security and political disengagement is discussed in following three chapters. Chapter IV, V, and VI explain three cases of the BAF's nontraditional security engagement and squares the outcome with the BAF's disengagement from politics. Finally, the concluding chapter summarises the outcome with the hypothesis and research questions and explains the outcomes.

CHAPTER II

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE INTEGRATION OF HUMAN SECURITY PRINCIPLES AND OBJECTIVES INTO NATIONAL POLICY AND DEMOCRACY

2.1 Chapter Introduction

This chapter provides a review and analysis regarding human security and its association with the national policy of Bangladesh. Besides indicating that human security principles and objectives constitute a policy tool to address crucial needs, the chapter will argue that the logic of human security principles and objectives reinforce the democratic aspirations of Bangladesh. Aiming to prove that democratic aspirations of addressing the rightful claim of all people and ensuring dignified life in Bangladesh have been, in part, instigated by the increased level of human security, this chapter analyses in six sections. The initial section relates to the capacity of human security to address human needs, which strengthens the functioning of democracy. The second section explains the functionality of human security objectives as a policy tool. In the third section, it is suggested that human security is a responsive and sound policy tool and is essential to help Bangladesh meet its social, political, health, and economic needs. In the fourth section, it is argued that Bangladeshi national policies are more appearing as human security principles and objectives to meet its national needs. Since human security has the potential to meet national needs, the fifth section describes the scope of the BAF's involvement for effective implementation of several nontraditional activities those in their nature associated with human security principles and objectives. Complementing these sections, this chapter concludes by explaining that the association to human security principles and objectives with national policy has involved the BAF as an implementing agency. The engagement of the BAF in human security related tasks does not weaken Bangladesh. Rather, it illustrates the synergy of the BAF's role in protecting national sovereignty and implementing nontraditional

security which, in turn, stimulates the association to human security principles and objectives with national policy.

2.2 Defining Primary Concepts

It is important that the essential concepts are understood from the beginning. Some concepts have contextual meanings, and others are statutory. The term “human security” may cause the most confusion. Defining “human security” involves a wider academic debate and is a challenge for many scholars. The other concepts are statutory and more context specific. Altogether, this research provides the conceptual discussion on human security, BAF, military disengagement and the characteristics of policies associated with human security principles and objectives.

2.2.1 Understanding Human Security

Regarding the definition of human security, in this thesis, accepts the definition provided by the UNDP. It also explains the important conceptual and national applications of human security to form its own definition. There is hardly any consensus about the definition of human security except the one provided by the UN Declaration of Human Security. (This definition is mentioned in Chapter 1) However, the problem is not that there is no definition but there are too many.¹ Before attempting to define human security it is necessary to establish a common understanding about the concept of security. The common understanding about human security does not include a historical explanation of the concept of human security but the one provided by the UNDP. The definition provided by the UNDP is given below.

¹ Adelman 2001, Axworthy 1997, Bajpai 2000, Bedeski 1998, Bruderlein 2001, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade in Canada 2001, Dorn 1999-2000, Edralin 2000, Edson 2001, Florini and Simmons 1998, Goulding 1997, Hampson *et al.* 2002, Heinbecker 2000, Kay 1997, Kilgour 2000, Kim and Hyun 2000, King and Murray 2000, Kirton 2000, Leaning and Arie 2000, Leaning *et al.* 1999, Nef 1999, Newman and Richmond 2001, Ogata 1999, 2001a and b; Matsumae and Chen 1995, McRae and Hubert 2001, O'Neill 1997, Paris 2001, Rothschild 1995, Sen 2000, Smith and Stohl 2000, Tehranian 1999, Thomas 2000, Tow *et al.* 2000, UNDP 1994, 1998, 2000.

Human security can be said to have two main aspects. It means, first, safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression. And second, it means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life – whether in homes, in jobs or in communities. Such threats can exist at all levels of national income and development (UNDP, 1994).

For the purposes of this thesis, the UNDP model is considered as main reference to define the human security. Although human security derives its definition from a process of changes in the concepts, and comprises varied application by different nations, the definition provided by the UNDP corresponds to most aspects of the various definitions. This thesis analyses the human security principles and objectives prescribed by the UNDP as it encompasses most of the associated concepts of human security. In the following section a detail explanation of the concepts is provided.

A. Conceptual Basis of Human Security: The idea of human security has evolved from policies related to development and pro-people welfare which have existed since the early history of the nation state. (A brief explanation of the selected concept of human security is provided in Annexure A) In its recent history, human security has appeared as a supplement to human development (Cheen, 1995). The Pakistani development philosopher, Haq, discussed this idea in the 1993 *Human Development Report* (UNDP, 1994: 22), which is explained earlier. In addition to that, the Commission on Human Security², in its final report *Human Security Now*, defined human security as “[t]o protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfillment” (Commission on Human Security, 2003: 4). This definition provides a development based approach to avoid conflict and stresses the need to address root causes that lead to conflict (MacFarlane, & Khong, 2006: 159). On the other hand, human security revived the basic need notion arising from Haq’s approach. Assessing Haq’s model of human security Inglehart and Norris explained that:

²The Commission on Human Security (also known as CHS) was established in January 2001 in response to the UN Secretary-General’s call at the 2000 Millennium Summit for a world “free from want” and “free from fear”.

“[h]uman security was also envisaged in the report of the UNDP as universal (applying to all people and societies), interdependent (where diverse types of threats are linked together), Preventive (where the primary concern is to ameliorate and reduce the causes of insecurity), and people-centered (focusing upon individuals not just relationships among nation-states)” (Inglehart, & Norris, 2011: 4).

Such an extended scope for human security is ideal, but challenging to attain. Gasper suggested that an extended definition of human security risks stability for its effectiveness and scope of attainability (Gasper, 2004). Later, Sen and Ogata introduced a new procedural dimension to the basic concept of human security. In light of such conceptual basis the following key components are essential for human security.

i. Attaining Capacity: The aspects of the attainability concept to accelerate the capacity of the people to attain certain results is compatible with the ‘capability approach’ described by Sen. In detail, the capability approach explains the process and policy application of human security (Sen, 2003). It explains that insecurity can have a downside risk for the poor (incapable) to a greater extent than people having better capacity. Sen’s ‘growth with equity’ approach suggests that comprehensive security ensures balanced growth and equity in wealth distribution. This justifies the freedom to attain capability as a means of achieving human security.

ii. ‘Freedom from Want’ and ‘Freedom from Fear’: The human security concept is generally understood to embrace two ‘mutually inclusive’ ideas: ‘freedom from want’ and ‘freedom from fear’. In short, well-being is the outcome of ‘freedom from want’, while safety represents ‘freedom from fear’. This approach also addresses threat as the missing component of the capability approach. The United Nations Commission on Human Security has viewed “[h]uman security in terms of protecting people’s vital freedoms from critical and pervasive threats” (Ogata, 2003: 2). Human security is not only a policy matter but also a programmatic aspiration addressing new security risks. This thesis focuses on policy to the extent that it may be influenced by the programmatic involvement of the BAF. This is consistent with the ‘freedom from want’ and ‘freedom from fear’ human security model.

iii. Seven Securities under the UNDP Model: The UNDP has classified seven security issues under the wider human security umbrella. The seven main categories “represent potential threats to human security: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security and political security” (UNDP, 1994: 24-25). Such a holistic approach has been embraced by the The United Nations Commission on Human Security, the UNDP, the World Bank, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the national governments of Japan, Canada, and Scandinavian countries. The outcome of the association to the UNDP human security model with the national policy can be better identified. With regard to the UNDP model, William has suggested that it will generate three distinctive elements for human security (William, S., 2007: 6). An analysis has been by Hampson made categorises the seven issues with their three core elements. Hampson discussed these three distinct elements as “(1) the rights and rule of law, (2) the safety of peoples and (3) sustainable human development” (Hampson, *et. al.*, 2002: 18). These three components also have a synergic linkage with the basic notion of ‘freedom from want’ and ‘freedom from fear’. Thus, the UNDP model includes various aspects of human security generated through changes in human security idea. The components of the UNDP model of human security justify that the UNDP model has embodied most essential aspects of human security those prescribed by various other definitions.

B. National Models of Human Security: The theoretical changes of the human security concept are distinctive from the national level applications in various parts of the world. The integration of human security principles and objectives into policy needs political will, and that can vary according to particular political structures. Since there is no international agreement about the application of human security, different political systems can interpret it to meet their own particular political imperatives. Without a formal or agreed framework on human security, it loses its appeal as a fixed policy solution and allows different nation to apply it differently. Several national level examples of human security application have a unique nature and focus. Despite the presence of distinctiveness in human security applications, these do not contradict the conceptual basis of human security. Rather, the practice of national level human security applications has formed distinct

understandings of human security. To ascertain the definition of human security such unique developments should be understood.

i. Canadian Approach: The Canadian example of the human security application model is the association to human security with the foreign policy. This model involves multilateral peacekeeping and ensuring human security through such a multilateral approach. Canada's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Llyod Axworthy, has argued that lasting state level security cannot be achieved until human security is guaranteed (Axworthy, 1997: 184). However, this limits the scope within the foreign policy only. By 1999, Canada had brought "Norway and other likeminded nations to further discuss the concept and its practicality" (Suhrke, 1999: 265). The Canadian model is focused on "protecting citizens at risk of atrocities arising from failed or perpetrator states" (Thakur, 2006: 73). Several scholars believe that "Canada has taken human security as the paradigm for its foreign policy and has taken a leadership role in operationalising it" (Axworthy, 1997: 183; Florini, & Simmons, 1998: 35; Hampson, *et al.*, 2002). The human security agenda has offered a way for Canada to contribute "a leading voice on the world stage" (McRae, & Hubert, 2001:9). But this concept necessarily excludes 'freedom from want' and is limited to physical security by calling it a 'peacekeeping model' of human security. Uniquely, the former UN Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson, explained the model as "freedom from despair" (Robinson, 2000). The Canadian model excludes Sen's 'freedoms to attain' approach. Gasper commented that it is not a "definite process of attainments" (Gasper, 2004). Essentially, the Canadian model involves supporting peacekeeping in other countries to bring domestic security.

ii. Japanese Approach: The Japanese model of human security has a policy root that enables development in a sustainable way. The Japanese led model prioritises the "development leg of human security" (Thakur, 2006: 73). MacFarlane and Khong considered that the Japanese approach contradicts the Canadian approach (MacFarlane, & Khong, 2006: 159). Japan has adopted the broadest definition of human security, which "comprehensively covers all the menaces that threaten human survival, daily life and dignity" (Japan Government, 2000). In particular, Japan does not prioritise 'freedom from fear' over the 'freedom from want', but holds both as dual objectives of human security (Acharya, 2001: 448). According to *Japan's Blue Book*,

Japan emphasises human security to strengthen coping with threats to human lives, livelihoods, dignity, and infectious diseases such as the Human Immunodeficiency Virus/ Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, also known as HIV/AIDS, etc.. The Japanese approach emphasises the ‘freedom from want’ over the ‘freedom from fear’, and is not an appropriate model for this thesis, and has not been adopted.

iii. Approach in Scandinavian Countries: The third example of policy association with human security is found in Scandinavian Countries such as the Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Norway. Although not all these countries have integrated human security in similar policies, the similarity can be found in their core approach. “Norway focuses on the freedom from fear aspects of human security, and identifies a core agenda of preventive action, small arms and light weapons control, and peace operations” (Lodgaard, 2001). As with Canada, Norway’s approach to human security emphasises protecting individuals. Canada and Norway have founded the Human Security Network³, a major intergovernmental body that works for human security. However, the Scandinavian countries are particularly focused on ‘developing certain social aspects’ to guarantee safety. “This policy resonates with the Social Safety Net⁴ model” (Grosh, 2008: 20). The social safety aspect has been challenged in the post 9/11 world. The Scandinavian model has integrated anti-terrorism as a component within the human security policy framework (Roach, 2003: 19). This approach addresses not just the immediate consequences but, rather, the root cause of

³The Human Security Network is based on a bilateral agreement between Norway and Canada that was signed in 1998. Today the Human Security Network consists of over a dozen countries – representing different regions of the world – with a common goal of identifying concrete areas for collective action in the area of human security. The members are committed to (1) promoting respect for human rights and international humanitarian law (2) strengthening the rule of law and good governance and (3) fostering a culture of peace through peaceful resolution of conflicts. More information is available at www.emb-norway.ca/Embassy-and.../humansecurity

⁴ Social Safety Nets, which is known as "socioeconomic safety nets", are non-contributory transfer or protection programs seeking to prevent the marginalized, poor or those vulnerable to shocks, emergency situation and poverty from falling below a certain poverty level (in extreme poverty). This is getting more popular among many countries in the world. On average, developing countries across the world are spending for the safety nets from 1 to 2 percent of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP). (Grosh, M., 2008:20)

insecurity. However, attempting to explain threats from a national perspective is beyond the scope of this thesis.

Considering the various theoretical and applicable models of human security, it is suggested that the human security could be achieved by accepting the essence of those existing models currently practised in various countries. Adopting the positive aspects of existing models provides conditions sensitive to human security principles and objectives. Unfortunately, there is insufficient scholarly research proposing such a composite approach. MacFarlane and Khong noted that, “there was substantial empirical literature dealing with concrete practical problems of human security but a parallel conceptual literature is largely absent” (MacFarlane, & Khong, 2006: 12). Most of the disagreement about the concepts arises from debates about where the central focus of human security should lie. Although human security is certainly centered on humans, there is no consensus about whether this means the individual or community. The state is not the central focus of the human security discourse but the interests of individuals and communities are the central focus. Importantly, the micro unit of human security is the individual; they constitute the group and ultimately the state. Thus, the principles and objectives of human security ultimately impact the wider security of the state. In its holistic approach, the Commission on Human Security has taken the view that “[i]n essence, human security means safety for people from both violent and non-violent threats. It is a condition or state of being characterised by freedom from pervasive threats to people’s rights, their safety, or even their lives” (Commission on Human Security, 2003). The central focus of the state security is to protect the sovereignty but for human security, it is to protect the dignity of the individuals. However, the sovereignty of the state cannot be gained without its dignified citizens, which means though these two approaches are different but the application of human security can improve the strength of a state through strengthening its citizens.

From the above discussion it is certain that the human security is focused on the individual unite to ensure the fullest realisation of their potentials. Despite the presence of several theories and models of human security application, the real bond to bring all thoughts together is the UN declaration on human security. In light to that this research explains human security as a *security framework with a central focus on*

human dignity, both at individual and community level, addressing intrinsic needs, aspirations and protect from real and pervasive threats with a directive to attain human potentials. This definition is instrumental in analysing the BAF's involvement in activities associated with human security and its influence on the GoB to integrate human security principles and objectives into national policy.

2.2.2 The Bangladesh Armed Force (BAF)

The definition of the BAF is a statutory one. The nature of the BAF varies depending on whether peace or an emergency situation prevails. First, in peace time, the BAF comprises the Bangladesh Army, the Bangladesh Navy and the Bangladesh Air Force. Other branches of the security forces, as well as the reserve forces, are also part of the BAF during emergencies. The BAF is governed by the Bangladeshi law including the Army Act of 1954, the Air Force Act of 1957, and the Navy Ordinance of 1961. Since 1971, the Bangladesh Army's growth has been phenomenal and is now the largest branch of the BAF. The Bangladesh Army has 200,000 personnel (Bangladesh Army, 2011), the Navy has 24,000 personnel (Bangladesh Navy Overview, 2011), and the Air Force has 17,000 personnel (Bangladesh Air Force Overview, 2011). The duties and responsibilities of the BAF are subject to the direction and control of the Ministry of Defense. (Details on the Constitutional provisions about the BAF are provided in Annexure B) Other branches of the security forces are subject to the Ministry of Home Affairs. The GoB can bring any section of the security forces under the management of the Ministry of Defense by executive order. In such situations, the transferred branches come under the control and command of the military. Sections of the security forces under the command of the military headquarters, therefore, are considered part of the armed forces of Bangladesh. Often, the expression 'Security Force' is used to replace 'Armed Force'. There is a particular concern about the position of the branches of security forces such as the police and the Detective Branch. Ordinarily, the BAF does not include the police or the Detective Branch. The police and the Detective Branch are the agencies to maintain law and order and are managed by the Ministry of Home Affairs. However, during emergency situations the police and the Detective Branch also work

as armed forces and are subject to the military command. Further details about the structure and functions of the BAF are provided in Chapter III.

2.2.3 Meaning of ‘Military Disengagement’

Danopoulos has argued that military disengagement from politics is rarely total or final. He has argued that the outcome depends on the action of civilian governments subsequent to the disengagement (Danopoulos, 1988: 12). Welch has viewed military disengagement as a paradigm leading to liberalisation and democratisation (Welch, 1992). However, he has also argued that military disengagement does not mean complete isolation of the military from political activity. Thus, the military can still influence politics but it has to be through proper channels. Here the proper means is to provide advice to the civilian government in its capacity of member of defence advising committee. Military disengagement is a critical issue where the state and degree of disengagement vary depending on specific situations. However, to constitute disengagement, the principal consideration remains the stoppage of inappropriate involvement in policy matters by military personnel. Military disengagement, therefore, is constituted not only by the absence of direct military involvement with political parties or politics, but it also includes absence of military involvement in the national policy making process. However, the military may remain involved in the policy process related to security and sovereignty. The ideal disengagement requires that it be undertaken under civilian control. To ensure a balance in disengagement, the spectrum of military disengagement needs to be politically influential without being politically partisan (Welch, 1992). This unique balancing of disengagement of not being partisan is difficult to achieve in a developing country such as Bangladesh. Rather, a formal withdrawal from the politics may be more practical or preferable as a solid indication of military disengagement and not being an attempt to dictate the political process in the country.

2.2.4 Human Security Policy

There is nothing specific such as human security policy. Human security theories those discussed above do not give the septicity about human security policy. But at the same time the application of the human security needs the policy as a tool.

Thus it is logical to argue that the policy that has the similar principles and objectives those of the human security is a human security policy. The initial discussion shows that the primary purpose of human security is to address the vital core concerns of human individuals. Chen has suggested that “the term human security...focuses the concept of security on human survival, wellbeing and freedom” (Chen, 1995: 139). The Commission on Human Security has explained that human security aims to protect fundamental freedoms that are the essence of life. This means protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations (Commission on Human Security, 2003: 4).

In this line of argument the national policy is the most feasible type of the policies that can incorporate the human security principles and objectives. This research is giving a brief narrative on the national policy. National policy is the defined goals, perceptions, guidelines, and processes intended to meet national objectives. Threlfall has described policy as ‘soft law’ and thus national policy is soft laws at the national level (Threlfall, 2007: 172). In Bangladesh, several interconnected levels of national policies exist, namely: (a) short term, (b) medium term, and (c) long term. Selected examples of major Bangladeshi national policies are i) Perspective Plan and the PRSP (long term, for 15-20 years); ii) Five Years Plan (medium term or macro plan); iii) The Three Years Rolling Investment Programme (medium term); and iv) The Annual Development Programme (short term plan). Often, national policy is described by reference to its method of implementation. There are differences in opinion about the implementation of national policy. Van Meter and Van Horn argued that “policy implementation encompasses those actions by public or private individuals (or groups) that are directed at the achievement of objectives set forth in prior policy decisions” (Van, & Van, 1974: 447-8). Wittrock and deLeon viewed policy as a ‘moving target’ (Wittrock, & deLeon, 1986: 55). National policies contain and reflect national aspirations, needs, and imperatives. Real security imperatives, people’s needs and ground realities should all influence and be served by national policies. This means the national policy can serve as ideal human security policy once it includes the principles and objectives of human security.

The strength of human security as a public policy tool lies in its capacity to address the needs of the people within the scope of policy structure. As a practical

policy tool, human security needs to be compatible with the flexibility of national governance so that human security policy does not breach the foundation of the state (Paris, 2001). Since the state is the primary player for association and application of human security, a balance between protection of the state and people is vital (Alkire, 2003). The realist ideology of national security has promoted the state as the primary player. Weissberg has explained that “the focus of national security is on the protection of its territorial boundaries and sovereignty. Power is measured through military capability” (Weissberg, 2006: 3). If this hardline approach is the only means to protect national security, there is hardly any scope for human security to be effective in creating the balance to which Alkire referred. Stoett has disagreed with Weissberg by stressing that by promoting only the military, security would be obtained at the expense of others (people) (Stoett, 1999: 17). This means that military security alone may jeopardise the people’s security. A balanced policy approach is vital to ensure security for the people as well as for the state. In the public policy domain, the human security approach by its nature is responsive to the needs of the people without endangering the national sovereignty. The simple argument is that if human security policy threatens national sovereignty, then the state as the primary player for integrating human security will also be threatened. This shows that to be a compatible policy tool, the human security approach has to ensure the necessary balance.

A human security policy prioritises the inclusion of human concerns in policy. It could be better understood once the policy formation would be discussed. Policy formation may be vertical, which is developed within a single organisational structure. In this process, policy formation considers broad overarching issues so that decisions flowing from one entity impacts on others (Smith, 2003: 11). The vertical style of policy formation hardly reflects the people’s concerns. By contrast, horizontal policy-making is developed by two or more organisations or entities. Smith has argued that in such a process each entity can influence the policy formation in any given situation (Smith, 2003:12). Since human security based policy formation needs to address the concerns of individuals and communities, horizontal policy-making is more appropriate for human security, where policy needs to acknowledge the concerns off all sections of the population.

It is also important to understand that the rationale for including people’s needs in human security policy is to ensure flexibility or continuous adjustment of policy formation to meet the people’s changing needs. In this argument, the linear model of policy process requires consideration of human security principles and objectives throughout the entire process. The linear model is a multistep process, which is responsive and innovative (Sutton, 1999). The following figure illustrates how this model operates.




Figure 2.1: Continuous Inclusion of People’s Needs under the Linear Policy Process (Grindle, & Thomas, 1990)

The linear model is followed by most national governments as it addresses people’s needs in a coordinated way (Grindle, & Thomas, 1990). Discussing the operation of the linear model, Juma and Clarke explained that the linear model assumes policy makers approach associated issues rationally through each logical stage of the process, and carefully consider all relevant information (Juma, & Clarke, 1995). The four steps of the linear model are: i) identifying issues, ii) agenda setting, iii) the decision phase, and iv) the implementation phase. Each step allows the inclusion of the people’s concerns. The systematic process starts with a broader idea and continuously focuses on real needs. It outlines policy-making as a problem solving process (Sutton, 1999: 9). Thus the linear model largely addresses the requirements of human security policy formation that is functional at the national level. Human

security policy addresses certain principles in its application. A brief discussion on the principles of the human security policy is given below:

A. Principle of Equal Importance: The principle of ‘equal importance’ needs to be embedded in public policy for it to be compatible with human security. Policy provisions should treat all humans equally, irrespective of their identity or position. Bilchitz, a prominent jurist, in describing equal importance has suggested “together with the premise that there are certain necessary conditions to realise lives of value, it would allow us to generate the conclusion that each being ought to be entitled to the equal provision of the necessary conditions required to live lives of value” (Bilchitz, 2007: 58). Most Anglo-American political liberals such as John Locke, Thomas Jefferson, Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, John Maynard Keynes, John Kenneth Galbraith, and John Rawls considered that the interest of the individual who is in authority and the autonomous individual who is free from political and ecclesiastical authority should be included in the policy and afforded equal importance. In practice, mainstream liberals consider that political and legal equality are more desirable than social hierarchy (David, & Charles, 2002: 18). The policy process is intended to ensure the transformation of legal equality to socio-economic equality eliminating discriminatory provisions.

The equal importance concept does not give priority only to individual interests or, as has been suggested by Nagel, the personal perspective of the individual (Nagel, 1991: 11). Likewise, the human security concept requires that individuals cannot seek priority for their own interests, or the interests of those they care about, over the interests of others. The equal opportunity approach is inconsistent with the idea of preferential treatment but allows scope for positive discrimination. Bilchitz has argued that equal importance is an entitlement. He has written “the principle of equal importance at least implies that each being should be equally entitled to the level of provision necessary to meet the thresholds” (Bilchitz, 2007: 68). Human security as a policy tool addresses the entitlement that is inherent in the human rights concept. The principle of equal importance thus plays a crucial role linking the goal of human security policy with human rights.

B. Principle of Peace: Human security policy addresses peace or social security as a condition to enjoy rights and welfare. The relationship between peace and

human security is practical. The very essence of human security includes the idea of peace. As most people claim to be in favor of peace (David, & Charles, 2002: 28), public policy based on human security should guarantee the existence of long term peace in society. The new emphasis on peace culture as expressed in *the UN Decade for a Culture of Peace and Nonviolence (2000-2010)* is designed to highlight matters of peace. Policies based on human security are certainly focused on minimising threats to individuals and society at large (Chen, 1995).

Inconsistent with the human security policy, war has also been used as an instrument of statesmanship as opposed to peace. The appropriateness of war has been subjected to, and correlated with, the state's own interest. States make war not from existential reasons but from expansionist motives (David, & Charles, 2002). Human security is inconsistent with such expansionist activities and necessitates greater cooperation beyond a state's own territory, and has the potential to ensure peace. Human security policy demands wider cooperation among states and non-state players to ensure freedom from threats (UNDP, 2005). Security cooperation, the joint defense idea, and evolution of the earth into a global village all encourage political accountability and better global governance. The new system is inspiring and empowering individuals (Chen, 1995), who are taking broader stakes in peace activities. Additionally, modern armed forces are also following the change. Armed forces now employ the word defense, rather than war. The human security policy, which is inspired by peace and non-violence principles, is involving various institutions of the state for its implementation.

C. Principle of Human Rights Promotion: Although the basic elements of human rights are acknowledged by human security principles and objectives, they do not come directly as human rights in the human security policy. The earlier argument about the inter-relationship between human rights, development, and security explains that the close relationship between development and security overlaps with rights. However, it does not explain the intrinsic relationship between rights and security. Othman has argued that human rights “include the granting and protection of other rights necessary to ensure freedom from fear of threats to ... human survival, health and well-being” (Othman, 2004). To meet the requirement of functioning human rights, the state needs to work as an agency to protect the

individual. O'Neill has been a powerful critic of the discourse of rights and has argued for a moral perspective, focusing on obligations rather than rights (O'Neill, 1996:134). From this theoretical analysis it is understandable that human security policy is designed to protect and promote rights and needs, whereas policy provides the basic operational tool to do that. In doing so, human security policy evolved as the tool for the government must not contradict with the human rights. Sung Han-Kim has argued that "at a minimum, human security requires that basic human needs are met" (Kim, 1999). However, addressing basic needs does not guarantee full human security. Rather it is the inclusion of human rights that provides more likelihood for the guarantee for human security. According to Acharya human security focuses on human rights (Acharya, 2000). The inter-relationship is inseparable and mutually enforceable.

D. Principle of Protecting Diversity: Both the policy process and the system of governance need to be responsive to social diversity. The Multilingual Orientation Service Association for Immigrant Communities explains that a responsive nation should be open to all communities and respectful of every professional group (Multilingual Orientation Service Association for Immigrant Communities, 2003). Human security policy provides equal opportunity for all communities irrespective of their differences (Smith, 2003). Thus, human security policy ensures functional linkages between the needs of diverse groups and sound policy process. This argument provides the rationale for adopting human security as an ideal policy tool for a society composed of diverse groups. Proper understanding of diverse groups "widens the range of options which (politicians) consider; it challenges some taken-for-granted assumptions about appropriate goals and appropriate activities" (Weiss, 1982: 620). In national goal setting, policy making has a greater chance of success in nation building once it considers the interests of diverse groups.

However, it is not clear whether political events shape the new thinking of bringing the concerns of minority groups in particular policies, or whether it is encouraged by the social evolution. Hearn has described the social evolutionary perspective as responsible for shaping the thinking of policy makers (Hearn, 2006:104). Contradicting with Hearn, Cryderman and Fleras viewed that attitudes shape perceptions of policy makers (Cryderman, & Fleras, 1992). The impact of social

evolution on the attitudes of policy makers is hard to determine. However, in ordinary situations, national governments often challenge the interests of subgroups and give priority to a dominant group (Multilingual Orientation Service Association for Immigrant Communities, 2003). As Huntington has observed, such domination can be a source of conflict (Huntington, 1996:22). The behavior and cultural orientation of a dominant group can be the decisive factor where a general social trend might not harmonise with real social needs (Cryderman, & Fleras, 1992). Lack of emphasis on diversity, therefore, may ultimately jeopardise the development goal. Such a risk of policy failure can be avoided by integrating human security and addressing the interests of minority groups. For example, in the context of Bangladesh, national policy should consider the interests of all diverse groups including diverse cultural groups. Human security policy has the potential to deal with such diversity in policy formation thereby encouraging development and a homogenous society.

E. Principle of Rightful Claims: Human security as a public policy approach works as an integrative tool connecting people in different segments of society by ensuring their rightful claims. Human security policy is embedded in a notion of solidarity among people (UNDP 1994: 24). The interactive approach promotes justice by addressing the rightful or real needs of all in a continuous fashion. Social progress should be based on fairness and justice, and meet present needs without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs (Custance, & Hillier, 1998). It is crucial to ensure rightful claims are addressed in policy so that the total process can coordinate the various needs of the people. Human security policy, therefore, by addressing the rightful claims ensures balance among the essential components of policy implementation, so that every step of policy implementation can actively address the rightful claims of the people. Balance makes the system functional, in a coordinated way, making sensible use of natural resources (Ohlsson, 2000).




Figure 2.2: Human Security Policy Ensures Coordination (Ohlsson, 2000)

The above figure explains the relationship which allows human security policy to ensure the optimum use of available resources. It is indicated that human security policy should consider the vulnerability, which can come as sudden shock on livelihood or otherwise, in developing the coping strategy. It also should estimate available resources after providing consideration on the unseen or potential threats. Now, these are the functional modalities of a human security policy, which considers the people cannot be liable for the unseen threats, system failure or sudden shock. Thus human security policy considers that the subject of the policy, the individuals, have their rightful claim over the resource despite the occurrence of sudden shocks. Thus, the four policy steps in the figure show that a coordinated process is a pre-requisite to ensure that the rightful claims of the people will be addressed. This cycle of human security policy functioning allows a better management of available resources, unseen threats, livelihood insecurity and coping strategy.

In the context of Bangladesh, such a policy should operate to guarantee the resources to secure livelihoods, which is vital for reducing vulnerability. Any failure to ensure sustainable and equitable resource use, over-consumption of resources in support of particular livelihoods, or the impact of a sudden shocks or unseen threats such as war or disaster on natural resources or their rate of consumption, can lead to a loss of livelihoods. Moreover, poor functioning of democracy in Bangladesh can generate corruption which again can result in resource depletion. In a human security policy the scope for revisiting the coping strategy can encourage the state to provide transparency to guarantee the openness and accountability necessary to reduce and control corruption (Sen, 1999). Thus, human security policy has the potential to

provide a coordinated policy process, which is vital to address legitimate or rightful claims.

2.3 Human Security Objectives and People's Needs

At the beginning of this chapter, it was suggested that human security objectives address the needs of the people, which is also the objective in a democracy. The objectives of both human security and democracy aim to bring about similar outcomes by ensuring the dignity of humans. This explains the relevance of human security in a democratic system, where human security strengthens and encourages the democratic process. This thesis describes democracy as commonly understood to mean a system of governance that follows the will of the majority, which is obviously the general perspective of democracy. It, therefore, avoids centering the argument on any of the narrower categories of democracy; such as direct, liberal, popular or even representative democracy (Standford, 2004). In this thesis, a democracy is considered as a political system with certain characteristics. Becker and Raveloson have suggested that a democracy has eight characteristics. Those characteristics are i) fundamental freedoms and rights, ii) the rule of law, iii) elections, iv) separation of powers, v) a parliament, vi) a government and opposition, vii) pluralism and viii) public opinion (Becker, & Raveloson, 2008). Touraine and Macey described democracy in *What is Democracy?*, as a system of government with four key elements: i) a political system for choosing and replacing the government through free and fair elections; ii) the active participation of the people, as citizens, in politics and civic life; iii) protection of citizens' human rights; and iv) the rule of law, in which laws and procedures apply equally to all citizens (Krause, & Williams, 1997). In other words, democracy generally takes account of, and places a high priority on, human rights and needs. Thus, the argument about the compatibility of human security objectives with democratic systems means that the objectives have to be able to acknowledge individual rights and to protect individuals and communities.

To explain the objectives of human security it is necessary to understand that concept. Earlier, this chapter discusses human security and its potential impact on the wellbeing of individuals and communities. The idea of using human security as a

process to build people's strengths and respond to their aspirations was advocated in the 1994 UNDP report (UNDP, 1994: 23-24). This is consistent with the characteristic of democracy, referred to above, which is to ensure the fundamental freedom and rights of human individuals. Without meeting vital core concerns of human individuals, fundamental freedom can never be achieved or sustained. This research further elaborates such functional objectives of human security, compatible with the democratic governance that addresses human needs. The objectives fall mainly into two categories: i) protecting and empowering people, and ii) ensuring development.

Once human security objectives are realised, 'freedom from want' and 'freedom from fear' can be achieved (Alkier, 2003). Although this aim of the human security approach is advocated mainly by the UNDP (UNDP, 1994), other scholars do not disagree. The *UNDP Human Development Report* of 1994 outlines the use of human security as a policy tool, which advocates that human security can bring the development aspect to realise human needs. The key features of the 1994 UNDP report are: i) its joint focus on 'freedom from fear' and 'freedom from want', and ii) its fourfold emphasis on universality, interdependence, prevention, and people-centeredness. This shows the inclusive nature of the human security approach that seeks to address human needs and also to institutionalise the values which will guarantee its continued existence and ongoing evolution. Annan, in his *Report to the United Nations* in 2000, endorsed the inclusive nature of the UNDP framework. (Annan, 2000) He confirmed that the UNDP framework of human security encompasses human rights, good governance, access to education and health care, and ensuring that each individual has opportunities and choices to fulfill his or her own potential (Annan, 2000). The human security framework proposed by the UNDP, which is also the framework adopted in this thesis, is structured consistently with national policy that represents the interests of the wider population. Thus, the application of human security principles and objectives in a national context is consistent with, and complements, a functioning democracy. With this explanation, the ways in which human security objectives have been realised under a democratic system of government are further described below.

2.3.1 Protection, Empowerment and Human Security

It is important that being responsive to the real needs of the people is a prior condition to their protection. Human security as a policy approach addresses the protection issue and also empowerment. To attain the goals of human security, the UN Commission on Human Security has proposed a framework based upon protection and empowerment of people. Neither of these issues can be dealt with in isolation as they are mutually reinforcing (Ogata, 2003: 1). “Protection and empowerment of people are the two building blocks for achieving the goal of human security” (United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security, 2009: 8); they are also core democratic values. Accordingly, realising these human security objectives is a precondition for democracy. The word “protection” in the context of human security does not always mean protection from external threats. Protection may also be required from pervasive threats and threats to human dignity and human potential. “Protection involves strategies that enhance the capacities of the institutional/governance structures needed to protect the affected community(ies) against the identified threats” (United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security, 2009: 18). On the other hand, the Commission on Human Security has viewed human security in terms of protecting people’s vital freedoms from critical and pervasive threats in ways that empower them so that they can fulfill their potential and satisfy their aspirations (Ogata, 2003: 2).

Ogata argued that the realisation of the objective to protect people’s freedom depends on the response of national governments, policy directions, and the functionality of the good governance. Protection of the people is also fundamental to any functional democracy. As it is part of fundamental rights, a democratic country is responsible for ensuring fundamental rights by providing sufficient guarantees against all kinds of threat to individuals and communities. Ogata has argued that “protection refers to the norms, processes and institutions required to shield people from critical and pervasive threats. It implies a ‘top-down’ approach, such as establishing the rule of law, accountable and transparent institutions, and democratic governance structures” (Ogata, 2003:2). The democratic system is bound to govern by the rule of law and ensure the separation of the powers, such as separation of the executive and the judiciary, to ensure protection through the due process of law. Thus, the

democratic system provides the functional tools to meet the objectives of human security.

Similarly, the objective of empowering people is one key component of the human security (UNDP, 1994). For empowering people, individual capacity and institutional access needs to be ensured, and ensuring empowerment requires a governance system that addresses individual capacity and access, such as democracy. King and Murray have identified democracy as one of key requirements for human security (King, & Murray, 2001: 585). According to them, democracy is a system which is responsive to people's capacity and access to services. Paris has argued that King and Murray's view is useful to assess human security, but he did not offer a clear justification for doing so (Paris, 2001: 87). To explain the functional elements of empowerment, Ogata has suggested that:

[e]mpowerment emphasises people as actors and participants in defining and implementing their vital freedoms. This implies a "bottom-up" approach. People protected can exercise choices. People empowered can make better choices, and actively prevent and mitigate the impact of insecurities (Ogata, 2003: 1).

The bottom-up approach to empowerment is very appropriate under a democratic system. Democratic governance guarantees people's safety and security, which is vital for empowering people. Simultaneously the empowered people strengthen the democracy. Thus the relationship between the democracy and protection and empowerment is partially re-enforceable.

2.3.2 Human Security, Human Rights and Human Development

Usually security is needed a downturn of development but the initial discussion shows that the human security principles and objectives are interdependent with development. In the Bangladesh context; as King and Murray claim, human security promotes development to ensure security (King, & Murray, 2001). Further, both human security and human development are partially reinforced by democracy. A responsive democratic system emphasises development to address the needs of the people. Meeting the development objective of human security is better effected under a democratic system. To understand this relationship, the concept of development as

an objective of human security needs to be clear. One concept of development is as human development in the context of human security (Bajpai, 2000). The theoretical grounding of human security brings human rights and human development within a single policy. The linking factor is the human, which is common to all three ideas. Addressing the 'vital core', the very essence of human beings, is the functional link common to the three. This essence may be defined in terms of 'capabilities' or even within the 'framework of freedom' that people have to gain or achieve to live dignified lives. Human security scholar Alkire has described the elements of this human essence as "fundamental human rights which all persons and institutions are obliged to respect or provide, even if the obligations are not perfectly specifiable"(Alkire, 2003: 2). This essence comprises the essentials of human security which are part of a wider human rights concept and which are ensured once human development has occurred. Analysis demonstrates that both human security and development are functional concepts and are ideally aimed at generating the rights which are the functional objectives of these three concepts.

However, human security shares the 'conceptual space' of human development, which is people-centered and multidimensional. Human security is defined in terms of human choices and freedoms. But human development is a broader, longer term, holistic objective that can capture the aspirations of any society, whether rich or chronically poor. Human development also suggests realisation of the socio-legal conditionality that supports the vital core. In practical terms, human development is the result of human security actions. Thus, the close connection between human security and human development manifests itself in national policies, which determine national actions. The following diagram describes the overlapping inter-relationship between these three ideas.




Figure 2.3: Human Security Functions to Realise Human Development

The diagram above shows the close proximity between human development and human security. However, human rights are the goals or aspirations of national policy, and link security with development. Once the application of human security and development is considered, various differences become apparent. Sen has suggested that “[w]hile human development aims at Growth with Equity human security focuses on Downturn with Security” (Sen, 2000). An alternate view, as given by Leaning and Arie is that human security must be attained prior to, and as a pre-condition for, the successful implementation of a human development strategy (Leaning, & Arie, 2000). Thus, the inter-relationship is established and the clear positioning of security and development is a pre-requisite for successful policy association.

Human development shapes policy under a democratic system because is the common inspiration of both human security and a functioning democracy, Becker and Raveloson have argued that human development is only possible when humans live in a democracy (Becker, & Raveloson, 2008: 5). Articulating development as the goal of democracy, they have suggested that “we must not forget that democracy represents a path to development. The democratisation process then leads to development. . .” (Becker, & Raveloson, 2008: 21). Human development ensures the capacity of the people and it provides long-term stability. The positive feature of human development facilitates the security of society. Thus, human development like human security, both create conditions where democracy can be expanded, and themselves because more dominant policies within a democratic context.

2.4 GoB's Inspiration for Human Security Sensitive Policy

The GoB's human security sensitive national policy needs to be understood within the context of Bangladeshi political and practical needs. The Center for Policy Dialogue ⁵ has explained that the human security approach in Bangladeshi national policy is a relatively new phenomenon. Democratic governments in Bangladesh have initiated the association to human security with policy but it cannot be considered a coordinated effort (Center for Policy Dialogue, 2003). However, a significant volume of public policies formulated under the democratic governments after 1990 explicitly refer to human security. Chapter I has referred to several such policies. Prior to 1990, the term human security was not referred to in Bangladesh national policies even though they may have incorporated human security principles and objectives (Safer world, 2008). Importantly, with the growing maturity of democracy, Bangladeshi national policies are increasingly responding to the people's needs by using and including the term human security (Khan, 2005). Mainly in the development of policy, human security has been instrumental in linking stakeholders' concerns with existing realities. The human security sensitive Bangladeshi national policy is a response to the crucial needs of the people, which is a realistic approach driven by the essentials of human security policy.

2.4.1 Human Security and Poverty Reduction in Bangladesh

Poverty is the biggest challenge to the development of Bangladesh (GoB, 2005a). The challenges due to poverty can breach citizens' fundamental freedoms and limit their participation in civil life. Over the last 10 years, Bangladesh has made impressive gains in relation to key human development indicators. In the 2010 UNDP Human Development Report, Bangladesh ranked 129th out of 169 countries in the Human Development Index (UNDP, 2010) In 2011, Bangladesh ranked 146 out of 187. However, between 1980 and 2011, Bangladesh's Human Development Index value increased from 0.303 to 0.500, an increase of 65.0 per cent or an average of about 1.6 per cent per annum (UNDP, 2011a). Encouragingly, growing numbers of

⁵ Center for Policy Dialogue is a think center based in Dhaka. Established in the 90s the main areas of its engagement are policy, economy and development of Bangladesh. Leading researchers from Bangladesh are contributor of Center for Policy Dialogue.

Bangladeshi politicians are accepting the human security approach to address such major causes of poverty as the lack of literacy, malnutrition, unemployment, rising criminality, and an environmental crisis. As poverty is multi-dimensional, the battle against poverty has to be waged on many fronts and with unremitting vigour (GoB, 2005a). Bangladesh has achieved considerable success in several areas of development since independence. According to Sen and Hulme:

After Independence in 1971, Bangladesh started off with an extremely adverse and volatile situation. At the beginning of the growth process, it appeared to have combined the worst of all-possible disadvantages. With one of the most vulnerable economies of the world characterised by extremely high population density, low resource base, high incidence of natural disasters, and extremely adverse initial circumstances associated with the inheritance of a war-ravaged economy, the implications for long-term savings, investment, and growth were deemed extremely unfavourable for Bangladesh (Sen, & Hulme, 2004: 20).

Since independence, there has been a substantial reduction in the number of people living under both the upper (poverty) and lower poverty (extreme poverty) lines. The national poverty rate has declined by about one per cent per annum over the last 15 years. Based on the upper poverty line, 40% of the national population is poor, which amounts to about 56 million people (World Bank, 2008). While this figure represents a considerable improvement over previous levels, it is still extremely high by international standards and reflects widespread poverty and vulnerability in Bangladesh (Pearce, 1991).

The UN has acknowledged Bangladesh's progress in the field of macroeconomic stability, women's empowerment, reducing aid dependence, food self-sufficiency, free and fair parliamentary elections, and a pluralist, democratic civil society (UN, 2005: 16). However, with over 63 million people still living below the poverty line, the ever present threat of sudden shocks, both natural and manmade, the uncertain impact of globalisation, and an increasingly competitive international trade environment, Bangladesh still faces considerable challenges (UN, 2005a). The presence of both the challenges and potentials for development makes Bangladesh

ideal for the application of the human security approach. To fully realise its overall potential, Bangladesh needs to continue pursuing functional democracy (UNDP, 2011a), otherwise, political malpractice may harm the basic institutions of democracy such as local and regional bodies. Improper “decentralisation may well be used to destroy local or regional centers of power hostile to the national regime” (Kazi, 2006). Under strong democratic practice, the push for poverty reduction through human security policy is becoming more prominent, which is receiving overwhelming support at home and from abroad (Bhattacharya, 2003). The GoB’s policies concerning poverty reduction explicitly refer to human security as an approach (GoB, 2005a). For example, section 3 of the PRSP defines poverty with its wider scope and identifies human security as the tool to deal with. Likewise, other recent development policies also utilise human security sensitivity as a GoB’s policy tool for addressing its urgent need to eradicate poverty.

2.4.2 Human Security Association with Development Needs in Bangladesh

Development requirements have often evolved with various existing threats reflecting the structural and geo-political situation. The geo-location of Bangladesh is both potential for development and poses security threats, which need to be addressed by human security policy. Bangladesh has a fertile delta of 147,570 sq km and is the home of a mainly Bengali speaking homogenous population. The characteristic of a homogenous population is its potential to expedite implementation of development policies, consideration of which is a component of a human security policy. On the other hand, the total length of the land border is about 4,246 km, of which 93.9% is shared with India and about 6.1% with Myanmar, indicates the potential for international economic cooperation with the neighbours, which can be important for development (GoB, 2010d). Any sound policy formation should consider these physical factors in order to meet development needs. Moreover, development needs reflect both internal and external contexts and influences which are often aggravated by security threats arising from its geo-location. For example, the Bay of Bengal is well-known for its cyclones. The delta is swept by upstream seasonal flood water every year with consequent extensive loss of life and property. Both, therefore,

pose critical development threats (Sen, & Hulme, 2004). To face existing development threats, Bangladesh is upgrading its physical infrastructure and applying a human security approach to enhance the lifestyle quality of its huge population (GoB, 2005). Thus, the GoB considers a human security based policy as essential and potentially able to meet existing development needs. This approach provides a better chance for effective policy formation.

The GoB is bound by law to take appropriate steps to secure its nationals from any pervasive and real threats (GoB, 1972). This type of government responsibility cannot be enforceable by court and may be regarded as a ‘directive principle’ of the state. A detailed explanation about directive principles has been given by Justice Badrul Haider Chowdhury of the Appellate Division of the Bangladesh Supreme Court in the judgment of *Anwar Hossain v Bangladesh* 1989 BLD⁶ (Spl). He stated in the judgment that, “though the ‘directive principles’ are not enforceable by any court, the principles therein laid down are nevertheless fundamental in the Governance of the country and it shall be the duty of the state to apply these principles” (BLD, 1989). Responding to the responsibility of securing the nations by ensuring the development needs, the GoB has taken extraordinary initiatives. Such as, it has adopted national policies sensitive towards human security, and, it has facilitated the BAF to implement several policies which can be seen as being based on human security values.

Bangladesh is also a typical Least Developed Country characterised by its vibrant population striving to overcome economic hardship⁷ (Rahman, 2011). Many of

⁶In this Mr. AnwerHassian challenged the Government of Bangladesh against the 8th amendment of the constitution, which is about creating branches of the Bangladesh High Court arguing that this will essentially breach the unitary system of the country. Though the case is famous for its stand on the Supreme Courts decisions on the basic structure of the state, but in the judgment also provides key directions related with the ‘directive principle’. The judgment of the case highlighted on the responsibility of the state to implement the directive principle of the Constitution. Though this is not as immediate as fundamental rights but the national policy needs to pursue these principles. The detail judgment is recorded in Dhaka Law Report (DLR) in 1989.

⁷ This poverty situation is drastically changing in recent days in Bangladesh. Modernization and economic liberalization is touching all sector of the country. Specially, the garment sector has

its development policies are being implemented to meet the eight Millennium Development Goals⁸ (MDGs) which are specifically related to the development needs of Bangladesh. Although they are not specifically concerned with human security, the development goals such as improving school enrollment, and maternal health and nutrition are essentially related to human security. The Asian Development Bank has claimed its projects have reduced child and maternal mortality helping Bangladesh to meet one MDG (Asian Development Bank, 2008: 2). However, “the MDG progress report remarked that the performance of Bangladesh is uneven” (GoB, 2005). The International Monetary Fund in its November 2006 Report noted that Bangladesh was reducing poverty and making headway toward meeting its MDGs. It also noted that “the remaining social and economic challenges are daunting, however, as a large part of the population remains below the poverty line” (International Monetary Fund, 2006). In 2005, the GoB commented that the challenges to achieving the MDGs within the next decade will require Bangladesh to develop and implement more ambitious and effective strategies (GoB, 2005: 8).

Other policies such as the PRSP and Sixth Five Years Plan have also embodied human security as a process to address development needs in Bangladesh

developed significantly and this is the driving force of Bangladesh’s rapid development. Semi and medium level enterprises are much popular for domestic investment and demanding technical knowledge from a skilled work force. Tele-communication, iron and steel, agricultural processing and pharmaceuticals sectors are demanding inter-national cooperation in sharing expertise and train its population. Goldman Sachs investment bank identified Bangladesh as one of “The Next 11”, having a high potential of becoming the world’s largest economies in the 21st centuries after BRICs, in a paper published in December, 2005.

⁸ World leaders at the September 2000 UN Millennium Summit agreed on the Millennium Declaration for accelerating democratization and securing peace, scaling up development and poverty reduction, ensuring environmental sustainability, and promoting global partnerships. The development agenda was further elaborated in 2001 into the Millennium Development Goals. The MDGs are a set of time-bound and measurable targets for combating problems including poverty, hunger, disease, environmental degradation and discrimination against women. The MDGs are now at the heart of the global development agenda. For each goal, one or more targets have been set, mostly for 2015, using 1990 as a benchmark. Indicators have been identified to measure progress against each target. Each goal, with their respective targets and indicators, needs to be adjusted according to the specific country context. For more information see <http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/>

(GoB, 2005a). Likewise, the GoB's commitment to the *UN Outcome Document 2005* requires addressing human security issues through its national development plans. However, success is uncertain, given the political reality in the country. Despite challenges to the successful human security sensitivity to meet development needs, it is nevertheless important to note that the GoB is considering human security policy as one key approach in its policy strategy.

2.4.3 Human Security Association with the Challenge of Large Population

One of the biggest challenges for Bangladesh is its large population. According to the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics Bangladesh had a population of about 147 million in mid-2007 (Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, 2007). Population size is widely considered to be a major problem for Bangladesh. In 2004, United Nations Population Division's revised population projections predicted that the population of Bangladesh would reach 218 million by 2050 and finally stabilise at about 260 million in the middle of the next century (United Nations Population Division, 1998). Streatfield and Karar have argued that "Bangladesh has achieved considerable success in reducing fertility but population momentum will carry its population close to 250 million" (Streatfield, & Karar, 2008). Of course, the security threats from a high population are real, but the basic security threats for the country lie in failing to meet the needs of its huge population. In that regard, the policy response needs to harmonise with the needs of the current large population. For example, if the policy fails to respond to their education or health needs, the population may become a threat to national stability. However, policies may ensure capacity development by providing quality education that can transform the population into a valuable human resource. Education provides not only the life skills but also an appreciation of certain behaviours and the disadvantages of other behaviours (Lewis, *et. al.*, 2000). Such skills and understanding provide the population with essential discipline which then allows it to be easier to discharge their duties.

A human security approach can offer extensive benefits. In addition to shaping the understanding of the people, human security policies consider the needs of all individuals and communities (Alkire, 2003). By improving the capacity of the

people and ensuring their basic needs, a huge population could become a huge human resource (Bajpai, 2000). The threats posed by a large population in Bangladesh can be transformed into a potential asset for the country; this may be termed a 'demographic dividend' (Global Security, 2012). The Sixth Five Years Plan has revealed that the GoB's intention to activate its huge population and turn it into a human resource is a human security approach. Human security policy creates more people with capacity, and reveals and releases their potential (Chen, 1995). Thus, the population may be transformed into a major resource for the country, which is a formidable solution to the threats posed by the large population of Bangladesh.

2.5 State of Human Security in Bangladeshi National Policies

Several national policies in Bangladesh are sensitive to the human security principles and objectives. The analysis of some of those policies provides an understanding about the state of human security association. Ideally, sound policy at a national level should effectively address core national issues (Lewis, *et. al.*, 2000). Often, the issues of marginalised communities are not considered in the policy process. As a result, the anti-poverty agenda does not carry much weight at the national policy level. Human security principles and objectives accommodate the agendas of the voiceless and make them prominent. In 2004, a study by the Japan International Cooperation Agency found that "in low income countries under stress a lack of human security appeared to inhibit productive activity, long-term perspective and social cohesion to such an extent that development never gained a foothold" (IC Net., 2004: 6). Importantly, Bangladesh is increasingly incorporating policies which address the GoB's priority concerns such as poverty eradication. The GoB's recent development policies have identified poverty as a core issue and human security as the approach to deal with it (GoB, 2005a). Human security policy can also reduce the gaps between the rich and the poor by ensuring growth benefits for the marginalized (GoB, 2005). Pasha, in his article *Pro-poor Policies in South Asia*, has argued that "the relationship between economic growth and poverty reduction through influencing both the process of generation and distribution of income should be in such a way that will benefit the poor" (Pasha, 2004:131). Human security promotes the 'trickle-down' of

resources. In operation, human security enhances skills, creates employment opportunities, and, where appropriate, re-distributes resources through social welfare, smart taxation and incentives (Alkire, 2003).

Recognising the range of potential benefits of human security, national policy has included human security principles and objectives to deal with the nontraditional security of Bangladesh (Barman, *al. et.* 2002). Human security principles and objectives are intertwined with a variety of policies addressing both security and development. A dialogue on *Human Security in Bangladesh: Recent Trends and Response* organised by the Center for Policy Dialogue has shown that good governance or a functioning democracy can ensure a human security based policy process in Bangladesh (Center for Policy Dialogue, 2003). The readjustment of social welfare and people's access to resources and services are two key elements that are increasingly being included in the policy. For example, Social Safety Nets and social welfare for the disadvantaged and vulnerable groups are specifically provided for in the National Food Security Policy of 2005. Under that policy, the Ministry of Food and Disaster Management "includes access to and utilisation of food, coordination, food policy analysis, short and long-run forecasting of domestic and world supply and trade" (Ministry of Food and Disaster Management, 2005: 14). Other examples of human security principles and objectives sensitive national policy are found in the National Development Plans, Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, Disaster Management Policy, and most of the development plans of action. In the following narrative it is shown that the GoB has adopted several key approaches in those national policies to apply human security principles and objectives. Those approaches have been implemented as the GoB's initiatives to comply with human security.

A. Positive Discrimination for Ethnic Minority: By specifically acknowledging its human security approach in national policies and using that term, the GoB has adopted several positive discrimination programmes⁹ as policy measures to ensure social equilibrium and fairness. By this means, certain sections of the

⁹ Positive discrimination is regarded as the preferential treatment of members of a minority group over a majority group, either by sex, race, age, marital status or sex orientation. It is generally considered illegal and unlawful. But many argue it as a measure for ensuring social justice.

population who remain in deprived circumstances can be brought to a similar condition with the rest. Bangladesh has adopted policies of positive discrimination for the Jumma population (ethnic minority) in the CHT, women, and the disabled (GoB, 1997b). The 'special quota' in all levels of education, preference in government employment, and a higher allocation of development funds for the CHT all demonstrate this process.

B. Social Safety Net for Vulnerable: The Social Safety Net Programme is a mechanism whereby the human security concept can be translated into practical action. Under the Social Safety Net Programme, several complementary programmes have been introduced by the GoB. The Social Safety Net Programme is more than a collection of well-implemented and well-designed programmes. It has a holistic and coordinated characteristic that creates operational scope for implementation. According to Arribas-Baños and Baldeón, the conditions or characteristics which make the social safety net better functioning are that it is : i) appropriate, ii) adequate, iii) equitable, iv) cost-effective, v) incentive compatible, vi) sustainable, and vii) dynamic (Banos, *al. et.*, 2007). In Bangladesh, the social safety net is newly introduced. The success of the Social Safety Net Programme is yet to be considered in serious debate. This Bangladeshi experiment is understood to constitute a 'beginner's approach'. Although it covers elderly pensions, free food rationing, and feeding in schools, the programme remains to be fully coordinated and implemented throughout Bangladesh.

There are arguments that some Social Safety Net Programme expenditure has not been appropriately incurred under this programme, but should be more properly included as part of the national budget (Iftekhharuzzaman, & Rahman, 1986). The World Bank (2006) has estimated that allocation for retired government employees and their families was being operated but was not recognised as Social Safety Net Programme budget in the Five Years Plan 2006-07 (World Bank, 2006). Apart from the procedural fault, the GoB's capacity for fully implementing the Social Safety Net Programme is also limited. The Social Safety Net Programme allocation is relatively small compared with the demand. In particular, the huge underprivileged population requires a practical programme with proper budgeting and sufficient funding. "The poor are the most vulnerable to a wide range of risks" (UNDP, 2011).

Positively, the GoB is expanding the Social Safety Net Programme for the poor (e.g. Vulnerable Group Feeding or Open Market Sales) to ensure food security for this vulnerable group in Bangladesh. In the National Food Security Plan and Action 2008-2015, the GoB has also initiated Vulnerable Group Feeding or Open Market Sales to ensure food security for society's most vulnerable (GoB, 2008d).

C. Women and Children Protection Measures: There has been a sequence of policy measures to improve and promote the condition of women and children. The Ministry of Women and Children Affairs is working to encourage reforms in many existing legal and institutional structures to ensure economic and personal security of women and children. The National Women Development Policy 2008 is a significant step. This policy is intended to create an appropriate socio-economic and political structure to support the overall development of women (GoB, 2010c). The protection of personal security of women has given priority. This policy provides scope to create specific mechanism and monitoring system for the protection of personal security of women (GoB, 2008a). The National Plan of Action for Children of Bangladesh 2004-2009 established exemplary measures for the welfare and protection of children. Section 3.5 of the Plan of Action detailed the areas of major intervention. They include ensuring food security, bringing them within the operational protection of social safety nets, ensuring their needs of nutrition by the National Nutrition Program and empowering them through quality education (GoB, 2004). These measures for the protection and promotion of women and children are human security agendas.

GoB's initiatives to associate human security principles and objectives into policies are well visible in numbers of national development policies. Since such association is referred time to time in this research it is convenient to provide a list of selected provisions of national policies those are containing human security principles and objectives.

Table 2.1: Selected Provisions of Human Security in Bangladeshi National Policies

Name of the Policy or Law and Year	Provisions Containing Human Security Principles and Objectives
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<p>National Environment Management Action Plan (1995)</p>	<p>Sec. 4.1.1: disaster has identified as cause of insecurity. Sec. 4.8.6: Crop security programmes (food security) are identified as the priority to address the climatic uncertainty. Sec. 4.10.6: Measures for food security is recommended as central security issue.</p>
<p>National Food Policy (1996)</p>	<p>Preamble: Achieving a ‘comprehensive food security for all’. Sec. B: Goal is to ensure food security for all by ensuring supply, access and adequate nutrition. Sec. D: Food security can be achieved once all can buy adequate food.</p>
<p>Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (2005)</p>	<p>Executive Summary, 3 (viii) and Chapter 1, Sec. 1A (1.5): Poverty has defined as ‘is a broad front. It is about income levels. It is about food security. It is about quality of life. It is about asset bases. It is about human resource capacities. It is about vulnerabilities and coping. It is about gender inequalities. It is about human security.’ Sec. 1A (1.13): Human security has mentioned as a core aspect of progress on par with economic and social development. Other provisions on human security in Section are: 1B (1.21) [food security], 3.B.1 (3.6) [social security], 3.B.4.1 (3.25) [social safety nets], (3.31) [personal security], (3.52) [social security], (3.53) [food security], (3.55) [personal security], (3.59) [food security], (3.60) [food security], 5.C [food security], 5.D.1.3 (5.270) and (5.280) [health security].</p>
<p>National Food Policy Plan of Action (2008-15)</p>	<p>Sec. 1.6: Linking food security with political commitment and poverty reduction (implementation of the PRSP). Sec. 1.2: Environmental insecurity (climate change) poses additional burden on food security. Sec. 1.2: Ensuring economic security is essential for food security.</p>
<p>National Plan</p>	<p>Introduction: Disaster is characterised as threat and the scope of</p>

for Disaster Management (2010-15)	<p>the plan is said to address the threats.</p> <p>Sec. 3.2: Disaster risk reduction and adaptation are aimed at human security.</p> <p>Sec. 4.7: Food security is one of the pillars for disaster management.</p> <p>Sec. 11.1: Ensuring the livelihood security (economic security) is identified as priority task for risk reduction.</p>
Bangladesh National Child Labour Elimination Policy (2010)	<p>Sec. 3: Among other reasons the cause of child labour is the lack of social security and poverty (economic security).</p> <p>Sec. 10: Emphasis on health security (service), personal security (safety) and economic security in work.</p> <p>Sec. 12: Prevention of child labour and safety (personal security) of children engaged in labour</p>

The above table shows that the association to human security principles and objectives with Bangladesh national policies is quite evident. The number of such policies is continuously increasing. It is important to note that all these policies are formed by the democratic governments of Bangladesh, which is an important consideration of this research. Certainly it provides logical strength to the argument that the human security sensitivity has an intrinsic relationship with the democracy.

2.5.1 Human Security in the National Development Plan

The national plans are seemingly being coordinated to implement the policies prioritising human security agendas, but the level of coordination is obviously a matter for debate. Although Bangladesh has a policy commitment to human security that has not resulted in perfect or ideal methods for implementation (Iftekharuzzaman, & Rahman, 1986). As discussed above, several national policies have incorporated human security objectives but all are not in a holistic manner. Often, a policy fails to specify an appropriate responsible government agency to implement or coordinate it. Some policy objectives do not meet the requirements of a truly integrated human security framework. However, as a beginner, a trend is gradually taking place and slowly emerging. The National Development Plan is one key policy that explicitly mentions human security.

Bangladesh has a long term (15-20 Years) development perspective described in the National Development Plan. Ideally, the plan is guided by the inspiration from the national constitution and addresses core national needs. It is worthwhile to mention that the core constitutional aspiration of Bangladesh is basically the pro-people inspiration and their aspiration to live with dignity (GoB, 1972). This feature of the National Development Plan is closely associated with the concept of human security, which also focuses on the protection of human dignity as the central goal of the policy. Thus the goal setting for the long-term plan of Bangladesh is consistent with a human security framework (GoB, 2010c). Since the National Development Plan deals only briefly with the smaller details of human security it is often interpreted differently by the various ruling political parties. This is an obvious defect in the process. The overall plan is executed by medium term and short term plans and programmes. These medium and short term plans are often manipulated by party preference. Thus, despite the presence of human security in the National Development Plan, the association is still far from perfect and requires constant improvement. The 'lack of continuity' in pursuing a human security approach in the National Development Plan jeopardises the effectiveness of the Plan. For example, the *Perspective Plan* took about 4 decades to prepare before the first long term Perspective Plan was finalised in 2010. In terms of the plan's background development, the Planning Commission developed several concept papers: *Preliminary Thoughts on a Perspective Plan of Bangladesh, 1980-2000* in 1979 and *Thoughts about Perspective Plan* in 1983. A further document called *Participatory Perspective Plan of Bangladesh (1995-2010)* was prepared in July 1995 but was never approved by the government. Finally, the *Outline Perspective Plan of Bangladesh (2010-2021): Making Vision 2021 A Reality* was published in 2021. This comprised a strategic articulation of the development vision, mission, goals and objectives towards the Digital Sonar Bangla, and identified human security as its principal strategy for poverty reduction and ensuring development for all (GoB, 2010a).

2.5.2 Human Security in the PRSP

There is a consensus among policy makers in Bangladesh and international stakeholders that poverty is the principal barrier to the country's development. The

World Bank directed developing countries early last decade to reduce poverty and ensure development. By March 2003, Bangladesh had developed *A National Strategy for Economic Growth, Poverty Reduction and Social Development* (GoB, 2003), an Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. The PRSP contains all the necessary direction needed to fulfill the development needs consistent with national aspirations and the constitutional direction. The PRSP 2005-2007 suggested that “the principal goal of the Bangladesh Government’s economic policy is to reduce poverty so as to gradually lift the vast majority of the people above the poverty line” (Gob, 2005a: 1). The PRSP has recognised the idea of people’s participation in the policy process and emphasised the importance of democratic governance as the key to successful development.

As a development strategy document, the PRSP addresses most human security needs. The PRSP 2005-2007 was extended as the PRSP 2007-09 followed the same course of action. The *National Strategy for Accelerated Poverty Reduction II*, the current PRSP for 2009-11, was published in February 2010. As its development vision, the present government has placed poverty reduction at the forefront of its development strategy (GoB, 2010b). The PRSP has linked the government’s agenda for poverty reduction to national needs. To realise the goal of poverty reduction a *Three Years Rolling Plan* was proposed. Unfortunately, the Rolling Plan details implementation of human security but only over three years. In the context of Bangladesh, the three years plan does not match the five years tenure of the political government. The government within in a single 5 years term can complete one rolling plan but has to leave the following one undone. As a result, the success of the Rolling Plan cannot be capitalised upon in elections. As a result, the government has abandoned the Rolling Plan and moved to the *Five Years Development Plan*. Thus, although the PRSP and the Rolling Plan explains human security implementation, they cannot be implemented due to political considerations. However, the recent Five Years Development Plan also proposes human security as a major strategy for reducing poverty.

2.5.3 Human Security in the Five Years Plan

The Five Years Plan is the main development plan and the bridge between the long-term Perspective Plan and short term Annual Development Program. Currently, Bangladesh has taken the Sixth Five Years Plan which is part of the implementation of 'Vision 2021' the GoB's main strategy to make Bangladesh a Middle Income Country and self-sufficient in food. "At the operational level the fundamental task of the Sixth Five Years Plan is to develop strategies, policies and institutions that allow Bangladesh to accelerate growth and reduce poverty" (GoB, 2010c). The core approach of the Sixth Five Years Plan is to enhance the capacity of the vast population to tackle potential threats. It also contemplates effective disaster management, promotion of environmental protection, and undertaking development projects without endangering the environment. Essentially, environmental security has made its way into development policy through the Sixth Five Years Plan.

One important aspect of this policy is the involvement of the BAF in human security implementation through, for example, involvement in responding to emergency situations. So the Sixth Five Years Plan has integrated human security and provided an opportunity for involving the BAF in the effective implementation of human security policies. Although there is still a party bias in designing policies and identifying human security imperatives, gradual progress towards human security association is evident. Several sectoral policies such as the *Water Resource Management Plan* have prioritised health and food security related to water management in Bangladesh (Rasul, & Chowdhury, 2010). Despite several limitations, it is interesting to note that Bangladesh is achieving more extensive association to human security principles and objectives with its policies and practical plans.

2.6 Human Security and Functional State

Appropriate national policies are essential for a functioning state. The above discussion shows that the national policies of Bangladesh are increasingly accepting the human security principles and objectives and those are strengthening the capacity of the state. Although, superficially, human security may not appear to be directly linked to the functioning of the state or even to protecting sovereignty, in a

practical sense human security addresses issues that impact on sovereignty. Political scientist Weissberg has supported this view and suggested “the human security model is clearly meant to cover a broad range of threats at the national level. But this confusing scope needs to be clearer in order to display how human security is applied and relevant to numerous threats” (Weissberg, 2006: 4). One way to understand the argument is to explain the relationship between the root causes of national vulnerability and the potential of human security to address those root causes. For example, environmental changes can be one root cause threatening sovereignty of a country. According to UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, “[i]n the coming decades, changes in the environment and the resulting upheavals were likely to become major drivers of war and conflict” (Ki-moon, 2007). War can be caused by environmental changes that may threaten national sovereignty. For example, war can take place due to reducing water flow in common rivers caused by the environmental changes. Dispute over the water flow in common rivers can cause conflict between two states. Thus, climatic threats symbolised as human security vulnerability can be transformed into threats to national sovereignty (UNDP, 2004). This shows that a new approach to security and development is needed to deal with the new phenomenon. The scope of mutuality between human security and national security meets this requirement which favours the stability of state and ensures a functioning state. Human security represents an extension of traditional security concepts (Haq, 1995). Thus, national vulnerability can be reduced by addressing the human security issues of the country.

The idea that human security predates the contemporary concept of a functioning state means the state is able to protect its borders. It could be seen that it is the state’s duty to protect its people, not only by protecting borders but also creating a society governed by the rule of law; this is explained by the social contract theory (Hobbes, 1651). This thesis argues that the state has been embracing elements of human security by protecting people from threats although the term human security is not used. At an international conference titled *Mainstreaming Human Security* in Thailand in 2007, Dr. Pitsuwan said:

“when we talk about human security, we usually think of it as something new, something noble, something that has just been invented for the world . . . human security is the primary purpose of

organising a state in the beginning . . . the concept of human security is not that new. It is just being re-packaged” (Pitsuwan, 2007).

His argument supports the historical basis of human security, which is to protect individual and community welfare. In exchange for protection from threats, humans obey the laws of their society and eventually laws of the state (Bajpai, 2000: 48). This shows that the factual basis of state formation has been inspired by the functioning component of the human security approach.

In January, 1990, *the North-South Roundtable*, held in Costa Rica, accepted that the post-cold war world needed a new concept of global security (North-South Round Table, 1990). It recommended that security in a post-cold war world needs reduced military spending. The budget should be allocated for human capacity development and that can ensure a stronger state and future peace. In short, this process is called ‘creating a peace-divided’, which is to ensure greater human development and ease economic and environmental imbalance.¹⁰ The transformed security focus brings the state and people onto a single page or to a common goal. Ensuring security for the state and people, the broader approach to human security application, confirms its comprehensiveness. The *Human Security Report 2005*, compiled by Professor Mack of the Human Security Centre, discusses the differences between the respective proponents of the ‘broad’ and the ‘narrow’ views of human security (Human Security Report, 2005: viii). The report shows human security is being narrowly interpreted. It also addresses threats to individuals, and ultimately protects national security. Although security policies focus on sustaining and promoting core values of states, they do not necessarily protect the people of the state. Former UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Ogata, explained that “traditionally, security threats were assumed to emanate from external sources. Security issues were therefore examined in the context of state security” (Ogata, 2001). She argued to protect individuals and communities from the external threats. By protecting people can reduce the vulnerability and provides better preparedness. The protection can be achieved through balancing application of both the human and national security.

¹⁰ These are stated in the statement of North-South Roundtable 1990. This was a meeting of high level participants. The Roundtable may account for some of the positive reception accorded to the analysis of human security notion in Human Development Report of 1994.

As state-centric security is becoming less popular with the growing number of intra-state conflicts, where over 85 per cent of major wars in the 1990s were fought inside national borders, the broader scope of human security is becoming more relevant (World Bank, 2000a: 50). In addition, the UNDP report suggests insecurity is particularly on the rise in poorer countries (UNDP, 2000: 36) meaning poverty is pushing the insecurity. Thus it requires realisation of development rights of the people to guarantee better security and stop the threats of conflict. *The Guardian* has reported that “civilians are at the greatest risk from contemporary wars, with over 1,400 non-combatants dying each day in the 1990s as a result” (Guardian, 2002). The correlation between the poverty and new conflicts is becoming prominent in the global security discourse. Obviously poverty is not only endangering the human lives but also the very existence of the state. Thus it is well understood that emphasising on human security can complement both the human empowerment and functioning state. Functioning state requires broad base people’s participation, which is maximised under the democratic system. The earlier discussion of this chapter shows that the democracy is the essential element for the human security sensitivity, which again is the core for the functioning state. Thus the democracy links the human security association and the functioning state in their single bond.

2.7 Military Involvement in Human Security Policy Implementation

The operative aspect of human security is a debatable issue among policy makers. The multi-level engagement scope of human security demands consensus among implementation agencies. Involving the BAF in human security implementation might appear paradoxical. However, the crucial role of the military in tackling security offers an avenue for military involvement. Human security seeks to find answers to questions such as security from what?, whose security?, and security by what means? (Tadjbakhsh, 2005). The institutional aspect of human security application is involved with the answers to these questions which also relate to national aspirations, resources, policy commitment and overall needs (Chen, 1995). If humans are the focus for security then the military’s responsibility to protect security allows the military to be part of policy implementation.

With a human security approach, the interests of the people are the focus of policy consideration. As a progressive approach, human security addresses the rights and needs of the people and also genuinely protects national sovereignty (Simon, 2008). Such an approach is a change from the cold war phenomenon. During the cold war period, the major state powers faced constant and explicit military threats from other states. “In such a hostile, bipolar system, focus on security invariably centered on the state and the state’s military capacity” (Weissberg, 2006). The military centric policy focused on strengthening the security agencies. Human security implementation, however, emphasises the effectiveness of civilian institutions (Simon, 2008). King and Murray have argued that “even successful examples of territorial security do not necessarily ensure the security of citizens within a state” (King, & Murray, 2001: 588). Thus the prioritisation of individual security for the better protection of national sovereignty theoretically justifies military involvement in human security.

The armed forces are integral to human security implementation. In Japan, the armed force is called the Self Defense Force and has human security duties and responsibilities. The Canadian armed force is required to undertake peace keeping as a human security task. The *A Human Security Doctrine for Europe* prepared by the Study Group on Europe's Security Capabilities argued for a quasi-civil/military to act as a Human Security Response Force (Study Group on Europe's Security Capabilities, 2004). Thus, the military can operate as a formidable force for implementing human security. Bangladesh is slowly re-defining the functional relationship between the civilian political government and its armed forces. The BAF’s involvement in human security increases inter-agency cooperation. Eventually, the BAF’s engagement in human security results in a better civil-military relationship, and also enhances the functioning of the state. The democratic governments in Bangladesh are realising this fact and involving the BAF in human security activities. The GoB is also considering several other strategies to promote the BAF’s involvement in human security implementation.

A. Military Involvement in Extended Security: The concept of security is expanding. Security is linked to past events and evolves to meet future changes. In *Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order 1648-1989*, Holsti linked

potential threats with future conflicts and emphasised “the need to be attentive to the problems of the past and the threats of the future” (Holsti, 1991). A more comprehensive historical perspective can offer further clarification. Although this thesis does not fully describe the historical context of human security, it is appropriate to note that the peace agreements of post-Westphalia acknowledge that human security addresses potential threats. Since the military is the initial means of dealing with potential threats, threats posed by the extended security concept justify military involvement in the implementation of the measures addressing this development. The following diagram of Debiel and Werthes shows the changes in the security relationship and emergence of extended security, which justifies the involvement of the military in dealing with extended security threats.




Figure 2.4: Horizontal and Vertical Security Agenda Extension (Debiel, & Werthes, 2006: 13)

The security discourse has evolved through three distinct stages or generations. In the first stage, the security discourse addressed traditional security at the national level and common security at the international level. The second stage witnessed the evolution of a concept of extended security at the national level and comprehensive security at the international level. In the first generation, the security concept was conservative and derived power from, and was controlled by, the state. Interpretation of the second generation security concept was controlled at a central

level and directed by the provision of law. The conceptual evolution through the first two stages has now progressed to a third stage. In the third generation security discourse, the security concept is further expanded and is interpreted with great flexibility encompassing people's needs and aspirations. The third generation is the human security. The third generation embraces the ideas of 'freedom from fear' and 'freedom of want' (Alkire, 2003). As a derivative concept human security emphasises human emancipation which is distinctive from the approaches in the earlier stages. Third generation extended security includes wider security threats. In dealing with such wider security issues, national agencies need to develop their own particular expertise and new skills. The military, as a national agency, has the necessary skills to deal with physical threats which are vital to address the policies related to 'freedom from fear'.

B. BAF's Involvement in Nontraditional Security: Nontraditional security is a security phenomenon that is not military in nature and requires measures beyond a traditional military approach. Sudarsono described nontraditional security as a welcome departure from the rather narrow debate about security (Sudarsono, 1996: 69). Nontraditional security needs a solid security strategy and approach to the root cause of threats essentially in same type of human security. More simply put, "it should be noted that current studies of nontraditional security in the international community tend to highly emphasise human security" (Evans, 2004). Since the nontraditional security is an evolution of traditional security ideas, traditional security tools have to be appropriately adjusted (Chaudguri, 2011). In the adjustment process, the 'comprehensive security' of the 1980s has included development and environment security but kept the focus on the state.

The Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security chaired by Palme in the 1980s brought a change in the conceptual debate of security. In his report, *Common Security*, he advocated alternative ways of thinking about security. Supporting Palme, Haq has suggested that "common security requires that people live in dignity and peace, that they have enough to eat and are able to find work and live in a world without poverty and destitution" (Haq, 1995). This suggestion extends, and is common to both nontraditional security and human security. The UNDP framework of human security advocates economic security and development to escape from poverty

(UNDP, 1994). The Stockholm initiative on Global Security and Governance has also indicated development issues as a cause of insecurity. The Commission on Global Governances in its report *Global Neighborhood of 1995* has argued that “the concept of global security must be broadened from the traditional focus on the security of states to include the security of people and the security of the planet” (Commission on Global Governances, 1995). One such extended security concern is terrorism. Piazza has suggested that most scholars argue that terrorism is an outcome of poverty; hence it is clearly relevant to lack of human security (Piazza, 2006). On the other hand, The Stanley Foundation has suggested that “the war on terrorism affects human security issues both directly and indirectly” (Stanley Foundation, 2003). In the context of the evolving global security concept, human security is either a cause of, or a response to, the outcome. Since the military is an inseparable stakeholder in responses to global security, it is justified to involve the military in implementing human security activities.

Although all nontraditional security does not advocate military involvement, a wide range of nontraditional security issues require the orderly, and sometimes immediate and qualified involvement of state agencies. The BAF, as a state agency, operates in a disciplined and orderly manner under a clearly defined chain of command. The military is also equipped to support the civil authority during an emergency or natural disaster (further details are set out in Chapter IV). Thus, the military is considered as a key implementing agency in emergency response.

The new security situation involves neither purely traditional military security nor fully non-military security. The Stanley Foundation has recommended three aspects of the human security approach to deal with this new security situation, namely: the people-based solution, multilateral and holistic solution of the security threats¹¹. The BAF as a regulated and disciplined agency has the ability to assist the civil administration in applying measures in a holistic way. The multi-dimensional

¹¹ The Stanley Foundation has organized the discussion on nontraditional security and suggested the human security approach as a way-out from the crisis of the outcome from terrorism. The discussion took place on October 16-18, 2003 at AirlieCenter, Warrenton, VA. The title of the discussion forum was 44th Strategy for Peace Conference. The outcome of the conference has summarized in the policy bulletin of the Stanley Foundation in 2003.

scope of nontraditional security allows military involvement as a necessary partner in human security implementation (United Nations, 2008). The wider scope of such human security implementation is roughly related to economic security, food security, personal security and community security, where the BAF is considered as an active partner in Bangladesh.

C. BAF Involvement in International Peace Efforts: Human security sensitivity is a way in meeting new challenges faced by the national citizens in the context of their membership in international community. Human security principles and objectives address the domestic impact of the threats generated due to inadequate international peace. In this context, the UN has been the main driving force in international peacekeeping although it faces numerous criticisms due to lack of effective programming. Even the UN Secretary General, Ban Ki Mon, has accepted that political realities reflect adversely on the organization (Telegraph, 2011). This also reflected in the agenda setting for human security. Kaldor has argued in her book *Human Security* that “a new ethical approach is needed (for UN’s action), grounded in the notion that the rights of individuals supersede the rights of states” (Kaldor, 2007:154). However, the UN has prioritized individual security and recommended a coordinated approach to integrate human security principles and objectives to protect human dignity (Commission on Human Security, 2003).

One major example of such an initiative is the UN peacekeeping programme (details of which are contained in Chapter VI). In current peacekeeping operations, the BAF is mainly involved in non-combat activities and works together with the civil administration. The scope of humanitarian involvement in peacekeeping gives the military opportunities to learn the process and importance of a functioning civil-political administration. Moreover, it is an involvement that protects vulnerable people as well as minimizing the chances of war. As a result, human security involvement in peacekeeping helps to maintain international peace.

D. BAF’s Involvement and Institutional Efficiency: BAF’s involvement in human security implementation has the potential to increase the effectiveness of other associated agencies of the security and civil establishment. When the state implements human security policies, the main institution involved is the civilian administration (Oxfam, 2012). Most recently, some advanced democratic countries

(e.g. Canada, and Japan) have developed well organized state agencies to operate human security based policies (IDEA, 2006). Among the state agencies, governments are involving the military together with civil agencies. For example, Canada involves military and civil agencies as peace keepers, which they believe are the agencies to deter potential threats. Since current trends in implementing human security frameworks do not involve just civil institutions, an increasing number of other agencies, such as the military, are also becoming involved. Most pragmatic scope of human security implementation is that it is responsive to national needs and involves multiple agencies without breaching the mandates of the agencies those are involved. To understand the varied needs of multiple institutional involvements it is helpful to consider the causes of insecurity. The Commission on Human Security suggested in *Human Security Now* that the cause of insecurity depends on each specific context. The cause of insecurity often involves issues related to the mandate of multiple agencies (The Commission on Human Security, 2003). In a national context, human security policy involves various national institutions to protect and empower individuals and communities (Bajpai, 2000). In addition, the strength and appeal of human security addresses the new causes of insecurity (Jolly, & Ray, 2006). Dealing with these new causes of insecurity, involves multiple state agencies, including the military. The important aspect of armed force's involvement with the other state agencies is the scope for influencing each other. As an orderly force, the BAF brings knowledge of discipline to local level civil agencies as well as learning about the functioning of local non-military authorities (further details are set out in Chapter IV). In addition to learning from civilian administrations, the BAF can contribute new ways and techniques to enhance the effective functioning of local civilian administrations.

2.8 Chapter Conclusion

This chapter explains relationship between the human security association and a favored political system, which is a democratic system. In explanation this chapter clarifies the objectives of human security in policy to meet national needs in the context of Bangladesh. It also explains aspects of human security implementation

and the appropriateness of human security association with national policy. The existing state of human security association with various Bangladeshi national policies shows that it is a recent trend and can potentially respond to national needs. It is also argued that human security policy is effectively addressing evolving security needs where the requirements of national security are also complementary to the human security policies. It shows that the human security based policies are basically made under the democratic governments. This logically justifies the argument that the human security association is expedited due to the presence of favorable democratic government. This chapter argues the potential of the BAF's involvement in human security implementation and explains that such involvement is beneficial for state functioning. It shows that human security association does not negate a state's sovereignty but rather reinforces it. In doing so, various state agencies are involved which strengthens civil-military cooperation. In the context of Bangladesh, by the active direction of the democratic governments the BAF is playing a cardinal role in applying human security. Accordingly, the following chapter explains the phenomenon of involving the BAF in human security activities and considers its impact on military disengagement from politics.

CHAPTER III

THE BANGLADESH ARMED FORCE'S INVOLVEMENT IN HUMAN SECURITY AND DISENGAGEMENT FROM POLITICS

3.1 Chapter Introduction

The GoB has been involving the BAF in human security activities since the democratic uprising of the 1990s. This chapter describes how the BAF's traditional role and structure were quite inconsistent and different from its present involvement in human security. Under the democratic system, the BAF has undergone structural and non-structural changes which have modified the dynamics of the civil-military cooperation in Bangladesh. In this chapter it is argued that the BAF's disengagement from politics was initially forced by the establishment of democracy and was then further assisted by the BAF's growing involvement in nontraditional security. A brief analysis of past military coups shows that the changed military practice is due to strong control exercised by successive democratic governments. It is argued that the enforcement of statutory measures for civilian control and thereby involving the military in human security activities have strengthened the grip of the political government over the military. This has allowed very little opportunity to engage in politics or commit a coup. This chapter provides a security mapping and argues that Bangladesh is facing both traditional and nontraditional security threats. Thus, the BAF's involvement in nontraditional security does not negate its obvious role in traditional security, and its involvement in nontraditional security activities can positively contribute to strengthening the political government, which eventually encourages military disengagement. This chapter suggests that the GoB's initiative in developing a stronger military does not contradict its growing involvement in aiding the civilian administration. This chapter argues that, with increased involvement in human security work, the strong BAF is encouraged to become disengaged from politics.

3.2 The BAF's Traditional Structure and Human Security

Involvement

To understand the dynamics of the BAF's involvement in human security and its disengagement from politics, an analysis of the BAF's background and structural evolution is needed. This thesis argues that the BAF's colonial background and traditional elite structure obstructed its involvement in human security. Although the inception of the BAF was inspired by the spirit of the independence war of Bangladesh, its historical roots lie in the colonial past. The predecessor of the BAF was the British and, later, the Pakistani Army. Professor Ahamed has mentioned:

“the Bangladesh Army inherited both the institutional framework of its British Indian and Pakistan Army predecessors as well as their orientation against civilian rule and their sensitivity to political power” (Ahamed, 2004: 101).

This internal orientation allowed the military to act as a dominant class in the newly established Bangladesh. He further explained this phenomenon in his book *Military Rule and Myth of Democracy* and stated that “[i]n a post-colonial state like Bangladesh the military tends to be dominant not only because these states have inherited an overdeveloped bureaucratic structure and its institutionalised practices, but also because of the nature of its institutional framework” (Ahamed, 1988: 49-50). The BAF, therefore, inherited an institutional mindset from its past structure where it was aloof from the civilian influences and closer to the powerful ruling authority. This orientation contributed to an unhealthy relationship between the civil and political arms of government. As a result, the military believed that it was the custodian of the law of the country, which basically undermined the political authority. Professor Ahmed has explained that:

“[t]hey (the BAF) were taught that politicians were no more than ‘rabble rousers’ and ‘disruptionists’, and that their (the BAF) merely undermined the social order and systemic solidarity. Thus the British Indian military officers in the course of time were not only thoroughly anglicised but also rendered anti-national, anti-political and anti-democratic” (Ahmed, 2004: 114).

The same opinion was been expressed by General Ershad even before his assumption of the power in March 1982. Major General Ershad demanded that the military be accorded a constitutional role to ensure the protection of the political system (Ershad, 1981:12). In his view, the motivation of protecting the political system legitimised military engagement with politics. With this attitude and institutional structure, the newly formed BAF constantly struggled to ascertain and clarify its role in a state under a democratic system. While this internal struggle was occurring, the military intervened regularly in the political system of the country, mainly by committing coups but also by joining the civilian administration and participating in politics. With a brief exception, this enabled the BAF to keep Bangladesh under direct or indirect military rule for two decades. The BAF's position as the ruling elite of the country acted as a barrier to the functioning of democratic norms in early Bangladesh. As a result, the nontraditional security issues were never recognised as an area for the BAF's involvement. This thesis explains that military coups in Bangladesh occurred due to conditions prevailed in political and governance field those are later contained by the democratic governments. Thus, the capacity of democratic governments to address the causes of the coups has allowed the BAF to become involved in human security activities and disengaged from politics.

3.2.1 Military Coups and Democratisation

It is argued that undertaking military coups was a display of the BAF's anti-democratic role. In the early period of Bangladesh's political history; the BAF was involved in a series of military coups which disrupted the prevailing political system. During the early Bangladesh political history, democracy had no opportunity to grow to maturity. Since this thesis focuses on military disengagement, it is essential to identify the facts relating to the military engagement in politics. This section describes the historical context of Bangladeshi military coups. It explains that the BAF's involvement in politics not only hampered civilian political growth but also the association to human security principles and objectives with national policy. It can be claimed that Bangladesh witnessed many military coups in the same way as many other developing and newly independent countries did in the 1960s and 1970s. Political scientist Hakim has offered the following international perspective of coups:

[i]n 1961, 12 per cent of the independent states of the world were under military rule, and . . . as many as 56 per cent of the independent third world states experienced military rule at least once by 1974 (Hakim, 1998: 283).

So the claim that international factors such as global politics, cold war impact and lack of democratic development were influential causes of the early coups in Bangladesh finds some legitimate ground. However, post independent Bangladeshi coups have some special or unique features. A chronological explanation provides a better understanding about the unique context and nature of these coups in Bangladesh. It shows that it was not international events but the state of domestic politics and superiority of the military establishment that caused the coups.

Immediately after independence in 1971, there was a series of coups and counter coups. In an article, political scientist Riaz explaining the historical context of the coups wrote that “the nation has experienced at least four successful and at least seventeen abortive coups d’état in the post-independence period” (Riaz, 1998: 56). The year 1975 was a key period that was marked by military engagement in politics. A civilian court found that the coup of August 15, 1975, was the most significant, and was organised by Major Syed Faruque Rahman and Major Rashid, who killed the popular leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (then Prime Minister of Bangladesh) (GoB v Major Syed Faruque Rahman, 1999). “This was followed by two other coups, one on November 3, in which Major Faruque along with Khondaker Mustaque were overthrown and brought Major General Khaled Mosharraf to power. A counter coup four days later (November 7) killed General Mosharraf” (Saaduddin, 2010: 3). That coup was led by Colonel Taher who rescued Ziaur Rahman from captivity but was later executed in a Kangaroo Trial (secret trial) by Ziaur Rahman (Schutz, 1979). There were many smaller coups until 1981 when, on 30 April, Major General Manzur headed a coup in the southern port city of Bangladesh and killed President Ziaur Rahman. Many experts of political history accused General Ershad of having covertly organised the coup using General Manzur. General Ershad was the army chief during the coup and later became President. However, he made the final coup and took power on 25 March 1982 by ousting the elected government. He continued in power till 1990. (A detail list about the coups and political events in Bangladesh is provided in

Annexure E) The military was engaged in politics either directly or indirectly until the democratic uprising overthrew General Ershad in 1990.

From 1975 to 1990, motivation for coups evolved through three stages leading to the current third stage. Changes occurred in 1975, 1981 and 1990, and significantly changed the political history of Bangladesh.




Figure 3.1: Turning Points of Military Engagement in Politics

A. Systemic Weakness: The first wave of coups in Bangladesh took place during the mid 1970s, and a complex and chaotic political situation evolved which developed and was characterised by institutional failure to deal with the military establishment. According to Khan, the rise of the military to power was due to the vacuum created by the absence of institutionalised political leadership in Bangladesh (Khan, 1984). Jahan suggested that institutional gaps developed because “the emerging political system . . . depend[ed] more on an individual than institutions” (Jahan, 1990). So the first turning point in the evolutionary history of coups in Bangladesh was due to organisational or structural failure caused by neglecting the BAF and creating the Rokhi Bahani¹, a parallel armed force, which did not include the BAF. The BAF perceived the eventual outcome of creating parallel armed force as undermining its role in the liberation war. It also created confusion about the role and status of the military in a democratic state. Top of that the government had initiated one party system in the country arguing it was necessary to address the post-war

¹ In 1973 the Awami league regime established a paramilitary force named Jatayo Rokhi Bahini (National Defense Force). That is particularly in conflict with the institutional structure of the army and many perceived with the formation, structure and its function that it was an attempt to de-prioritize the military. The Jatayo Rakhi Bahini was composed primarily of freedom fighters loyal to Awami League.

situation in Bangladesh but undermined the democratic spirit. Thus the policy of the early government of Bangladesh had upset the democratic process.

B. Lack of Institutional Functioning: The second stage of military coups in Bangladesh occurred during the early 1980s. The history of coups in Bangladesh shows that there were significant conflicts within the BAF during the late 1970s. The BAF's internal institutional struggle had deteriorated the power struggle among various political stakeholders who received backing from the BAF. This caused numerous smaller coups until 1980. Codron considered that "the main source of instability was, unquestionably, to be found in the army" (Codron, 2007). President Zia had taken extraordinary measures due to the institutional struggle within the BAF. The *Far Eastern Economic Review* reported that "this is clearly attested by the fact that, within a few months of his takeover, Zia felt the necessity to found a special police force of 12,500 men" (Far Eastern Economic Review, 1976). President Zia, therefore, did not depend only on the military for security but also created a loyal force. This shows the lack of control over the military. Political scientist Franda argued using the same logic and that "in fact, during the Zia years, every time the higher command intervened in the divisional officers' nomination process, rebellion burst out, sometimes triggered by the General Officer Commanding himself" (Marcus, 1982: 241). Due to such internal dynamics of the BAF the organisational system was undermined by certain big man (senior military officer) and they captured the higher political office through coups. In this case General Ershad had taken the opportunity to become such a big man.

C. Poor Civil-Military Relationship: The coups history shows that it has changed the civil-military relationship in Bangladesh with a complex paradox and finally reached to a standard stage after the democratic uprising of 1990. With the maturity of democracy, command and control of the BAF is also becoming stable and is leading to military disengagement from politics. Importantly, the BAF has been increasingly involved in nontraditional security since 1990, and the BAF's attitude to civilian authorities has also changed significantly. In a recent example of this changed BAF's attitude, the BAF has come out to the media on January 19, 2012 and explained the facts related to an internal disturbance (*Daily Star*, 2012). The mere fact of placing the BAF before the public media by the BAF itself was an unprecedented incident in

the history of the civil-military relationship. The absence of military coups since 1990 and the maturity of democratic institutions allow political control and authority over the BAF.

This brief historical summary of Bangladesh coups shows that the backgrounds of the coups were not same. The series of coups and counter coups proves that the country was in a critical stage where the political institutions were not insufficiently developed and were facing chaos. Lack of a centralised command structure within the BAF caused the internal conflict. The historical analysis clearly shows that the country had very poor democratic practice during its early days. The absence of real democratic practices had contributed to the military coups. If the present political context is considered it can be argued that the poor democratic conditions had inspired the coups and those are less present after the restoration of democracy in 1990. More or less the country is experiencing uninterrupted democracy. Although there are claims of two unsuccessful coup attempts in 1996 and 2007, the overwhelming majority of security experts never call those events attempted coups. The popular euphemistic term currently used by security experts to identify the incidents in 1996 and 2007 is “internal disturbance”. Thus, the democratic governments have so far successfully contained military engagement with policies.

3.2.2 Democratic Governments Addressing the Causes of Coups

The chronological explanation and description of the Bangladesh coups and the different stages reveal that their causes are related to the syndromes of a new born nation. So far, this thesis has described the four stages of evolution of coups in Bangladesh and has revealed causes ranging from corporate interest to personal ambition of particular military officials. Although scholars are divided in opinion, the common feature of all explanations is that the lack of democratic practice in government was the fundamental cause of all the coups in Bangladesh. The later political history of Bangladesh shows that the democratic governments have taken extensive measures to overcome the various causes of the coups. The historical analysis outlined above and commonly agreed generic reasons for the coups have been vigorously addressed by government initiatives under the democratic system. The wider responses of the democratic governments have covered the following areas.

A. Addressing Systemic Weakness and Poor Governance: The summary and historical analysis of the military coups in Bangladesh show that the structural problems of the nation's early days contributed significantly to the coups. Dr. Ahamed in his *Military Rule and the Myth of Democracy* accepts poor governance as the root cause of military takeovers. In addition to structural weakness within the military administration, he posits that systemic weaknesses within Bangladesh society played a vital role in encouraging the military to seize power (Ahamed, 1988). Thus, structural problems within the military and civilian administrations created a situation of poor governance which allowed the military to engage in politics. Importantly, under a democratic system of government, both military and civilian institutions have to be accountable. Establishment of a parliamentary democracy, reform in civilian administration, separation of executive and judiciary powers, providing media freedom, and other reforms by democratic governments have addressed the systemic weaknesses and poor governance.

B. Ensuring Functional Political and Military Institutions: The earlier explanation shows that the lack of properly functioning political and military institutions caused the military coups. Political scientist Hassan linked coups with factor of the interest of the bourgeoisie politically upper class (Hassan, 1991). Bertocci prioritised the lack of political institutionalisation and the failure of the intermediate regime that brought the military to power (Bertocci, 1982). Disagreeing with these views, Riaz argued that “the most serious flaw in this kind of interpretation is the basic assumption that the military is an apolitical organisation, operating beyond the purview of politics” (Riaz, 1998: 57). However, the early history of the coups shows that it was not political awareness among the military but political ambition that was present, and which allowed it to seize power and become the dominant governing authority, and to retain power over the years. Mr. Alam, a member of Bangladesh Law Commission and trainer of BAF Long Course, stated that:

“the democratic system has developed the political institutions and initiated certain regulatory practices to ensure such institutionalisation of civilian control over the BAF. The functioning of the Parliamentary Defense Committee, three layers of defense monitoring and reporting system under the Prime Minister Office are

examples of some of the ways of creating civilian control over the military” (Interviewed on February 15, 200).

The indications suggest that the BAF has been evolving as an institution under the civilian government with its own place in the state but not of a political nature.

A small number of scholars have labeled corporate interest as the motivation for conducting coups, which is also a kind of institutional shortcoming with the BAF. Ahamed claimed the deliberate negligence by the early government of 1975 made the BAF conscious of its corporate interests (Ahamed, 1988). Bhattacharjee has explained that corporate interests involved the BAF's desire for greater budgetary support in the face of encroachment by rival institutions (Bhattacharjee, 2010). Despite this claim, the impact of the corporate interest on the commission of coups is very debatable. The BAF officially mentions two organisations that conduct business, namely the Sena Kalyan Songstha and the Bangladesh Army Welfare Trust. However, the reform in the BAF's corporate entities has largely curtailed the possibility of a military monopoly over the control of these organisations. Democratic government has introduced regulatory measures to ensure control by the Ministry of Defense, which is directly under the Prime Minister's Office. Moreover, the government has appointed an eight-member Board of Trustees for day to day control over those BAF's business organisations (Bhattacharjee, 2010). Thus, effective control by the democratic government has contained the BAF's corporate interest as a cause for coups.

C. Addressing the Issue of Negligence to the BAF: In the immediate post-independence period, the BAF considered itself as an important stakeholder in the independence movement. But the actions of the political government undermined the BAF's contribution. This caused the BAF to believe that it was facing political negligence. As a result the negligence converted into anger against the political leadership. The Mujib regime neglected the military reflected by reduced military spending and the rise of a parallel para-military organisation (Ahamed, 1988: 141). Others viewed negligence as a political failure which encouraged the military to become actively involved in politics by committing coups. For example, Bertocci has argued that “both the coups of 15 August 1975 and 24 March 1982 were consequences of the failure of the civilian regime to ensure a steady economic performance”

(Bertocci, 1982). However, the argument that poor performance of the civilian government caused military coups is highly debatable. Due to poor governance, the political government could not display their responsibility to the legitimate claims of any institutions and that includes the BAF. However, the political government's performance and actions need to be judged politically and not militarily and thus the military does not have the moral or legal authority to intervene politically. Under a democratic system of government, the military is receiving proper attention to its demands (Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies, 2009). The GoB has developed the new Defense Development Plan (Bangladesh Army, 2011). These kinds of programmes help the military feel it is an important stakeholder under a democratic system. Thus, initiatives to control and expand the BAF are currently successful in preventing it from engaging in political activism in Bangladesh.

Besides, the socio-anthropological perspective of the argument about the causes of military engagement in politics points that when the struggling ruling classes are unable to form a stable government, the military takes the power to provide stability. Umar analysed the coups in terms of the state's nature, social class structure, production and market. He argued that "the army in Bangladesh, as in many other countries, seized power because of a certain crisis within the ruling classes" (Umar, 1989). Post-independence Bangladesh society was not stable due to the shock of war. This social instability was the sign of conflict among the political leadership which encouraged the BAF to take over political power. However, ideally in a democratic country, the very notion of elite and lower classes does not exist. But the reality defers from the ideals. The early history of Bangladeshi politics indicates that the presence of political elite was a reality. With the maturity of democracy, the ordinary citizens of Bangladesh are acquiring a larger political stake which is helping to reducing the power struggle among the ruling classes and ending the chances for military coups. Thus, the military engagement in politics in Bangladesh was once highly visible but is now being contained by the maturity of democratic practices in the country.

3.2.3 BAF in Civil Administration

Besides military coups, members of the BAF often occupied higher positions in the civilian administration. In this way they were also able to influence

vital national policies. There have been numerous examples of army officials appointed to senior administrative positions by the military governments. Mahmood observed that “many key posts in the civil service including the Foreign Service have been given to either serving or retired military officers” (Mahmood, 2005). Such practices opened significant new career opportunities for military officers but adversely affected the career prospects of civil servants, and particularly the democratic institutions of the country. Most Bangladesh governments have appointed military personnel to key administrative positions to control the BAF and support the governments (Rashiduzzaman, 1978: 126).

However, a significant change in this practice occurred after the restoration of democracy in 1990. Khan has suggested that, although there are examples of appointing the BAF officials to some strategic positions by democratic governments, such appointments are not made in order to get support from the BAF (Khan, 2004). To understand the context of such appointments, the type and nature of the appointment needs to be explained. Most appointments of the BAF personnel under democratic governments have been to technical positions and can be explained or justified in terms of state needs rather than political motivation. Although the desire for the BAF's support cannot be entirely discounted by such appointments, their number is insignificant. It can be suggested, therefore, that the democratic system of government in Bangladesh has so far been able to keep the civil administration free from military involvement and intervention, and, in turn, reduced the likelihood of a military coup.

3.2.4 BAF's Political Participation

Attempt by serving members of the BAF to influence political parties to support retired senior officers who join political parties was a regular practice. However, the democratic governments subsequently introduced more rigorous disciplinary rules to prevent this practice. At the same time, democratic vigilance through stronger media also plays a role in preventing this from happening. Although political participation is a democratic right of all citizens irrespective of their professional background or status, it is also a fundamental and accepted norm that serving military personnel may not proclaim their political opinions publicly in a

functioning democracy. The Bangladesh constitution in Articles 37, 38 and 39 safeguards the rights to political participation. Article 38 deals with rights to association and provides that “every citizen shall have the right to form associations or unions” (GoB, 1972), with this right the citizen can also join the political parties. Retired officials of the armed forces, therefore, are free to join political parties according to their political inclinations and convictions. This was practised excessively during the early history of Bangladesh. Mainly, the military governments were encouraging army personnel to participate actively in politics. A significant number of military personnel joined the major political parties of Bangladesh in the 1970s and 1980s (Khan, 2004). However, it cannot be positively established that politics was hijacked by the military due to participation of its members. But the indirect influence of the military institution can hardly be avoided once its members are involved in politics. Thus, the crucial consideration is whether the democratic governments have limited, reduced or controlled the likelihood of influencing the serving military to favour military personnel involved in politics. Mr. Mazher, a senior researcher on the BAF and politics in Bangladesh, said that “the chances of indirect influence of the colleagues serving in the armed forces cannot be overruled” (Interviewed on April 11, 2011). There are instances when retired officials influenced the BAF to ensure its support for political activities.

However, the democratic governments have successfully introduced restrictions on the involvement of serving BAF members to support their retired colleagues involved in politics. The GoBs have introduced harder monitoring and vigilance through the BAF head-quarter. According to Hakim, “the armed forces (BAF) that previously looked for a pretext to intervene have shown signs of restraint and political maturity” (Hakim, 1998). Khan has suggested that the recent changes apparently show that the BAF has created a distance from the politics (Khan, 2004). Importantly, the different military response to the calls of their retired members involved in politics is a significant achievement of the functioning democracy in Bangladesh. The political government is limiting the involvement of serving members of the BAF in political matters of the country. Strong vigilance or oversight by political parties and the media has been helpful in this process. Preventing the involvement of serving members of the BAF in politics does not mean that the armed

forces have been relegated to a lower status or position in the national social hierarchy, but it is a characteristic of an armed force within a mature democratic system. The present state of democratic control in Bangladesh is obviously not without fault, but at least it is a system that can potentially ensure sufficient regulatory control to prevent serving military personnel assisting political parties and retired members of their own. Eradication of this practice is reducing the extent and likelihood of political engagement by the BAF.

3.3 Democratic Government's Control of the BAF

An important means of controlling the BAF by democratic governments of Bangladesh has been the successful application of statute law. For example, the earlier governments had been unable to implement the measures appointing multiple monitoring committees on the military. The Constitution and the Army Act provide for the provision of formal legal mechanisms to monitor the military by establishing monitoring committees. The democratic governments have passed several statutory measures which, *inter alia*, establish several intelligence committees to monitor security matters as well as oversee the activities of the military and report to the political government. This has given the political government dominance over military affairs and ensures civilian control.

In terms of military history, although the modern BAF dates back to April 1971, the BAF has evolved significantly since its initial establishment, and subsequent democratic governments have been particularly concerned to establish and enhance their statutory control over the BAF. Historically, the BAF was organized as a Bangladesh Force in the first Sector Command Conference (held July 11-17, 1971), and Muhammad Ataul Gani Osmani was the Commander in Chief of all Bangladesh Forces (Bangladesh Army, 2010). "It was a force defected from the Pakistani military and joined by the ordinary members from the other security forces. Even with this construction Bangladesh Force has done a commendable job during the liberation or independence war" (Khan, 2009). This particular mode of inception was marked as the significant reference point for the orientation of the BAF. However, the post-independence military suffered both internally and externally. As described by Khan:

Perhaps no other military in recent times had had to undergo so much upheaval internally, and suffer so many traumas infused by political turmoil since 1971, than the Bangladesh Armed Forces. It does not help to overlook the very nature of the birth of the military in Bangladesh (Khan, 2009).

Interestingly, this internal turmoil helped the military to adjust to the new political reality within Bangladesh. The GoB has initiated successful legislative measures to ensure civilian control over the BAF. Besides developing the BAF as a regular force, the democratic GoB has reformed the military command structure. One clear example of the GoB's internal reform initiative was to ensure a balanced representation from various sections of the armed forces in the command structure. Secondly, the government is also making the Bangladesh Army more diverse in nature. Since its establishment on 11 April, 1971, the army has been the largest and most important element within the BAF. It has been suggested that:

[t]he army structure is similar to many armies of the Commonwealth Nations. However, major changes have taken place following the adoption of U.S. Army tactical planning procedures, training management techniques and noncommissioned officer educational systems. It is supported by twenty corps, the most important of which are the Infantry, Artillery, Medical, Engineers, Nurse, Armored, Army Medical, Army Services, Military Police, Ordnance and Education corps. In times of war or crisis, the Bangladesh Army can also be reinforced by the Bangladesh Rifles, Ansar, Village Defense Parties, and other paramilitary land forces numbering about one million trained personnel (Agent, 2011).

This structural shift from its early composition has brought inner change within the establishment. The Bangladesh Army has evolved as a mega establishment of the new country. But gradually the democratic government is exposing it to the global security framework, initiating standard training and strategy combining with other sections of the armed forces. With its growth, the democratic governments have introduced a strict command and control system. This is a key statutory requirement but never

before introduced to the degree that the democratic governments have done. As a result, the civilian government is able to control the detail of military affairs.

However, the initial establishment of the Bangladesh Army offered little scope for a functional relationship with the people. Rather it evolved as a prestigious government agency. The democratic governments, therefore, have taken further action to ensure the BAF will be responsive to the needs of the people. Under the democratic governments since 1991, not only the Bangladesh Army but the entire BAF has developed as an organisation that has regular members. Codron has suggested about the BAF's present state that "the BAF is a classic professional organisation of the State with regular members at the forces" (Codron, 2007). Previously in 1975, it was suggested that the BAF should be composed of members of the political parties. That threat was eliminated by the democratic governments.

The BAF is managed and administratively controlled by the Ministry of Defense. Although the bureaucracy of Ministry of Defense is supposed to be predominantly civilian, the military exerts a great deal of influence over its operations. Heitzman & Worden explained that "through the appointment of military retirees and active-duty officers to the Ministry of Defense the military indirectly controls the ministry" (Heitzman, & Worden, 1988: 218). The democratic governments have significantly changed this practice and brought civilian personnel into the Ministry of Defense, which was early headed by ex-officio or retiree from the BAF. Through these civilian officials the democratic government maintains its control over the BAF.

Ensuring the civilian control over the BAF is a constitutional requirement. According to the constitution the head of the government is the Prime Minister of Bangladesh (GoB, 1972). The President of the country is the commander-in-chief of the BAF. According to the Army Act, the Prime Minister and the President receive advice from the Defense Advisory Board and the Intelligences (GoB, 1972a). The issue of advising the commander-in-chief is vital in a sense that often major decisions can be taken based on the recommendations of the Defense Advisory Board. According to the Army, this Defense Advisory Board is a six member's advisory team consisting of the three heads of the three arms of the BAF, the Principal Staff Officer of armed force division, and two military secretaries of the President and the Prime Minister. The Director of three intelligence divisions namely, the National Security

Intelligence, the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence, and the Border Guard Bangladesh independently provide advice about defense matters (Bangladesh Military, 2011). The system of independent advising has been crucial and mostly absent during the early history of the country. Under the present system, multiple sources provide information to the commander-in-chief. The source variation enhances civilian control over the BAF. The democratic governments have perpetuated their control by ensuring multi-level monitoring of the BAF, which helps to maintain effective civilian control and eventually allows the BAF's disengagement from politics.

3.3.1 Appropriate Military Structure for Effective Civilian Control

The democratic governments have installed the appropriate functional military structure in order to ensuring its command and control over the BAF. The legal structure of the BAF is provided by the constitution, which ensures the civilian control over the military. However, the scope of this civilian control was ignored by the earlier undemocratic governments. The democratic governments have initiated various steps to ensure the functioning of the military structure and to ensure the dominance of the civil-political authority in the command and control structure. Ideally, in Bangladesh, two state organs, the executive and the legislature, deal with issues related to security and the BAF. Chapter IV of Part IV of the Constitution of Bangladesh deals with the Defense Service of the BAF and provides the necessary descriptive and interpretive framework for the management, organisation and control of the Defense Service and its interrelationships with other government agencies and elements of government power. The overall management structure of the BAF is shown in the figure below:




Figure 3.2: Structure of Security Sector of Bangladesh and its Governance

The figure shows that the management oversight process is common for both the external (e.g. the BAF) and internal security agencies. The oversight institutions as well as the two management organs should be headed by civilian personnel. Article 62(1) of the Bangladesh Constitution, in the matter of recruitment, provides that:

[p]arliament shall by law provide for regulating (recruitment, etc., of defense services (a) the raising and maintaining of the defense services of Bangladesh and of their reserves; (b) the grant of commission therein; (c) the appointment of chiefs of staff of the defense services, and their salaries and allowances; and (d) the discipline and other matters relating to those services and reserves (GoB, 1972).

The legal provisions require the ultimate control and authority over the BAF rests with civilian agencies of the state. The recruitment and control of the BAF members is subject to the direct assent of the parliament. Article 76 of the Bangladesh Constitution requires the Parliamentary Defense Committee to monitor and oversee the activities and needs of the BAF (GoB, 1972). The overseeing bodies under the Ministry of

Defense shall be headed by civilian personnel (GoB, 1972a). In practice, many subordinate bodies of the Ministry of Defense were headed by military personnel. They were able to change the decisions of the ministry. Importantly, it is the democratic governments which have ensured the functioning of these statutory measures, appointed civilian personnel to key positions, and introducing new initiatives to strengthen the civilian control allowed by the statutory provisions. For example, never before had the Parliamentary Defense Committee ever required any kind explanation or accounting from the BAF until the establishment of democratic government. In November, 1999, during the period of the seventh *Jatiya Sangsad* (Bangladesh Parliament), the Defense Committee for the first time dealt with a frigate purchase from a Korean bank port company, for the Bangladesh Navy, (Amin, *et. al.*, 2011: 30). The democratic governments, therefore, have initiated measures to ensure the functioning of the BAF consistently with democratic principles, and this is gradually promoting the accountability of the military to the civilian authority.

However, the concern over the appropriate functioning of the legal structure is yet to end fully. Although the democratic governments are keeping the anomaly at its minimum by ensuring the statutory measures (e.g. functioning of the Parliamentary Defense Committee and appointment of civilian as the head of the sub-committees) but the internal dynamic of the BAF is inflicting considerable danger. For example, in theory, the three service chiefs are equals in the national command structure. However, in practice, the army dominates the defense establishment (Heitzman, & Worden, 1988: 217). This acts as one cause of divisiveness within the BAF. The domination by one agency in the command hierarchy currently attracts allegations of bias, including allegations that promotions and postings have not been impartially based on proper professional considerations. On the other hand, to ensure civilian involvement and control over the BAF, military regulations need to be consistent with the democratic practices of Bangladesh. Since most of the laws and regulations were formulated before the independence of Bangladesh, some are based on an authoritative approach. The popular perception of military regulation is that it is highly structured and keeps the BAF quite isolated from the people. Codron has argued that the Military Act which established the BAF was not based on a colonial mentality but still there are tendency of hardcore implementation by the military

dictators (Codron, 2007). In other words, existing military law neither negates the BAF's position under the democratic system nor carries the colonial perspective. It is the government that can decide how the political government should ensure control by using the provisions of military law. Importantly, current practice in Bangladesh shows that the government is progressively ensuring the functioning of the BAF's institutional structure by using statutory provisions to perpetuate civilian control over the military.

3.3.2 Involving in Nontraditional Security and Civilian Control

So far, the analysis of the BAF's practices and evolving democracy in Bangladesh shows that democratic governments are successfully introducing control mechanisms for the BAF. The controlling process has restrained the BAF from the types of political intervention commonly experienced in the early years of independent Bangladesh. However, the most important change is not institutional or regulatory, but the introduction of whole new approach regarding the way in which the BAF operates. The new responsibility of nontraditional security activities have been brought to the military by exploring the existing regulatory scope and further reinforcing the supplementary legislation concerning these types of involvements. The GoB has introduced to the BAF the nontraditional security activities under the regulatory scope of 'aid to the civilian authority', for which the BAF is responsible. At the same time, the GoB has introduced new legislation concerning nontraditional security or human security activities allowing the involvement of the BAF in such tasks. For example, the Disaster Management Act 2010 and the National Food Policy of Bangladesh 2006 clearly outline provisions for military involvement in nontraditional security activities. This involvement requires the military to work under civilian authority and enhances political control over the BAF.

The introduction of nontraditional security to the military is not just an isolated initiative of the GoB. Its involvement in nontraditional security also serves the GoB's changing perception of security and responses to popular needs under democratic rule. To understand this development, a brief description of modern day military involvement is helpful. The duties and responsibilities of modern armed forces are not limited to traditional armed combat. Even in war, it is not just the war

performance rather the role of the armed forces in implementing associate strategy of non-military activities determines the outcome of the war. The armed forces' role now extends beyond mere combat and war. This modern role has its roots in the early history of armed forces. In China, in about 500BC, in his famous *Art of War*, Sun Tzu wrote that "in execution of war emphasis must be on brains rather than brawn approach" (Griffith, 1963). Even modern military history suggests that the evolution of an orderly national army inevitably has to be responsive to the needs of the people. The military organization of the post Middle Aged has higher fighting and strategic capacity which is evolved to a defined structured unit of a nation state. In its evolution, the historical composition of the armed forces was varied. Machiavelli has argued in *The Prince* or *The Discorsi* that "the military forces of a state or under any ruler should be composed of the inhabitants of the land" (Machiavelli, 1990: 42). By bringing inhabitants of the land was to enhance war strategy but also engage with issue links with people's needs. Modern time the development of war strategy endorsed by Basil H. Liddell-Hart, Halford or even Giulio Douhet has advocated to include not just elements of direct fighting but to develop tactics that can help avoid face-to-face encounter (Halford, 1904: 521-422). Such new approach promotes to form a strategic deterrence (Trout, & Harf, eds., 1982: 70-71). The explanation shows the role of modern days military is not only to prepare for fighting but also to engage in activities deterring the chances of fighting, which finds much similarity in the BAF's present approach. The GoB's initiative in introducing nontraditional security activities to the BAF is not an exception to such generic evolutionary role of the military establishment in the world.

In terms of operationalising such nontraditional security involvement the democratic governments are involving the BAF more in assisting civil authorities in implementing activities which are essentially about human security in nature. To understand the reasons beyond the generic military's evolution to involve the BAF in nontraditional security activities this thesis has explained the real motivations of the democratic governments. As the democratic governments respond to popular demands for ensuring its support base the government is motivated to prioritise the nontraditional security issues in the policy as those correspond with the people's needs. The BAF is a full time, ready, technical and disciplined force performs to

operationalise GoB's policy agenda. For example, one of such engagement area is the implementation of policy related to poverty eradication. Although Bangladesh has made remarkable progress in recent times in reducing poverty, it still faces socio-economic challenges. "Of the poor, two out of three are caught in hard core or extreme poverty, as measured by the consumption of food and other basic needs" (Asian Development Bank, 2006). The World Bank suggested that poverty was the greatest challenge for Bangladesh to overcome. Confronted by the challenge of poverty eradication, the GoB has taken the initiative to involve the BAF in several aspects of policy implementation. Involving the BAF to distribute essential foods, ensuring a continuous supply of food, and securing food storage during emergencies are examples of the GoB's initiative to involve the BAF in nontraditional security (Bangladesh Army, 2010). Such activities ensure that most needy people will get sufficient food and supplies. The BAF is also involved in supporting the GoB in implementing emergency infrastructural projects concerning irrigation or dam building. These kinds of involvements help the GoB to limit, control and eradicate the causes of poverty and enhance its political dominance in Bangladesh.

A democratic government due to its own accountability to people has to act in accordance with the needs of the people. In conducting activities to respond to the needs of the electorates the government also shows its responsibility to the various state agencies, such as the BAF. The response of the people makes the democratic governments motivated to enhance the accountability of the BAF through its involvement in nontraditional security activities. Essentially it creates a better relationship between the people and the military. Professor H², who has undertaken extensive research about the BAF, has suggested that:

"the reason of the motivation of democratic governments to involve the military in human security based activities is a question of proving their legitimate authority. The government is pushing nontraditional security issue to the military as a test factor to ensure the loyalty" (Interviewed on March 10, 2010).

² The interviewee is a researcher on military. But the interview contents can be potential danger for his carrier. Due to such risk and sensitivity, the interviewee has kept as anonymous

In doing so, political parties are covering various human security agenda as their pledge to the people. As the democratic system opposes to the political model based on patron-client relationship the parties are needed to be sensible to the people's need. Otherwise, the politics can face the danger of emerging faction and that can be counter-productive to pursue the human security agenda (Khan, 2005). Thus the BAF's nontraditional security engagement provides both the legitimacy to the democratic government and cements the chances of fractional politics.

As a result, the democratic governments have been developing the BAF as a modern and strategic force primarily to protect the sovereignty of the country and also to assist the civilian authority in implementing nontraditional security activities. According to the BAF's own assessment of this change, its website claims that the BAF is not only ready to tackle the external threats but its training and orientation motivates it to be a modern liberal army that works as the GoB's implementing agency (Bangladesh Military, 2011). Besides the inside view of the BAF expressed by several security specialists also argue that the gradual change to adopt the perspective to work with civilian issues has been a positive aspect in BAF's structural approach (Khan, 2009). Ahmed viewed that the BAF has not been evolved as an elite institution. The democratic spirit of the nation has provided a decisive direction to the security establishment of the country (Ahamed, 2004). Thus the BAF with all its limitations has managed to accelerate its capability to work with the civil administration. The BAF's peace time engagement symbolizes the greater goal of assisting the government in implementing its policies. If the present pattern of the BAF's training and operational practices is analysed it is noticeable that a significant segment of training is now focused on training on emergency management training, aiding the civilian authority, and nontraditional security issues (Bangladesh Army, 2010). These are to provide tools to the military enabling them to assist the government in pursuing its policy. Eventually, the process of change to involve the BAF in nontraditional security helps democratic governments to control the activities of the military, which makes the government stronger in performing.

3.4 Regulatory Measures to Involve the BAF in Human Security

Although there are several positive examples of the BAF's involvement in human security activities most such engagements were arranged on an ad-hoc basis during its initial stage. The laws and policies concerning military involvement in nontraditional security tasks were mostly voluntary and not mandatory. For example, the governments were involving the BAF in disaster relief work pursuant to the emergency provisions in part IXA of the constitution (GoB, 1972). However, with the evolution of democracy, the GoB has enacted the National Disaster Management Act 2010 to involve the military in emergency response situations. There are also several other examples of recent legislation which have enabled the civil authority to involve the military in nontraditional security activities. These regulatory measures are mainly in the areas of disaster management, emergency food distribution, maintaining civil utilities and conducting emergency construction (GoB, 2008). Although there is concern that wide scale involvement of the BAF in nontraditional security activities can result in dependency on the BAF and reduce the capacity of the civil administration. However, a core GoB policy document has rebutted this argument. For example, the PRSP emphasises this joint civil-military programme to enhance the capacity of the civil administration to implement human security activities (GoB, 2005a). Unlike the earlier practices the recent policies have better articulated the modality of the BAF's involvement in human security. The policies have specified the role of the military to aid the civilian authority and ensured no overlapping. Due to this recent regulatory development the BAF's nontraditional security involvements are mostly directed by laws and policies. However, some nontraditional security involvements are connected with the BAF's responsibility and duty to protect national sovereignty, but most are not. Laws and policies are formed mostly for pure nontraditional security activities but not for tasks which are mixed in nature. The following figure shows the current extent of the BAF's nontraditional security involvement.




Figure 3.3: Types of BAF's Engagement to Assist Civil Administration

The above figure shows that the BAF's nontraditional security involvements are mainly of two kinds. Sections 1B and 02 show the overall extent of its nontraditional security involvement and section 1A shows the specific laws and policies corresponding to particular nontraditional security involvements. Section 1B shows the cluster of nontraditional security activities directed by specific laws. Importantly, these are pure nontraditional security activities, whereas nontraditional security activities under section 02 are not directed by any particular law or policy. Rather, these are the activities where military involvement serves both nontraditional security and traditional security needs.

Notably, the regulatory measures to involve the military in nontraditional security activities direct and provide the necessary modality for specific tasks. Other characteristics of these regulatory measures are i) the tasks required by these laws do not involve national security issues, and ii) the laws and policies of this kind were very recently enacted and formulated by the democratic governments of Bangladesh. In addition, a flexible interpretation of the laws and regulations related to the BAF's involvement in nontraditional security helps to make it an active agency (Khan, 2005).

The democratic governments have created the opportunity for the BAF's growing engagement in human security by forming new laws and policies. New laws provide clearer direction for nontraditional security involvement and minimise the chances of possible conflict between civil and military agencies, which eventually encourages growing BAF involvement in nontraditional activities.

3.5 Security Realities and Human Security Involvement

The present security composition of Bangladesh is both traditional and nontraditional. The BAF is designated to deal with traditional security but peace time nontraditional security threats are also real. The military, therefore, is required to deal with traditional security threats as well as be involved in nontraditional security threats. However traditional security threats keep the military as full time prepared agency or ready to be deployed agency. Such characteristic of 'ready to be deployed' allows the GoB to involve the BAF in certain nontraditional security tasks, for example, involving the BAF in disaster management. A thorough understanding of existing threats is needed to assess whether the BAF's preparedness is compatible to deal with both traditional security and nontraditional security threats.

Traditional security threats are basically the outcome of the realist notion of the security discourse. In this regard, Bangladesh considers its large nuclear neighbor India as its principal security threat. The BAF has never been involved in war except for its involvement in the Bangladesh war of independence. So the aspects of the BAF's disengagement from politics, which can also be explained by the Civil-military Relationship matrix, has never been analysed from a war time perspective (Khan, 2009). Importantly, an assessment of Bangladesh's current security situation reveals that there are, in fact, very real potential military threats with the potential to cause war. So the BAF's preparedness to tackle such threats can be argued in Civil-military Relationship matrix, where the working relationship with the civil and political authority is a vital factor. In this case, the BAF's involvement in dealing with security threats generated from non-military sources is the real aspect to determine its relationship with the civilian authority, hence with the political authority. Thus it is not the traditional security issues but the BAF's nontraditional security involvement is

predominantly shaping the Civil-military Relationship in Bangladesh as well as creating new BAF's orientation towards the political government.

Now describing the security situation of Bangladesh it can be argued that the GoB has tended to consider the security situation in terms of external threats. Joseph and Sean considered that this is not an adequate analysis but it provides the political basis (Joseph, & Sean, 1988). Once reality is separated from political considerations, Bangladesh faces the same type of security threats as other small states. However, the GoB maintains its tactical and innovative security strategy to deal with such threats (Bangladesh Army, 2010). Osmany and Ahmed have suggested that "limited war capability and the lack of potential resources vis-à-vis a stronger potential adversary makes the weaker side to visualize the security objective as being defense not offence" (Osmany, & Ahmed, 2003:72). Accordingly, traditional security concerns are apparently addressed using defensive strategies in the same way as other small states. Interestingly, the GoB's basic security concerns associated with external threats have been overtaken by internal social and development challenges (GoB, 2005a). Despite this strategic approach towards traditional security, the GoB has started to build a stronger military under its 'Vision 2021'. Importantly, Bangladesh has become increasingly aware that a weaker population and insignificant international presence can increase traditional security concerns. Thus, the present efforts of the GoB to involve the BAF in issues of national sovereignty and development are seen as addressing both traditional and nontraditional security concerns under a holistic strategy (GoB, 2010a). The GoB is not undermining the importance of the BAF to respond to both kinds of security threats and this is enabling the BAF to be involved not only in traditional security but also in nontraditional security. To understand this reality a brief summary of the GoB's security concerns is set out below.

3.5.1 Traditional Security Threats Require Better Prepared

The BAF considers that real conventional security threats for Bangladesh are in existence. Often nontraditional security threats can be evolved as traditional or conventional security threats. For example, lack of development in the tribal region of Bangladesh can be the inspiration for insurgency supported by neighboring country. Here the lack of development is a nontraditional security issue but the insurgency is a

traditional security threat. To meet these conventional security threats, the BAF needs to ensure its preparedness. Ideally, it should be ready and capable of meeting both traditional and nontraditional security. To understand this constantly changing phenomenon an analysis of what constitutes traditional security assists. The major traditional security concerns originate neighboring from India and Myanmar (Bangladesh Army, 2010). A brief on the traditional security threats from India and Myanmar is given bellow:

A. Threats to Bangladesh Posed by India: India is the main security concern for Bangladesh. Compared with Bangladesh, India is much larger in terms of area and population. It also has greatly superior military capability, including nuclear capability. Osmany and Ahmed have observed that “from an apogee of very close friendship in the aftermath of Bangladesh’s independence in 1971, Bangladesh-India relations plummeted into a nadir of mutual mistrust and suspicion within a very brief period” (Osmany, & Ahmed, 2003: 77). India’s support for the Bangladeshi independence movement is greatly admired but its interference in internal Bangladeshi affairs is considered intolerable and causes significant mistrust. There is also tension between India and the rest of South Asia due to its attitude as the heir to all the great rulers of the undivided India. Gupta has stated that “the Indians perceived themselves to be inheritors of the rights and privileges the British used to enjoy in what is now known as South Asia” (Gupta, *et al.*, 1986:18). Similarly, referring to the take-over of Sikkim by India, and its hegemonic attitude towards Sri Lanka, Nepal and the Maldives, Iftekharuzzaman has suggested that “India’s regional security posture came to be perceived in Bangladesh as a threat to its security” (Iftekharuzzaman, 1989: 18). However, Kodikara has expressed a different view: “contemporary India conceives of her neighboring countries as lying within the Indian defense perimeter and being integral to the security interests of India” (Kodikara, 1986: 34).

The India Doctrine of the late 1980s of posturing its regional military might over its smaller neighbors was not successful, as a result, “[d]uring V. P. Singh’s rule, Indian regional posture underwent a process of change” (Osmany, *et al.*, 2003: 81). The change was first formally made through the Gujral Doctrine³ of 1997.

³ Gujral Doctrine is based on five principles that are to be abided by Indian in its relations with the neighbors. The main features of the doctrine are: i) with its neighbors like Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan,

Referring to India's security policy, scholars identified eight issues in Indo-Bangla security relations, namely : (i) withdrawal of water from common rivers; (ii) halting implementation of the Land Boarder Agreement of 1974; (iii) India's support for insurgency in the CHT, and for other terrorist groups; (iv) crossing the Bangladeshi maritime boarder; (v) occupying the South Talpatty Island; (vi) illegal cross-border activities; (vii) pressure for transit and corridors and (viii) inflexibility regarding trade and cultural matters. India allegedly accused Bangladesh of allowing insurgents from India's North-eastern states and Inter-Services Intelligence to use Bangladeshi territory. Datta mentioned that "there is factor of the Bangladesh government's approval to this practice" (Datta, 2000: 502). Without here considering the accuracy, or otherwise, of these accusations, it seems that India's conduct and beliefs worried Bangladesh sufficiently for it to adopt a strategy to neither compel India to find a compromise solution nor elicit any concession from New Delhi. How such an ambiguous position helps Bangladesh to lead the development agenda in the face of nuclear India is a big question.

B. Tension between Bangladesh and Myanmar: Although Bangladesh has never considered Myanmar a threat to its sovereignty, but the recent mode and initiative to develop the internal security strength of Myanmar has made Bangladeshi concerned about its own security. Some unresolved issues like the Rohingya refugees and maritime boundary demarcation is also causing tension. This tension is illustrated by two recent incidents. The first involved a direct violation of Bangladeshi sovereignty and a serious military assault on the BAF. In 1991, Myanmar attacked and ransacked the Rejupara border out post. Myanmar forces killed three members of the Bangladesh Rifles. The second incident occurred when Myanmar clearly violated Bangladesh sovereignty by a maritime intrusion. Patwary reported that "the most recent stand-off took place in November, 2009, when four Korean ships guarded by Myanmar's navy started exploration for oil and gas reserves within 50 nautical miles South-west of St. Martin Island, in Bangladesh water" (Patwary, 2009: 2). This

the Maldives, Sri Lanka and Nepal, India does not ask for reciprocity, but gives and accommodates what it can in good faith and trust. ii) no South Asian country should allow its territories to be used for any activity against the interests of another regional country. More can be found *U.S.I. Journal*. New Delhi: Vol. CXXVII, No. 527, Jan-March 1997. P. 3

incursion, therefore, has contributed to the growth of concern and tension with Myanmar.

Myanmar has built up its military capability to a disturbing level. There are rumours, albeit unconfirmed, of North Korea developing a secret nuclear reactor and plutonium extraction plant in Myanmar. In this context, Bangladesh's 150,000 regular troops (Bangladesh Army, 2010) is no match for the 500,000 regular troops of Myanmar. In light of this defense reality, Bangladesh must establish its priorities and undertake a total review of its defense policy to meet the magnitude of its perceived threat (Patwary, 2009).

The physical nature of the traditional security concept shows that the BAF is compelled by the external potential or perceived threat to equip itself with best possible military means. The above narrative of the traditional security threats shows that the BAF's preparation to deal traditional security does not negate its capacity to deal with nontraditional security threats. It is rather reinforced as the preparedness for the traditional security threats can serve double purpose. It can keep the military prepared for any potential traditional security and at the same time the skill and capacity that the military gain from such preparedness can be useful in dealing the nontraditional security threats.

3.5.2 BAF Addresses the Nontraditional Security Threats

Nontraditional security threats to Bangladesh arise from non-military security threats. Non-conventional or nontraditional security threats fall within the definition of human security threats, and are the nascent area of security understanding in Bangladesh. Florini and Simmons have suggested that the "nontraditional security discourse is an offshoot of attempts at redefining security that began in mid-1980s" (Florini, & Simmons, 1998: 41). They suggested for including or recognising economic issues, environmental issues, cultural values, and non-military instruments of power and influence as a part of nontraditional security. In such circumstances, the UNDP human security framework can be an alternative tool to analyse nontraditional security threats. In the case of Bangladesh, nontraditional security threats arise from multiple sources, many of which are subject to change in the global arena while others arise internally in the country. However, the major nontraditional security issues in

Bangladesh are suggested by major international reports (Safer World, 2008) and are outlined below.

A. Insecurity Arising from Political Malpractice: In Bangladesh, confrontational politics at the domestic level and severe political divisions is major nontraditional security threat. Poor intra-party democratic practices, political dynasties, and elitism encourage corruption. Political scientists Iftekharuzzaman and Rahman have suggested that, “even if they are not directly in control of political power, their influence on decision making, allocation and distribution of resources-aid, investment or local resources – is enormous” (Iftekharuzzaman & Rahman, 1986: 27).

B. Poor Law and Order: Threats to social and personal security are also important nontraditional security issues those mostly visual in day to day life of the ordinary people. The inflow of small arms and drugs, lack of law enforcement, the presence of insurgents and terrorists all are contributing causes of social violence.

C. Lack of Economic Justice: Economic insecurity in Bangladesh arises from both internal and external sources. Chronic poverty and political corruption internally, and the anti-poor policy of the World Trade Organisation and other international agencies externally expose Bangladesh to adopt imbalanced economic policies. International trade and global fiscal policies are severely affecting the growth and development of Bangladesh.

D. Shrinking Labour Market and Unemployment: The global recession and uneven competition in the international labor market threaten Bangladesh’s economic prosperity and cause economic suffering. The country, therefore, is exposed to a threat as foreign remittances are a major contributor to its GDP. Although Bangladesh is a big supplier of manpower, there are gaps in policy to make the labour market diversified and to promote labour skills.

E. Food Security and Insufficient Agricultural Production: Bangladesh has a large population but is not agriculturally self-sufficient. It, therefore, often has to spend a sizable amount of its annual budget to buy food and agricultural products from other countries. Although Bangladesh is trying to lease land in other countries for commercial agriculture, it has been largely unsuccessful except in Africa.

F. Poor Energy Security and Heavy Dependence on Imports: Bangladesh is not self-sufficient in energy and has to spend about US \$ 8-9 billion

every year to import oil. The country has been unable to diversify its energy sector or develop sources of renewable energy. This creates pressure on the national economy and increases Bangladesh's vulnerability.

G. Environmental Security Challenges: Much of Bangladesh is low lying and is particularly vulnerable to natural disasters. It has already been severely affected by climate change, and this environmental problem has been aggravated by the withdrawal of water from major common rivers by neighboring India. The country and its infrastructure are yet to be well-prepared to face such emergency situations and environmental challenges.

To deal with these important nontraditional security threats, the development of appropriate strategies and long term policy guidelines has become an urgent imperative for the GoB. Traditional responses to security threats need to be modified and updated to reflect new security imperatives. Osmany and Ahmed have argued that "traditional tools for dealing with even those areas which are considered traditional security concerns will have to be continually re-evaluated and re-designed" (Osmany, & Ahmed, 2003: 115). This re-evaluation needs to be considered in the context of both prevailing traditional and nontraditional security needs. The role of the BAF to implement security policy is vital. Balancing traditional and nontraditional approaches can be expected to result in less contention, conflict, and confrontation, and more reliability for the GoB and BAF (Bangladesh Military, 2011).

Creating such a balance is a matter of defense preparedness. It has already been noted above that current BAF training addresses both traditional and nontraditional security issues, of which nontraditional security is obviously a more recent addition. Importantly, some traditional security training is also relevant to developing the BAF's capacity to deal with nontraditional security threats. The BAF's technical assistance is vital to deal with the nontraditional security needs (Hakim, 1998). As a disciplined, organized and trained force, the BAF is equipped with vital tools to deal some nontraditional security threats. In this regard, for example, it is capable of quick deployment for disaster management; it has high-tech communications ability; and it has skills suitable for rescue and rehabilitation missions (Bangladesh Army, 2010). The civil administration often lacks such resources, and the BAF always provides an alternative option for the political government. Thus,

assisting the civil administration or even supporting the government's development programme for the betterment of the people is now a nontraditional security responsibility of the BAF.

3.5.3 BAF's Nontraditional Security Capabilities

The security analysis shows that the BAF is presently a force that can deal with both traditional and nontraditional security issues. The inclusion of traditional and nontraditional security in the BAF's training and its role to assist the civilian administration to implement policies related to nontraditional security constitute present military practice. However, once traditional security issues come under consideration the BAF explores strategies to avoid any confrontation by adopting preventive measures (Bangladesh Army, 2010). However, if diplomacy, for example, fails and a threat to the national security becomes imminent, the BAF will become the first agency to deal with any adversary by force of arms. The role of the BAF in facing a direct threat to national security is of vital importance (Maniruzzaman, 1994: 165; and Ibrahim, 1998). However, it does not necessarily prevent the adoption of innovative strategies to meet both traditional and nontraditional security threats. The preference for strengthening a deterrent strategy of threats involving the BAF in nontraditional security matters. Peacetime defense preparedness increases Bangladesh's capability to face aggression as well as involving the BAF in human security activities. It works both as a real time need as well as a deterrent. Khan and Barai have argued that while there is no denial of the military role in facing conventional threats to security, enhancing security capability deters aggression (Khan, & Barai, 2000). Karim has suggested such preparedness could be regarded as 'total defense management', which includes preparedness for dealing with conventional security threats as well as nonconventional security threats (Karim, 2002: 17).

Since 'total defense preparedness' includes both traditional and nontraditional security preparedness; it can be considered a dual approach. Moss has suggested that the BAF needs to be prepared to deal with both traditional and nontraditional security as its mandate and defense expenditure needs to justify such preparedness (Moss, 2011). Competitive strength cannot be achieved only by

professional training and motivation. A coordinated strategy utilising military hardware and software is also necessary (Bangladesh Military, 2011). It is important that the GoB is making a significant effort to achieve dual preparedness which is enabling the BAF to implement nontraditional security principles and objectives effectively.

There is speculation that the application of a dual approach will result in the GoB facing problems to avoid, mitigate or postpone a conflict and resisting a superior force once an armed conflict has developed (Maniruzzaman, 1982, 15). However, the defense strategy of Bangladesh involves foreign policy and diplomacy as its first line of defense, but which is combined with the BAF's international involvement for nontraditional security to improve the foreign relation. For example, by ensuring international recognition for the BAF and the country, it is successfully participating in international peace keeping, or supporting other countries during emergencies. Such nontraditional security involvement helps to create moral superiority in dealing with traditional security threats. Regional support is also generated by defense cooperation with bigger powers through cooperation with regional organisations such as the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (Bangladesh Military, 2011). The effectiveness of the BAF in UN peacekeeping has been another important means of enhancing its prestige and strengthening it in dealing with traditional and nontraditional security threats. On one hand, it enhances the BAF's combat capability while, on the other hand, it demonstrates the effectiveness of the human security approach in dealing with potential military threats. Thus, the dual approach helps to strengthen the BAF's nontraditional security capabilities, which is vital for the democratic government's increasing involvement of the BAF in human security activities.

3.6 Institutional Strength for BAF's Human Security Involvement

Traditional national security advocates argue that involving the military in human security activities makes it weaker. Unlike active combat in wartime, the military implements nontraditional security activities alongside its civilian counterpart in peacetime. Critics argue that emphasising peacetime involvement results in the

government paying less attention to developing its combat capability. In response to this argument, this thesis explains that the defense development plan adopted by consecutive democratic governments demonstrates their desire for a stronger military force. Importantly, the same democratic governments are also increasingly encouraging the BAF's involvement in nontraditional security activities. This suggests that the BAF's involvement in nontraditional security is not inconsistent with the development of a stronger security force.

The BAF has been undergoing substantial defense modernisation by recent democratic governments. Presently, the GoB is committed simultaneously to developing a stronger defense force and also involving the military in human security activities to assist the civil administration. To understand this approach and its impact on the ability of the military, this thesis analyses the application of the BAF's modernisation process within the context of a functioning democracy where the BAF is an essential agency to support the civil administration. The state of the BAF's modernisation is significant in the Bangladeshi context. Both for the existing security realities as well as having competitive global advantage on security issue, defense modernisation is vital. Thus the development of defense infrastructure is conducted with regard to both the hardware and software of the BAF. Even in the area of defense strategy, Bangladesh is adopting a new direction. Under a recent military development plan, Bangladesh has rearranged its military strategy. Moss explained that close cooperation with China and other European countries shows that the GoB is actually creating a strategic balance in its defense plan. China is not the sole supplier of military equipment to Bangladesh, military technology has also been provided by Italy, Russia, South Korea, the UK and the United States in recent years (Moss, 2011). This strategic directional change is also reinforced by the BAF's hardware procurement. Under the *Bangladesh Military Goal 2030*, the BAF has stressed hardware development. In recent years, Bangladesh has embarked on a large scale defense upgrading process. For the first time in the history of Bangladesh record high amounts have been allocated for the procurement of weaponry, especially in the new budget for 2010-2011 (Bangladesh Military, 2011). The new defense strategy and growing procurement suggests that the GoB is committed to the development of a stronger military.

This becomes even clearer from an analysis of defense budgetary allocations by the democratic governments of Bangladesh. It shows that the democratic governments have been spending significant amounts of money as defense. The *World Development Indicator Database* shows the position of Bangladesh's defense expenditure from 2001 to 2005). It shows that the GoB spent US \$ 995,300.00 (or 1.14 % of GDP)⁴ in 2005, and that Bangladesh ranked 84 out of 145 countries.

Table 3.1: Annual Military Expenditure of Bangladesh against GDP (World Development Indicator Database, 2005)

Year	Amount (% of GDP)	Rank (Out of 145 Countries)
2005	1.14	#84
2004	1.19	#96
2003	1.2	#104
2002	1.25	#102
2001	1.34	#100

The upward trend in defense expenditure has reached its height compared with the defense budget allocated by the previous military backed governments. According to Jane's Intelligence, "a document from the Ministry of Defense,

⁴ Military expenditures data from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute are derived from the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation definition, which includes all current and capital expenditures on the armed forces, including peacekeeping forces; defense ministries and other government agencies engaged in defense projects; paramilitary forces, if these are judged to be trained and equipped for military operations; and military space activities. Such expenditures include military and civil personnel, including retirement pensions of military personnel and social services for personnel; operation and maintenance; procurement; military research and development; and military aid (in the military expenditures of the donor country). Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute). 2005. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Arms Transfers. Database. February. Stockholm.

published in late 2011 to outline defense expenditure plans, has forecasted a 48 percent increase in total defense expenditure over the next four to five years with the allocation reaching Bangladeshi Taka 80 billion in Financial Year 15-16” (Jane’s Intelligence, 2011). The Bangladesh defense budget allocation is so large that that is often considered disproportionate and exceeds the education or health budget. Ms. M⁵, a researcher and lawyer, explained this issue and stated that:

“There are two principal reasons for this increase. First, the increased budgetary allocation is a defense necessity; secondly, the purpose of this increase is to keep the BAF content so that the political government remains safe from the threat of an armed coup” (Interviewed on September 11, 2010).

Some critics, however, argue that several studies show that the Bangladesh defense budget or plans for procurement have the potential for corruption of the political leadership. Thus, the argument for allowing high expenditure and the involvement of party personnel to control the party’s internal demands is strongly based. These arguments are often debated at a domestic level and failed to find a conclusive reasoning of such higher defense budget. Importantly, with the establishment of democracy, the parliament and the open media is able to raise questions on the higher defense budgeting, which gives the chance to demand justifications from the GoB.

However, the scope of the research does not allow an analysis about the context of intra-party corruption and influence of party policy on defense budgeting. However, one key finding from the above argument matches with the research objective. The increase of defense expenditure reconfirms the motivation of the democratic governments not to undermine the BAF under the democratic system. Most democratic governments have increased defense budgetary allocations and have involved the BAF in human security activities. Although this may appear to be a paradox, the idea of a strong military under a democratic government seems to fit better if a budgetary increase is considered parallel with the changes in defense policies. Of course, defense budgeting has often been a political issue rather than merely a defense one. In Bangladesh, the security reality requires that the BAF be

⁵ The interviewee is a lawyer of the BAF and requested not to disclose her name on the ground of sensitivity.

better prepared. This operates to boost citizens' confidence in the GoB which many popularistic governments seek.

At the same time the *Defense Development Plan* describes the modality of closely working with the civilian authority to aid its activities. Working with civilian authorities has become a priority for the BAF (Bangladesh Army, 2011). The official website of the BAF has also confirmed that military engagement in aiding civil authority as well as participating in diverse security activities are taking place as a part of its development plan. The GoB claims the military modernisation process is a part of a wider development plan, 'Vision 2021'. In this development plan, Bangladesh has unveiled its development programme, including details relating to defense. In the Sixth Five Year Plan along with higher per capita income, Vision 2021 contemplates that the BAF will be an essential agency implementing the development plan (GoB, 2010c). Roy in her *The Human Security Framework and National Human Development Reports: A Review of Experiences and Current Debates* explained such relationship where she suggested a balance between creating stronger security force and ensuring development (Jolly, *et al.*, 2006). In the same spirit the protection of country and citizens is included in *Development Plan for 2030* with the view of a stronger BAF involved in activities to protect citizens from both traditional and nontraditional threats. The GoB believes that military modernisation complements its approach to involve the BAF in human security. Gomes has suggested that "Bangladesh's military modernisation is the part of a broader development plan based on the expectation that by 2017 its economy will reach a 10 per cent annual growth" (Gomes, 2010). The GoB perceives the development as a nontraditional security task and the BAF as a stakeholder in the development (Bangladesh Army, 2010). Thus, the initiative for creating a stronger and more capable military for both traditional and nontraditional security duties and responsibilities makes a better option for the democratic government of Bangladesh, which negates the argument that involving the military in human security contradicts a stronger military.

3.7 BAF's Human Security Involvement for Military Disengagement

The GoB's initiative to build a stronger BAF and increasingly involve it in nontraditional security activities is significantly impacting its overall response to

politics. Although the definition of military disengagement provided in Chapter II might suggest that military disengagement cannot be a total reality, the degree of military's involvement into the politics can be protected by regulatory measures. Importantly, after more than two decades of democratic governments, military disengagement from politics has become a landmark in the independent development of the democratic institutes in Bangladesh. Lieutenant Colonel Islam, a senior BAF officer, has suggested that the BAF has been implementing various human security activities to support the policies of the GoB. According to him, this style of engagement has boosted the BAF's relationship with civilian administrative authorities (Islam, 2004). An online article in *Global Security* explained that the BAF has been the principal agency helping the civilian authority under democratic governments. The BAF is not willing to undertake every kind of task requested by the political government, but it nevertheless acts in the best interests of the people (Global Security, 2008). Everyone does not believe the same. Mr. Ahmed, a leading researcher on the BAF, disagreed and stated that:

“the matter of the BAF's nontraditional security involvement is not about its willingness. It is rather depends on the position of its command. If the command favours any specific nontraditional security involvement the BAF serves, but if the command has reservation, the political authority can hardly pursue them”
(Interviewed on September 8, 2010).

However, leaving the issue of the BAF's willingness to be involved in nontraditional security tasks, the consequence has significant impacts. The close cooperation between the civilian and military authorities through nontraditional security activities has enhanced the civil-military relationship, which discourages the BAF from becoming an active agency of intervention in the political system. To explain the argument this thesis analyses the following two perspectives. First, the argument analyses that the BAF's involvement in human security activities enhances the military role to 'aid the civil administration', which results in a better working relationship and eventually allows the military to disengage from politics. Second, the argument explains that the BAF's human security involvement enhances mutual respect between civil and military institutions, which strengthens the civil-political entities and eventually results

in military disengagement from politics. The whole gamut of the argument provides the analysis that the outcome of the BAF's nontraditional security involvement strengthens the functioning of democracy.

3.7.1 BAF's Role to Aid-the-Civil-Authorities

Growing nontraditional security involvement has increased the BAF's role to aid the civilian authority. The BAF is enquired by law to work with the civil administration (GoB, 1972). The BAF supports local authorities in disaster response, maintaining public order, maintaining peace and ensuring internal security (Global Security, 2004). There is admiration by the civilian about the BAF's joining in verity of civilian activities or nontraditional security activities. "The BAF is serving on disaster management, rehabilitation, and in aid to civil administration" (Bangladesh Army, 2005). The BAF's 'aid-to-the-civil-power' function was started by the British colonial code but it has refurnished and structured by the democratic government of Bangladesh (Bangladesh Military, 2011). The government has created certain example of such role by enacting laws. For example the Disaster Management Act has articulated BAF's disaster time involvement as 'aid to the civil power' (GoB, 2010e). Ms. U⁶, a Member of the Bangladesh Parliament and Parliamentary Defense Committee, has explained that:

"the provision of the BAF's involvement in nontraditional security was used even during the Pakistan era and has been employed in Bangladesh by all the governments both civilian and military in nature. Importantly, under the democratic governments the function of the BAF to aid civil authority has become a routine work" (Interviewed on September 23, 2010).

As a consequence, the BAF has learned about the functioning of the civilian authority and, as a result, it is conditioned by this process to accept it has responsibilities and duties to aid the civil administration. Apart from increasingly aiding the civilian authority, the BAF's involvement in nontraditional security activity is the informing process to the military about the importance of human security (discussed in Chapter

⁶ The interviewee is a member of Bangladesh Parliament and requested not to disclose her name on the ground of sensitivity.

II). It allows the BAF to appreciate that human security involvement is an important and effective means of addressing potential security threats. Conversely, it is also important for the BAF to understand that addressing such potential threats needs civilian leadership and guidance. Thus, it provides a better perspective that the military needs to serve the nation under political leadership. As a result, the BAF orients with its role to aid the civilian authority in nontraditional security activities. This works as a fundamental of its position within the state and that keeps the BAF at a distance from the politics (Islam, 2004).

Although the democratic GoB is involving the military in various nontraditional security activities to aid the civilian authority, the impact of any such involvement varies according to the modality of involvement with the civilian authority, whether, in fact, the BAF is working parallel with the civilian authority or under the civilian authority. There is another issue of the motivation of the government that can also be reflected in the modality of military involvement to aid the civilian authority (Global Security, 2004). However, once the military engages in aiding the civilian authority and works subordinated to civilian administrative procedures the opportunities and likelihood of mutual learning is higher. Such involvement can provide a better insight into the functioning of civil administration, although this has been only superficially researched. Such learning is a matter of mutual confidence, which also corresponds with the aspirations of the people where they want to see both civil and military arms of government supporting each other. Thus in the context of democratic country the military should remain disengaged from politics. Security specialist Ahamed has suggested that most Bangladeshis do not want the BAF to be involved in national politics, which is also the obvious inspiration of the democracy to see the military as the institution that aids the civil authority (Ahmed, 2004). Eventually, working with the civil authority allows learning about each other and encourages the military to work under the civilian authority. As a result, military disengagement from Bangladeshi politics is encouraged.

3.7.2 States of Civil-Military Relationship

The Civil-Military Relationship is a unique feature that determines the extent and nature of the BAF's attitude to people and confidence of people on the BAF. The empowered civil-political component is an integral condition for better civil

military relationship explains the state of the BAF's disengagement from politics. The successful implementation of national development activities, particularly generating support from the BAF, requires better mutual understanding. In the 1970s and 1980s, Bangladesh experienced an unhappy civil-military relationship due to repeated coups. Professor Jahan has explained this from a structural point of view that "during the post military takeover in 1975 the civil and military bureaucratic elites consolidated their position and perpetuated their rule" (Jahan, 1980). Riaz has questioned Jahan's view about "what processes led to their unity prior to 1975 and why other classes (e.g., the bourgeoisie) failed to consolidate power are questions yet to be answered" (Riaz, 1998). The difficulty in determining the dynamics of civil-military relationship is not limited by a single outcome. In the case of civil-military relationship, the political practice and the trend of military engagement with the politics is not the only dynamics, but the nexus of state and the position of the military during the functioning of the state also play important role. Khan has argued that:

"the issue of civil-military relationship in our context is not only an interesting exercise but a very challenging one too if one were to honestly indulge in identifying the shortcomings and taking measures to remove them. And we must look at the issue dispassionately and objectively to determine the future course of civil-military relationship in Bangladesh" (Khan, 2009).

The civil-military relationship could be varied subject to the organisational structure, complexity, political functions and coherence of the military. According to Professor Hossian's explanation in *Civil Military Relations in Bangladesh: A Comparative Study*; it can be argued that within a state some groups or agencies are loosely structured; others are highly organized along military lines. However, the tuning between the civil and military takes place according to their working approaches and mutual understanding (Hossian, 1991). If this argument is analysed in the context of Bangladeshi political history the reason behind the military engagement with politics during 1975 can be understood. Unstructured political forces could not match with the highly structured BAF, which shows the state of civil-military relationship was in lowest level.

The post 1975 regimes worked closely with the BAF. Even the elected governments appointed a significant number of army personnel to administrative positions and kept the military institutional demand at the forefront of their policy formation (Ahmed, 2004). This strategy might be expected to give the BAF a stake in national politics and satisfy individual expectations. The result was obvious military engagement in politics, a negative factor in the framework of civil-military relationship. Contrary to the individual level involvement of the military personnel in the civilian matters, the institutional involvement of the military in the social and economic issue creates positive aptitude in civil-military relationship. It is easier to maintain the chain of command once the involvement is institutional. Chesterman has stated that “the more structured a group, the easier it would be to determine the chain of command and conduct” (Chesterman, 2001: 55). Logic suggests that in a group loosely structured participation is fluid and the rules of conduct are not properly framed. It is difficult for other agencies to enforce standards of conduct on them. Thus a structured armed force provides sufficient scope for civilian control and less chance of military engagement in politics. In other words, the structured military institution can be involved in nontraditional security by the civilian governments easily (Islam, 2004). Such involvement establishes connectivity between the people and the BAF, which is vital for a healthy civil-military relationship and preventing the BAF from political activism.

Thus the structural aspect of the BAF can be a factor in establishing civilian control over it. Although the BAF’s participation in civil protection and humanitarian activities is not their primary responsibility or duty, it nevertheless falls under its wider mandate. Scoping nontraditional security as a mandate for military demands a liberal interpretation of ‘security’ itself. This is possible if the civilian governments remains strong and has firm control over the military (Khan, 2005). Strong and structured armed force, therefore, works better for the nontraditional security implementation. According to Chesterman, “[m]ilitias with very narrow objectives and with a loose structure are expected to be the most challenging interlocutor” (Chesterman, 2001). Conversely, a military organisation with wider objectives and a strong structure is less likely to challenge a civilian government. In the context of Bangladesh, with the evolving nature of civil-military relationship, the

BAF has become more structured under democratic government. The military backed governments contained many interest groups, and competition between them created new struggles and chaos. In contrast to the military governments, the civilian democratic governments have created structured order for the BAF for its own security and that has allowed it to be dominant.

The obvious outcome of a controlled military institution is that it will be less likely to engage with politics. Thus the evolving dynamics of the civil-military relationship under the democratic governing system is important in encouraging military political disengagement in Bangladesh. In this context Ms. A⁷, a member of the BAF, believes, “the most important feature of the current BAF is its support for the political process of the country” (Interviewed on February 12, 2010). Disapproving Ms. A’s comment, Mr. Razi, security specialist from European Union, viewed:

“the BAF’s support for political process cannot be the most important feature of an armed force in a democratic country, rather it is its duty and outcome of mature civil-military relationship” (Interviewed on September 23, 2010).

Although history records mistrust and arrogance in the civil-military relationship, the BAF’s disengagement from politics since 1990 suggests the obvious maturity of that civil-military relationship (Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies, 2009). Assisting the civilian administration has been shaping close cooperation among the two agencies (Ahmed, 2004). The BAF’s disengagement from politics is promoting its position as a dependent state agency and encourages the GoB to involve it in human security activities.

3.8 Chapter Conclusion

The BAF’s evolving involvement in nontraditional security in addition to traditional security duties facilitates its political disengagement. This chapter has described how the maturity of democracy in Bangladesh has obviously contributed to

⁷ The interviewee is a member of the BAF and requested not to disclose her name on the ground of sensitivity.

this disengagement by addressing the causes underlying the earlier military involvement with politics particularly through coups. However, such mutually reinforcing development of democracy and military disengagement from politics is also influenced by the increased military involvement in nontraditional security activities. The democratic governments of Bangladesh are increasingly creating regulatory measures to allow the BAF to aid the civilian administration in implementing nontraditional security activities more effectively. So the change in the GoB's approach is encouraging the BAF to accept nontraditional security involvement as one of its core responsibilities; this undoubtedly influences its institutional perspective of the political government (Hakim, 1998).

By explaining the various security threats to Bangladesh, this chapter has shown that the BAF is inseparable from its traditional defense preparedness role. However, the analysis shows that peacetime Bangladesh is addressing nontraditional security threats more vigorously than any other threats. It is argued that the BAF's involvement in dealing with human security issues is expressly required by statute (GoB, 1972a). This chapter has explained that the GoB has initiated a system of holistic defense preparedness which enables the BAF to deal with both traditional and nontraditional security matters. In doing so, the GoB is increasing budgetary allocation for military hardware and software development and modifying its training and readiness to deal with nontraditional security threats, thereby strengthening the BAF and enabling it to deal with both kinds of security threats. This thesis argues that a stronger BAF is better capable to deal traditional and nontraditional security issues. However, in undertaking human security activities, the BAF is getting closer in touch with the civilian administration as well as learning the people's needs first hand. Such practice is changing the dynamic of civil-military relation in Bangladesh (Khan, 2009) resulting in the BAF's disengagement from politics.

The first three chapters show that, although the modality of the BAF's involvement in nontraditional security plays a crucial role in influencing military disengagement, overall involvement in nontraditional security serves to familiarise the BAF with human security. As a result, the BAF has learnt its role, duties and responsibilities under a democratic system, and is motivated to disengage from politics. It is also potential to generate repel or deterrent effect on the superiority

complex of some individuals of the security force, which also caused military coup in previous time in Bangladesh. However, such impacts are to be corroborated with the orientation of democratic values from the human security involvement of the BAF.

To understand such orientation the research is introducing three distinctive cases of the BAF's nontraditional security involvement in the following chapters. It is essential to link the BAF's perspective with certain factors that resemble democratic norms, such as strengthening the civil administration, encouraging people's participation and empowerment of the local government, hence the political society. Any improvement in these factors due to the BAF's involvement would mean improvement in democratic practice that re-enforces military disengagement from politics. But parallel to such process nontraditional security engagement also has the potential to affect the military perspective. The following chapters also explain the internal impact that enables the BAF to be better aware of the importance of the functioning of Bangladesh's civilian and political arms of government. This reverse process ultimately provides confidence in the political system and encourages political disengagement.

To understand the case studies in the following three chapters a table is provided. The table explains the types of nontraditional security involvement, types of the task BAF does, engagement modality and command position during the nontraditional security involvement.

Table: 3.2: Basic Characteristics the Case Studies on BAF's Human Security

Engagement

Case	Types of Tasks	Engagement Modality	Command Position
Context One: Involvement for emergency response	Fully human security approach	Working with civil administration	No change in army command and report to the civil administration
Context Two: Dealing internal security and	Partial human security approach	Assisting civil administration but no defining working	Special command body and no reporting to the civil

insurgency		relation	administration
Context Three: Human security task in UN peacekeeping	Human security approach with a scope of self defense	Working with civil administration but engagement with external actors	Temporary mission command has civil element but ultimate report to home command

The above table shows different engagement modalities depending on the type of the BAF's involvement. Three types of nontraditional security engagement vary due to the type of engagement, reporting mechanism, and position of civilian entity in commanding. Such varied scopes are considered to assess the influences on the BAF's political disengagement. The following chapters are arguing that due to the prevailing factor of military disengagement the democracy is continuing and sustaining as a factor for associating human security with the Bangladeshi national policy.

CHAPTER IV

THE BANGLADESH ARMED FORCE'S INVOLVEMENT IN DISASTER MANAGEMENT AND ITS IMPACT ON THE LOCAL DEMOCRATIC CONDITIONS

4.1 Chapter Introduction

The BAF's nontraditional security involvement is, perhaps, most evident in its disaster management assistance to the civil authority. This chapter attempts to analyse whether the disaster management involvement allows the BAF to have better insights about the functioning of the civilian arm of government, and if so, whether this insights discourages the BAF to be engaged in politics. From the examples and interviews it is observed that the BAF not only leans about the functioning of local civil-political authority but also influences important factors of local democracy by strengthening the skills of the civil authority as well as improving local governance. The previous chapters have explained that the BAF's extended engagement in disaster management is new under the democratic governments. This chapter explains that not only the democratic system influences and encourages the BAF's involvement in disaster management but this trend of involving the BAF in disaster or emergency management has also contributed to the development of formal policy measures making the BAF an essential partner for disaster management. Interestingly, holistic disaster management has been recently adopted by the GoB, and the BAF has responded to this by making a substantial contribution to the GoB's disaster management capability. This chapter explains that the BAF's involvement in disaster management evolves through the development of various policies. Moreover, this chapter assesses whether the impact of the BAF's involvement in disaster response activities is just limited to the duration of such activities or more pervasively it results in a significant governance improvement at a local level and last beyond the duration of the actual disasters. Since the BAF is directly involved with local civilian administrations and affected populations, qualitative changes in the capacity of the

civil authority as well as accountability of the local government take place. These positive changes help the BAF to appreciate the importance of the independent functioning of civilian authority, which eventually helps to accelerate the BAF's political disengagement process.

4.2 The Conceptual Context of Disasters

Prior to explaining the extent and severity of disaster in Bangladesh it is better to understand the concepts related with disaster. In general terms, disasters have two major components: hazard and vulnerability. Hazard was defined by the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction in 2004 as “a potentially damaging physical event, phenomenon or human activity that may cause the loss of life or injury, property damage, social and economic disruption or environmental degradation” (International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, 2004). On the other hand, vulnerability was defined by the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction in 2004 as “the conditions determined by physical, social, economic, and environmental factors or processes, which increase the susceptibility of a community to the impact of hazards” (International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, 2004). A disaster then occurs if these two conditions are met. Considering the generic meaning the disaster can be explained from two angles: first from a management angle, and second from disaster impact angle. The Brussels based Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disaster defined:

“[a] disaster is a situation or event which overwhelms local capacity, necessitating a request to a national or international level for external assistance” (World Bank, 2010a).

Past disaster management practices, particularly in Asia, used to focus primarily on managing the responses to disasters. However, recent global trends in disaster management are now more concerned to manage the risk rather than the response. Previously, disaster preparedness was about relief and rescue, but present disaster preparedness also includes activities prior to the actual disaster in order to minimise the risk of a potential disaster. Guzman has reported that present disaster management leans more towards managing risks and the underlying conditions that lead to disasters

(Guzman, 2001). Guzman's view complements the explanation of disaster made by Quarantelli and Dynes. They considered disaster as a 'collective stress situation' and identified it with a 'social crisis period' (Quarantelli, & Dynes, 1977: 23). They defined disaster as a summative or total concept that includes both stress and impact. However, Britton in his explanation agreed the difficulties of defining disaster. He has suggested that "disasters can be more easily recognised than they can be defined" (Britton, 1986: 255). A disaster may also be viewed as "a significant departure from normal experience for a particular time and place" (Turner, 1978). Thus the concept of disaster has evolved significantly from the earlier experiential description. The experientialist view of disasters that emphasises the mental construction through experiencing the hazardous situation is one conceptual approach to view that disaster also requires managing the disaster by creating a sense of risk reduction among the people. Barkun viewed that disaster is "the symbolic component requires knowledge of the sense of vulnerability, the adequacy of available explanation and the society's imagery of death and destruction" (Barkun, 1977: 219). In his explanation the 'sense of vulnerability' is the central focused which needs to be addressed in an effective disaster management approach. Such approach is now opted by several global entities, such as the World Health Organization. It views disaster as any occurrence that causes damage, ecological disruption, loss of human life, or deterioration of health and health services on a scale sufficient to warrant an extraordinary response from outside the affected community or area (World Health Organisation, 1995). Thus an effective disaster management needs to address not only relief but the overall protection of health and health service. Critically this approach emphasises on health issue only, but the underlining spirit calls for a prior step to reduce the risk.

These changes in disaster management have had wide scale implications. One classic example is seen in Ethiopia. Abebe has provided a detailed account of the adoption of this new approach in Ethiopia with regard to droughts and food shortages caused by the transformation that the Ethiopian Disaster Management system had achieved since the mid-1990s. Under the system of Ethiopian Disaster Management steps include, for example, building strong organisational establishments for disaster risk reduction; improving the policy and legal framework, carefully planning international cooperation and the establishment of an early warning system (Abebe,

2009: 2). Guzman has reported that the concept of ‘Total Disaster Risk Management’ has introduced structured and systematic processes and procedures for examining risks and for making decisions based on such risk examination (Guzman, 2001). According to the Natural Disasters Organisation of Australia, this type of approach requires long term planning and expert management of disasters (Natural Disasters Organisation of Australia, 1987). With these global changes Bangladesh has changed its earlier relief based approach to a holistic disaster management approach by incorporating long term disaster risk management as a statutory requirement (GoB, 2010e).

The scope of involving the BAF in disaster response can be explained from the analysis of the new notion of disaster from its structural and non-structural angle. Brammer, Currey and Alexander viewed the traditional idea of disaster by geographical explanation, which is also known as structural explanation (Brammer, 1990; Currey, 1978: 87; Alexander, 1993). Zaman viewed it from historic-structural perspective (Zaman, 1989: 196). The structural approach views disaster as a consequence or result of administrative or institutional faults, which suggests structural remedies and cooperation among the government agencies, including with the armed forces to ensure better structure to cope with the disaster (Haque, & Zaman, 1989: 301). In doing so, Latif and Custers argued for a systematic approach, where both structural and non-structural issues can be considered (Latif, 1989; Custers, 1993: 1501). The non-structured approach suggests the combination of the actual problems and the negative consequences of the disaster, and then combines the action considering other associate factors related with the disaster (Adnan, 1990; Boyce, 1990: 419; Rogers et al., 1989; Pearce, 1991: 7; Custers, 1993, Khalequzzaman, 1994: 80). Such explanation of interrelated facts and causes demands the coordinated regulatory framework to manage a disaster.

The Red Cross and Red Crescent consider that “disasters are exceptional events which suddenly kill or injure large number of people. . .” (Red Cross, 2010). Others tend to explain disaster from the ‘impact angle’. Fritz defined disaster, “as an event, concentrated in time and space, in which a society or a community undergoes severe dangers” (Fritz, 1961). In situations of severe danger, Bangladesh needs the training, experience and organisation that a trained military force can offer for effective response. The GoB considers the concept of damage and disruption as well

as the management issue in defining disaster. The earlier 'relief mode' approach to disaster response has been replaced by the concept of 'Comprehensive Disaster Management'. The Draft Disaster Management Act was the first to provide the basis of disaster understanding from its management angle (GoB, 2008c), which later formulated the definition with solid position in the Bangladesh Disaster Management Act of 2010. The Disaster Management Act, in Article (2), sub-article IX, defines disaster as "a serious disruption to a community caused by the impact of an event which requires a significant coordinated response by the Government and other entities to help the community to recover from the disruption" (GoB, 2010e). According to the Act, the GoB perceives that disaster management involves full recovery from disruption. Thus the disaster management in Bangladesh has evolved through updated regulations and policies; those are consistent with the changes of global disaster idea.

4.3 Disaster Management and Human Security

From the above discussion on the concept of disaster management and the analysis on the concept of human security in chapter II provides an account about their compatibility. A survey conducted by the Safer World, a frontline organisation on disaster management, in 2008 revealed an astonishing attitude among ordinary people about the nature of vulnerability due to natural disasters and how the response work signifies it as 'daily security' work. Most of the respondents viewed the vulnerability of Bangladesh is the natural disaster and the response work is daily security task as the threats are on 'freedom from want' in nature (Safer world, 2008). As the research has explained the notion of 'freedom from want' as a human security concept, the linkage between the disaster management and human security principles and objectives is pertinent. Ogata explained this relationship in her speech at an event organised by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies. She argued that natural disaster is a human security problem and that by not addressing disasters using a human security approach, disaster related poverty increases (Ogata, 2012). This notion is clearer in the explanation of Faizal. He explained in a report that failure in linking disaster vulnerability with human security impedes poverty reduction in a country (Faizal,

2012). If this notion is analysed with the human security definition provided by the UN and mentioned in chapter I, where human security approach is to assist the cross-cutting challenges of survival, livelihood and dignity, it is rational to argue that the disaster management involvement is closely associated with human security approach.

The argument about disaster management as a human security issue relates the disaster management task to protect the ‘human dignity’, which is a central goal of human security. As Ogata has explained, natural disasters affect human wellbeing, and dignity is intrinsically related to human security (Ogata, 2012). Ms. Fatima Degom, a resident of a cyclone affected area in Bangladesh, it should be noted that many residents have done human rights training, with action aid, and they are familiar with using human rights terminology, said:

“working for the disaster is to help the people who are suffering due to the hardship. Protecting the affected people helps them to live with dignity. Once the disaster threat is reduced people can conduct their activities without fear, which makes them empowered” (Interviewed on September 13, 2010).

The fact of protecting dignity of affected people in a disaster management ensures that the outcome is the increase in people’s human security, which is expressed by the *Human Security Now* as a core component of human security (The Commission on Human Security, 2003). The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation has published a report entitled *Disaster Reduction and Human Security* containing 93 case studies from 41 countries and regions in different parts of the developing and developed world. These case studies represent an impressive accumulation of firsthand knowledge which illustrates how holistic disaster management is a human security issue which contributes to building societies safely and sustainably (Shaw, & Rouhban, 2005).

Although due to the training on disaster management many members of the BAF appreciate of the manner in which disaster management and human security are inter-related, this relationship is still not commonly understood among the ordinary people in Bangladesh. During the field work for this thesis, some individuals equated disaster management with relief work. An ordinary villager, Mr. Goni Mia said:

“when there is a flood, we can have relief. The army comes and gives relief: rice and oil. So we like the army. *Union Parishad* (local government) officials and some NGOs come and give training- that is only talking. What can we do during disasters with only talking?” (Interviewed on April 02, 2011).

For him, disaster response meant relief and he did not think community training or capacity development activities constitute disaster response work. Many villagers, therefore, have not yet grasped the idea of the GoB's holistic disaster response.

The same can be said for a large portion of local government representatives who also believe that disaster response means no more than relief. Yet they have the primary responsibility for working with the local people and implementing government programmes. Despite their vital role they have only partial understanding of the role of disaster response and the BAF's participation. Mr. Abdur Rahman was a representative of the local government or the *Union Parishad*. He expressed his perception about disaster and said:

“sometimes when big floods happen, we need relief. But it is difficult to receive the relief on time. Often we get the relief late and it does not help. Sometimes government officials come, the army comes and they want to have meetings. Meetings cannot help us. But when the army comes with their engine boats that can help us because we can reach villages in a distance that is disconnected due to flood” (Interviewed on September 22, 2010).

The BAF's involvement in holistic disaster response work may be dominated by provision of immediate assistance in the form of relief and rescue, but longer term recovery activities are now more common (Bangladesh Army, 2010). The BAF is involved in the reconstruction of vital infrastructure that is needed to protect the community from disaster and establishes communication and supply routes (Bangladesh Military, 2011). These are obviously beyond immediate relief distribution work. However, the BAF's involvement in long-term community building and training is nothing but human security work (Rahman, 1991). Despite the encouraging growing understanding about disaster management as a human security task, a sizable proportion of the population is yet to accept it.

4.4 Extent and Severity of Disaster in Bangladesh

With the above discussed understanding of natural disaster it can be argued that Bangladesh experiences several kinds of disasters. To understand the nature and extent of disasters in Bangladesh, this thesis provides a brief overview of the various types of disaster experienced in Bangladesh. The Complete Emergency Database in the *International Disaster Database* divides disasters into two categories: i) natural and ii) technological. It has further divides the natural disasters into five subcategories. These five subcategories cover 12 types of disaster, which can be further divided into about 30 subtypes as set forth below.

Table 4.1: Natural Disaster Categories, Types, and Subtypes (Complete Emergency Database, 2011)

Hydro-meteorological				
Biological	Geophysical	Hydrological	Meteorological	Climatological
Epidemic - Viral infectious disease - Bacterial infectious disease - Parasitic infectious - Fungal infectious - Prion infectious disease Insect infestation Animal stampede	Earthquake Volcano Mass movement (dry) - Rockfall - Landslide - Avalanche - Subsidence	Flood - General flood - Coastal Flood - Storm surge - Mass movement - Rockfall - Landslide - Avalanche - Subsidence	Storm - Tropical cyclone - Extra-tropical cyclone - Local storm	Extreme temperature - Heat wave - Cold wave - Extreme winter condition Drought/wild fire - Forest fire - Land fire


Among the list of 30 types of disasters Bangladesh faces mainly cyclone and floods in greater scale. The chart below shows the number of cyclones and floods occurring between 1907 and 2005 in Bangladesh.

Table 4.2: Disaster Frequency in Bangladesh from 1907 to 2004 (Complete Emergency Database, 2011)

Types of Disaster	# of Events	Total Killed	Avg. # Killed	Total Affected	Avg. # Affected
Cyclone	137	614,112	4,483	63,817,281	465,820
Flood	64	50,310	786	369,678,156	5,776,221

From the figures of killed and affected population of the cyclone and floods in Bangladesh, it is apparent that the severity and losses are significantly high. To understand this severity a brief analysis on these two types of disasters is provided below:

A. Cyclones: Cyclones are the main form of disaster in Bangladesh in terms of casualties. Crane has stated that “every year, there are some eighty tropical cyclones occurring around the globe, out of which about four originates in the Bay of Bengal” (Crane, 1988). Of the 508 cyclones that have originated in the Bay of Bengal in the last 100 years, 17 per cent have hit Bangladesh, amounting to a severe cyclone almost once every three years. Of these, nearly fifty-three per cent have claimed more than five thousand lives (GoB, 2008b). Comparing with the frequency and scale of cyclones in elsewhere those originate in the Bay of Bengal are with higher vulnerability.



Map 4.1: Coastal Cyclone-prone Zone of Bangladesh (Source: Islam, 2004)


The above map of the coastal cyclone-prone zone shows that about one-fifth Bangladesh's area and its population are exposed to the danger of cyclones.

Sometimes accompanied by storms and tidal surges, cyclones can cause huge losses of human life and destroy the total infrastructure in the coastal areas affected. The historic document *Ain-E-Akbori* describes a 16th century cyclone as a disaster in the southern belt. However, the extent and scale of recent cyclones are higher than before. “During the last three decades almost all of the coastal areas and offshore islands faced cyclones” (Nasreen, 2004: 5). The higher number of cyclones is due to climate change (GoB, 2008b). While many scientists agree with the GoB (Emanuel, 2005; Webster, et al. 2005), others have challenged this conclusion, citing, for example, problems with data reliability, regional variability, and appropriate measurement of sea-surface temperature and other climate variables (Landsea, *et al.*, 2006). However, the International Workshop on Tropical Cyclones has recently noted in *the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Fourth Annual Report* that “[i]f the projected rise in sea level due to global warming occurs, then the vulnerability to tropical cyclone storm surge flooding would increase” (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007). To deal with the extended cyclone threats, the GoB is receiving instant and skilled assistance from the BAF.

B. Floods: Floods are the second most common form of disaster in Bangladesh, and occur regularly. Karim has reported that “the major floods that attracted international attention occurred in 1987 and 1988. Serious floods have also occurred in 1984, 1980, 1977, and 1974” (Karim, 1994). According to Hossain, Bangladesh generally experiences four types of floods, namely: i) Flash floods, ii) Rain-fed floods, iii) River floods, and iv) Storm surge floods (Hossain, 2003). Floods inundate large areas of the country and cause river erosion. The results are large scale destruction, erosion, food shortage, and internal human displacement. Erosion itself is a typical disaster creating numerous pressures on lives and livelihoods. A position paper of COAST, a leading organisation working on disaster, reported that “in the last 34 years submerging of river side lands are 21,9286 acres in Jamuna, 69,135 acres in Ganges and 95,119 acres in Padma” (Mahmud, *et al.*, 2011). However, floods exacerbate erosion and cause massive displacement. During floods, communications and transportation of supplies in flood affected areas are mostly beyond the general coping capacity of the civilian authorities. The BAF works as an important partner to

civil authorities to ensure the smooth execution of the GoB’s flood response programmes.

According to the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery, an agency organised by World Bank, “Bangladesh’s geographical location and land characteristics make it one of most hazard-prone countries in the world” (Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery, 2011). The following multi-hazard map shows the disaster risk hotspots in Bangladesh, which basically extends all most all parts of the country:



Map 4.2: Bangladesh Map of Multi-Hazard Disaster Risk Hotspots by Hazard Groups (Complete Emergency Database, 2011)

From the map it is clear that a significantly large area of Bangladesh is vulnerable due to at least one kind of hazard (Complete Emergency Database, 2011).

Top of that, comparing with other vulnerable countries Bangladesh stands as a country that seriously vulnerable in disaster. The following figure shows the three most affected countries between 1990 and 2008 were Bangladesh, Myanmar and Honduras, with their ranking in the Climatic Risk Index (CRI).

Table 4.3: The Three Most Affected Countries from 1990 to 2008 by CRI (Harmeling, 2009:6)

CRI 1990-2008	CRI score	Deaths per 100,000 Inhabitants (per annual)	Total losses in million US\$ (per annual)	GDP Losses in % (per annual)

1. Bangladesh	8.00	6.27	2.189	1.81
2. Myanmar	8.25	9.60	707	2.55
3. Honduras	12.00	5.56	660	3.37

Among the three countries most affected one was Bangladesh. A World Bank report termed Bangladesh as one of the most vulnerable country. The report mentioned that “among the world disaster in 2010, 37% occurred in Asia and among Asia Bangladesh is one of the most vulnerable that suffers disproportionately human lives” (World Bank, 2010). Habibullah and Hussain also mentioned the similar. They wrote that disasters are the biggest threat¹ to the development of Bangladesh (Habibullah, *et. al.*, 1998; and Hussain, 1995). In addition to loss of valuable lives the disaster vulnerability of Bangladesh affects the economy, food security and infrastructure. A report of the Asian Disaster Reduction Center shows that “economic damages to those disasters were enormous . . . the country is losing a good number of GDP each year due to various natural disasters” (Asian Disaster Reduction Center, 2007). Often the economic damage comes along with the severe threats on food security. This fact is recognised by the United Nations Office for Project Service in its report *Disaster management in Bangladesh: Report of the Project on Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme*, where it explained that “natural disasters disrupt the nation’s food supply and decimate the livelihoods of the many Bangladeshis who work in agriculture” (United Nations Office for Project Service, 2009: 1).

Similar to the report, Shamsuddoha and Chowdhury explained that “the immediate impact on crop loss and strain livelihood is going to adversely affect food and health security” (Shamsuddoha, & Chowdhury, 2007). Such condition inflicts extreme economic hardship on the country. Any shortage of food or serious disruption of the public life can have a wider impact in Bangladesh than in other countries,

¹ The potential impact can be understood from the current pace of damage caused by various types of disaster. For an example we can mention the impact of flood on food security. Although it is clear that floods can affect agriculture production significantly, little is known about the incremental future damages from more frequent extreme events or increased discharges. Economic damages have been calculated after several recent extraordinary flood events (e.g. almost US\$700 million in agriculture losses were reported after floods in 2004). Sea level rise and salinity intrusion implications on the agriculture sector are even less understood. The loss of food-grain due to soil salinity intrusion in the coastal districts is about 200,000 to 650,000 tons. (Habibullah *et. al.*, 1998; and Hussain, 1995)

simply because there is not enough alternative for the people to recover from disaster damages.

The normalcy of disaster in Bangladesh has an added vulnerability due to change in weather and climate change. The United Nations Environmental Programme in the *Global Environment Outlook* has described global warming as a serious environmental problem for Bangladesh. Considering the consequence of global warming, Shamsuddoha has explained that “being a low laying deltaic country, Bangladesh will face the serious consequences of sea level rise including permanent inundation of huge land masses along the coast line” (Shamsuddoha, & Chowdhury, 2007). GoB also raised similar concern and mentioned that “tens of millions will be displaced by floods from rising sea levels and tropical cyclones” (GoB, 2008: 35). Ali explained the climatic vulnerability issue much earlier. He mentioned that “in the foreseeable future, Bangladesh is likely to be one of the most vulnerable countries of the world in the event of climate change” (Ali, 1999). These analysis shows that Bangladesh is facing significant disaster vulnerabilities which challenges the overall development of the country.

4.5. Involvement of the BAF in Disaster Management

The presence of numerous hazardous conditions including the geo-location as well as the weakness of the physical structure of Bangladesh is causing vulnerabilities (Islam, 2004). Considering such vulnerability, GoB needs to ensure skillful support for the disaster management. The ability to be able to respond to the whole range of disasters faced by Bangladesh is clearly beyond the capacity of the existing civilian agencies and justifies the GoB's policies to involve the BAF in disaster management activities. It is claimed by the BAF that as a trained and organised agency of the GoB, it is required to assist the civilian administration implement measures to manage the disaster (Bangladesh Military, 2011). Though it seems as a one sided view but the evidence shows that the GoB is involving the BAF to address not only the short term rescue and relief but also to deal with the disaster related infrastructural weakness, such as building the necessary disaster prevention infrastructures, dams and shelters. The complexity of disaster management logically

makes the involvement of the BAF crucial in disaster management. The Prime Minister of Bangladesh acknowledged the contribution of the BAF and she said in her speech during the 65 Bangladesh Military Academy Long Course:

“Bangladesh Army has always been beside the people during all natural disasters and national crises. Besides, Bangladesh Army is assisting the civil administration in the fields of infrastructure development, preparing national identity cards and voter list” (Prime Minister’s Speech on 65 Bangladesh Military Academy Long Course, December 2011).

With the higher priority given to disaster preparedness, Bangladesh has managed to develop significant regulatory mechanisms including the BAF as a partner agency for disaster management and complying with the international standards, such as the Hyogo Framework of Action 2005-15² and SPHERE³ standards for effective and comprehensive disaster management. The process emphasises developing community resilience and preparedness for the disaster response (SPHERE, 2004), which is inclusive, multi-dimensional and multi-faceted process for rescue, relief, recovery, and long term reconstruction. In the context of Bangladesh, the civil authority is not enough trained for such multi-dimensional and multi-faceted response work. On the other hand, the BAF is trained, along with the regular issues, during its ‘Bangladesh Military Academy Long Course’, on urgent rescue, relief, recovery and long term reconstruction to support the disaster management. Numbers of blog writings by the

² The Hyogo Framework of Action 2005-15 is also known as the *Framework of Action* for disaster management. It is adopted in World Conference on Disaster Reduction, held on 18-22 January in Hyogo, Japan in 2005. The Conference provided a unique opportunity to promote a strategic and systematic approach to reducing vulnerabilities and risks to hazards. For more see UN/ISDR. 2005. *World Conference for Disaster Reduction*. Geneva: International Strategy for Disaster Reduction.

³ SPHERE is the internationally accepted principles. Popularly it is known as the Red Cross r Red Crescent Minimum Standards of Humanitarian Response. The initiative started from 1997. SPHERE is based on two core beliefs: first, that all possible steps should be taken to alleviate human suffering arising out of calamity and conflict, and second, that those affected by disaster have a right to life with dignity and therefore a right to assistance. It is adopted in 2004. For more information see The SPHERE Project. 2004. *Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response*. Geneva: The SPHERE Project.

members of the BAF suggest that such training is helping to improve the efficiency of the BAF.

Bangladesh needs long term measures to be fully and continuously prepared to meet the range of threats confronting it. Measures to reduce its vulnerability to potentially devastating impacts of natural disasters are similar with the human security principle and objectives. These measures essentially correspond with the aspect of addressing potential threats of the disaster. The same notion is expressed by the Safer World. The Safer World, a frontline organisation on disaster issue, claims to deal with the involvement of the BAF in disaster management this needs to be addressed through the GoB's disaster management policies reflecting human security approach (Safer world, 2008). The GoB's newly formulated laws and policies are consist with the human security principles and objectives in addressing the threats posed by natural disasters, including climate change (Salim, *et al.*, 2011). For example, the 'adaptation approach' is the key approach to deal the climatic impact in Bangladesh. The view is expressed by Dr. Siraj, a bureaucrat of the GoB. He explains the 'adaptation approach' and justifies the GoBs policies consistent with the approach where the BAF has an essential stake. He said:

“The 'adaptation approach' involves building the necessary resilience within the community so that it can deal with adverse situations arising from climate change. This approach is clearly consistent with the human security approach to deal with the potential threats. The GoB is involving the BAF to build the community resilience by proving them with better training, which shows the application of the 'adaptation approach'” (Interviewed on March 9, 2010).

The BAF has viewed this notion from another direction. It is mentioned in the website of the Bangladesh Army that the GoB has begun to involve the BAF in building the infrastructure necessary to deal with the impacts of climate change, which is disaster vulnerability for the country (Bangladesh Army, 2011). The interviewees also acknowledged that the BAF is now recognised in the GoB's policies as an essential partner of the civil authority to address the disaster vulnerabilities.

But the concern is unlike the emergency rescue and relief, whether the BAF's long term infrastructure development assistance truly serves the interest of the people or this practice disempowers the civilian authority. Importantly, there is no domestic research on this issue, probably because it needs to be assessed with its long term impacts. However, Dr, Siraj, one bureaucrat of the GoB, accepted the possibility of negative impact of involving the BAF in long term disaster infrastructure making task. He tried to assert the idea of involving the BAF as an efficient way to complete this type of task. Since, the public process of tendering the infrastructural development is yet to free from corruption and unnecessary delay the involvement of the BAF at least saves the time for the building of urgent disaster infrastructure. However, it is important to note that such practice cannot be a permanent solution, rather developing essential capacity of the civilian authority to conduct could be.

4.5.1 The BAF's Involvement under the Disaster Management

Structure

Current disaster management in Bangladesh has evolved from previous approaches and has developed a structure which ensures the BAF, as a specific entity, a role in disaster response work. According to the Encyclopedia Britannica “of all the natural risks facing Bangladesh, it was a tropical cyclone that hit the nation in 1991 that catalysed the Government of Bangladesh to finally take action to shift from a reactive to a proactive approach to disaster risk reduction” (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2011). The GoB has realised that disaster management should not start after a disaster, but rather that holistic management should ensure appropriate preparations before any actual disaster strikes (GoB, 2010e). The GoB has shifted disaster response from a ‘relief’ approach to one that involves the totality of disaster management and recognises the BAF as an essential participating agency (GoB, 2008c). At the same time, the GoB has clearly defined the institutional structure of disaster management and BAF's involvement by statute law, as simplified in the Figure below.




Figure 4.1: Institutional Structure of Disaster Management and Space for BAF's Involvement

In the figure, the darkly outlined boxes show where BAF involvement is required by statute. It is significant that the BAF is involved in all the Disaster Management Committees at every level (GoB, 2010), which is the implementation stage. The BAF is also in control of the GoB's disaster related information center located in the Prime Minister's Office, which is the higher stage of disaster management structure. The disaster management structure identifies the Ministry of Food and Disaster Management as the national focal point for disaster management in Bangladesh. (Detail on the structure of disaster management is provided in Annexure C) The figure shows that the BAF is not involved at the middle stage of ministerial level. There three parallel agencies through which the Ministry of Food and Disaster Management manages disasters, namely:

- i) The Disaster Management Bureau ,
- ii) The Directorate of Relief and Rehabilitation, and
- iii) The Directorate General of Food.

These bodies operate through local level Disaster Management Committees which ensure speedy responses as these departments are with their specialisation about the local contexts (GoB, 2008c). Practical Action Bangladesh, an organisation working on disaster management, wrote:

“it is important to appreciate the local knowledge and to build on it in order to improve local capacities to withstand and respond to the impacts of disasters” (Practical Action Bangladesh, 2009).

In the process of such build up on the local knowledge the Union Disaster Management Committee and village level units directly implement policies directed by the National Disaster Management Committee, and bring local knowledge of disaster management to the mainstream process. Mr. Ahmed, a researcher on democracy and military, viewed:

“the unique characteristic of the institutional structure is its systematic divisions and scope for local participation through the people’s organisation at the implementation level. The BAF’s absence from the national agencies of the disaster management system signifies the independent space for the civilian authority to respond to a disaster” (Interviewed on September 8, 2010).

However, this very positive attribution to the disaster management structure does not eliminate the chances of the BAF’s undue influence over other agencies involved in the task. Though the local level civil and political authority expressed their satisfaction over the involvement of the BAF in disaster management work but the danger of the BAF’s influence at the higher level and mid-level or ministerial level can be potential. One view by Mr. Mahzer, researcher and civil society activist, is worthy to cite here. He said:

“the BAF’s involvement at the higher stage of disaster management task suggests very little justification. Their assistance at the implementation level needs to be assessed with different needs, such as lack of capacity with the civil authority to deal the sudden shock of the disaster. But the involvement at the higher level certainly cannot be justified with same logic” (Interviewed on April 11, 2011).

This argument raises the faulty aspect of the disaster management structure in Bangladesh. To be transparent all three stages of disaster management structure shall have a justification of involving the agencies including the BAF.

4.5.2 The Policies on BAF's Disaster Management Involvement

The BAF's engagement in the disaster management can be explained by examining the statutory framework and other policies. Although the BAF has been involved in disaster related activities since its formation, recently that involvement has been regularised through specific laws and policies. The Pacific Disaster Center has stated that the "armed forces played a significant role in all past disaster management in the light of the tasks assigned in the Standing Order on Disaster of 1999" (Pacific Disaster Center. 2006: 23). In line with the GoB's disaster management policies, the BAF has developed a contingency plan to deal with the consequences from potential earthquakes in Dhaka city. The BAF has also developed its own training for disaster response (Rahman, 1991). The BAF is also involved in activating the Disaster Management and Relief Monitoring Cell at Prime Minister's Office after a disaster (Pacific Disaster Center. 2006: 23), which is a vital part of entire disaster management work.

This crucial role of the BAF's involvement serves both structural and un-structural needs of the people. Rahman acknowledged the notion and wrote that the BAF's involvement in disaster management addresses both the structural and non-structural needs of the people (Rahman, 2012). Structural measures are not just building infrastructure but also creating a legal structure for disaster management (Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery, 2011). Mainly, the GoB enacts laws and develops policies such as the Flood Action Plan as its structural response. Before introducing the Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme (CDMP), the GoB had considered international standards in disaster response such as the Hyogo Frame Work of Action, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the SAARC Framework for Action and Agenda 21 (National Disaster Management Plan 2008-15: Preface, 14).

These measures are included to the GoB's new approach to disaster management. The BAF's disaster response is now more defined, institutionalised,

regulated and more comprehensive. According to Article 2 (XII) of the Disaster Management Act the BAF's involvement is in planning, co-ordination and implementing measures to lessen the effects of disasters (GoB, 2008c). The GoB directs assistance from different agencies for the coordinated disaster management. The agencies include parts of the BAF, such as the Bangladesh Army, the Disaster Emergency Centre of Armed Forces Division, the Rapid Action Battalion, the Flood Forecasting and Warning Center, the Bangladesh Meteorological Department, and the Cyclone Preparedness Programme (GoB, 2010e). Such extended statutory and programmatic scope of the BAF's involvement in disaster management proves that the new approach has paved the way for the BAF's wider engagement in emergency response.

The statutory provisions have also explained BAF's specific involvement. Aslam has explained these tasks and divided them into three stages, namely, i) normal stage, ii) alert stage and iii) disaster stage (Alam, 2010). The Disaster Management Act 2010, the Standing Order on Disaster Management 2010, and the National Disaster Management Policy 2008, collectively allocate the following tasks for the BAF during normal periods:

- Designate a Disaster Management Focal Point and inform all concerned.
- Establish effective contact and ensure continuous liaison with Ministry of Food and Disaster Management and other committees.
- Ensure necessary and appropriate preparedness, along with necessary equipment, of the three services to extend all support required with regard to the security purposes of the people, especially in disaster prone areas before the flood or cyclone season starts.
- Arrange disaster management training for the task force formed under the Disaster Management Act and form a group of from the BAF for emergency deployment for effective relief, rescue, and evacuation work.
- Develop a plan and ensure necessary budget allocation for disaster emergency operations to respond to demands and emergencies.
- Keep budgetary provision for disaster preparedness and management affairs.

- Undertake planning in cooperation with the Disaster Management Bodies for the use of the BAF in aid to the civil authorities on the basis of requisition and request.

- Undertake training for the Task Force Commander in emergency response, relief and recovery.

- Ensure safety and security of installations, establishments, equipment, personnel and resources.

- Prepare a contingency plan for the GoB to response disaster (GoB, 2010e; 2010; 2008).

The following tasks are conducted during the alert and warning stage:

- Operate the Control Room, Prime Minister's Monitoring and Coordination Cell round the clock (24 hrs).

- Maintain liaison with the Ministry of Food and Disaster Management and other bodies.

- Keep the appropriate units of Army, Navy and Air force in readiness to conduct rescue, evacuation and relief operations as per requisition.

- Ensure that the necessary preparedness arrangements for the deployment of the Task Force in the event of disaster to areas identified by the Government are in force (GoB, 2010e; 2010; 2008).

Finally, the following tasks are conducted during the disaster stage:

- On requisition of the GoB, deploy the BAF for disaster response, relief and rehabilitation work in aid of the civil powers.

- Collect information on the rescue, relief and rehabilitation work and dispatch it regularly to the coordination cell of the Prime Minister's Office and other ministries.

- Ensure early recovery, relief and rehabilitation work as decided by the GoB.

- Prepare a report on relief and rehabilitation operations by the BAF and furnish it to the National Disaster Monitoring Cell (GoB, 2010e; 2010; 2008).

Such extended but defined involvement of the BAF shows its scope of engagement in disaster management activities. Researcher Mr. Mazher explained:

“the statutory role of the BAF shows its scope of contribution is in the area where civil administration is lacking. The statutory and institutional structure shows that the BAF’s involvement in CDMP is to meet such statutory requirement” (Interviewed on April 11, 2011).

The following figure shows the statutory, institutional and policy scope of the BAF’s involvement for disaster response.




Figure 4.2: BAF’s Statutory, Institutional and Policy Scope of Engagement in Emergency Response

The functional linkage between the BAF and the civil-political authority in discharging the disaster management services of the BAF fits with the democratic structure of accountability and separation of inter-agency power. The above figure shows that the BAF’s involvement at the operational level is based on a defined structure. This structure is embedded in the GoB’s institutional structure for disaster management (explained in figure 4.1). Similarly, figure 4.2 explains the tasks that the BAF undertakes for the CDMP. These tasks are guided by the Disaster Management Act 2010, the Standing Order on Disaster Management 2010, and the National Disaster Management Policy 2008, and show that the BAF’s involvement in disaster management is pursuant to its statutory responsibilities.

The GoB's shift towards disaster risk reduction has resulted in the introduction of an inclusive and broad-based programme, namely the CDMP formed in 2003. In wider terms, the CDMP addresses the ability of Bangladesh's disaster management system "to reduce unacceptable risks and improve response and recovery activities" (United Nations Office for Project Support, 2009: 1). The disaster management structure outlined above operates the CDMP and ensures the involvement of the BAF. Ms. Lubna, a researcher on the BAF and civil society activist, acknowledges this fact and explained the disaster preparedness as one component in the CDMP, which encourages the BAF's involvement. She said:

"the CDMP includes prior preparedness. Disaster preparedness goes beyond institutional and structural arrangements and includes initiatives to change the behavior of stakeholders. In this regard the BAF ensures its preparedness through proper training" (Interviewed on September 11, 2010).

Practical Action of Bangladesh, an organisation on disaster management, has viewed that "disaster preparedness refers to measures taken to prepare for and reduce the effects of hazardous events which threaten to become a disaster" (Practical Action Bangladesh, 2009: 13). The GoB, as part of the CDMP, is following the comprehensive Disaster Risk Reduction Plan to reduce the hazardous events (GoB, 2008c). As response to this Plan, the GoB applies 'Disaster Risk Reduction' concept and encourages the community based disaster preparedness by involving the BAF in the task (GoB of Bangladesh, 2010e). To ensure the community based disaster preparedness the local coping knowledge needs to be mainstreamed. The BAF encourages applying the local knowledge in disaster management due to its understanding about the CDMP in its 'Bangladesh Military Academy Long Course'. Mr. W⁴, a member of Bangladesh Navy and involved in disaster management task, gave his account to matter and said that "the BAF has already adopted the CDMP as a part of its training and that enables the BAF to explore the local knowledge for the best preparedness" (Interviewed on March 18, 2011).

⁴ The interviewee is a member of Navy, a wing of the BAF, requested not to disclose his name on the ground of sensitivity.

Since the “preparedness deals with the potential threats” (Ogata, 2012), BAF’s assistance in the preparedness means it is involved to address the potential threats from the disaster, which resonates the BAF’s involvement with the human security principles and objectives. However, the CDMP has detailed the scope of the BAF’s involvement in the disaster management. In each of the GoB’s options to deal with disasters, the BAF has specific tasks, which is now also responsible for coordinating and maintaining the information.

Table 4.4: GoB’s Responses to Disaster Mitigation and Involved Actors including BAF (Regional Research Centre for Asia and the Pacific, 2001)

Options	Out Comes	Actors
Flood		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Strengthening Capabilities for Flood forecasting and monitoring - Structural mitigation programs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Real time forecast and timely possible evacuation - Mitigation of losses and sufferings - Less inundation due to embankments along the river banks 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Flood Forecasting and Warning Centre - Surface Water Modeling Centre , NGOs - Electronic media (i.e. radio, television) - <u>BDF</u>,
Cyclone and Storm Surge		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Strengthening of warning and forecasting centre - Shelter construction - Awareness building - Institutional arrangements up to grassroot level 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Reliable and timely forecast - Large-scale evacuation of vulnerable people - Spontaneous response to warning - Well coordination prior to and immediately after disaster 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Bangladesh Meteorological Department - Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief - Local Government and Engineering Department, NGOs - <u>BAF</u>
Earthquake		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Requisite number of 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Reduction of building 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Bangladesh Meteorological

seismic observatories - Updating the inventory of equipment - Contingency plan - Massive awareness/drill	vulnerability to tremor - Systematic and accurate seismic observations - Efficient and quick rescue - Better coordination	Department, BAF - Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief - Ministry of Home Affairs, NGOs, Donors, Social Organisations
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The above table shows the working position of the BAF in the GoB's overall disaster management structure. In the functioning of the CDMP all the Disaster Management Committees are headed by the civil authorities and the role of the BAF is to assist the civil authority. The programmatic guideline for the field level implementation as well as central management comes from the appropriate central civil authority. But the guidelines often fall short in implementation as the local authority with poor competence cannot implement them. Mr. Rahman, a member of the local government, said:

“the Disaster Management Committee at the district level is dominated by the district authority (higher civil administrative). Once the union and village level (local government) representative meets the higher district authority in the coordination meeting of the Disaster Management Committee, they are not capable to face the higher authority with confidence simply because the higher authority holds the budget for local development with them. So the local representatives cannot establish their view bargaining with the officials from the higher civilian administration. As a result the real issue of the affected local area, sometime remains neglected” (Interviewed on September 22, 2010).

Here the BAF's presence plays as a critical balancing factor between the local government and the higher civilian authority. The BAF presents as member at all the Disaster Management Committees at the district, union and village level and they can provide their support to the local government representative to better present the local situation in the coordination meeting. Mr. Rahman, a local government representative, explained that “the member of the BAF helps us to explain our demand to the district

level meeting. Their support makes our demand strong” (Interviewed on September 22, 2010)

Such support provides leverage between the central civilian authority and the local government. Essentially, BAF’s involvement enables the better coordination of the implementation of the disaster management regulation and policies.

4.6 Examples of the BAF’s Disaster Management Involvement (Independent Case Study)

This chapter has narrated both the positive and negative attributions of the BAF’s disaster management involvement. It has explored the avenue of influencing the local democratic conditions through the BAF’s involvement. However, the crucial factor of the positive or negative impact is analysed to be based on certain conditionality. To substantiate the analysis of this chapter, the research is providing practical examples explaining how the BAF’s involvement is creating essential attribution to the governance components at the local level. These attributions are earlier argued as significant factors influencing the local democratic practice and the BAF’s orientation for military disengagement from politics.

The above analysis about the disaster management and the scope of the BAF’s engagement is interpreted with practical examples. The examples explain the outcomes from the BAF’s engagement in certain disaster management activities within the context of improving democratic practices. Since the BAF’s engagement in disaster management associates with human security principles and objectives, the outcome from the human security involvement will allow explaining the BAF’s influence at the grass-root level. The BAF as an agency of the government supposed to applies its best skills and professional capacity during the disaster management. The BAF works under the command and control of the central command but involves with local authority to serve its statutory role to ‘aid to the civil authority’. However, its operational task is dictated by the civil administration, which is under the directives of the District Commissioner. In this working structure the BAF jointly work with the civil administration, which can be characterised as autonomous.

The two independent case studies are to analysis the capacity development aspect of the local civil authority and improvement of the governance component due to the BAF's involvement in disaster management. The examples justify the theorem linking the BAF's disaster management work and the improved functioning of the local democracy. The local democratic power structure and functionalities is the unit of bigger national democratic practice. Thus the case studies of the influence of the local level democratic practices opened the wider discussion of the influence on democratic practice at the national level, where the BAF's involvement in nontraditional security task of disaster management serves as the key factor.

4.6.1 Example One: BAF's Involvement Improves the Capacity of the Local Authority

The first case study is about the improvement the capacity of the local authority in the process of strengthening the local administration, which is a theoretical component that encourages the military disengagement. (Explained in chapter I) The improvement of the capacity of the local authority is another way to explain the strengthening the local civilian entities. It is also explained that the involvement of the BAF encourages the local participation. It is narrated with the example of an individual who is a victim of the natural disaster and entitled to receive a comprehensive support from the government. Whereby, the individual actually received the service and support of the BAF. The experience of disaster victim gives an ample opportunity to assess the BAF's engagement. The individual as an ordinary citizen can assess the response and function of the local administration comparing its role pre and post period of the BAF's engagement, where it is found in the example that the functioning of the local authority had improved after the involvement of the BAF. The example has helped to analyse the perception and impact of the improved capacity of the local administration.

A. Introduction: Shreen Begom aged 65 is a senior citizen from village South Tetubaria of Latachapa Union under Kalapara Post Office of Potuakhali District. Potuakhali is a Southern coastal district vulnerable of natural disasters such as cyclone, flood and river erosion. The recent cyclone SIDR of 2007 has devastated the Southern coastal districts of Bangladesh including Potuakhali. Ms. Shreen Begom was

one of the victims of the cyclone. Though she managed to survive from the devastation of the cyclone with some limited injury, her entire livelihood and her only house was completely destroyed.

Ms. Shreen Begom was the only person living in her house during the disaster. She is an early widow and does not have any children. She had a coconut garden as the sole income source. With the income she barely managed her life. She had a house made of corrugated iron sheets. Compared with her some poorer neighbor Ms. Shreen Begom had a decent house. SIDR washed away her entire house and destroyed her coconut garden. That had made her so vulnerable that she had to depend on the relief provided by the government.

B. Areas under SIDR's Impact: SIDR was a powerful cyclone. A GoB report mentioned that the "Cyclone SIDR hit Bangladesh's offshore islands at approximately 6:30 pm on the evening of 15 November and made landfall across the Barisal coast at 9:00 pm during ebb tide. At landfall, SIDR was a category 4 storm⁵, with a diameter of nearly 1000 km and sustained winds of up to 240 km per hour" (Government of Bangladesh, 2008b: 26). With such force SIDR had a devastation of unprecedented scale. The southwest coast of Bangladesh was affected, where four districts; Bagerhat, Barguna, Patuakhalki and Piroipur; were classified as severely affected and a further eight; Khulna, Madaripur, Shariatpur, Barishal, Bhola, Satkhira, Jhalakthi, and Gopalgani; were classified as moderately affected. The village of Ms. Sheern Begom is located in the worst affected Patuakhali district.

C. Damage Caused by SIDR: SIDR has estimated to affect about 2.3 million households among those one million were seriously affected. The Joint Damage Loss and Needs Assessment team comprised of representative of GoB, officials of the Ministry of Food and Disaster Management and members of international agencies has made an extensive assessment at the affected area. The Joint Damage Loss and Needs Assessment held that "the number of deaths caused by SIDR is estimated at 3,406, with 1,001 still missing, and over 55,000 people sustaining physical injuries" (Joint Damage Loss and Needs Assessment, 2008). Many locals actually viewed that most of the destruction and economic losses resulted from the

⁵ On the Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Scale, ranging from category 1 to 5

harsh storm and failure of the government to ensure the extensive embankment system.

The economic losses are serious in the affected districts. National damage and subsequent response was concentrated in food, agriculture and livelihood sectors. Those are closely related with human security of the people. The government report shows that “[t]he impact of Cyclone SIDR was relatively moderate when measured by impact on overall GDP (estimated to be equivalent to 2.8 percent of Bangladesh’s GDP)” (Government of Bangladesh, 2008b). However, the damages in the affected districts caused serious post-cyclone crisis in-terms of immediate, medium and long-term needs.

D. Suffering of Ms. Shreen Begom: The damage of the SIDR had inflicted huge suffering on Ms. Shreen Begom. Losing her entire coconut garden was not all but also her house was fallen. She was injured and had no means to recover. Immediate after the cyclone Ms. Shreen had to depend on government relief. At her 65 she can hardly accept to live at the temporary shelter. She had to make a makeshift shade with the curled corrugated iron sheets. One major cause of suffering was lack of safe drinking water. The whole South Tetubaria village was heavily surged by sea water. Water of wells and water tanks became unconsumable. That was the biggest immediate threat to Ms. Sheern’s life. None of the village roads was fit for communication. Top of that, the village became water-logged made it harder for an aged lady like Ms. Shreen to go for relief. However, she was lucky that there was no serious breakout of diseases in the villager. In a nutshell, Ms. Shreen lost her livelihood and residence due to cyclone. Her immediate need for food, shelter and pure drinking water was in serious stake, thus she had to fully depend on the government support.

E. The BAF Involvement in the Response Activities: The BAF had responded the call from civil administration immediately after the cyclone. They had deployed the troops from the army to assist the local administration of Latachapa Union under Kalapara. The working modality of the BAF was to assist or support the work of the civil authority as well as run the relief program. The BAF also involves the local civil society and people’s organisations in the damage assessment and relief. The BAF also organised specialised training for the local authority and people. Such

working engagement allowed Ms. Shreen to learn about the BAF engagement with the civil society and member of local government. She never had the opportunity to have direct contact with any member of the BAF. Due to the cyclone she learnt that the uniformed member of the BAF can work to help the villagers. Ms. Shreen expressed her appreciation and said:

“the BAF came to our village after the cyclone and gave corrugated iron sheets, water and food. They along with the NGO members took many sick people to the camp and treated them. The small medical they set-up after the cyclone was so good many people went there to have treatment. I also went there and had very good medicine and I got a new glass (spectacle). I can see now and walk around easily. Importantly it all was free” (Interviewed on January 12, 2009).

The initial appreciative reaction from Ms. Shreen was not an exceptional view rather it is quite common perception among the villagers. Ms. Shreen mentioned that the only relief they have received was from the BAF and the NGO. But she was frustrated because after the BAF left the promised corrugated iron sheet for her house have never arrived. Though the members of the local government, also known as the *Union Parishad*, have told them while the BAF was there that the iron sheet will arrive in three weeks. She mentioned that the member of the *Union Parishad* did not list her name as allegeable for the iron sheet but the army officer did.

She said the *Union Parishad* members actually tried to influence the BAF and include the name of the relatives of the *Union Parishad's* members. The BAF did not include the names of the relatives of local government members. The BAF listed all poor villagers for the Vulnerable Group Feeding⁶ card. Members of the BAF along with the NGO people helped to repair the school and roads connected to the school.

⁶Vulnerable Group Feeding, also known as the VGF, stands for Vulnerable Group Feeding. This is an extension of government relief program. It is also part of government Social Safety net program. Under this program government provide food and other basic needs to most vulnerable and marginal group (like poor widow, aged). After SIDR government has issues 5000 VGF in each Union and Municipality. Source: Relief Web. (2011) *Food Security Assessment SIDR- Bangladesh*. [Online] available at <www.reliefweb.net> [Accessed on February 12, 2011]

This helped not only to the school going children but also the villagers. Following their work *Union Parishad* had to complete the repair work of the total road.

F. Learning from the Case: The interesting aspect of the BAF's involvement was not just a matter of smooth distribution of the relief, but also there were socio-political implication. The structural and functional mechanism of the NGO became dominant with the involvement of the BAF. Moreover the local government seems to be poorly accepted by the local people not because they do not trust the system but because of the inefficiency and corrupt practice of certain member of the local government. However, it seems Ms. Shreen wants the local government to work efficiently and not leave the villagers while they are in trouble. At the same time she expresses her confidence on the functioning of the NGOs. This shows villagers have expectation on the civil society and local government but at the same time they see the BAF as a force that helped local government to function better and did not barred the functioning of the civil society. As summary, the following factors are noted as the learning of the example. Importantly, the outcomes with their similarity of the research arguments reemphasise the impact of BAF's involvement in CDMP.

i. Better Access of Local People to the Union Parishad: The most important impact of the BAF's involvement with the local government was to creating better access for the locals to the member of the *Union Parishad*. The ordinary villagers were able to go to the member of the *Union Parishad* easily than normal time. The access factor works as an empowerment process. Villagers learnt more about the availability and access of the relief product at the *Union Parishad*. Usually, the villagers are hard to learn about the relief and their entitlement. But during those days the information was well disseminated and people learnt what they can and shall have from the *Union Parishad*.

Finally, there was no example of fighting among the working agencies during the BAF's involvement. The smoothness of functioning was rare in that part of the village but it was a reality. Ms. Shreen and villagers credited the BAF's presence for the better coordination in Vulnerable Group Feeding card and relief distribution. The BAF's engagement with the civil administration brings qualitative change in service delivery. Mentioning the establishment of the health camp and supplying the

drinking water to the villagers claimed the BAF involvement for the enhancement of local administration's capacity.

ii. Better Function of the Civil Society and Local Government: The presence of the BAF was a 'pressure factor' for the *Union Parishad* to deliver better job compare to its usual time and include the civil society as an essential partner in the local level disaster management work. Local government had to response all the needs and queries of the local people. But it often does not recognise the concern rose by the civil society and hardly accepted the civil society as the partner in disaster management. Ms. Shreen observed that the BAF has brought the civil society members in the 'Joint Damage Loss and Needs Assessment', which is disaster damage assessment process. They were also part of the relief distribution. Such process introduces new knowledge and approach to the local authority. It is also vital to strengthen the relationship between the people and the local authority.

The disciplinary matter within the local administration was improved. Interestingly, the example that Ms. Shreen Begon had given about the allegation of corruption against one member of the local *Union Parishad* was dealt in an exemplary manner. Dr. Siraj, a bureaucrat of GoB, viewed that

“though theoretically there is no relation between the involvement of the BAF and their policing duty over the administration but the mere fact that the uniformed disciplinary force suppose to hold a higher moral authority can help to solve conflicts” (Interviewed on March 9, 2010).

On the other hand, the naming and shaming of the alleged *Union Parishad* member has resulted him to express regret to the people. Such step empowers the good members of the *Union Parishad*. Thus most villagers precede their allegation against some corrupt member of local government to the BAF members. In a way, it strengthens the communication between the people and the local authority, which is a core component for the better functioning of the local authority.

In addition to that the BAF's skillful assistance helps the local authority to understand the disaster management. There was specific training for the local authority as well as for the people. Though BAF was not the only party to organise the training but the specialised skill is trained by the BAF's personnel. These trainings are key for

the improved capacity for the local government. Of course these training go along with the regular training organised by the civilian authority. The BAF members are also part of the regular training to support the local authority's capacity for the disaster management. Importantly, the reflection of such training or improved capacity is not limited within the disaster response but to the whole business of the local civilian authority. The improvement of the capacity of the local authority is a crucial component that influenced by the BAF and also in return influences the BAF's attitude towards the local civilian authority.

4.6.2 Example Two: BAF's Involvement Empowers the Local Government

The engagement of the BAF during the emergency is multi-dimensional. The current example describes the perspective of a *Union Parishad* member about the BAF's involvement. The *Union Parishad* is the lowest administrative unit of the governing structure, which, being people's representatives the members of the *Union Parishad* engage directly with the people. Thus the impact from the BAF's involvement in the disaster management on the functioning of *Union Parishad* is uniquely important to determine the influence on the overall governing practice.

Under the role of 'aid to the civil authority', the BAF works jointly with the disaster management committee at the *Union Parishad* level. Such working relationship impacts on the institutional orientation and practice of the BAF. The independent case study of the member of a *Union Parishad* provides the perspective of local government about BAF's role to aid the civil administration. The BAF does not work in a superior or inferior degree with the civil authority. Rather the BAF works in complimentary with the civil authority. BAF's emergency support is a temporary involvement having potential for immense impact on the usual course of democratic function at local level.

A. Introduction: Mr. Shajahan Mia, aged 56 years was an elected member of Lata Chapali *Union Parishad* of Kalapara upazilla under Patuakhali district. Mr. Shajahan Mia had experienced working with the BAF during the post-SIDR recovery and relief in 2007-08. Several villages were under his responsibility where the BAF worked after the cyclone SIDR. Particularly, in the village named Kuakata Panjupara.

This is a unique village with a minority group living for long time. According to Ulrich Kleih and others, “Kuakata Panjupara is a village on the coast open to the Bay of Bengal. It is located just adjacent to the open sea beach . . . is a relatively small village inhabited by 198 households with an approximate population of 1,200 people” (Kleih, *et al.*, 2003: 28). Kleih stressed that 40 to 50 years ago this locality was inhabited by the Rakhaine people who emigrated from nearby Myanmar.

The view of Mr. Shajahan Mia is that in this village the BAF has shown a great deal of sincerity, sacrifice and hard work to save a couple of people’s lives and livelihood during the post SIDR period. The BAF had rescued several old and seriously injured individuals and brought them to their health camp that the BAF made during the operation. Mr. Mia explained the role of the BAF is crucial while local administration was in need of organised, equipped and trained by the BAF.

B. The BAF’s Working Approach: The members of the BAF worked with the local civil authority during the post-SIDR response. Though they were serving under the central command and working under the Ministry of Defense but their task specific role had a complementary relationship with the civil administration. The BAF does not report to the civil authority but guided by the program given by the civil authority. The deployment as well as station detail is planned by the District Commissioner in his capacity of the head of the District Disaster Management Committee. At the union level the BAF works in close cooperation with the *Union Parishad*. Mr. Shajahan Mia as a senior member of the Union had planned the entire relief work of his union along with the BAF members. He mentioned:

“the members of the BAF were sincerely valued the information provided by the *Union Parishad* members in the planning the relief and rescue operation. They also provided important and technical information necessary for the success of the entire relief and rehabilitation work. The operational detail and process had been the crucial element for the operation. The discipline members of the BAF have influenced the entire local team” (Interviewed on February 16, 2009).

Mr. Mia considered the efficiency of the BAF is excellent but noted some individual members of the armed forces do not value the opinion of the members of the civil

authority. But that often resolved due to the direction of the person at the commanding level. It is natural that some of them are from same locality and they had shown a personal attachment with the people. Mr. Mia viewed such tendency as natural. However, the BAF's role to provide inspiration to other agency members was highly appreciated by locals.

C. Opportunity for Learning and Enhancing Capacity: The members of the BAF were equipped with specialised tools and knowledge about relief and rescue. Some of them had joined UN Peacekeeping and specifically trained for the relief and rescue during the emergency. Mr. C⁷, a member of the BAF, explained:

“the internal training of the BAF is gradually including the component of rescue and relief. Though such type of knowledge does not match with direct military approach but it is ultimately contributing for the holistic capacity development of the armed force” (Interviewed on February 16, 2010).

The BAF's post cyclone involvement helps to translate such knowledge to the ordinary citizens and importantly to the members of the *Union Parishad*. Mr. Shajahan Mia viewed that such cooperation has the potential to enable the local authority with necessary and technical knowledge to deal the emergency situation.

Mr. Mia explained that while the BAF was rescuing the serious injured people from the remote Kuakata Panjupara village they have shown the important technique to rescue to the members of the *Union Parishad*. That helped the local administration to accelerate the process. Without the help from the BAF members they would rather had to leave them for an uncertain fate. Organised BAF is a strong option that helped during SIDR response activities. The BAF's involvement in assessment, planning, framing tactics and developing back-up mechanism has taught the local authority. The systematic process was a great factor for the success of recovery during the post SIDR operation.

D. Significant Contributions of the BAF: Mr. Shajahan mentioned that the BAF was not only a regular helping agency for the civil administration but they had made some critical contribution during the operation which ultimately saved

⁷ The interviewee is a member of the BAF and joined disaster management task requested not to disclose his name on the ground of sensitivity.

hundreds of lives. Rescuing 45 individuals from a very serious condition and supporting them with life aid, managing the burial of hundreds that enabled to contain spreading disease and ensuring safe drinking water for the people are few to mention. However, the most significant contributions are given below:

i. Social and Psychological Empowerment of the Locals: The BAF's support and task-based engagement has a psychological and social implication. The people of the Union had actively participated in the task driven by the civil administration and joined by armed forces. People's participation in the process made the whole administration active and committed. Mr. Shajahan Mia mentioned:

“[p]robably no other time the people of Lata Chapali *Union Parishad* was as serious and active as that time. They were not just joined the task but also continued to monitor” (Interviewed on February 16, 2009).

If it is argued that the acceleration of local participation as a sign of political and social empowerment, it can be claimed the BAF's engagement helped the empowerment process. How that happened is a critical issue. Professor Ms. H⁸, a regular commentator on the BAF, viewed:

“the empowerment of the people is the other side of fearlessness from the members of *Union Parishad*. Local people were in an advantaged position due to the presence of the armed force. They knew that the members of the *Union Parishad* would not be doing anything that jeopardise the credibility and embarrass them” (Interviewed on March 10, 2010).

The empowerment of the people has a trickledown and bottom-up impact. People in the local constituency often have limited options to make social change. The psychological condition under patterned local governance often makes people to adopt what is known as ‘no hope phenomenon’. The presence of the strong government agency at the local level psychologically boosts up the people.

ii. Accepting Mutual Shortcomings for Better Civil-military Relation:

The BAF's local engagement may not be always desired one. There is an inherent

⁸ The interviewee is researcher and commentator on the BAF requested not to disclose her name on the ground of sensitivity.

danger with any blank scope of military involvement. Though the BAF accelerates the process of relief, sometimes it might be destructive in nature. There are examples of underestimating the opinion of the local administration. It could cause confrontation between the local authority and the BAF. Mr. Mazher, a senior researcher, viewed:

“there are shortcomings in the local civil administration but that does not mean they are not competent to run the business in their area. Respecting the view of the local is vital for the success of any operation, which needs to be understood by the agencies working with the local authority” (Interviewed on April 11, 2011).

Thus the BAF needs to depend on the local authority for authentic local information. The BAF does not have the local knowledge and this limitation can be addressed by mutual cooperation. Accepting mutual shortcomings is helpful for effective disaster, which effectively empowers the local authority. It signifies that the statutory guideline for the BAF's disaster management involvement shall be helpful to limiting its role but at the same time expanding the capacity impact on the local authority, which to strengthen the local authority.

4.7 Significance of the BAF's Engagement in Disaster Management

Specific laws and regulations are in place to make the BAF's involvement in disaster response mandatory. The BAF is involved in overall relief operations (Bangladesh Military, 2011) and this is well-recognised by the nation. Importantly, the BAF is involved in various emergency activities but its involvement procedure is the same, meaning in all types of emergency involvement the BAF has to be under the civilian authority (GoB, 2008c), which inflicts mutual impacts. Besides, the BAF serves at critical times and in difficult places inaccessible to other government agencies. The provision is related to the civilian control over the BAF's disaster management involvement is a key feature of the Sanding Orders on Disaster Management. This engagement is based on certain principles under the CDMP. The principles are as follows:

A. Aiding Civilian Administration: The BAF is required to assist the civilian authority under the constitution of Bangladesh (GoB, 1972). The Disaster

Management Act has provided procedural guidelines for assistance to the civilian authority (GoB, 2010e). Basically, such assistance comes as institutional support, usually started by the request from a district authority (GoB, 2008c). The Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies held the view that cooperation between these the BAF and the civilian authority can potentially strengthening the civil-military relationship (Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies, 2009). The complementary role encourages and allows a mutual exchange of expertise (Codron, 2007) and reduces the institutional differences between civilian and military agencies. Thus the BAF's involvement in the CDMP contributes to the functioning of both civilian and military agencies. There are strong critics against the BAF's regular involvement in disaster management work. Every member of the BAF is not equally eager to be involved in all kinds of disaster response work. But as an institution the BAF is joining in the disaster management. Rahman argued such involvement is due to practice of the armed forces to follow the command. He viewed that "the absolute obedience to command and newly introduced training for disaster management has been instrumental for the BAF's unconditional involvement in disaster management" (Rahman, 1991).

Ms. A⁹, a member of the BAF, also expressed similar opinion and viewed the position of the central command as a factual reason for the BAF's involvement in aiding the civilian authority. She explained:

"the constitutional obligation to aid to the civil administration is of course inspiration for joining the disaster response programme. But the major fact is the position of the central command" (Interviewed on February 12, 2010).

Here the position of the central command means whether the BAF's command at the head-quarter favours the involvement or not. If the command favours the involvement of the BAF in the disaster management assistance to the civil authority there could be no other opposition to that. Thus the BAF's involvement to assist the civil authority is mainly guided by the command structure of the BAF, which obviously comes after the request from the civil authority.

⁹ The interviewee is a member of the BAF and requested not to disclose her name on the ground of sensitivity.

B. Responding National Crisis: One of the core responsibilities of the BAF is to respond to national crises (GoB, 1972a). Disasters have the potential to cause national crises (Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery, 2011). Thus the BAF's involvement in disaster management is not just to help the civilian authority but also to fulfill its responsibility to address national crises. The BAF has adopted a new vision for disaster response activities, as can be seen in the new training called 'BAF Long Course', which is to reduce the vulnerability of people, especially the poor. The BAF's disaster response considers the effects of natural, environmental and human induced hazards to a manageable and acceptable humanitarian level (Alam, 2010). The BAF's involvement enhances the safety of vulnerable people. The outreach effort of the BAF is intended to reach the most inaccessible parts of any disaster affected areas where ordinary help cannot reach (GoB, 2008).

Rahman viewed that to deal with national crises; the BAF has developed a wide range of expertise through extended training programmes (Rahman, 1991). The BAF has created different specialised units to deal with the disaster management task. This is also an evidence of giving priority to the disaster management work by the BAF (Bangladesh Army, 2011). The institutional objective of disaster management is to strengthen the capacity of the Bangladesh Disaster Management System (GoB, 2008). The BAF's disaster response mission works towards comprehensive risk reduction for avoiding potential national crises (Alam, 2010). The CDMP also required the BAF to develop its capacity for this purpose. Such involvement is not limited by relief or short term engagements. Rather the CDMP requires the BAF to gain expertise to tackle any potential long term crisis originated from natural disaster (Rahman, 2012). The long term disaster related crisis can be turned as national crisis. Thus the BAF's involvement in disaster response also shapes its real potential to deal with national crises.

4.8 The Outcome of the BAF's Involvement in Disaster Management

The contribution of the BAF in disaster management has been evolving and affecting the democratic practices at the local level administration. The above mentioned examples and interviews implied that the BAF's involvement in disaster

management works to strengthen the local civil-political authorities. The BAF not only provides the necessary skills to the local civil-political authority but also helps to strengthen the good governance practices. For example, the simple initiative to ensure the local government's information display board for the public helps to information sharing and creates the sense of transparency, which is an important component of good governance. Mr. F¹⁰, a researcher and occasionally involved in BAF's training course as trainer, explained the BAF's involvement in disaster management helps to strengthen the local democracy. He mentioned:

“the BAF works with the local units of the disaster management bodies. It helps to link the people and the administration. The process also boosts the capacity of the local authority. Such process is essentially encourages the democratic practice at the local level”

(Interviewed on March 3, 2010)

However, this positive remark can be contested. It is argued in the example that the people went to the BAF with allegation of corruption against their local government representative. Such dependency can also disempower the democratic institutions at the local level. Thus it is important to act in a balance while the BAF is working with the local actors.

In addition to that, to understand the impact on the democracy this thesis analyses the evolution of the BAF involvement in disaster management. This evolution follows two time lines, namely i) before the installation of democratic government in the 1990s, and ii) the BAF's involvement under democratic governments. Previously, immediately after independence, the BAF had contributed to post-war recovery measures and disaster relief efforts (Bangladesh Army, 2010). Codron viewed that subsequently, changes in civil-military relationship by the series of military coups caused certain setbacks (Codron, 2007). Significantly, that has changed once the democratic governments introduced a systematic process to engage the BAF in disaster management work (Khan, 2004). Ms. Lubna, a researcher on the BAF and civil society activist, is of the opinion that “At present, it seems the BAF has eased the barriers between the civilian authorities.” She further added:

¹⁰ The interviewee is a researcher and occasionally involved in the BAF's training as trainer has requested not to disclose his name on the ground of sensitivity.

“the BAF’s involvement in disaster management was always been there. But it has become prominent in recent days under the democratic governance, while the BAF in conducting disaster response” (Interviewed on September 11, 2010).

With such easing the BAF is contributing extensively to disaster response activities as its role is to aid civilian authority in nontraditional security activities. The impact of this involvement is not limited to relief, recovery, and rebuilding work. Rather, these involvements open up a new horizon of unique impacts on the socio-political and institutional level.

As demonstrated above, the BAF’s disaster response involvement allows it to work with the civilian authority and people directly. The analysis on the links between the disaster management and human security principles and objectives allows to argue that the BAF’s disaster management activities is a nontraditional security involvement which allows it to have first-hand experience of the activities associated with human security principles and objectives. These two factors shows the BFA’s sensitivity towards activities associated with human security, which are unorthodox to the BAF’s usual national security approach that it is oriented with (Riaz, 1998). The impact of such involvement can be extensive. Hasan viewed that a sudden exposure of the BAF to such exceptional condition impacts both internally and externally (Hasan, 2011). Some of the outcomes impact the direction of Bangladeshi politics and security, whereas others play as persuasive role in changing the institutional practices to engage in nontraditional security activities.

The above discussion indicates that the BAF’s involvement in disaster management has the potential to cause qualitative changes within the BAF. In addition to that, since the BAF directly works with various political and administrative agencies of the government, there is also potential to be influenced by the BAF’s involvement either positively or negatively. The crucial thing is how such influences can be directed for the improvement of the governance system during the post disaster phase. The issue is both technical and political. Mr. Mazher, a senior researcher on the security and BAF, argued that to ensure the changes to be positive certain conditions need to be fulfilled. He said:

“the BAF’s involvement modality is the first thing to be considered. The BAF has to discharge their duties under the civil-political authority. It is followed by the balanced involvement of the BAF in the nontraditional security task. The GoB needs to be aware that excessive involvement can be harmful for the democratic institution, whereas limited involvement can add as a support for the civil-political authority” (Interviewed on April 11, 2011).

There are other views to ascertain the changes. Aquierre mentioned that the impact can be identify from the changes in the overarching policy and governance matters as those are obvious characteristics of long-term social impacts (Aquierre, 2009). Now, in the context of Bangladesh if the recent policy trend and political practice would be considered it can be claimed that the country is developing policies associated with human security principles and objectives since 1990s, the same period of time when the country is having uninterrupted democracy. Thus the impact of the BAF’s nontraditional security involvement is neither negating such policy integration nor it hindering the democratic practice. This indicates the potential influence from the BAF’s disaster management involvement is most likely positive.

With this perspective the BAF’s role in disaster response can be argued as one influencing factor. Mr. Mazumder, a senior lawyer of the BAF, explained the positive attribution of the BAF in disaster management. He said:

“the BAF is now essential part of the disaster management. They are dealing issues started from very minor local issues to the important national policy decisions related with disaster management. This is true that the BAF is not the direct promoter of the political governance. But due to their involvement at the multi-level disaster response- the BAF brings a subjective and qualitative changes to the local political authority” (Interviewed on September 09, 2010).

From the analysis the example in the earlier of this chapter it can be argued that the BAF’s involvement influences local accountability and promotes the capacity of the local civil-political authority. All these changes support the component of functional democracy and influence the political disengagement of the BAF. (As the theoretical framework in chapter I referred the Stephen’s military disengagement theory)

Apparently, these outcomes are contradictory to the nature of the BAF's usual role. But the changes are indeed the indirect impacts from the BAF's involvement in nontraditional security and in this case the involvement is the disaster response. This thesis has segmented the BAF's influences under the following issues.

4.8.1 State of Local Participation

The new CDMP has inter-linked the different units of the government and non-government entities as well as ensured local participation in the disaster response activities (GoB, 2008; 2010e). Mr. Mazher, a researcher on the BAF, explained that the practice differs from what the programme intends. He said:

“in a disaster situation the local people becomes less included, so does any local people's organisation or even the NGOs. The normal practice does not encourage local participation, which significantly changes due to the involvement of the BAF. The NGOs are included in the local disaster management programme irrespective of their closeness with the local authority. Thus the involvement of the BAF encourages the local participation and influences the democratic practices” (Interviewed on April 11, 2011)

Ideally, the paradigm shift in disaster management in Bangladesh allows the government pursuing the disaster management agenda in a holistic way and put in a perspective of cross-cutting issue (Government of Bangladesh, 2005a). Critically, people see the GoB's policy and regulatory measures mostly as instrument to exercise authority rather ensuring the rights of vulnerable related with disaster. Mr. Rahman, a member of local *Union Parishad* and member of local Disaster Management Committee, mentioned:

“though government has passed so many laws and policies but the scope for involvement of *Union Parishad* (local government) is still limited. We have to depend on the higher government authority to decide about the local issues. The Disaster Management Committee at the district level decides what the local government will receive. Often the higher authority does not listen to our real legitimate demand” (Interviewed on September 22, 2010).

Such incompatibility between the spirit of the holistic approach and practice at the ground can only be justified as the involvement of the local government has lack of procedural clarity. Ms. U¹¹, a Member of the Bangladesh Parliament, disagreed with the argument of Mr. Rahman. She mentioned,

“I am also a people representative and understand the importance of technical regulatory process. The *Union Parishad* (local government) member cannot have the authority to decide the priority within an entire district. The task needs to be dealt by the competent authority and in this case the District Commissioner is a competent authority to decide what support the government can provide to a local level. But the involvement of local authority cannot hamper the task of competent authority. Rather it helps effective implementation. So the lack of local participation is not a procedural problem” (Interviewed on September 23, 2010).

Despite varied argument about the effectiveness of regulations ensuring local participation it is widely understandable that the general practice does not help much to ensure local participation. The Disaster Management Standing Order 2010 clearly spells the urgency to ensure the local participation for the transparency and addressing the real needs of the affected people (Government of Bangladesh, 2010).

The BAF in its involvement attempts to ensure the local participation (Hasan, 2011). Mr. Mazher, a researcher on the BAF, accepted the view of Hasan and explained:

“the BAF is member of the local Disaster Management Committee where the *Union Parishad* (local government) representative is the chairperson. Since the District Disaster Management Committee decides the allocation for the local level, the BAF helps the local government representative to make their case stronger in the district committee meeting. This is an important practice to strengthen the participation of the local authority in the district level committee” (Interviewed on April 11, 2011).

¹¹ The interviewee is a Member of Parliament of Bangladesh. She requested not to disclose her name on the ground of sensitivity.

One example of the BAF's initiative to ensure local participation is involving the local authority for damage impact assessment. The information for disaster impact assessment needs to be non-bias and accurate for effective response work (Government of Bangladesh, 2010e). Local assessment is usually done by the governmental official and rarely by the member of *Union Parishad*. In this case the local participation remains under represented. Though the issue is not to bring larger people to participate in the assessment but to include the representative is vital. Ms. Chowdhury, a survivor of Cyclone, mentioned:

“the government officials hardly consult with the ordinary people. Sometime they ask the *Union Parishad* member and decide. They are even lazy to go to the hard heated area. But the military comes the village and brings the *Union Parishad* member. They talks with us about the cyclone and makes list about the relief” (Interviewed on March 17, 2011).

This is a way to ensure local participation but also to check the activities of the local government. Researcher Ms. F¹² supported Ms. Chowdhury added this perspective by linking the service of the local government with corrupt practice. She claimed:

“the local *Union Parishad* members always have their own baggage. They are mostly bias. They want to deliver the supply received from government either to their family members or to the people who support them” (Interviewed on September 20, 2010).

However, Mr. Rahman, a member of local *Union Parishad*, disagreed with the point that local government representatives are bias. He argued such allegation is unjustified and far from truth, and said:

“as a local representative, we need to consider the benefit of all. Often people who belong to the opposition blame us because they do not want us to deliver anything to the people genuinely affected just because the affected people support us” (Interviewed on September 22, 2010).

¹² The interviewee is a researcher on the BAF and requested not to disclose her name on the ground of sensitivity.

With such dynamics of local government's participation and scope of corruption is an unavoidable issue of practicing democracy. This can be genuinely addressed by the functioning of democratic institution, where the BAF cannot and should not have any involvement. However, the BAF's role to influence the disaster management task in accordance with the GoB's policy and needs of the people influences the local conditions favoring local participation

4.8.2 Capacity of Local Authority

The significance of enhancing capacity of the local government and people is vital to deal with disaster. The Standing Order on Disaster requires the GoB to introduce the disaster management capacity development for all professional and educational training including for the BAF (Government of Bangladesh, 2010). Regional Research Centre for Asia and the Pacific report mentioned that "the GoB has also made to hold a compulsory session of at least two hours on disaster management in the curricula of all types of Training Institutes that train officials and nonofficial" (Regional Research Centre for Asia and the Pacific, 2001). The BAF also receives the training about legislations and skills related with disaster response in its regular professional training (Rahman, 1991). The BAF has included disaster management in the course at Bangladesh Military Academy. Mr. Mazher, a leading researcher on the military and policy, provided his account on these trainings and viewed that the expertise from these training is crucially not limited within the BAF only. He said:

"the expertise from these trainings supports the BAF during disaster management and also translates to other government agencies working in disaster response with the BAF. There are significant instances of the BAF's support in capacity development, for example, supporting the implementation, consolidation and strengthening the Flood Forecasting and Warning Services 2000-2004, establishing the Storm Warning Centre and supporting the Flood Forecasting and Warning Centre" (Interviewed on April 11, 2011).

Hasan also elaborated the BAF's role in strengthening the capacity of the civil authority. He mentioned that "BAFs are always in a state of operational readiness to

move quickly to any disaster affected area and their ability to work under adverse ground & climatic conditions is of immense help to any civil authority during disaster situations”(Hasan, 2011).

In addition to that, the detail legislative structure concerning disaster management and the technique to deal with disaster needs to be communicated with the people. This is done through training. Mr. D¹³, a member of the BAF, explained this notion with clearer reference. He stated:

“the capacity development contributes to pursue a sustainable manner in disaster management. It also underlines the importance of the professional and task base expertise of the BAF in the overall disaster management activities of Bangladesh. The BAF is introduced with tools and techniques of disaster management as well as regulations related with disaster management, which they relay at the community level training” (Interviewed on February 18, 2010).

The training initiative of the BAF is a direct contribution for the capacity development of the local authority. BAF organises disaster management training courses, workshops and seminars at the *Union Parishad level* (Regional Research Centre for Asia and the Pacific, 2001). In these programmes different stakeholders joined and received training from specialised agencies, including the BAF. The BAF is a regular contributor in the specialised support of such training (Regional Research Centre for Asia and the Pacific, 2001). Ms. M¹⁴, a lawyer with the BAF, supported the view of the Regional Research Centre for Asia and the Pacific and stated:

“the BAF's support in disaster management training on early warning system, fast-aid, rescue and water purification capacitates significant number of local government representatives, volunteers, or even the government officials” (Interviewed on September 11, 2010).

These support and sharing experience has greater impact to the local authority. The BAF's operational involvement with the local government allows them to transfer

¹³ The interviewee is a member of the BAF and requested not to disclose his name on the ground of sensitivity.

¹⁴ The interviewee is a lawyer with the BAF and requested not to disclose her name on the ground of sensitivity.

their knowledge and expertise to the local authority (Hasan, 2011). Though such capacity development does not suggest that the local government is not capable but it promotes the idea of sharing the technical skills from the military to the civil authority. It is true that some local representatives are not qualified. Mr. Rahman, a local representative, viewed:

“the local government has its limitation. Due to the construction of the local government and long and traditional practice of the local leadership often influence to elect the incapable representatives” (Interviewed on September 22, 2010).

Ms. U¹⁵, member of Bangladesh parliament, supported the view and extent the argument by saying that:

“often the incapable representative makes the *Union Parishad* dysfunctional. The issue of ‘incapable representative’ does not mean they are not capable in any field but it essentially expresses the idea that the local representative often not capable with specialised issues, such as disaster management” (Interviewed on September 23, 2010).

Ms. U suggested the BAF’s influence as positive factor to capacitate and empower the local government. She particularly mentioned that the honest and capable members of the local governments are first to be empowered by the orderly activities of the armed forces. Mr. Haque, a researcher on the BAF, viewed:

“the sections of local government that truly represent the people get access and voice with the presence of armed force. Since the BAF largely follows the regulated procedure they are supportive to the honest and true personalities among the local government. This is obviously an empowerment factor” (Interviewed on September 10, 2010).

Thus the involvement of the BAF has the potentials to influence the capacity of the local government. Though there could be negative impact as well depending on the nature of power exercised by the members of the armed forces. The power exercise can negatively impact the capacity of the local authority. However, the strict internal

¹⁵ The interviewee is a Member of Parliament of Bangladesh. She requested not to disclose her name on the ground of sensitivity.

Command and Control process is designed to keep the BAF in a distance from such practice.

4.8.3 Governance of the Local Government

The local democracy depends on the state of governance of the local government. It also closely associated with the total good governance practice. The wider idea of governance includes people's participation, rule of law, transparency, accountability and widely the effectiveness of the government (World Bank, 2001). This research explains that the BAF's involvement in the disaster management influences the local government. How such influence changes the condition of good governance is a consideration. Here it is relevant to mention the view of Khan, who is a regular columnist on civil-military relationship in Bangladesh. He mentioned that the BAF's involvement in disaster management brought them closer to the people (Khan, 2009). Researcher and trainer in BAF Long Course, Mr. F¹⁶ explained:

“[c]lose communication with the people ensures transparency within the BAF and local government. At the local level, the BAF ensures the display of the disaster related facts and figures to the people to promote the transparency” (Interviewed on March 03, 2010).

This is a practice generally not followed by the local government. Hasan viewed that while the BAF works with the civilian authority to carry the direction from the nonmilitary entities it responds to the people's authority. He also raised the caution that the BAF's “short-term, non-participatory approach is often a source of operational tension with the civilian agencies engaged in similar activities informed by considerations of development” (Hasan 2011).

The people's authority is also the greatness of the people. Thus the BAF actually serves the people through the civil authority. The examples of placing information display board of the *Union Parishad* mentioned earlier shows that the BAF's effort during disaster also helps to ensure the procedural rule of the functioning of the local government, which in another word to help to improve the transparency of the local government. In doing so the BAF's action works as check and balance for the

¹⁶ The interviewee is a trainer of the BAF Long Course and requested not to disclose his name on the ground of sensitivity.

activities of both the BAF and the local government. Mr. Polash, a resident of cyclone affected Pakhuakhali district, mentioned:

“during last cyclone SIDR, the people of our area knew what the damage was and how the government is dealing with the damage. We never knew those in the previous disaster. With the direction of the BAF the *Union Parishad* has managed to display the information board explaining all the activities of the BAF and the local authority” (Interviewed on September 14, 2010).

He added that the big information board of the Chairman’s room was placed outside, which allowed the public to see it easily. Such step of ensuring transparency helped the governance to be improved. This needs to clarify that the BFA’s involvement might not influence all the governance components but even slight improvement in the good governance practice is a positive contribution.

In the same line of argument the research has analysed the practice of wider disaster related information dissemination that develops accountability about the activities of the BAF and civil authority in disaster management. Security specialist Mr. Razi viewed it as true feature of governance improvement. He added by saying that:

“the BAF’s initiative for improved information dissemination about the disaster and the updated state of response activities allows the local people to learn the true features of the disaster management. This gives them to understand how their demands are being addressed. This is a basic condition for good governance” (Interviewed on February 23, 2010).

The critical point is whether the improved governance is the characteristics of the activities of the armed force or it has some other contributing factors. If the first presumption is right then why does the governance issue not being considered as facts of armed force’s internal business? If the second presumption is right then the contributory factors need to be identified. The second view is supported by Ms. U¹⁷, a member of Bangladesh parliament. She argued:

¹⁷ The interviewee is a Member of Parliament of Bangladesh. She requested not to disclose her name on the ground of sensitivity.

“the BAF’s active participation at the local level has less restriction over their work process. They are being subjected to assist civil administration and have to follow the statutory process of work. So the BAF has to practice the process that the civil administration supposes to practice during the disaster response. Of course, those practices are mean to ensure good governance at the local government. So the basic feature of improved governance during the BAF’s involvement is due to its strict persuasion to follow the statutory guideline” (Interviewed on September 23, 2010).

Such argument gives a clearer clue about the improved good governance at local authority has some influence due to the BAF’s involvement. For an example, the feature of consulting with local people is an efficient tool and mandatory aspect of conducting disaster impact assessment. Such practice pushes the people empowerment process while local authority moves towards more transparent way to deal disaster management work. On the other hand, the maintaining discipline or having systemic approach in the course of disaster management is vital, which influence the civil authorities with certain value of good governance. These exchanges of professional conduct help to influence the good governance practice at the local level.

4.8.4 Military Disengagement from Politics

BAF’s engagement in the disaster management activities has multi-dimensional impacts (Hasan, 2011). The BAF’s responses are structural and non-structural, short and long term and temporary and sustained (Khan, 2009). All these opposite features show the dynamism and influence from the BAF’s service at the lower strata of the government. It is indeed the vital aspect of disaster management in Bangladesh where the involvement of the BAF is strictly regulated but widely practiced (Guzman, 2001). Nevertheless, the acceptability of their non-combat or humanitarian support commands a high degree of popularity. The acceptance is despite the BAF’s previous reputation of engagement in politics. The interviewees expressed their opinion about the people’s acceptance about the BAF involvement in disaster management. The examples of the BAF’s involvement in post SIDR cyclone shows the BFA’s involvement helped to conduct the relief and rehabilitation smoothly

where all stakeholders participated, which was a sign of general acceptance of the BAF's role in disaster management. With such realities, the functional democracy at the local level re-enforces the BAF's nontraditional security involvement in disaster management.

This research analyses the disaster management engagement has an organic influence over people's participation as well as efficiency of local government, which is contributing the democratic practices. Mr. D¹⁸, a member of the BAF, mentioned:

“the BAF's involvement during the disaster period helps the local people to access their representatives, the member of local *Union Parishad*. They are also able to claim their rights directly and protest if there is any undue practice. The increased access influences the functioning of democracy at local level” (Interviewed on February 18, 2010).

Mr. W¹⁹, a member of the BAF, supported Mr. D's view and extended it by bringing the issue of inwards impact. He said:

“the practice of the BAF's involvement in the disaster response work has a governance implication- both external and internal. The external impact makes the local democratic conditions improved but the internal impact makes the BAF sensitive towards the democratic institutes” (Interviewed on March 18, 2011).

The BAF learns the importance of the presence of the local civil-political authority and its functioning while it works with the civil-political authority during the disaster management (Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies, 2009). The practice of democratic spirit internally contributes to the institutional mindset of the BAF, which is vital to shape its external response such as ensuring military disengagement from politics. The governance improvement has significant external implication. Ms. H²⁰, an academician, viewed:

¹⁸ The interviewee is a member of the BAF and requested not to disclose his name on the ground of sensitivity.

¹⁹ The interviewee is a member of the BAF and requested not to disclose his name on the ground of sensitivity.

²⁰ The interviewee is a researcher on the BAF and requested not to disclose her name on the ground of sensitivity.

“the good governance is the key external outcome of functional democracy, where the BAF's contribution for the improved governance is indeed helping the democratic practice at the local level” (Interviewed on March 10, 2010).

Considering the impact on the local civil-political authority– the BAF's strive for good governance at the local level contributes to the improvement of governance at the lower strata of democratic country.

Importantly, if the BAF sustains its presence and influences democratic practice into undemocratic, then the local institution would be jeopardised and sustained negative growth. The fear of such undue influence by the BAF has been a cause of precaution to call against the excessive involvement of the BAF. Thus a balance needs to be ensured. Mr. Mazher, a researcher, urges the importance of statutory bar on the BAF's long-term involvement. He mentioned:

“the BAF's disaster management involvement needs to be limited by law. Though, the BAF can only be involved by the request of the civil authority but the time frame of its involvement needs to be mentioned in every single deployment. A balance approach is vital to ensure the positive impact from the BAF's disaster management involvement” (Interviewed on April 11, 2011)

Thus the impact from the BAF's disaster management involvement can be both positive and negative on the democracy and military disengagement. The impact is mostly depends on the approach of the civil-political authorities. Once the involvement remains within the legal boundary the vital outcome of the BAF's disaster management involvement has an overarching influence on the trend of the BAF's military disengagement from politics, which helps the organic development of politics in country.

4.9 Challenges of the BAF's Involvement in Disaster Management

Despite the positive attributions of the BAF's involvement in the disaster management it also poses significant challenges. The initial challenge for the BAF is the lack of knowledge about the area where it is involved (Hasan, 2011). Though the

BAF has initiated to strengthen its knowledge for disaster management but capacity remains a key challenge in every time (Ministry of Food and Disaster Management, 2005). At the beginning the BAF's major responsibility is not designed as one for disaster management work. It is unwise to expect all disaster related capacity from the BAF. But technical expertise and skill of the BAF to deal the emergency compliments its involvement. Ms. H²¹, a researcher on the BAF, mentioned:

“the BAF's involvement helps to address the challenge of lack of capacity of the local authority. But it is not an agency that can deal all the disaster management challenges as efficiently as some civilian agencies can do. Simply the BAF is not primarily designed for the disaster management. In recent time the BAF is getting various professional skills on of disaster management” (Interviewed on March 10, 2010).

However, the bigger challenge of BAF's role in CDMP can be challenging towards its wide range of systemic involvement. The extended involvements are segmented under the following heads:

A. BAF's Control over Information Dissemination: Though the BAF is just one stakeholder in the process of disaster information management but its central role to deal with the vast and expanded information system helps them to be the crucial stakeholder for the entire disaster management. “The central information of the Prime Minister Office on the disaster situation is coordinated by the BAF” (Bangladesh Military, 2011). Researcher Mr. Haque explained such role in a critical way. He mentioned:

“[c]ontrolling disaster information is a core of coordination, where the technical ability of the BAF plays a key consideration. Obviously, the inter-linkage between the natural disaster and the security is asserted by this very structure of the information center and its control” (Interviewed on September 10, 2010).

²¹ The interviewee is a researcher on the BAF and requested not to disclose her name on the ground of sensitivity.

His argument shows the technical and strategic side of the BAF's involvement at the central information management on disaster. Ms. H²², a law professor and researcher on the BAF, has expressed a negative view slightly disagreeing with Mr. Haque. She showed her concern of the non-civilian control over the disaster information management, which is a democratic country, shall be controlled by the civilian authority. She mentioned:

“the information is heart to the disaster management. Managing the information dissemination is the key to control the aspects of disaster management. The BAF as the non-civil entity shall not possess such controlling authority” (Interviewed on March 10, 2010).

However, this issue of non-civilian control of the disaster information is also contested. Mr. W²³, a member of Navy expressed support to the concern but made a critical remark about the process of the information management to justify the BAF's control on the disaster information does not violate the civilian control. He mentioned:

“the concern of some people about the information control by the BAF is valid and it might be a significant factor that contradicts the people's right to information about the exact situation of disaster. However, in the context of Bangladesh this argument have no basis. The information generated at the field checked by the people's representative. Secondly, even the villagers can have the chance to verify the information. Thirdly, every coordination committee verifies the information and gets approval at the district level. Finally, at the central level it is checked by the concerned governed ministries. The politicians check and comment openly at any stage. So the accuracy and secrecy cannot be the concern” (Interviewed on March 18, 2011).

His argument shows the civilian involvement in every stage of disaster information management. Many argue the BAF's technical ability as the reason for their position

²² The interviewee is a researcher on the BAF requested not to disclose her name on the ground of sensitivity.

²³ The interviewee is a member of Navy, a wing of the BAF, requested not to disclose his name on the ground of sensitivity.

in the disaster information management. For example, Ms. Lubna, a researcher on the BAF and civil society activist, added by saying that:

“the BAF takes the responsibility because it is technically capable and functionally sound. The BAF is the only agency of the government which remains functional with its fullest competence during the disaster period” (Interviewed on September 11, 2010).

Her statement is very positive towards the BAF’s capacity, which others do not want to accept giving the example of the Bangladesh Metrological Department’s technical capacity for disaster information management is no less than the BAF. However, ‘disaster makes the country’s security vulnerable’, this could be an argument for the BAF’s control over its information. Mr. Haque argues the BAF’s control over the disaster related information is necessary for them to understand any national security threats during the disaster. However, the fact that the information management centre is located at the Prime Minister’s office, gives the justification of the control of the Prime Minister over all issues of the disaster information, which is the key of civilian control. Mr. Razi, a security specialist, argued this reason to claim that the obvious civilian control remains exclusive with the political leadership (Interviewed on February 23, 2010). The argument for both side shows that the BAF’s control over the central disaster information management has the potential to exploit the situation that might go beyond the authority of the civil-political authority of the country.

B. Overlapping Responsibility of Human and National Security: The range and extend of an emergency response often overwhelm and creates confusion. The national and human security response can be overlapped. There is a particular issue of national security during disaster, when the country faces an emergency the components of national security become vulnerable (Natural Disasters Organization of Australia, 1987). Thus the involvement of the BAF in the response activities related with emergency has an overlapping role. The BAF serves both for protecting national security as well as adding to the civil administration to assist activities associated with human security principles and objectives (Rahman, 1995). The critical aspect is how the BAF maintains the balance and keeps the nontraditional security task separated from its general national security responsibility. Arguably, the involvement of the BAF in the CDMP implementation is itself an independent engagement under the

clearer structure of Command and Control at the BAF's headquarter (Hasan, 2011). Ms. A²⁴, a member of the BAF, argued that the BAF's functioning and its command structure are exclusively designed to keep the BAF primarily involved for the national security responsibility. She said:

“the BAF command structure gives very little scope for any overlapping between the BAF's role in disaster response and the BAF's regular role of protecting national security. The BAF is primarily responsible for protecting national security. Whereas, the disaster management work is only an event specific involvement, where the BAF works with a certain involvement guideline provided by its central command” (Interviewed on February 9, 2010).

The arguments of this chapter show the critical importance of the BAF's involvement in CDMP as part of its regularised involvement in activities associated with human security. Without infringing the BAF's national security role the disaster management task of the BAF unveils its peace time involvement to assist the civilian authority. But the danger of mixed approach in disaster management can never be eliminated. Rather, a balance involvement of the BAF in the matter of disaster management can be a helpful way to keep the national security approach separated from its human security involvement in the disaster management task.

4.10 Chapter Conclusion

This chapter demonstrates in the above arguments on the BAF's involvement in disaster management that the BAF's involvement is potential to improve the governance and democratic practice at the local level. However, this chapter has also highlighted the precautions against the negative impacts those can be caused due to the BAF's involvement in un-statutory or even extra-statutory means. But the basic argument explains that the importance of the BAF's participation in the disaster management has been formalised by the shift in the GoB's approach in disaster management, which instigates statutory means for the BAF's participation. It

²⁴ The interviewee is a member of the BAF requested not to disclose her name on the ground of sensitivity.

has highlighted that the changes are in-line with the global changes that allows the BAF to be involved as a necessary partner for the implementation of the disaster management activities which is basically human security in nature. This chapter has argued that the democratic government has ensured the BAF's participation with clearer legislative scope. The impacts of such involvement significantly contribute to improve the functioning democracy at the local level. It is argued that the BAF's participation has extended the scope for enhanced people's participation or performance of the civil society, improved governance components and ultimately improved the democratic practices at the local level, which to support the military disengagement from politics. On the other hand, as the practice associated with human security principles and objectives the positive impacts influence the continuation of human security integration. It is argued that the inward impact of the BAF's involvement reflects the better working relationship between the civil-political and military authority. This improves the civil-military relationship and ultimately influences the military disengagement from politics. With the examples this chapter explained the BAF's engagement in nontraditional security can be negative on the democratic practice depending on the modality of the engagement. The following chapter brings such example of the BAF's involvement in the development activities and internal security with a varied working modality. Unlike the BAF's involvement in the disaster management activities its involvement in internal security activities in CHT keeps the BAF under the direct central command and aloof from the civilian authority. As a result it causes the negative impact for the military disengagement from politics.

CHAPTER V

THE BANGLADESH ARMED FORCE'S INVOLVEMENT FOR INTERNAL SECURITY IN THE CHITTIGONG HILL TRACTS AND ITS INFLUENCE ON THE CIVIL-POLITICAL AUTHORITIES

5.1 Chapter Introduction

The BAF's involvement in the CHT can be divided into two stages. The first stage started in the mid-70s and ended in 1997, when the Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord was signed. The second stage of the BAF's involvement started in 1997 and continues to date. The present BAF's involvement is known as the post Accord involvement. Although the BAF's initial involvement in the CHT was to conduct counter insurgency activities, the post Accord involvement is focused on the maintenance of internal security, which is a dramatic shift from its earlier involvement. After the signing of the Accord, the BAF was mandated to assist the civil authority to maintain the internal security in the CHT along with pursuing development activities for sustainable peace (GoB, 1997). Such activities are also the BAF's nontraditional security involvement, which ideally do not involve its combat role. This chapter explains that the BAF's post Accord involvement in the CHT has the unique characteristics of superseding the civil-political authority and advancing the development with the underlying counter-insurgency motivation, which hardly matches with the principles and objectives of the human security involvement. The special administrative setup for the CHT, measures for addressing the grievances of the Jumma population and withdrawal of all members of the BAF from the CHT is agreed by the Accord. In reality what happens in the CHT is more confusion regarding the administration. This chapter considers that the feasibility of applying the agreed measures have significant legal and practical setbacks. In such a context the BAF's post Accord involvement in the CHT, including the role to ensure the internal security,

has its legal limbo. Besides, the hardcore national security promoters argue the BAF's engagement in the CHT is a requirement for protecting national sovereignty. Referring the occasional fighting among several groups they view the possibility of re-emergence of insurgency without the presence of the BAF in the CHT. But such argument fails to link the BAF's post Accord involvement in protecting internal security and its undeclared purpose of countering the possibility of re-emergence of insurgency. This chapter argues that the BAF can be part of maintaining internal security once the civil authority fails to do so and seeks the assistance from the BAF. But in the case of the CHT the BAF takes the security matters as its prerogative. The BAF's paradoxical involvement in the CHT has impacted negatively despite the tasks are supposed to involve people's interest, which associates with the principles and objectives of human security. As a result, the BAF's involvement for the maintenance of internal security and conducting development activities in the CHT do not influences the functioning of the civilian authorities; hence the superiority of the BAF over the local democratic institution is maintained. Considering such practices this chapter argues that the BAF's role undermines the democratic spirit of the civil-political authority in the CHT and inflicts negative influence on the BAF's political disengagement.

5.2 The Unique Conditionality in the CHT and Involvement of the BAF

The CHT is both politically and geographically unique in Bangladesh. As a unique part of the Bangladesh, the CHT is home to the Jumma population who in their cultural life has a certain degree of difference from the rest of the country (Bang-
oa, 2004). Ms. Puba, a residence of the CHT and member of a local NGO, explained the uniqueness in terms of historic socio-economic conditions in the CHT and relates it with the security of the Jumma population. She said:

“[r]elatively weaker socio-economic condition and several adverse policies affecting the cultural rights of the Jumma population have caused a deteriorated security situation in the CHT. The Bengali settlers are also landless and extremely poor. But it is the historic

socio-economic and cultural position of the Jumma population that makes the condition of the CHT unique in Bangladesh” (Interviewed on April 5, 2011).


Despite such unique conditions in the CHT the GoB's early response did not lead to much improvement. This is because of the overwhelming opposition of the Jumma leadership to the creation of Bangladesh. Immediate after the independence of Bangladesh, sections of the Jumma population started an armed insurgency (Bangladesh Military, 2011). The BAF was deployed in the CHT to conduct the counter insurgency operation and to protect the ordinary people in the CHT including the Bengali (Bangladesh Army, 2010). Most Jumma and civil society criticises the BAF's response in the CHT. The Commission on Chittagong Hill Tracts, a civil society organization, viewed that the BAF's engagement in the CHT impacted negatively due to its heavy-handed response to the conflict (The Commission on Chittagong Hill Tracts, 1997). However, the pro-government intellectuals always identify the BAF's response in the CHT as a success and claim that the counter-insurgency activities of the BAF were beneficial for the locals. Chowdhury countered this notion and mentioned that though the military approach included conducting certain development activities in the CHT, the development engagements were dimmed by the armed responses (Chowdhury, H., 2002). Another scholar expressed similar concern and added that the mental distance between the BAF and the local Jumma population has created mistrust. The result of such mental distance (between the BAF and the Jumma population) is the non-acceptance the BAF's presence in the CHT by most of the Jumma people (Chowdhury, K., 2008).

However, after the signing of the historic Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord in early 1997 with the insurgents, the GoB has revised the BAF's role in the CHT (Saha, 1999). The BAF is provided with the responsibility for peace and security in the CHT as well as conducting development activities (GoB, 1997). Ideally, the BAF's involvement in CHT has changed purely to a noncombat role to support the implementation of the development activity and protect the internal security which is human security in nature. However, the provisions in the Peace Accord contradict with the step of the BAF's any involvement in the CHT. Guhathakurta mentioned in her writing during the end of 1997 to explain the early sign of the BAF's role according to

the Accord that the reality differs quite significantly from the agreed role for the BAF in the Accord (Guhathakurta, 1997). Instead of withdrawing the BAF from the CHT they are increasingly involved in protecting internal security and certain development work in the CHT, which BAF argues as practical need for the CHT. The analysis of this chapter argues that this is a unique reality of the CHT as the BAF's presence in the CHT is continuing despite the GoB's commitment for withdrawal.

Besides, there are other uniqueness of the CHT those make it significantly different from the rest of the country. Most pro BAF scholars view that the political, geographical, cultural, demographical and economical uniqueness of the CHT have generated certain security situation which instigated the BAF's involvement in the CHT affairs. Whether these uniqueness make the BAF's presence essential or not is a different matter of discussion but a general understanding about these uniqueness is required at this beginning of the chapter. Among these unique conditions few are explained below:

A. The Strategic Geo-location of the CHT: The area of the CHT is 10 percent of Bangladesh with significant natural resources. It is a strategic position (Committee Chittagong Hill Tracts Campaign, 1986). It is the only place where hill tribes are living in Bangladesh, who constitutes more than half of the CHT's total population. According to national statistics "the tribal population is 0.5% of the total population of Bangladesh" (Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, 2007), who are at the 10% of Bangladesh. The location of the CHT is strategically highly significant for the country. Considering its' location, Hutchinson noted that "the terrain in the CHT is part of the great hill mass- an offshoot of the Himalayan range - occupying parts of India, Myanmar, and Bangladesh" (Hutchinson, 1978: 1). It is also stark contrast to the alluvial plains of the rest of Bangladesh (Chowdhury, H., 2002: 9) giving it strategic edge for the national interest.



Map 5.1: Map of the Chittagong Hill Tracts (Chittagong Hill Tracts Development Facility, 2010a)

In security consideration the CHT gives certain strategic advantages over India's conflicting eastern zone and troubled northern Myanmar (Bangladesh Army, 2011). Mr. Mazumder, expert on the BAF and law, viewed the important geo-location of the CHT as a factor for the BAF to ensure its presence. He mentioned:

“the strategic geo-location prompted the BAF to engage in the CHT issue. The BAF do not want to take any chance and ensures it is controlling the CHT. The neighboring region of Myanmar and India also suffers security problems, where the BAF's firm control gives it strategic advantage” (Interviewed on September 9, 010).

From the above analysis it is obvious that the BAF always has its intention for its physical presence in the CHT for certain national security advantage. In doing so, the BAF had its role to conduct the counter insurgency operation in the 1970s and early 1980s. Thus the BAF considered uniquely the national security prior to any other issue in its earlier involvement in the CHT. However, the Peace Accord involvement is claimed by the BAF as non-combat but the reality differs significantly.

B. Intertribal and Ethnic Differences: Guhathakurta argued that the post Accord non-combat involvement of the BAF considers certain contextual reality (Guhathakurta, 2004), such as the political and cultural differences among the tribal

and ethnic groups living in the CHT. The BAF and the government projected this cause as a significant reason for its present involvement. Mr. Mong, a Jumma resident of the CHT, explains this reason as an artificial excuse. He mentioned:

“the BAF blames the various Jumma fractions for the present tension in the CHT. The grouping among the Jumma population was not present in this degree prior to the Accord. It is the BAF that has instigated such grouping to ensure sustain tension in the CHT, which can give it reason for stay in the CHT” (Interviewed on September 19, 2010).

Hutchinson differed with the above view and argued the BAF’s role to protect the peace in the CHT in the face of tension among various groups. He explained that the BAF’s role is to maintain peace, because there is a certain degree of cultural difference between the Bengali and the Jumma people in the CHT there is a potential for conflict (Hutchinson, 1978). There are distinctive language, life style and food in CHT. Importantly the difference is not only with the Bengali but also among the 13 different tribes who make the total population (The Commission on Chittagong Hill Tracts, 1997). The number of tribes varies in different analysis. According to the Chittagong Hill Tracts Development Board, also known as CHTDB, “the CHT is the home of 11(eleven)¹ tribes” (Chittagong Hill Tracts Development Board, 2010). The United Nations and People Organization provided the explanation regarding the religious difference among these groups. It mentioned that “the largest groups, the Chakma and Marma, are Buddhist, the Tripura are Hindu, while the smaller hill peoples such as Bawm, Pankhua and Mru are Christian or practice their traditional beliefs” (United Nations and People Organization, 2011). About half of the population in the CHT is Bengali. Most of them are settlers from the plain land (Committee Chittagong Hill Tracts Campaign, 1986). Lawyer Mr. Mazumder, who has reputation of dealing several CHT related law suits, mentioned:

“the poor communication and resource competition among settlers and different tribal groups is causing deteriorating ethnic

¹ This number varies. The World Directory of Minorities claims it as 13. Some other groups and the website named Bangladesh. Com also claims the number as 13. However, the most authentic claim is 11. The national statistic as well as the UNICEF claims the number of tribes living in CHT is 11. The ethnic groups are Chakama, Marma, Tripura, Tanchangya, Lushai, Pankhua, Bawm, Mro, Kheyang, Khumi and Chaklives.

relationship. Settlers are never accepted by majority of the tribal groups. Though the settlers are mainly located near the BAF camps but the land those are given to them are claimed by the Jumma” (Interviewed on September 9, 2010).

The competition is also true among different tribes. Hussain had given one such example in his writing and explained:

“between 1958 and 1968 a large number of primary schools and some high schools were established in the CHT. The Chakmas were mostly to benefit out of this spread of education and by 1970 the rate of literacy among them shot up to more than 50 percent” (Hussain, 1999).

The progress in education has provided Chakma with more political leadership over the rest. As a result the other tribes felt discriminated by the dominant tribal group. In this context the BAF argues the rationality of its involvement in the CHT. The BAF explains that “the BAF’s role to protect the peace is to enable all groups and tribes to participate in their cultural life without hindering the others” (Bangladesh Army, 2010). Mr. C², a member of the BAF, agreed with the BAF's explanation and tried to justify the BAF's involvement in the internal security by bringing the issue of the inability of the civil authority to deal with the internal security in CHT, where cultural difference is widely present. She said:

“though arguably, the responsibility to ensure the political and cultural rights of various groups remains with the civil authority, but in a place where the armed conflict just ended the civil authority does not have fullest control over the people to deliver such responsibility. Thus the chance of such cultural conflict remains wide and that justifies the BAF's involvement in internal security issues in the CHT” (Interviewed on February 16, 2010).

The BAF explains that the civilian authority is not capacitated to deal with the security challenges generated from the cultural differences and requires the support from the BAF (Bangladesh Military, 2011). Most of the civilians do not accept this argument. Rather the civilian notion of the managing inter-tribal conflict is to increase the

² The interviewee is a member of the BAF and requested to keep her anonymous.

capacity of the civil authority. Thus the presence of inter-tribal and group conflict in the CHT is one unique issue that often referred by the BAF to justify its presence in the CHT.

C. Demographic Reality in the CHT: The CHT has a low population density in contrast with the rest of Bangladesh. According to Chittagong Hill Tracts Development Board, “CHT has 100 people per sq km. The national average is 800. The population is currently estimated at 1.4 million, making up 1.1% of the country’s total” (Chittagong Hill Tracts Development Board, 2010). A small number of people are living in a larger area of the CHT, whereas people in the rest of the country have to undergo serious competition for land (Cultural Survival, 2010). Though the land in the CHT is mainly hilly and not suitable for large scale dwellings, the settlement process took place in the 70s (Zaman, 2009). This process continued till the 90s, which has increased the Bengali population in the CHT nearly half of its total population. A United Nations document mentioned, “over the last 30 years, Bengali settlers from other parts of Bangladesh have been allocated land in the CHT districts and now represent approximately 50 per cent of the CHT population” (Noorani, 2004: 1). Similar figure is revealed by the GoB's data. According to the 1991 Census, “the total population is 974,465 out of which 501,145 (51 per cent) belong to groups of different ethnic origins. About 49 per cent are Bengalis” (GoB, 1991). The present demographic makeup has made the ground reality that it is difficult to maintain peace without a harmonious relationship among the different ethnic groups. Thus it requires a sensible effort from the authority is vital to curb any chance of violence among the population. This demographic reality is artificially created through the settlement process, which is also unique in Bangladesh.

As a result of such demographic reality the inter-ethnic relationship is not satisfactory, which generates internal security concern. The BAF’s involvement in the CHT considers that the civil authority needs its assistance to ensure the harmonious relationship among its population (Bangladesh Army, 2010). Although the Peace Accord implementation remains in progression, the GoB views the BAF’s involvement is still a necessity to ensure the internal security (Chittagong Hill Tracts Development Board, 2010). The critical issue is the role of the BAF is not clear to the people at large. Although the BAF claims that it is performing noncombat role but the

chances to involve in combat role is always high. Cultural Survival, a Jumma organisation, viewed the nature of the BAF's involvement is largely noncombat but that does not conclusively deny its combat role in the CHT (Cultural Survival, 2010). According to the Accord there are issues of land reallocation to the Jumma, some of those lands are already allocated to the Bengali population, is a contentious issue. Besides, the complex administrative set-up provides significant control of the Chakma tribe over the rest and denies the proportionate representation of smaller tribes and Bengali population can be a potential issue for conflict. These are the unique conditions in the CHT those are linked with the demographic reality at the ground. These issues are being referred by the BAF to justify its presence in the CHT.

However, the BFA's presence in the CHT is argued not only on the present uniqueness but the historic factors also have significant relation. Thus it is important to have an understanding about the prior issues related with peace and conflict in the CHT and the difficulty of the CHT civil-political administration to function.

5.3 Historical Context to the Conflict

The state of practical peace in the CHT is anything but real. Over the last quarter century, the indigenous people of the CHT have been involved in an insurgency for autonomy from the Bangladesh state (Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti, 2009). Gain explained the reason for such crisis by saying that the main causes of the crisis in the CHT are centered on the land issue, the transfer of population from plain districts and the control of administration by non-inhabitants (Gain, 2000). Tripura, Ahmed, and Mohsin have explained the reasons for conflict from a rights angle. They wrote:

“[d]iscrimination, deprivation and exploitation in social, cultural, economic and political fields and the programme of assimilation of the indigenous hill people into the majority Bengali population were ... bones of contention” (Tripura, 1992, Ahmed, 1992, Mohsin, 1997a).

However, the peace and conflict situation has a significant root that goes beyond the creation of Bangladesh. The root is economic and political discrimination against the

Jumma population in the CHT, which generated hate and mistrust against the then central Pakistani government. Unfortunately, the discriminatory attitude continued even after the creation of Bangladesh and that is why it is required to address the past concerns of respective parties to have a sustainable peace. A brief analysis on the initial causes of the conflict in the CHT covers the following main issues:

A. The Kaptai Dam Project: The Kaptai dam was a significant issue that historically breached the rights of the Jumma people. As of its background after the British colonial period there were a couple of events of significance that took place in the CHT that generated anger among the Jumma. The Pakistani government (Bangladesh was part of Pakistan until 1971) built a huge hydroelectric dam named Kaptai Dam at Kaptai between 1957 and 1963 (Gain, 2000). Due to the dam construction an area equivalent of 54,000 acres has gone under water, which consisted of 40 percent of Jumma people's total cultivation land (Parveen, & Faisal, 2002). As a result 100,000 Jumma people were affected losing livelihood and houses where people had been living for generations. These are critical concern related with the human security principles and objectives. On the other side, the development rhetoric of the then government is also associated with the human security. Hussain gave the reasons of Pakistani government's dam project in CHT. He wrote that the Government of Pakistan undertook such measures for utilising two natural resources of the CHT, namely the forestry and hydroelectricity (Hussain, 1999). The then West Pakistan government did the development with a discriminatory attitude towards the Jumma population which inflicted much suffering, and providing them with virtually nothing from those development projects. This shows that historically the rights of the Jumma population were violated and their human security concerns were not recognised. In this context the Jumma people claimed their right to deal their own affairs by themselves. Linking it with their social norms and approach for development the Jumma people claimed their right to have special treatment within the state of Pakistan. The Chittagong Hill Tracts Commission viewed that the violation of Jumma people's rights in the name of development was the historical justification of the claim for special treatment (Chittagong Hill Tracts Commission, 1997). In the context of the early political landscape of Bangladesh such claim of special right to deal with their

own affairs received mixed acceptance from the national politicians and as a result there was increased tension between the GoB and the Jumma leadership.

B. Political Position of the Jumma Leadership: The anti-liberation role of a section of Jumma leadership in Bangladesh impacted the tribal-Bengali relationship in early Bangladesh history. The section of Jumma leadership influenced a group of Jumma youths to fight against the Bangladesh liberation war. According to the historian Hussain, “the inducted youths from Jumma people formed the Civil Armed Force; a body to collaborate against the liberation of Bangladesh” (Hussain, 1999: 13). At the same time the Chakma Chief, Tridiv Roy gave anti-Bangladesh propaganda at the international level. Ms. Chak, a local Jumma resident of the CHT, believes the political position of the Jumma leadership has created initial distance between Jumma and GoB. She said:

“the political position of the anti-independent movement by certain Jumma leaders has created a deep mistrust among the politicians about the Jumma people’s convection for the independent Bangladesh” (Interviewed on September 20, 2010).

Later in the mid70s the Civil Armed Forces, who had fled to the forests immediately after the surrender of Pakistan army, gradually reappeared and regrouped to become the nucleus of the tribal armed organisation *Shanti Bahini* (Hussain, 1999: 13). In covering this history, the United Nations and People Organisation, stated:

“after the Bangladesh war of liberation the hill people had hoped for political recognition and some form of autonomy within the state of Bangladesh. This was denied to them. In 1972 the *Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti*³ (Chittagong Hill Tracts People's United Party, or PCJSS for short) was formed and in 1976 its armed wing the *Shanti Bahini* started guerilla attacks” (United Nations and People Organisation, 2011).

³ ‘*Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti* or PCJSS is a Bengali acronym for the Chittagong Hill Tracts People’s United Party, a regional party in CHT representing the hill peoples of CHT. The *Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti* had been the only political platform of the hill people of CHT until 1997 when they ended a guerrilla war fought against the Bangladesh government and signed CHT (Peace) Accord, which ultimately factionate the *Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti* into pro and anti-Peace Accord. The anti-Peace Accord group formed a new political party in 1998’ (Chowdhury, K., 2008: 57–78).

The armed attack was the final provocation for the BAF to start the counter insurgency operation in the CHT. However, prior to that the GoB started the settlement of landless people from other parts of the country to CHT arguing it is the only part of the country where the population density is significantly lower. The Jumma interpretation of internal migration is that this is a process of the militarisation and the cause of insecurity (Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti, 1997). However, the BAF's version is that it has started the counter insurgency operation in the mid-70s to curb the security threats as well as protect the residence of the CHT (Bangladesh Army, 2010). It is important to note that the BAF indicated protection of the the settlers as 'protect the resident of the CHT'. The BAF claims that even after the signing of the Peace Accord the elements of insurgency are still around. Mr. D⁴, a member of the BAF, claimed that:

“there are certain sections of the *Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti* leadership who are having characteristics to renegade (defector). Some of them are still trying to create issues to go back to insurgency. Given the situation it might not possible to raise a real insurgency but the possibility can never be denied, which requires a constant vigilance by the BAF” (Interviewed on February 18, 2010).

If such a view would be considered as the internal view of the BAF it is easily understandable that the BAF's presence in the CHT is not just related with the provisions of the Accord. Rather it is a matter of national security for the BAF and its involvement in the human security based activities in the CHT is not the real purpose.

C. Inter-Jumma Conflict in the CHT: The political and ground reality recently has dramatically shifted and generated inter-tribal tension in the CHT, which is often cited as a reason for the BAF's presence in the CHT. The BAF explained that at present there are several tribal groups are active in the CHT, among the *Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti* and the *United People's Democratic Front* are the main (Bangladesh Army, 2010). Their position is quite opposite to each other in every issues regarding the CHT. Mr. Mong, a senior Jumma person from the CHT, viewed that “it is no more the place for single leadership. There has been a brutal competition

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The interviewee is a member of the BAF and requested not to disclose his name.

among several groups to take the leadership of Jumma people” (Interviewed on September 19, 2010).

The inter-tribal conflict in the CHT has a new face - mainly between the Chakma and Marma, the main two tribes in the CHT. Traditionally the Chakma leadership was in the frontline of any negotiation and had the opportunity to control over the affairs affecting all the tribes living in CHT (Bang-oa, 2004). This has been obviously raised concern among other smaller Jumma groups about their political security. As being a comparable size the Marma population wants to assert their rights and a section of Chakma leadership is against such change (Chowdhury, K., 2008). This has made the smaller tribes aware about the fact that the Jumma controlled local council might be another institution that can harm their political and cultural security because they would not have a democratic institution to access remedies. Considering the struggle in the Jumma leadership the prospects for the advancement of the peace process is also limited. At present the major insecurity in the CHT is due to intra-jumma factionalism (Mamun, 2011). However, Ms. Banu, a senior Bengali citizen of the CHT, viewed the present practical peace situation is posed by serious threats from the intra-jumma faction. She stated:

“the post Accord split within the Jumma struggle has created two parties, the *Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti* and the *United People's Democratic Front*,. These two along with other smaller groups are continuously in fighting for the domination, which is the major threat to the daily peace life in the CHT” (Interviewed on September 20, 2010).

In this situation the BAF is at the middle of these two groups and claiming that it is in the CHT to maintain the security. The argument about the divisive political move of the Jumma leadership is causing security threats for the nation, which is giving the BAF an excuse for maintaining its presence in the CHT.

The above analysis regarding the context of the uniqueness of CHT and its conflict explains the background of the BAF's involvement in CHT. It also explains that after signing the Peace Accord the BAF's earlier counter insurgency involvement has changed. The post Accord BAF's involvement in CHT is not an agreed condition under the Accord. But the reality shows the BAF is mandated by the GoB for

maintaining internal security and conducting development activities in CHT. The critical issue is though the internal security task and the development responsibility is ideally associated with human security principles and objectives but the real implication of such involvements serve military goal in CHT, which is to contain any future chance of re-emergence of insurgency. In this stage it is important to understand that why the Peace Accord is not implemented and as a result of that why the BAF's presence in CHT is continuing. To explain this issue this research argues the unrealistic and, to certain extend, legally contradicted provisions of the Peace Accord makes it virtually impossible for the GoB to implement. This is what created vacuum in the CHT where the BAF takes the advantage and ensures its presence.

5.4 The Complexity of the CHT Administration

According to the above stated context it is argued that the Accord recommended administration for the CHT is very confusing and contradicts the democratic spirit. The Accord gives legality of three administrations in CHT. First, the traditional administration, second, the state runs special administration leaded by the Jumma and third, the general unite of the public administration. The structure of the overall administrative arrangement has given bellow:




Figure 5.1: Organogram of the CHT Administration (GoB, 1997)

The figure shows the complex pattern of the CHT administration setup. However, the authorities of these administrations are in many occasions contradicting among themselves. But more importantly, the traditional administration based on the hereditary appointment and selection, which violates the basic democratic norms. It

also violates the rights of the Bengalis and smaller tribes in the multi-tribal CHT. At the same time the special Jumma headed administration negates the right of half of the CHT's population, who are Bengali. The authority overlaps between the special Jumma headed CHT administration and the general public administration. For example the general public administration in a district is headed by the District Commissioner and the security matter is dealt by the Superintendent of Police. The Accord places them under the authority of the special Jumma headed CHT administration. This gives a clear scope of conflict and legal expert views it as a violation of unitary system provided by the Bangladesh Constitution. In an interview Ms. U⁵, a member of Bangladesh Parliament, raises the issue of legitimacy of such provisions. She argued:

“the controlling of District Commissioners and Superintendents of Police (general public administration) in the CHT through local tribal authority constitutes breach to the unitary administration is unlikely to be realised” (Interviewed on September 23, 2010).

In this context the issue was taken to the constitutional court of the country. The court expressed the similar view and shows reluctant to accept the Accord for consideration due to its nature of non-legal character. Such confusion further re-enforced the vacuum and allowed the BAF to be present in the CHT.

To understand this in detail the research is providing analysis on the total CHT administration. The CHT is the largest of Bangladesh's administrative districts, comprising more than 9 percent of the nation's territory (Cultural Survival, 2010). In terms of the CHT's administrative structure it was a single district till 1984 and then divided into three administrative districts, namely Rangamati, Khagachari and Bandarban. Adnan and Lewin argue that “the CHT districts differ from the rest of the country in history, topography, ethnic composition, social organisation and religious ways of life” (Adnan, 2004; Lewin, 1870). Considering the uniqueness in CHT the administrative system has evolved with its own exceptionality. However, as stated above the present complexity of the CHT administration can be divided into three

⁵ The interviewee is a member of parliament has made several points that go against her party position and she requested not to disclose her name.

types of administration, where the simultaneous presence of both the traditional and state run system makes it confusing.

A. Issues Related with the Traditional Administration in CHT: As it is stated above that there are three different administrations in CHT. As a result the CHT is typically run under dual system, which contradicts the democratic value of the state and creates confusion among the population. The presence of both traditional administration and public administration is the example of the duality. Ms. Chak, a Jumma resident of the CHT who works with NGO, argued the duality as a problem factor. She said:

“the presence of several administrations allows harness authoritative process. Under the duality the tribal system dictates the traditional and personal rights whereas the public issues are commonly under the national administrative system. Since hereditary traditional system runs through one family of the larger tribe it faces lack of confidence from the ordinary Jumma as well as smaller tribes. It also gives little space for individual right to choose the leadership” (Interviewed on September 20, 2010).

This complex system started during the British colonial period. The British system provided the CHT a unique position and introduces the presence of both traditional and public administration. The traditional system that the British introduced is recognised by the Accord. The Accord has provided following three levels in the traditional administration:

i. **First Unit (Karbari at Village level):** As a basic level each village has its own *Karbari*, which is the leader of the villages. The *Rajah* directly or on the recommendation of the *Mauza Headman* appoints the *Karbari* from the villagers (Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti, 2011).

ii. **Second Unit (Headman at Mauza level):** *Mauza* is the second level of administrative unit comprised of a number of villages and headed by a headman/woman. The *Mouza Headman* is “responsible for collection of revenue, preservation of peace, allocation of agricultural lands including the jums” (Roi, 2000).

iii. **Third Unit (Rajah at Territorial/ Circle level):** This is the top level of administrative unit. There are three circles in the CHT. Under the British the CHT

Regulation of 1900, the hill tracts were divided into three revenue circles, namely the Chakma, the Mong, and the Bohmang, each headed by a *Rajah* (Gain, 2000: 17). The *Rajah* is a hereditary position and he heads the territory (Rashiduzzaman, 1998).

The composition of these bodies is based on the traditional practices, which has hardly any links with democratic spirit. *Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti* mentioned, “the post of the Circle Chief (*Rajah* at third level) is hereditary, as is (was) the case with *Headmen*. Generally, the child of past *Headman* (at second level) is given priority for headship” (Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti, 2011) The confusions added by the functional relationship between these traditional bodies and the public administration. Ms. Roi wrote “[p]arallel to the three chiefs there is a state-operated administrative structure with the Deputy Commissioner as the chief executive” (Roi, 2000).

Confusion about the jurisdiction of the chiefs often keeps the public administration ineffective in the CHT. The purpose of allowing the overlapping administrative setup is viewed differently by different scholars. Among the scholars, Bushra viewed that “by allowing such duality British perpetuated their control over the CHT” (Bushra, 2002). Interestingly, in the context of Bangladesh such confusion is allowing the BAF to maintain their presence in CHT.

B. Contradictions in the Special Administrative System: Beside the traditional and public administration the CHT Accord provides a special administrative system for the CHT with Chittagong Hill Tracts Regional Council and three Hill District Councils. In the CHT Administrative set up the Chittagong Hill Tracts Regional Council is the apex body (Guhathakurta, 2004), which is given power over the general public administration. “The Chittagong Hill Tracts Regional Council is the main body, which is composed of 22 members with 2/3 indigenous representation including its Chairperson” (GoB, 1997). The Peace Accord provides provision for the election of the Chittagong Hill Tracts Regional Council excluding the Bengali, which contradicts the democratic system of the country. According to the Accord the Chairmen of three Hill District Councils need to be Jumma only. More importantly, the Accord takes away the GoB's absolute right to make laws for the CHT. The Peace Accord has provided that “in making any law in connection with the

CHT, the Government shall enact such law in consultation with the Regional Council” (GoB, 1997).

Such special provision gives the Chittagong Hill Tracts Regional Council a certain degree of control over the CHT affairs (Hill, & Chakma, 2005), but subjected the GoB’s right to enact laws regarding CHT under the provision of consultation with the Regional Council. This is another confusing provision that keeps the GoB away from making the Special Administration functional. Three Hill District Local Government Councils were established in CHT, for the districts of Bandarban, Khagrachari and Rangamati respectively, which needs to be functional for the feasible peace and development in CHT (Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti, 2010).

However, the other view is that the Hill District Councils are empowered and given authority over many activities those are under the control of the public administration. It is estimated that the Hill District Councils are given responsibilities in the 33 specific activities, which has created tension between them and the public administration. This confusing situation allowed the BAF to apply their prerogative in CHT. Ms. A⁶, a member of the BAF, explained:

“the BAF works to assist the public administration to protect the internal security. It suspects there could be components of ex-insurgents within the Hill District Councils” (Interviewed on February 12, 2010).

Due to such suspicion the BAF is neither supporting the activities of the CHT special administration nor being active in implementing the agenda of the public administration. The BAF is implementing its own agenda by the name of maintaining internal peace and supporting development, which is apparently noncombat human security task but in real sense it is a continuation of its combat engagement in CHT.

C. Jumma Control of the CHT Administration: Considering the unique cultural and traditional set-up, the CHT needs to be administrated with special expertise. GoB’s response to such a need is the creation of a separate ministry to head the public administration. The Ministry of Chittagong Hill Tracts Affairs is headed by a Jumma from the CHT (GoB, 1997). Under the *CHT Manual* of 1990 the administrative power is held by the Commissioner in Chittagong, but in the course of

⁶ The interviewee is a member of the BAF and requested not to disclose her name.

time some of these administrative powers were delegated to District Commissions, located in the districts (Hill, & Chakma, 2005). Parallel powers of public administration were given to the Department of Forests, as confirmed in the Forestry Act of 1927. Local law and order remained the domain of the Circles in Rangamati, Bandarban and Khagranchari respectively; those are too headed by Jumma (Chittagong Hill Tracts Development Facility, 2010b). The confusion remains within the public administration as well. The above stated departments are headed by Jumma people but the District Commissioners and Superintendent of Police comes from the general public officials, who are mainly Bengali. The functions of District Commissioners and Superintendents of Police are also under separate ministry, which is under the Establishment Ministry. But the Accord provides provision on the function of the District Commissioners and Superintendents of Police, and placed them under the special administration of CHT. This again raises confusion of the real authority in the administration, which predominantly favors the Jumma control over the administration.

Another issue is the overlapping authority among the special administration and the public administration. Due to such complexity the confusion remains about the authority to run the development works associated with human security principles and objectives in the CHT. The BAF in between takes the advantage of such confusion and claims themselves to be involved in the activities associated with noncombat human security principles and objectives.

5.5 The BAF's Presence in CHT and Peace Accord Implementation

The CHT Peace Accord is the only available instrument that offers peace. The signing of the CHT Peace Accord in 1997 was a historic event ending the two decades armed conflict. Saha viewed that the CHT Peace Accord of 1997 was a major achievement by the GoB and *Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti* to end the armed conflict in CHT (Saha, 1999). The Accord recognises the CHT as a tribal-inhabited region (GoB, 1997). The counter insurgency was initiated by the BAF and continued till 1997, the year of signing Peace Accord. Though the armed conflict was stopped, according to some critics, the full implementation of the Accord is still dream

to many (Hill, & Chakma, 2005). The GoB has completed the Accord due to political reason but facing legal complexity once it is considered for implementation (Rashiduzzaman, 1998). The CHT Accord has gained symbolic feature of the realisation of the rights of the Jumma population but suffered by human rights standards. Nevertheless, there is hardly any alternative explored by any of the parties. The Accord is remaining as sensitive issue to claim or even brought for discussion. The question of the BAF's withdrawal, the legality of the Accord and potential expulsion of Bengali settlers has made the implementation far more complicated (Saha, 1999). The uneasiness about the Accord is limiting the authority to implement fully. Bengali resident of the CHT, Ms. Banu argued:

“authority is implementing only those provisions which are not in contradiction with the general acceptance but initiating few activities to protect the cultural identity of Jumma population, which is not bringing peace among us” (Interviewed on September 20, 2010).

Mr. Mong, a senior resident of CHT, viewed the steps of the GoB as positive but insufficient. He argued:

“the government has addressed some critical issues such as refugee resettlement, incorporating Jumma language in education, withdrawing significant armed forces and addressing land rights. But the concern is that many issues are still not implemented according to the Accord or if the difficulties are there the GoB is yet to address the difficulties with the Accord” (Interviewed on September 19, 2010).

Even specific matter of sectoral rights; such as women rights and issue of gender sensitivity, is still neglected. By human rights standards those are critical. Mohsin narrated:

“there were no women who participated in the peace talks. Hence not only was the woman question missing from the Accord but there was also a total absence of women from the entire peace process” (Mohsin, 2003).

The women suffered the most and victims of the insurgency but they had also been an integral part of the autonomy movement. The neglect towards the gender matter is

visual on both the government and Jumma side. There was a hilariously disturbing quote of Mr. Shantu Larma, the leader of the *Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti*. He said:

“I (Mr. Shantu Larma) do not believe in women empowerment, once the nation is empowered women would automatically be empowered” (Mohsin, 2003).

These are the facts that jeopardise the potentials of the peace from a human rights point of view. The opponent can easily play around while these are clearly not meeting the rational standards of protecting human rights.

A large number of CHT residents view the presence of the BAF is a sign of the non-implementation of the Accord. They are also suspicious about the role of the BAF in CHT. A tribal resident of the CHT Mr. M⁷ viewed that the presence of the BAF in the CHT is a not sign of implementing the Accord. He said:

“[s]ome Jumma groups claim that the BAF presence and its functional structure in the CHT has little changed even after signing of the Accord. The principal activity of the BAF has been the counter-insurgency. BAF's development involvement is just to add its authority. Since the BAF remains in the CHT the Accord is not having its full implementation” (Interviewed on September 19, 2011).

The BAF's involvement in economic, internal security and development to assist the civil administration to improve the life of hill tribes is ideally associated with human security, but this objective appears to fades away because of the BAF's alleged involvement in violating rights (Chowdhury, K., 2008). Chowdhury viewed that the BAF is supposed to be a force for implementing the human security approach in post Accord CHT but it is effectively controlling the direction of the civil authority (Chowdhury, H., 2002). GoB's lack of urgency in withdrawing the BAF from the CHT is aggravating this situation (Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti, 2008). However, it is not only the presence of the BAF that is causing the non-implementation of the Accord. There are several structural and legal reasons including the provision for confusing administration is hindering the fullest implementation of

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The interviewee is a Jumma resident of the CHT and requested not to disclose the name.

the Accord. Thus the BAF’s presence in the CHT is both a cause and effect of the non-implementation of the Accord.

Until now the implementation can be termed as partial. The partial implementation is happening due to the simultaneous presence signs of implementation and non-implementation. The following figure shows the simultaneous presence of wider range of issues those make the Accord being partially implemented.




Figure 5.2: Factors Causing Partial Implementation of the Peace Accord

Viewing this partial implementation of the Accord as a fact Saha narrated that the realistic scope of CHT Accord implementation is very thin (Saha, 1999). The major issue of implementation of the Accord is the withdrawal of the BAF from CHT. The implementation of the Accord is obstructed by the BAF’s long presence even after the Accord. The BAF clarified its role by stating that:

“[w]ith the signing of the Peace Accord and its gradual implementation the *modus operandi* of the security forces was redefined to suit the changed scenario. Such as, *Operation Uttaran*, signifies ‘transition to peace’, has been launched with the effect from August 1, 2001” (Bangladesh Army, 2011).

In reality Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti viewed that the security operation codenamed *Operation Uttaron* which was resorted to in 2001 to tighten security noose, is still in operation (Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti, 2009). Regarding the withdrawal of the BAF's camp the Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti noted that only 66 temporary camps including a brigade out of 543 camps were withdrawn so far. Rest of the temporary camps is yet to be dismantled (Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti, 2010). Though in November 2011 the Prime Minister has reiterated her commitment for the implementation of the CHT Accord but cautioned that the process will take longer time. The GoB's steps include establishing an inter-ministerial committee, named the Strategic Management Forum, to oversee the Accord implementation. But the BAF remains as key member of the committee. The Bangladesh Adivasi Resource Center mentioned that these initiatives are to create more control of the BAF in the CHT and keep the implementation partial.

In addition to the presence and role of the BAF in CHT, the non-implementation of the Accord is related with issues, such as the land issue, legality of the Accord, public resilience, presence of business interest, fractional tribal politics. Regarding the Accord implementation, the Bangladesh Adivasi Resource Center has shown in a recent publication that the status of implementation and viewed that "so far there have not been any official steps by the government to preserve the characteristics of the Tribal Inhabited Region" (Bangladesh Adivasi Resource Center, 2011), which is the spirit of the Accord. Ms. Chak, a Jumma resident of the CHT, viewed:

"[t]o preserve the CHT as a 'Tribal Inhabited Region' the land ownership is a critical issue. Though the Accord provides a Jumma headed Land Commission to decide the land issue but it is yet to commence its function and its Act is yet to be amended in the light of the Accord" (Interviewed on September 20, 2010).

The reason land is a crucial issue for the Bengali settler too. Because the settlers are settled on the *Khash* land (government land), which the tribal people claims as their ancestral land. Thus the constitute of the land commission is an positive step but keeping it ineffective is clearly a negative attribution for the Accord implementation.

The BAF claims it has changed its role after the Peace Accord and stated that "[a]t present the activities under the *Operation Uttaron* are designed to support

the Government's effort for the implementation of the Peace Accord" (Bangladesh Army, 2011). However, Mr. Mong, a Jumma residence of the CHT, viewed opposite. He mentioned:

"the army is involved in CHT to do their own business. They are not helping the people not the authority. Their work for development or constructing road is not designed to help the ordinary people, but to help their communication in deep mountainous area" (Interviewed on September 19, 2010).

Defining specifically what these activities are is not that clear. Ideally the BAF is dealing with the development activities and supporting general peace and security (Guhathakurta, 2004), which associated with human security principles and objectives. In reality the BAF is pursuing its national security goals. From the interview it is apparent that the BAF's communication development activities have the potential to make their position in the CHT more solid to deal any potential struggle.

In addition to the BAF's presence in the CHT other structural and legal factors are also causing the non-implementation of the Accord. The multi-dimensional field reality is constraining the Peace Accord implementation. One major issue is the lack of national consensus about the Accord. Even during the initiation of the Accord, the GoB has failed to create any national consensus, which is vital for its implementation. According to Rashiduzzaman:

"since the formal signing of the Peace Agreement (Accord)- often described as a treaty though it is not a compact between sovereign states- on December 2, 1997, the Bangladesh public has demonstrated both acceptance and rejection of the Accord . . . Consequently, the Accord has failed to create the national consensus desired by the Bangladesh political leadership" (Rashiduzzaman, 1998: 653).

A similar caution about the post Peace Accord situation and its sustainability was expressed by Mohsin. She particularly focused on the division within the Jumma population regarding the Accord, and wrote:

"[t]he situation in the CHT is in flux and has acquired complex dimensions following the Accord, with one faction of the Hill people

committed to pursuing full autonomy. The state's slow pace of implementing the Accord has only exacerbated the situation” (Mohsin, 2003: 13).

Thus the non-implementation of the Accord is further pushed by the internal factionalism of the Jumma political front. At present there is no single political representation for the tribal people. The factional representation also commands a wider Jumma population who directly contradicts with the *Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti* and do not accept the Accord. In this situation the implementation of the Accord has become more challenging due to the court challenge against the legality of the Accord. The GoB is in both political and legal limbo to implement the Accord fully. In such situation the government does not want to hinder the presence of the BAF and its role in civil affairs. As a result the BAF is controlling aspects of civil affairs in the CHT amounts the Accord not being fully realised.

5.5.1 The Practicality of the Peace Accord

The impractical aspect of the Accord has made it inapplicable and contradictory with the national law (Chittagong Hill Tracts Commission, 1997). There was court case against the Accord. It is observed that there are several provisions of the Accord which directly contradict with the Constitution of Bangladesh. Earlier it is discussed that one of the basic features of the Accord is to introduce a special political arrangement for the CHT with formation of Chittagong Hill Tracts Regional Council, as an apex political body of the region and three Hill District Councils. The provision contains a separate administrative system which breaches the unitary nature of the state (Saha, 1999). Mr. F⁸, a senior researcher, viewed the Accord has inherent legal problem. He mentioned:

“though it is argued that the provision is an extension of the functional local government but the power and responsibility given to the Chittagong Hill Tracts Regional Council to some extent goes beyond the legal limits of a local government” (Interviewed on March 3, 2010).

⁸ The interviewee has requested not to disclose his name believing the sensitivity of his interview.

His point about the nature of the Chittagong Hill Tracts Regional Council as a local government needs to be considered alongside with the limitations of local government of Bangladesh. Local government does not have the authority to overrule the direction of the central government. But in the case of CHT, the Accord provides provision empowering the Chittagong Hill Tracts Regional Council as the authority to decide issues related with CHT, which in many instances overrule the authority of the central government. He further pointed that the state of democratic proportional representation in the Chittagong Hill Tracts Regional Council is not maintained. Since according to the Accord, the GoB has made follow-up amendment in three acts to give preference to the Jumma representation in the special administrative in the CHT with CHT Regional Council and three Hill District Councils, the issue of democratic rights of the office of the Bengali population become a serious issue. According to Bangladesh Adivasi Resource Center, an NGO on Jumma issues, they argue that:

“[t]he majority of the seats (two-third) in the Chittagong Hill Tracts Regional Council and Hill District Councils, including the positions of chairs, are reserved for indigenous peoples and one-third seats for permanent Bengali residents. The Peace Accord also contributes to the creation Ministry of Chittagong Hill Tracts Affairs in Dhaka to be appointed a minister among from indigenous peoples and to be constituted an Advisory Committee to lend support to the ministry” (Bangladesh Adivasi Resource Center, 2011).

The issue of representation does not reflect the proportion of Bengali and Jumma people living the CHT, which is equal. Thus this probation breaches the democratic right of representation of the Bengali population of the CHT. According to Chowdhury, “though the proportion of population composition by Bengali and Jumma is equal the Accord advocates for disproportionate representation favoring Jumma population” (Chowdhury, K., 2008). Member of Bangladesh Parliament, Ms. U⁹ supported this notion and argued:

“[i]n a unitary country the alienation of a larger group of population (Bengali) to be represented in the local government sounds

⁹ The interviewee is a member of parliament has made several points that go against her party position and she requested not to disclose her name.

disconnected from the constitutional guarantee for democratic participation.” (Interviewed on September 23, 2010)

In the face of such legal complexity several law suits were filed at the High Court of Bangladesh to nullify the regulations related with the Chittagong Hill Tracts Regional Council and the Peace Accord. On 12-13 April 2010 the High Court Division of Bangladesh Supreme Court, in a verdict, declared the Chittagong Hill Tracts Regional Council Act 1998 as well as some provisions of the Hill District Councils Acts unconstitutional. However, the High Court Division has not declared legal the decision about the CHT Accord itself. The reason described by the High Court to spare the CHT Accord is “the CHT Accord is political in nature; an Accord with the belligerents could not be reviewed judicially” (Tajul Islam v. GoB, 2010). After a prolonged hearing, the High Court Bench of Justice Syed Refaat Ahmed and Justice Moyeenul Islam Chowhury announced judgment on these cases, on 12-13 April 2010 stating that the court observed the Chittagong Hill Tracts Regional Council Act 1998 was unconstitutional for it violated the ‘characteristic of the unitary structure of the state’. In the same finding, the High Court declared that Section 4(6), 17, 32(2), and 62(1) of the Rangamati Hill District Council Act 1989, Khagrachari Hill District Councils Act 1989 and Bandarban Hill District Councils Act 1989, as amended in 1998 in accordance with the CHT Accord, violated the characteristic of a unitary state (Bangladesh Adivasi Resource Center, 2011).

The court has referred the Section 4(6) of the Hill District Councils Acts as one that goes beyond the constitution. The Section says: whether a person is a non-tribal or not and, if so, which community he is a member of, shall be determined, subject to his producing a certificate from the concerned Mouza Headman/Union Council Chairman/Municipality Chairman, by the concerned Circle Chief and without a certificate in this connection being received from the Circle Chief, no person shall be eligible as a non-tribal to be candidate for the post of a non-tribal member [Section 4(6) of Hill District Councils Acts 1989- amended in 1998]. This section clearly defines the person's status based on certification from Circle Chief who is by law a Jumma person. Practically, the Bengali is unlikely to receive the certificate from the Jumma Circle Chief, since most of the Jumma leadership does not regard Bengali as permanent citizen of the CHT. Mr. Mazumder, a lawyer of the Supreme Court of

Bangladesh, explained argument from the angle of constitutional rights given to all citizens of Bangladesh. He said:

“the basic right of a citizen of the country is to have free access and rights to be anywhere of the country that is a single unitary state. But curbing the right of non-Jumma people to be legal resident is an important constrain” (Interviewed on September 9, 2010).

This argued contradiction of the Accord makes it unlikely to be fully implemented. Though the Jumma scholars such as Ms. Roi argues such provision on the ground of ‘special treatment’ for the backward population, claiming the Jumma population is backward section in Bangladesh and they need such protective measures (Roi, 2000). In this regard the court guideline mentioned that “it was the government's responsibility to adopt a method and procedure, which would be reasonable and convenient for” (Tajul Islam v. GoB, 2010). So the court accepts the special measures but directed it to be reasonable or to keep it within the constitutional boundary. In another word, the special measures are permissible but that cannot breach the constitutional rights of other citizens. In this case if the Jumma leadership has the absolute right to decide who will live in the CHT and who will be excluded, that goes against the right of the ordinary citizen of the country. The court decision against the legality of the laws related to the implementation of the Accord carries serious importance. The GoB is virtually unable to act beyond the legal limit set by the constitution and the court is keeping the Accord unrealised. This is another gap that allows the BAF to be continued its presence in the CHT affairs.

5.5.2 The Accord and Public Resilience

As discussed earlier the CHT Accord faces wider public resilience among the mainstream Bengali population as well as substantive numbers of Jumma population. The Accord has clear provisions making the nontribal population ineligible for voting in local elections, and even controlling nontribal participation in development activities (CHT Peace Accord, 2007). Ms. U¹⁰, a member of Bangladesh Parliament, notes:

¹⁰ The interviewee is a member of parliament has made several points that go against her party position and she requested not to disclose her name.

“the accord does not reflect the popular view. It is against the notion of equality and non-discrimination. Prohibiting a section of population from voting cannot be accepted by majority. Thus the Accord faces public resistance (Interviewed on September 23, 2010).

The critical and undemocratic attributions of the Accord have made it difficult for the government to take steps for full realisation.

The Accord is not only resisted by the Bengali but also a section of Jumma. Mohsin, in her study of the Peace Accord has critiqued the process by giving the example of resilience from the Jumma side. She said:

“the Peace Accord reached between the *Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti* and the Awami League denied many of the longstanding demands of the Hill people, which to them were crucial for reaching a just peaceful settlement” (Mohsin, 2003).

She viewed that the demand of the Jumma for recognition as the Jumma nation was denied; instead the CHT was recognised as a Tribal inhabited area. No provision was made for the compensation of war victims, the raped and the widows. Justice was denied to the Hill women. Thus the dissatisfactions and resistance against the implementation of the Accord are on both sides.

5.5.3 Alleged Presence of Business Interest in the CHT

The long standing conflict in the CHT and relatively restricted movement generated extra-legal ways to deal business in the CHT. On top of that there is a huge amount of development funding, both by the GoB and international donors (Mohsin, 2003). The management of such development aid is also becoming a crucial source of corrupt practice by both Bengali and Jumma leadership. Ms. Banu, a Bengali resident of CHT gave her account and said:

“the political leadership among both Bengali and Pahari (Jumma) are corrupt. On the one hand, they keep the criminal gangs and political movements active to justify their presence and on the other hand, they help certain business to run. If we look at their personal wealth, all are benefiting out of the conflict” (Interviewed on September 20, 2010).

From the interview it is found that those businesses are timber, fish, agricultural products and most importantly development funding. Saha viewed that the business interest in CHT is hindering the process of Accord implementation (Saha, 1999). Local residences claim that the Jumma and Bengali leadership as well as the BAF are benefiting from local business, which often needs official and unofficial permission from these sections. Many policy makers tend to overlook the cause. Ms. A¹¹, a member of the BAF, viewed:

“the issue of illegal benefit from the trade and development money has created a vicious circle in CHT where both the Bengali settlers and Paharis (Jumma) are involved. This is one of the biggest perils to the implementation of the Peace Accord” (Interviewed on February 12, 2010).

Some interviewees suspect that there are communications between the BAF and certain groups involved in business. But the presence of business interest within some sections of armed forces is asserted positively by the interviewees. Ms. Chak, a Jumma resident of CHT, mentioned:

“the leadership of Bengali and Jumma groups works with some criminal groups to run illegal business in CHT. They have to pay certain section of the BAF. If CHT runs under proper administration the illegal business will stop. This makes the benefited section to act against the Accord” (Interviewed on September 20, 2010).

If that is the case then the BAF personnel who are engaged in such business shall be brought to justice, but there is no example of punishing any BAF personnel on the grounds of involvement in illegal business in CHT. Is it a matter of impunity? The BAF by law enjoys immunity for their operational engagement (GoB, 1972a). But that does not include the any allegation of such illegal business involvement. However, Ms. A¹², a member of the BAF, has not agreed the point and said:

“the presence of such business linkage with the armed forces is not the factual matter. Rather it is a speculative matter. Since each member of the BAF is posted in CHT only for a limited period the

¹¹ The interviewee is a member the BAF and requested not to disclose name.

¹² The interviewee is a member the BAF and requested not to disclose name.

chance to create such relationship is fully imaginary” (Interviewed on February 12, 2010).

The argument indicates that the BAF are very protective of their image of impartiality as well as non-involvement with activities connected with illegal issues. But the fact of the matter remains critical - since they are not party to such activities why they are not able to completely stop such practices? Does it mean they are not able to have effective control in the area or the issue of monetary gain is subjected by impunity? In both the cases the efficiency of the BAF would come under scrutiny that the BAF does not want. If the illegal business involvement of the BAF proves it will jeopardise their claim of ideal role of assisting the civil administration in implementing the activities associated with human security principles and objectives. Moreover, if the BAF's illegal business proves it will link the BAF's interest to continue tension in CHT by not implementing the Accord. Thus the matters concerning the implementation of the Accord cannot be separated from the presence of illegal business interest in the CHT, where the BAF needs to be effective to stop those businesses.

5.6 BAF's Engagement in Internal Security in CHT (Independent Case Study)

The role of the BAF in CHT has been questioned by various rights groups. Its effectiveness and neutrality is always in doubt. However, national security scholars prescribe the BAF's presence as the solution of insurgency. The post-accord BAF's presence was critical. It was for development assistance and anti-insurgency operations in CHT. In reality, the security force in the CHT is widely present even after fourteen years of the signing of the Peace Accord in 1997. The BAF's presence is in CHT a huge issue for Jumma leadership and often termed as major barrier in implementing the Peace Accord. The government is in limbo - will they be risking the reemergence of insurgency by withdrawing the army? There are examples of the presence of armed elements within certain Jumma groups which have been reported on regular basis. Contrary to this, there are claims by Jumma groups that the army is creating obstacles in confidence building process for a sustainable end to the conflict

in CHT. Nevertheless, the BAF's position has not been cleared yet over the role of the BAF in CHT and its impact on implementation of Peace Accord.

Officially, the BAF is in CHT to maintain the security situation and assisting the development activities of CHT. The BAF in its legal mandate is supposed to work under the civil authority, supporting the local council in maintaining law and order situation and assisting development work. Consequently, due to their presence in the area they often become party to the conflict and the reason for the further acceleration of conflicts. In CHT the presence of army for assisting security matters is notably unusually high in number. The impact of their presence on the democratic institution is certainly debatable. The concern is that their adverse impact on political institutions might endanger the national trend of disengagement of military in politics. The following two independent examples are to understand the direct and indirect impact of the BAF's involvement in CHT on the civil-political institution before and after the Peace Accord. This will help to sharpen the argument that the BAF's involvement in activities associated with human security cannot have positive implication of the civil-political authority once they serve beyond the civilian control. The examples are about the violation of rights allegedly by the BAF, which the BAF claimed was their nontraditional security involvement. In these two examples analyses the potential violation of rights is due to their independent involvement in the CHT rather serving under the civil-political authority. This also shows the process is potential to disempower the democratic process in the CHT.

5.6.1 Example One: BAF's Anti-insurgency Role and Democratic Practices

The conflict in CHT had resulted in serious suffering of numerous individuals. This example about one Jumma victim, who was not a direct party of the conflict, is used to demonstrate her role as a social activist. The counter insurgency activities of the BAF caused such a violation of rights that it has a negative impact on the Military institution. This incident took place before the Peace Accord of 1992 allegedly by the Jumma, and the perpetrators are some individuals from the BAF. It was the act of several individuals who were seemingly protected by the BAF. The role of the security force is not clearly understood in this incident. The lack of authority of

the civil administration over the work of the BAF has adversely affected their relationship after the incident, which negatively impacts the establishment of democratic practices.

A. Introducing the Victim: The role of the BAF in the CHT during the full conflict situation was anything but pro-people. It was an anti-insurgency hard-line military approach. During that period unreported numbers of human rights violations took place. Of course the story is not one sided, but the State has the responsibility to protect its subjects even in extreme situations. On the contrary the army has allegedly been the perpetrator of some of the human rights violation,. such as the abduction of a tribal lady and rights activist Ms. Kalpana Chalma (23), a member of Chakma tribe. As a Jumma individual she was active in the field of protection of women's rights. She was the General Secretary of the Hill Women's Federation. According to the Chittagong Hill Tracts Commission,

“[s]he was abducted from her home in Lallyagona Village, Baghaichari Thana, Rangamati District, allegedly by a group of armed plain-clothed security personnel on the night of 11 to 12 June 1996, just hours before the parliamentary elections. Two of Kalpana Chakma's brothers were also taken outside and blindfolded by the kidnapers, but they managed to escape while being shot at” (Chittagong Hill Tracts Commission, 1997).

The example is a serious human rights violation that contributed to the escalation of tensions among the locals. Though the identification of the perpetrator was not verified, it was widely believed that the BAF members were involved. The role of security forces was led by a combat means often impacting negatively on the sustainability of peace in CHT. There has been a debate to revised the mandate in CHT to win the hearts and minds of the people through assisting local administration and villagers. However, such incidents were being termed as collateral damage by the BAF, which shows very little confidence among the policy makers about the utility of army to be social force in the CHT to improve peace.

B. Sequence of the Incident: There are several version of the story of the abduction of Ms. Kalpana. The army claims their noninvolvement in the incident, while the Jumma groups and several civil society organizations mentioned specific

individuals in the army conducted the abduction. According to Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti Kalpana Chakma was abducted by the members of the Bangladesh Army from her home at Lallyaghona village of the CHT. An army Lieutenant named Ferdous with 11 soldiers from the nearby Kojochari army barrack raided Kalpana Chakma's home at that night and picked her up forcibly (Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti, 2008). The blog of Paritosh Chakma mentioned the account of the 60 years old mother of Kalpana, Ms. Badhuni Chakma stated that we were asleep when someone called out from outside and wanted to know who were inside the house. Then they pulled down the latch of the door from outside and entered the house. They kept powerful torchlight on our face and took away my younger son Khudiram saying that his 'Sir' (Lieut. Ferdous) wanted to talk to him. Few minutes later they took away my elder son Kalicharan and my daughter Kalpana leaving behind myself and Kalicharan's wife (Chakma, 2009). A very similar scenario was narrated by Ms. Kabita Chakma. She mentioned in a newspaper report that,

“[a]t around 1:30am on June 12, 1996, the day national elections were held, Kalpana was abducted from her house at Lallyaghona village in Rangamati, along with her two brothers, allegedly by a group of plain-clothed security personnel, at gunpoint” (Chakma, 2010).

Paritosh Chakma has described the escape of her brother Khudiram Chakma, in his own words, stating that-

"I was asked to dip into the water near the well. As soon as I did so, someone shouted 'shoot him'. Sensing imminent death I somehow untied my hand, removed blindfold around my eyes and started running in the waist deep water. I could hear one gunshot behind me but I kept running" (Chakma, 2009).

Followed by the abduction Jumma activists staged a demonstration on 27 June 1996 demanding the release of Kalpana Chakma and the punish Lt. Ferdous and the Village Defence Person (Nurul Haq, son of Munsu Miah and Saleh Ahmed). At one stage the demonstration got violent and there were shootings. During the demonstration a 16-year-old boy Rupam Chakma was found dead and three students - Monotosh Chakma, Sukesh Chakma and Samar Bijoy Chakma were reported missing

in Baghaichari on their way to the demonstrations. On September 7, about two months later, the then prime minister of Bangladesh, Sheikh Hasina, set up an inquiry committee consisted of three-members. Those were former Justice Abdul Jalil (chairperson), Shakhawat Hossain, deputy commissioner of Chittagong and Professor Anupam Sen of Chittagong University. On February 27, 1998 the committee submitted its findings as a report to the home ministry. A Bengali residence¹³ of the CHT Mr. Q¹⁴ said:

“the report has never been made public. It was utterly surprising that the incident has much media attention in whole country yet it could not make the GoB understand the sensitivity of non-publishing the report” (Interviewed on September 19, 2010).

The same view is expressed by others as well. Kabita Chakma provides a better account of the fact and said:

“[w]hat little is known is from news leaked to a national daily, according to the latter, the inquiry committee's report was only one and a half pages long, it had been submitted to the home ministry; the inquiry report states that Kalpana was abducted but is still alive, it makes no mention of where she is; neither does it mention the allegation that she had been abducted by a group of people, or members of a government agency. The report recommends a police investigation, to be undertaken on the basis of the case filed at the

¹³ Bengalis are the majority ethnic group in Bangladesh. Prior to the 1950's Bengalis were a small minority in the CHT (9% in 1956). Bengalis now constitute half of the CHT population (48.57% in the last count in 1991). This drastic demographic change in the CHT occurred because of GoB's (Settlement) program from the late 1970s to the mid 1980s. See Adnan, S. (2004). *Migration Land Alienation and Ethnic Conflict: Causes of Poverty in the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh*. Dhaka: Research & Advisory Services, 2004. pp. 44-67. Also see Roy, D. (1980). 'The Population Transfer Programme of 1980s and Land Rights of the Indigenous Peoples of the Chittagong Hill Tracts'. in Bhaumik, S., Guhathakurata, M. and Chaudhury, S. (eds.) (1997). *Living on the Edge: Essays on the Chittagong Hill Tracts*. Calcutta: South Asia Forum for Human Rights/ Calcutta Research Group, pp. 167. This footnote needs to go much earlier

¹⁴ The interviewee is a local Bengali resident of the CHT. Due to personal security concern he requested not to disclose his name.

police station, to learn about her whereabouts, and her present condition” (Chakma, 2010).

The position of army was confusing. The army denied any involvement in the kidnapping. Initially the army suggested that it was a love affair and that she and Lt. Ferdous had eloped. Later, the army dropped leaflets from a helicopter announcing Taka 50,000 to anyone who could provide information about Kalpana Chakma’s whereabouts. Ever since, there was no clear mentioning about her location of condition. A NGO named, Bangladesh Human Rights Commission, had a press conference on 15 August 1996, where is claimed that Kalpana Chakma was seen in Tripura, India. However, an Indian NGO named Humanity Protection Forum had a counter claim saying this was a baseless and false story.

C. Significance of the Incident: The incident signifies the lack of accountability of the actions by state agencies in the CHT, in particular the security forces, which caused the deterioration of security. During the height of the conflict (before the Peace Accord in 1997) the de-facto governing authority in CHT was the BAF. The mode of the State was compromised by the action of the army, otherwise we would have been seen a firm action against such case. Moreover, there was no formal criminal allegation by the State against the alleged perpetrator. Thus the ‘confidence building’ process had been partially jeopardised and the case created mistrust among the different groups in the CHT. Finally, the intended involvement of BAF in CHT to maintain law and order and assisting the development in the area was under questioned. BAF’s such role also justifies the inappropriateness of its involvement in implementing activities associated with human security in the areas facing internal security challenges.

Factually linking the incident with such significance it can be claimed that Kalpana Chakma was even not a subject of armed threats to the BAF. She was rather a representative of modest social activist. According to Glen Hill and Kabita Chakma, “she came from a landless internally displaced refugee family who had been evicted from their original homes in 1962 when the creation of Kaptai hydro-electric dam inundated the largest town in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Rangamati, and many villages, rendering . . . homeless” (Green-Hill, & Chakma, 2005). Her family did not own any cultivable land. Two of her six brothers worked on other people’s land as day

labor. “Unlike her brothers and sisters, Kalpana was fortunate enough to receive the support . . . to enable her to continue her studies. At the time of her abduction she was a under graduate student at Baghaichari Kachalong College and lived with her two brothers, sister-in-law and her elderly mother, who was a widow” (Green-Hill, & Chakma, 2005).

Kalpana was engaged in her personal capacity. Allegation of love affair is a personal matter and that cannot be linked with the criminal act of abduction. It would have been justified if the culpable activity of Lt. Ferdous was brought to the regular course of law. Once that was compromised the issue of impunity surfaced. It is immaterial whether the act had an institutional approval or it was a private wrong doing. The State has its responsibility to try and show its positive intension. The case signifies the unwillingness of the authority in dealing with the issue. This is a kind of gesture that was apparent due to non-publishing the report of the inquiry committee. The whole population of the country despite their ethnic and political affiliation was united to learn the truth of fact. But the disjuncture between the GoB's response and people's demand is critical to perceive the BAF's role in counter insurgency work. Invoking the notion of national security cannot be an excuse for justifying such criminal act.

The danger of dealing the internal security matters with heavy handed military response thus recalls inappropriateness of the approach. The particular example shows the unclear chapter of activities of security forces during the time of conflict in the CHT. Mr. C¹⁵ viewed:

“[o]f course the overlapping of military approach and development engagement, which can be termed as apparently human security approach, has failed to act effectively in the conflict” (Interviewed on February 16, 2010).

Such acknowledgment of failure from the members within the BAF shows the poor approach to the CHT affair.

D. Critical Learning from the Incidents: It was not rare to witness such human rights violation by the BAF or by Jumma insurgent groups in CHT. The BAF's mandate to promote the peace in CHT demands in such case- transparent investigation

¹⁵ The interviewee is a member of the BAF and requested not to disclose his name.

and exemplary intervention of court system to bring the perpetrator to justice. GoB has failed to respond in desired manner in the case of Kalpana's abduction. However, the incident provides significant following learning-

i. Not applying the Due Legal Process Escalate the Insecurity: The Kalpana case shows the authority has taken neither pre-inquiry nor post-inquiry initiative to try the culprit in the law court. The whole issue of counter insurgency in the CHT shall be clearly distinguished from the criminality. The Kalpana case was a criminal act conducted under the umbrella of undeclared impunity. The attempt to save the perpetrator was potential for human rights violation. We have seen the formation of inquiry committee after a popular demand, which should be done normally. The report of inquiry was neither published nor even any action taken followed by the inquiry. Such action intensifies mistrust and pushed for escalation of violence. Eventually weaken the democratic institutions in CHT.

ii. Lack of Gender Rights Sensitivity in Prevailing: The gender aspect of the abduction and post-abduction responses was entirely neglected. The gender sensitivity was shown very poorly among the security force and in the society of CHT. Ms. Kalpana herself wrote:

“on the one hand (the woman faces) the steam roller of rape, torture, sexual harassment, humiliation and conditions of helplessness inflicted by the military and Bengalis, and on the other hand, she faces the curse of social and sexual discrimination and a restricted lifestyle” (Guhathakurta, 1997).

The abduction of Kalpana was labeled as an incident of love with Lt. Ferdous. Regrettably, the incident was never been considered from a gender angle. Though the women and human rights organisation meant to initiate a campaign but it was never reached to the targeted security force.

iii. Nonfunctioning of Human Security Approach by the BAF: The incident shows the inapplicability of human security approach by the security forces dealing the anti-insurgency activities. The human security approach or the mandate for the local development was never clear in the deployment of army in the CHT during the height of the insurgency. Army has taken its engagement as a counter insurgency operation responding the activities of *Santi Bahini*, mainly since 1976. Though it was

a military operation but there was a component for participating in local development activities. The development work in the CHT was neither communicated with locals nor jointly conducted with civil authorities. Such disconnection had created the divisive environment that negates human security involvement. The security forces were not trained with such orientation. Only trained to act in a disciplined manner does not raise the scope for human security application, particularly during the anti-insurgency activities.

iv. Lack of Democratic Practice can be an Escalating Factor: The poor response from the authority during and the post abduction period shows that the democratic practice was not present. The security force as a government agency had failed to demonstrate their accountability in the Kalpana case. It seems from the fact that the activities of Kalpana demanding accountability were not recognised. Sajjad explained this in Special Supplement of Kalpana by the *Daily New Age* as:

“by demanding accountability and raising the plight of the Jumma people, she (Kalpana) had joined the ranks of leaders, Bengali and non-Bengali before her, who had wanted Bangladesh to be one that was accepting of differences. Her disappearance signifies how far we have yet to go before we can truly call ourselves a democratic nation” (Sajjad, 2010).

The true democracy can never afford unchecked security forces in their action. The BAF's response in Kalpana case was not encouraging to create positive relationship with the people and clearly against democratic practice. Typically, the anti-insurgency involvement was commanded and controlled by the army command. The working relationship among the BAF and the democratic institutions were not visual at the Kalpana's entire case. It is very unclear that who works under whom. Certainly the example shows the local democratic institutions were not in any superior or parallel working relationship with the BAF and that contributed for the poor democratic practices in the whole incident.

5.6.2 Example Two: BAF in Internal Security and State of the Local Government

This case study is of post Peace Accord military involvement in CHT, which is not contributing for improvement of democratic conditionality. The subject of the example is a Jumma individual who was killed allegedly by army personal while subjected by confused factional conflict. It shows how military can be engaged in matter that is potential for escalating the conflict rather reducing it. The role of army has not been clear enough to ascertain their task in a period when the major focus would be to constructively engage with people and increase the healing process. As a negative example this case shows that the working modality of the military in the CHT is entirely out of the control of the civilian authority that leads the security forces to act independently. Such response is potential for negatively impacting on the local government and deteriorating democratic practice.

A. Introduction: The post Peace Accord phase of CHT is full of confusion and mistrust among the acting parties. The government is pressured to withdraw the armed forces from three CHT districts still feels the importance of continuing their presence due to ongoing tension among factions¹⁶ of Jumma movement as well as strain relation between the Pahari and the Bangali settlers. Often military got involves in these tensions as active party. Though the Peace Treaty of 1997 has promised to ensure local participation but slow realisation of the treaty is

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There are different groups active in CHT. The Chakma movement is also divided. Though abuses are perpetrated against Jumma as well as Bangali population, by Bangladesh security forces, Bengali settlers and the opposing forces of the Jumma community's warring political groups, the *Parbattya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti* (Chittagong Hill Tracts People's Solidarity Association) and the *United People's Democratic Front* or UPDF (the UPDF formed as a break away movement from the *Parbattya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti* in opposition to the *Parbattya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti's* acceptance of the terms of the 1997 Chittagong Hills Tracts Peace Accord). An overview of the available information follows in reverse chronological order (for background information on the manner in which Chakmas have found themselves on both sides of the *Parbattya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti–United People's Democratic Front* conflict, see 'Infighting kills 100 "Chakmas" in 5 years' 2005, *Bangladesh Observer*, 24 October. [Online] Available at <<http://www.bangladeshobserveronline.com/new/2003/10/24/city.htm>> [Accessed 31 May 2005]

causing serious concern among the people at the CHT. Incidents of human rights violation and fighting among the tribal groups are taking place on regular basis. Often that involves military. Instead of focusing on the development activities armed forces are still consolidating internal security through military means and that is leaving innocent victim. Top of that the military is having little of zero civilian scrutiny over their activities. So it leads the security agency violating the norms of its engagement. In this case, a 30 years old man Mr. Tarun Kusum Chakma, an active supporter of the *Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti*, was one of the victims. It is reported by some groups that he was shoot dead by the security force and others claimed that he was killed by rival Chakma faction. According to the Indigenous Portal; a pro *Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti* site:

“on 26 June 2009 Mr. Tarun, an innocent Jumma youth was shot dead by the military forces of Shuvalong camp of 6 Bengal led illegibly by Major Jakir/Manjur in Shuvalong, 30 kms off the district town, under Barkal upazila in Rangamati district” (Indigenous Portal, 2009).

Several national and international organisations have expressed their protest and demanded justice¹⁷. According to the World Organisation against Torture, earlier in the day, Mr. Tarum Kusum had been detained and released due to lack of evidence against him. His body was found with a broken neck, several wounds, and bullet injuries on his leg and scrotum (World Organisation against Torture, 2009). Mostly evidence about the death was due to shoot. As a matter of fact the role of military becomes critical in pursuing peaceful way to settle the conflict in the CHT. The BAF's role to assist civil administration in maintaining law and order and helping in development activities are often overshadowed by the engagement in human rights abuse.

¹⁷ Among the organizations- Indigenous Portal at <http://www.indigenousportal.com/Urgent/URGENT-ACTION-Extra-Judicial-Killing-by-the-Military-Forces-at-Shuvalong-in-Rangamati-Bangladesh.html>; Bangladesh Institute of Human Rights (BIHR) at <http://www.bihar-bihr.blogspot.com>; and the International Secretariat of the World Organisation Against Torture are three examples.

B. Description of the Incident: There is conflicting information about the incident. The pro *Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti* organisations describe military as the only perpetrator but others said the incident as a result of conflict between two Chakma factions. On the other hand, the security force denies their role in the incident. According to World Organisation Against Torture:

“[o]n Friday 26 June 2009 around 09:30, as he (Mr. Tarun) was headed towards Shuvalong Bazaar for marketing, he was detained and handed over to the Shuvalong military camp for interrogation, reportedly by members of a rival political party. Having found no evidence to detain him during interrogation, the military released him” (World Organisation against Torture, 2009).

This is clear that Mr. Tarun was detained by the rival Chakma faction. It further mentioned that as he returned to the Bazaar, Mr. Tarun Kusum Chakma was pursued once again. He jumped into the lake near the Shuvalong forest outpost in an attempt to escape, but was pursued by a group of soldiers, led by a Warrant Officer and Corporal of 6 Bengal, and other men in two boats. The army repeatedly shot at him as he reached land, causing bullet injuries on his leg and scrotum. His body was found near Shuvalong Bazaar. Photos of his body also show evidence of torture, including a broken neck and severe wounds (World Organisation against Torture, 2009).

On the other hand, the pro BAF's media mentioned that “the army variously claimed that Mr. Tarun Kusum Chakma was killed while leading an armed group in terrorist activities, in an attack on military forces, or by a rival group” (World Organization against Torture, 2009). Some witnesses and tribal organizations contradict the official versions of explanation. However, the people at the market who witnessed the event at the time of the incident explain that Mr. Tarun Kusum Chakma was caught by rival Chakma group in the market without any provocation and handed over to the army. In an interview the younger brother of the victim Mr. Palash Chakma claimed that Mr. Tarun was not involved in any kind of terrorist activity. He argues about the innocence of Mr. Tarun and stressed that he was not involved in any armed group (Interviewed by World Organisation against Torture).

The Indigenous Portal mentioned in its Call for Action that “he was an innocent youth and used to earning by day labour or by collection of forest products

for family survival . . . he was active supporter of *Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti* for implementation of the CHT Accord” (Indigenous Portal, 2009). About the incident the same Portal stated that a group of members of United People’s Democratic Front, an anti-Accord terrorist organisation, with the help of Mintu Bikash Chakma (who is familiar as Bhumihin Mintu), caught Tarun Kusum Chakma while he got down Shuvalong Bazaar from a steamer at around 9.30 am. Then he was handed over to Shuvalong camp authority after heavily torture labeling him as miscreant. The Indigenous Portal mentioned:

“[c]amp authority released him found nothing after interrogation. Again, United People’s Democratic Front men tried to catch him when he reached at Bazaar after getting release from army custody. Having no alternative to save his life, he tried to escape from United People’s Democratic Front attack and jumped over the lake (Kaptai Lake) near Shuvalong forest outpost. At that time, a group of army . . . and a group of United People’s Democratic Front men ran after him by two separate boats when he was swimming for escaping” (Indigenous Portal, 2009).

The Portal explained the role of United People’s Democratic Front and stated that ‘Mr. Elen Chakma, who was arrested during the incident, was claimed as member of the United People’s Democratic Front in a press release by Shantidev Chakma, chief of Rangamati district. Shantidev mentioned that “Elen went there to help army to catch the victim and the army mistakenly arrested him” (Indigenous Portal, 2009). Thus the information from various sources had conflicting description about the incident but one thing is common that every source admit the involvement of the United People’s Democratic Front and the BAF in the killing.

C. Learning for the Facts: The example of killing of Mr. Chakma is a post Accord incident that also involves the BAF. The critical aspect of the example shows the impact of the internal tribal grouping where the army’s involvement makes it complex. However, in total, the role of the local government or civil authority is equally absent as of the earlier example of pre-Accord incident of human rights violation. Thus the example shows the army’s involvement to protect the law and

order in CHT hardly benefits the democratic institutes. In addition to that following issues could be mentioned as learnings from the example.

i. Rivalry among Factions Aggravating Conflict: There are severe conflicts among the conflicting parties of Jumma factions. The pro and anti-Peace Accord groups of the Jumma movement are creating severe terror among the population. The conflict between the *Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti* and *United People's Democratic Front* is often aggravated by different local interest groups. The Bengali settlers are also divided among party line. Thus the situation remains confused. While the Hill District Councils is not strong enough to dictate the development as well as security agenda the security forces are taking the upper hand. It is not clear who is the ultimate game maker in the CHT. In such situation the factions are causing uncertainty on the development and security situation. Most of the violence among these factions has its root either in the political control, land issue or taking bribe from the developmental contract. The assertive fact of the rivalry between the factions was the reason behind the tragic death of Mr. Tarun.

ii. Negative Impact of the BAF's Presence in CHT: According to Article 17 (a) of the Accord- "after signing of the agreement between the government and the *Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti* and immediately after the return of the *Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti* members to normal life, all the temporary camps of military, Ansar and Village Defence Party shall be taken back to permanent installations . . ." (CHT Peace Accord, 1997). There was a commitment to withdraw temporary military presence from CHT. The BAF would be assisting the local government during normal and emergency situation upon request. However, the BAF's presence in bigger camps, boarder areas, and potential danger areas is an unsolved issue in the implementation of the Accord. Government is reluctant to withdraw the Army from CHT. Mr. Razi, a security specialist, mentioned in his interview that "the situation is now critical as government is showing it's interest for the implementation of the Accord but cannot fully withdraw the Army without having full cease of conflict, which is not the case at the moment" (Interviewed on February 23, 2010). Due to the BAF's presence the local affairs are influenced by the position of the army and civil authority remains ineffective.

iii. Ineffective Role of Military to Promote Law and Order: The CHT Peace Accord provides the direction of involvement of the Army for the promotion of law and order situation but that would be under the local administration. Article 17 (a) provides:

“in case of deterioration of the law and order situation, natural calamity and such other works the army can be deployed under the civil administration like all other parts of the country as per relevant laws and rules. In this case, the Regional Council may, according to the necessity or time, request the proper authority for the purpose of getting assistance” (GoB, 1997).

The complimentary relationship between the security force and civil administration is not the case in the CHT. The local government is mixed Bengali and Jumma with whom the BAF can work though there is not many example of such involvement in CHT. But the difficult part is the special nature of the CHT regional administration. The regional body holds a special authority about their affairs and they can dictate the operation direction for BDF. Since the leadership of the regional administration was related with the former insurgents it is very unlikely that they would be allowing the BAF's assistance in any affairs in the CHT. Recent review from the Indigenous Portal explain their view on the BAF's involvement in law and order protection by stating that “the army was entrusted responsibility to combat law and order situation by imposing de facto military rule *Operation Uttoron* in 2001. Consequently, the military forces continue having the negative attitude toward the CHT and indigenous Jumma people” (Indigenous Portal, 2009). The mutual negative perception is likely to bar the BAF's natural involvement in law and order protection task in the CHT.

iv. Land is the Heart of the Conflict: Most of the post Accord violent conflicts are taking place for the possession of land. The conflict of interest among different Jumma factions is influencing the land disputes. Some locals claim that the killing of Tarun is an example of such conflict of interest. What this implies is the role of army in solving such claim because they often become party of such disputes naming it as security issue. Though the BAF is supposed to hand over the land they are using to the civil authority. According to the Article 17 (b) of the Peace Accord: “the lands of camps and cantonments to be abandoned by military or para-military

forces shall be either returned to the original owners or to the Hill District Councils” (CHT Peace Accord, 1997). But such commitment is yet to be in reality. The land issue is influencing the overall conflict in CHT. Some Jumma groups are claiming absolute rights over land as their ancestral property. They claim ownership over the lands distributed to the settlers and Jumma returnees. Often such claim causes serious violent conflict. In some instances the BAF involvement in the conflict has resulted adversely to the peace.

D. Conclusion: In a conclusion it can be said that the chances of recurrent of such incident remains high unless the role of the BAF in the CHT gets a clearer and transparent mandate. Any hard-line approach, such as death of Mr. Tarun is neither benefiting the role of maintaining law and order nor helping the BAF to achieve a positive image among the local population. An inclusive approach from the authority needs to bring the conflicting parties closer by removing the gaps. To do it bringing the BAF and the civil authority in a single fold will definitely speedup the process. Crucially, in the total narrative the role of civil-political authority is missing. It gives a perspective that the BAF is acting of its own. Involvement of the BAF in activities of nontraditional security needs an overseeing body from the civil-political authority or at least the civil authority shall be in control over the affair of the BAF. In the CHT the BAF is still conducting their task relatively free from civilian control and that is still continuing even after the Peace Accord. Such feature of the BAF’s involvement in nontraditional security task is neither helping empowering democratic institute nor promoting the integration of human security principles and objectives into national policy.

5.7 The BAF’s Involvement to Maintain Internal Security

The CHT had been a major internal security challenge for Bangladesh with its earlier character of threat against sovereignty. According to Islam, “those aware of the country's history know only too well that when the separatist *Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti* and its armed wing *Shanti Bahini's* activists posed as a threat to the solidarity of the nation, the government had to deploy the armed forces in the CHT region” (Islam, 2005). He argued army’s sacrifice has foiled the armed movement,

following which the Peace Accord was signed with *Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti*. Thus the key policy position of security force about the conflict in the CHT was conducting anti-insurgency operation. There is argument that the scale of insurgency was added by the external support from the neighboring India (Chowdhury, H., 2002). The BAF uses it to justify the massive build-up in the CHT. It is mentioned that “the justification for the massive military build-up in the CHT was that it was needed to counter and contain insurgency activities of the *Shanti Bahini*” (Angle Fire, 2006). With the huge presence of the BAF in the CHT their task and responsibilities are varied depending the nature and situation of their deployment, which remain in nearly similar even after the Accord.

A. Post Accord BAF's Presence in the CHT: Continuing presence of the BAF in the CHT is the salient features of the government response to the CHT matters (Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti, 2010). However, in official term military presence in post Accord period is only to ensure security at the region (GoB, 1997). However, the pre Accord BAF presence was to deal with the insurgency and it functioned under the command of the height authority. About the present command structure for the CHT the BAF mentioned that “the 24th Infantry Division of the army is in charge of the CHT. The overall command for the CHT is with the General Officer Commanding in the Chittagong Cantonment in Chittagong town” (Bangladesh Army, 2011). The BAF's presence was extended and prepared to deal with the insurgency. The army had four Brigade Headquarters in the CHT: Rangamati, Khagrachari and Dighinala in the north and Bandarban in the south. There were garrisons in Ruma and Alikadam in the south and there were army base camps in each Upazilla Headquarters in the CHT as well as in various villages (Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti, 2008). There was naval base at Kaptai. The Boarder Guard Bangladesh's task of controlling the border and check illegal crossings was added by counter-insurgency under the command of the General Officer Commanding. Finally the civil security force, such as the Police in the CHT was also involved in counter-insurgency activities under the command of the General Officer Commanding. The last unit of paramilitary force the Ansar was also responsible for counter insurgency activities in the CHT are monitored by the General Officer Commanding. The following table shows the

extended presence of the BAF in the CHT that continued even after the signing of the Accord.

Table 5.1: Size of Armed Force Deployment in CHT (Bangladesh Adivasi Resource Center, 2011)

Name of the BAF's Wing	Units	# of Personnel
Army	24th Infantry Division	80,000 personnel
Bangladesh Rifles	6 Battalions	25,000
Ansars	4 Battalions	8,000
Navy	1 Battalion	1,500
Total		114,500

From the BAF sources the CHT Commission gathered that there are over 230 army camps, more than 100 Bangladesh Rifles camps and over 80 police camps in the CHT. The military deployment in CHT is heavy¹⁸ and understandably it has its own consequence. In a recent report *Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti* claims that thirty-one army camps out of 543 have so far been taken back. But the government claims that more than two hundred camps have been dismantled. It mentioned:

“[f]ollowing the formation of a new government by the grand alliance a total of 35 camps including a brigade were withdrawn. . . . it (1973 Order of Army Deployment) was replaced with Operation Uttoran (Operation Upliftment) on 1 September 2001 in the post-Accord period. As a result, the army continues to involve itself in the civil administration hindering normalcy from returning” (Bangladesh Adivasi Resource Center, 2011).

¹⁸ The *Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti* mentioned that – the earlier reports on the CHT have estimated the military strength from 30,000 in 1981 (one third of all the regular troops in Bangladesh) to 120,000 in 1984 (including para-military and police forces). Military handbooks such as *Military Balance* (1989/90), *Military Technology* (1989) and *Military Powers* (1990) estimate the number of army personnel in Bangladesh as varying between 80,000 and 90,000 (excluding navy and air force) plus 55,000 to 80,000 para-military forces (including armed police). If these figures are accurate, the sum of 80,000 army personnel in the 24th Division seems too high.

Actually a Philippine based report claimed that “an order issued in 1973 for clamping military administration in the CHT has in effect never been rescinded” (Bang-oa, 2004). However, the continuation of the larger BAF presence cannot be explained as a reason for maintaining peace or development initiative. Since the peace and development work is primarily the responsibility of the civil authority, just to assist that work the excessive BAF presence is clearly disconnected. Rather it raises the argument that continuation of BAF's presence in the CHT is not only for keeping internal peace but also to protect any potential threat for renewed violence.

B. The BAF's Role to Protect Internal Security: The current state of debate on internal security and insurgency is somehow confusing. Saha argued that starting from the Peace Accord the complicity has grown (Saha, 2003). The BAF defends itself for such confusing situation in the CHT. Mr. D¹⁹, a member of the BAF mentioned:

“the confusion is not because of the role of the BAF but the associate political agenda in the CHT is playing the underlying role. Though there are claims to implement the Accord for ensuring internal peace but the total implementation of the Accord is legally impossible” (Interviewed on February 18, 2010).

Chowdhury introduced other factors in the discussion and argued that the role and inter-relationship among the different state agencies and local population was not clearly demonstrated in the current peace structure (Chowdhury, K., 2008). With this reality the peace in the CHT is far to reach so does the application of the policies associated with human security. Researcher Guhathakurta added other complicacies and wrote that the modality of the promotional development task and protection of the law and order in the CHT is not properly defined (Guhathakurta, 2004). To unveil the true features and appropriateness of the BAF's nontraditional security engagement in the CHT the entire scope of the BAF engagement needs to be assessed. It is still the Standing Order of 1973 and the *Operation Uttaron* is the basis for the BAF's engagement. Both the instrument guides the BAF to work for nontraditional security but gives main priority for the anti-insurgency task.

¹⁹ The interviewee is a member the BAF and requested not to disclose name

Thus the BAF in the CHT is still working against insurgency. So the critical factor to assess BAF's role is not the direction but the approach of BAF's involvement. Mr. W²⁰, a member of Bangladesh Navy explained:

“the approach of the BAF operation against insurgency includes maintaining internal security as well as assisting development activities. These two operations are not similar but complement each other” (Interviewed on March 18, 2011).

Ms. H²¹, a law professor, emphasises on the counter-insurgency role of the BAF. But her view defines more about the real engagement of the BAF. She expressed:

“the BAF are clearly mandated for the counter-insurgency activities in CHT. Despite the Accord the growing tension within the Jumma groups as well as safety of settlers concern the GoB. There is also a real gap of trust. So the government believes the components of insurgency are still there, fewer but real. So there is an overlapping role by the BAF in the CHT” (Interviewed on March 10, 2010).

The overlapping indicates that unless a sustainable peace would be restored in the CHT, the scope of BAF's involvement remains critically confusing. The fact shows that it is mainly the counter insurgency role that the BAF is playing the CHT covered by its role terming to assist the civilian administration to protect the law and order. The development intervention is characterised as human security approach hardly matches as the persistent nature of the BAF's involvement in the CHT.

5.8 Features of the BAF's Development Involvement

The BAF's development involvement is an inspirational activity for the locals. Saha viewed as a tool to maintain peace. He mentioned that the BAF's development involvement allows maintaining the statuesque of peace (Saha, 2003). Ms. Banu, a CHT resident, analysed the issue from a military tactics. She mentioned:

²⁰ The interviewee is a member the BAF and requested not to disclose name.

²¹ The interviewee mentioned several issues which goes against the security apparatus and requested not to disclose his name.

“participation in development activities in the CHT is a military tactics. That is to support peace and promoting avenue to maintain law and order. Maintaining law and order is an approach that closely associated with human security is a subsidiary task and not the core approach of the BAF in the CHT” (Interviewed on March 10, 2010).

The BAF obviously explains its role purely for promoting and protecting people's rights. According to the BAF, “the development of roads and communication is one priority that provides access to remote areas. Such access helps to maintain law and order situation” (Bangladesh Army, 2011). The argument underlines the principle role of the BAF in the CHT is to allowing them to maintain the peace. Whether such task is for counter-insurgency or just maintaining law and order is a policy issue of the authority but that is not mentioned in its official term.

The scope of development intervention is having significantly contributes for resolve the conflict but hardly addresses the root causes. Mr. H²², worked extensively on the CHT issue, explained:

“most of the GoB's development plans in the CHT and its realisation have BAF's stake. Either they are part of the planning or part of the implementation, where they hardly consult with the civil authority. Meaning the entire development task has its own security explanation. Unfortunately, the development task hardly addresses the causes of the conflict” (Interviewed on March 10, 2010).

From the nature of the development activity the real purpose of it is hard to explain. However, the security specialist Mr. Razi favored the view that the development improves the human security of the CHT population, but he linked it with the motivation of the BAF. He explained:

“the development activities in the CHT obviously addresses the human security needs of the people but the main motivation of the BAF to do the structural development is to ensure it's communication access to the remote part of the CHT. The access

²² The interviewee mentioned several issues which goes against the security apparatus and requested not to disclose his name.

will hugely increase the BAF's capability to counter any potential reemergence of insurgency" (Interviewed on February 23, 2010).

This argument is critically important as it shows the BAF has pursuing its previous counter insurgency approach but shows as development involvement.

The end benefit of such involvement is always a debatable issue. Chittagong Hill Tracts Development Facility viewed that nothing harm from such involvement because it is helping the tribal to improve their socio-economic condition (Chittagong Hill Tracts Development Facility, 2010b). However, such involvement is potential to jeopardise the BAF's qualification for nontraditional security involvement and contravene the trust building among the population in the CHT.

5.9 The BAF's Involvement in the CHT and Democratic Institution

The BAF conducts development activities isolating the civil-political administration, which is inflicts negative consequence on the democratic practice at the local level. Chowdhury wrote that the BAF is involved in the CHT under a strict command structure (Chowdhury, H., 2002). The strict command structure makes the BAF pursue only the task ordered by the command. In this case the development task or the task for the protection of law and order is the order of the command. How that affects democratic institutions is a complex issue since it is related with the peculiar security situation in the CHT. The issue of influencing democratic institutions needs to be considered with the perspective of wider democratic practice in Bangladesh related with the CHT matters. Bangladesh's democracy still does not acknowledge the challenges of a multiethnic nation. The pluralistic politics have not been developed in Bangladesh. Lack of political recognition of the Jumma in the mainstream obviously shapes the institutional mindset of the BAF. Ms. A²³, a member of BAF viewed the same and said:

“the mainstream political response towards the Jumma movement is neither inclusive nor complete. Thus the BAF does not have any clue of political stand on the issue. However, the common position of all

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The interviewee is a member of the BAF and requested not to disclose her name.

political parties is against the insurgency” (Interviewed on February 12, 2010).

Saha also thinks similar and wrote that the common position gives the BAF a stronger motivation for their extended presence (Saha, 2003). This perception is critical to understand the impacts of the BAF's involvement in the CHT.

Gain believed that the main priority for the CHT comes due to the nature of the CHT conflict as threats the national security (Gain, 2000). Mr. D²⁴, a member of the BAF explained similar by saying that:

“the BAF's takes the CHT issue from national security perspective. So the influence on the democratic institute due to the BAF's nontraditional security involvement is not a core consideration at least in the CHT case” (Interviewed on February 18, 2010).

Meaning it is unrealistic to expect positive influence on democratic institutions, local civil administration, or even local government in the CHT from the BAF's involvement in development or protection of law and order, which are connected with nontraditional security involvement.

Arguably the democratic practices in the CHT are not yet receiving enough institutional support. This is even true at the national level. Once the democratic issues elated with the CHT is considered the matter receives different treatment. In the CHT the democratic practices are poor in standard. Ms. Chak, a Jumma resident of CHT, indicated mutual mistrust among the local authority and military agencies in the CHT is causing such poor democratic performance. She explained:

“the working relationship between the BAF and local government is relative negative in CHT. There is a component of suspicion against some local government leadership. The BAF never considers the Jumma leadership as genuine democratic actor. So the security apparatus feels less confident to work with them” (Interviewed on September 20, 2010).

Guhathakurta introduced another dimension in the discussion. She mentioned that there is lack of democracy in the local politics in the CHT (Guhathakurta, 2004). The

²⁴ The interviewee is a member of the BAF and requested not to disclose his name.

traditional leadership is now shaping as democratic leadership in the CHT, which does not have the real root as democratic process. Moreover, such undemocratic system is recognised by the Accord (GoB, 1997). This generic argument about the fragmented democracy in existing political and administrative setup of the CHT also resonate supremacy of certain section of the society over the rest. There is the absolute domination by the unelected chief and the process has hardly any scope of free expression of ordinary Jumma people. As for the intra-Jumma dynamics the overwhelming control by the Chakma is not reflecting the democratic practice either. The BAF's involvement in nontraditional security activities has very little to offer in this context. However, the BAF's support to the local government in the CHT can be argued as a positive tribute for democratic practice at the local level. But this supporting role of the BAF is basically limited by the development activities, which again neither guided nor planned by the local government. Thus the BAF's mandate to involve with civilian authority in pursuing development activities is hardly visual in practice. Mr. Rahman, a member of local government, explained:

“the BAF can support the local civil and political authority for the realization of development work and protecting internal peace. But in practice, the BAF is not accountable to its local civil-political counterpart. As a result this involvement has hardly any positive attribution for improving democratic condition” (Interviewed on September 22, 2010).

However, the government claims very different. GoB's view is that improve local government communication and assisting development works are army's direct support for the local government (GoB, 1997). The analysis and interview shows that the BAF is neither consults with the local government nor includes them in the implementation of any nontraditional security activities in CHT. Such practice left hardly any room for improving the local democratic institute. As a result the BAF gets stronger in the socio-political term, which makes harder for the BAF to disengage from the political affairs.

5.10 Chapter Conclusion

The involvement of the BAF in the CHT cannot be claimed matches with the principle and objectives of human security. The practice from its pre-Accord counter insurgency operation is somehow playing a role in their present role for the internal security and development. Though the reality of the CHT has tremendous national implication but the pressing socio-cultural needs are purely in human security nature. Those were also the cause of the conflict. The BAF is involved in several of such human security related security improvement and development task (Mamun, 2011). The chapter describes that those involvements also find various motivations which are distinct from human security reasoning. The crucial aspect of the BAF's engagement in CHT is its working modality that enables them to work independent from the civilian authority. Such involvement is neither creating positive impact for the civil-political institutions nor enhancing the democratic conditionality at the local level. As a negative case study this chapter has provided the analogical perspective that BAF's involvement in activities associated with human security principles and objectives itself does not necessarily influence the military disengagement as well as fail to greater integration of human security principles and objectives at the national level. Rather it is a depended factors predominantly explained by the modality of its engagement. With this understanding the next Chapter brings another case of the BAF's involvement in activity associated with human security principles and objectives, which is the peacekeeping. As a conceit example of working under the civilian authority the case is to analyse the impacts generated from the BAF's peacekeeping in disengaging from the politics.

CHAPTER VI

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE BANGLADESH ARMED FORCE'S PARTICIPATION IN UN PEACEKEEPING AND MILITARY DISENGAGEMENT FROM POLITICS IN BANGLADESH

6.1 Chapter Introduction

The previous two chapters have analysed two significant cases of the BAF's nontraditional security involvement within the national territory of Bangladesh. It is shown that, depending on the working modality with civil authority, the impacts of the two types of nontraditional security involvements are different. This chapter describes another form of nontraditional security involving the BAF outside Bangladesh. The peacekeeping role of the BAF is well-recognised and provides the BAF with opportunities to be involved in real life situations to implement its nontraditional security role. During peacekeeping the BAF serves to address purely nontraditional security concerns, especially those are associated with human security principles and objectives. This chapter assesses the BAF's opportunity to be oriented with human security principles and objectives through working with civil-political authorities during peacekeeping. It is important to note that in peacekeeping the BAF's own national political interest has no influence. Thus it can be claimed that the BAF's actions in peacekeeping are not motivated by the possibility of political gain. In this context, this chapter analyses whether the BAF's post peacekeeping involvement critically reflects its experience from the peacekeeping; hence supports the natural political process to be continued without intervention from the BAF. With factual evidence this chapter analyses the critical link between the BAF's peacekeeping involvement and military disengagement in Bangladesh that eventually encourages the integration of human security principles and objectives into national policy.

6.2 Concept of Peacekeeping Operation and Its Mandate

Peacekeeping as defined by UN is “an operation . . . without enforcement power” (UN, 1991: 4). Wall argued “because UN peacekeeping is an evolving concept that emerged in the field, finding an all-encompassing definition of UN peacekeeping is almost impossible” (Diehl, *et al.*, 1998: 34). The idea of peacekeeping has been changing its form and shape since the establishment of the UN on October 24, 1945. Although there is no explicit mentioning of peacekeeping in the UN Charter, the very purpose of establishment of the UN was explained in the Charter “[t]o save succeeding generations from the scourge of war” and to “maintain international peace and security” (UN Charter, 1945).

The Department of Peace Keeping Operation mentioned that the Charter gives the UN Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security (Department of Peace Keeping Operation, 2007). In fulfilling this responsibility, the “Security Council may adopt a range of measures, including the establishment of a United Nations Peacekeeping Operation” (Department of Peace Keeping Operation, 2009: 13). The UN Security Council time to time establishes such missions through its resolutions. Peacekeeping has a clear mandate not only from the UN but also from other international legal sources. The UN Charter of 1945, which is the foundation of all UN work, has been the main reference to describe the legitimacy of peacekeeping. According to the Charter one of its main purposes “is to maintain international peace and security” (UN Charter, 1945). The peacekeeping is designed considering its legitimacy from the UN Charter. However, the legal mandate for peacekeeping can be analysed under following heads:

A. Charter Based Mandate: There is no explicit provision for peacekeeping in the UN Charter. However, peacekeeping has evolved into one of the main tools used by the United Nations to achieve its purpose (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2008: 9). Thus the Charter goal can be realised by peacekeeping. The Charter gives primary responsibility¹ to maintain

¹ Although the United Nations Charter gives primary responsibility to the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security, General Assembly resolution 377 (V) of 3 November 1950, also known as the “Uniting for Peace” resolution, recommended in case of UN Security Council’s failure to take action for maintaining peace- ‘*the General Assembly shall consider the matter*

international peace and security to the UN Security Council. The UN Guideline for peacekeeping explains that the legal basis for such action is found in Chapters VI (Pacific Settlement of Disputes), VII and VIII of the Charter. Chapter VII contains provisions related to “Action with Respect to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression”. These provisions of the Charter have provided an indirect mandate for peacekeeping.

B. International Humanitarian Laws: International humanitarian laws, known as the “law of war” or the “law of armed conflict,” are comprised in the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and two Additional Protocols of 1977. Collectively, they give legal means and methods for peacekeeping. According to the Secretary-General, the fundamental principles of international humanitarian law may be applicable to United Nations peacekeepers (United Nations, 1999).

C. UN Security Council Mandate: Peacekeepers are deployed on the basis of a mandate from the UN Security Council which passes resolutions on specific issues/situations. Security Council mandates differ from situation to situation, depending on the nature of the conflict and the specific challenges it presents which is also the normative framework of international law (Department of Peace Keeping Operation, 2008: 15). So the protection of basic rights and security of humans provides a legitimate objectivity to peacekeeping.

The UN explains the characteristics of peacekeeping as “an operation involving military personnel, but without enforcement powers, undertaken by the United Nations to help maintain or restore international peace and security in areas of conflict” (UN, 1991: 4). This basic premise allows human security involvement from its earlier inception. The UN Security Council’s definition of peacekeeping “involving military personnel, but without enforcement powers” has also extended the idea. Uesugi argued:

“[e]ven such a broad definition no longer reflects the reality of peacekeeping. The most remarkable defect of this definition concerns the phrase ‘without enforcement powers’ (Uesugi, 2004: 99).

The 'United Nations Missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina' and the 'United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti' did not involve any military personnel. Arguably, in its strict sense of definition, these above mentioned missions may not be termed as peacekeeping operations. But the missions' objectives and scopes were peacekeeping proving the fact that UN peacekeeping has integrated a non-combative approach.

The peacekeeping force is traditionally composed of troops from UN member countries. However, the evolving nature of peacekeeping occasionally exposes the peacekeeper to combat engagement. In this regard William praises the evolving peacekeeping operations but is critical about the risk involved in any combat intervention (William, J., 1993). In the face of this argument, some security strategists are advocating the creation of a UN Army. Smith proposes a permanent standing UN Army with "rapid reaction capability" under the sole direct command of the UN (Smith, 2006). Another argument for a UN Army is that there could be situations needing combat involvement. In such situations any involvement of a national army might be risky for the nation and make it part of the conflict. Thus an independent UN Army receives a good support. It is also argued that peacekeepers need to be similarly oriented to meet emergency ground situations. A UN Army can gain such orientation through pre-mission training. Counter arguments against the formation of a UN Army are stronger. Most criticisms suggest that a standing army will only increase the U.N.'s appetite for precipitous involvement in conflicts. Sheehy suggested: "U.N. should concentrate on improving its traditional peacekeeping role following realistic and achievable objectives" (Sheehy, 1993). In this context, the UN needs to be innovative in balancing national policy imperatives with peacekeepers' mission goals and their need to complete specific missions successfully. This, however, can be achieved by appropriate pre-training. A UN Army would also involve a huge additional financial responsibility for the UN, which would be unlikely to be acceptable to major funding countries. Thus, peacekeeping by security forces from member countries remains the most viable response option for international security. One of the key objectives of peacekeeping is to carry on the mission learning to the troops sending country. Mission orientation not only helps the mission country but also has a positive attribution for the troops sending country. Robert stated that such approach to bring the mission learning to the national armed force gives leverage to reduce conflict in

the troops sending country (Robert, 1994). In other words, the peacekeepers bring back their learning on nontraditional security activities to their country. Thus peacekeeping works to promote peace and security in the mission country as well as in the peacekeepers' home country. This process eventually helps to promote the global peace. This critical scope is what impacts on the security establishment of the peacekeepers' country. In this way the orientation of the troops with non-combat approach associates with human security principles and objectives is potential for strengthening democratic practice at the peacekeepers' country.

6.3 Peacekeeping and Human Security

Peacekeeping is largely considered as non-combative to protect the international peace and security. Peacekeeping has increased in terms of numbers of peacekeepers, size and complexity. A Department of Peace Keeping Operation report stated in 2008:

“[b]eyond simply monitoring cease-fires, today’s multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations are called upon to facilitate the political process through the promotion of national dialogue and reconciliation, protect civilians, assist in the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of combatants, support the organisation of elections, protect and promote human rights, and assist in restoring the rule of law” (Department of Peace Keeping Operation, 2008: 6).

Berdal expressed a similar view and wrote that under the umbrella of UN protection, international peace and security is becoming ever more complex and challenging (Berdal, 1993). This extended form of peacekeeping is clearly a shift from earlier peacekeeping that responded to inter-state conflict. In recent years, however, peacekeeping has more often addressed conflicts within states, sometimes where governments no longer functioned. The UN Department of Public Information reported that “with the end of the cold war, peace-keeping operations have grown in number and complexity” (UN, 1996: 3). Robert explained the growth of peacekeeping is impacting how people live. He wrote that with the growth of peacekeeping its

potential to impact people's lives has also witnessed significant growth (Robert, 1994).

The extended scope of peacekeeping has generated a 'second generation' of peacekeeping operations which are multifunctional, with political, humanitarian, social and economic components to address peace in holistically (William, J., 1993). The UN report of 1992 titled by *An Agenda for Peace* recommended:

“United Nations must assist in a progression from conflict prevention, resolution and emergency assistance to reconstruction and rehabilitation, and then the economic and social development”
(UN, 1992)

This also reflects the idea of Norton and Weiss, who argued that “the strength of UN peacekeeping operations lies in their creative and spontaneous adaptation of general principles to a specific situation” (Norton, & Weiss, 1990: 25). To meet such changes, peacekeeping maintains flexibility. Fetherston considered that flexibility is due to avoiding institutionalisation of peacekeeping. He wrote that “the UN peacekeeping has avoided institutionalisation and that promotes flexibility” (Fetherston, 1994a: 124). The UN in 1985 described flexibility as necessary and stated that “they (peacekeepers) are a purely empirical creation born of necessity” (UN, 1985: 3). Thus the evolution of peacekeeping focuses on multifunctional involvement where flexibility in mission has generated increasing involvement associated with human security principles and objectives, such as trauma counseling of affected communities, supporting agricultural extension to ensure food security, and creating education and health opportunities in the mission area. These are the tasks not directly related to the mission mandate but help effective implementation of that mandate and are closely associated with human security principles and objectives.

6.3.1 Making, Peace Keeping, Peace Building, and Human Security

UN peacekeeping is one of the several activities undertaken by UN for the protection and promotion of human rights and international peace. It has evolved with time into peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace building. The inter-relationship between these associated concepts is inter-connected and hard to distinguish. UN efforts are usually classified as preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping,

peace-enforcement, or peace-building (Uesugi, 2004: 101). The Department of Peace Keeping Operation considered that peacekeeping has embodied the three concepts although those are also the steps of the operation. “To explain the peacekeeping requires match with three basic principles, i) consent of the conflicting parties, ii) impartiality of the UN peacekeeping force and iii) non-use of force, except in the self-defense” (Department of Peace Keeping Operation, 2008). The former UN secretary-general, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, has described the related concepts as follows:

i) **Peacemaking** is an action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations.

ii) **Peacekeeping** is a UN presence in the field to implement or monitor the implementation of arrangements relating to the control of conflicts.

iii) **Peace-building** means identifying and supporting measures and structures that will solidify peace (Ghali, 1992a: 11; 1994: 147; 1997: 68).




Figure 6.1: Inter-relationship of Peacemaking, Peacekeeping, and Peace-enforcement (Department of Peace Keeping Operation, 2008: 13)

The UN Department of Public Information has provided the above diagram to explain the inter-relationship between the concepts. True peace demands a combination of these approaches. This shows peacemaking, peace-enforcement and peacekeeping overlap but post-conflict peace-building requires peacemaking as the

essential approach. All the processes can ultimately cause a complete conflict transformation (William, J., 1993). The armed forces involved in peacekeeping are more involved in the post-ceasefire stage. Importantly, this is the stage where war participation is less the consideration than supporting continuing adherence to agreed terms of peace. During the post-ceasefire period the political process takes place, which provides better chance for the peaceful conflict transformation (William, J., 1993). Peacekeeping provides opportunities for troops to participate more in nontraditional security activities rather than fighting. Opportunities to work closely with the people and civilian authorities provide armed forces skills about activities associated with human security principles and objectives. Essentially, such involvement of peacekeepers works to prevent a reoccurrence of conflict (Robert, 1994). In another word, peacekeepers prevent the potential threats of reoccurrence of conflict by addressing the needs of the people. Involvement in peacekeeping also provides the best avenue for peacekeepers' countries to familiarise its armed forces with the essence of human security principles and objectives. As a result of such familiarity the armed forces respect and follow the civil-political authorities of the country, which encourages democratic practice.

6.3.2 The New Role in Peacekeeping and Human Security

The evolving role of peacekeeping has introduced human security principles and objectives. Although the traditional involvement of the peacekeeper is to monitor the peace treaty the new role includes peacekeepers working for the sustainability of the peace treaty. Fetherston considered the traditional role and stated that the general role of UN peacekeeper is to monitor a peace treaty or create a buffer zone between two conflicting parties (Fetherston, 1994a). But the traditional role does not include the activities involving the ordinary people where the peacekeeping is taking place.

Mr. D², a Bangladeshi peacekeeper, stated that “the traditional role hardly involves interaction with ordinary people addressing their development and security needs” (Interviewed on February 18, 2010). Berdal similarly commented that the new

² The interviewee is a member of the BAF and provided his opinion on many issues of the research. He requested not to disclose his name on the ground of sensitivity.

approach of peacekeeping involves more grassroots involvement (Berdal, 1993). “Since 1989 the United Nations has created forty-one new operations, but only three were sent to conflicts fought between states” (Uesugi, 2004: 97). In the context of growing intra-state conflicts the role of peacekeepers is also changing, bringing them closer to the people. William argued that new engagement in intra-state conflicts brings peacekeepers closer to the people’s needs and welfare (William, J., 1993). The so-called Brahimi Report (it was submitted to UN Secretary-General in 2000 by the Panel on UN Peace Operation) suggested recommendations reforming the traditional peacekeeping approach to include peace-building. By that peacekeepers are more exposed to humanitarian activities to ensure the human security of the people (Uesugi, 2004). Peacekeeping history has taught that peacekeepers and peace builders are inseparable partners in complex operations [UN Document (A/55/305-S/2000/809), 2000: 5]. It is in this integrated composition that most UN peacekeeping operations are associated with human security principles and objectives.

UN peacekeeper interposition between conflicting parties by monitoring cease-fires, and supervising the creation and functioning of buffer zones, thwarts potential threats of re-emerging conflict. Thus, peacekeeping strives to ensure freedom from fear for the people and offer a clear scope for human security involvement (Uesugi, 2004). James explained that “UN peacekeepers seek to defuse and then stabilise the conflict situation” (James, 1990: 4). The interposition role involves political effort and peace-building tasks. Yasushi Akashi explained the political aspects as ‘show windows’ for peace (Akashi, 1995: 41). Such an approach helps to coordinate initiatives to institute peace in more manageable way. Goulding has added that the UN peacekeepers seek to help adversaries overcome difficulties in a coordinated way (Goulding, 1993: 452). These aspects of the new role of peacekeepers are the extension of their role during peacekeeping, which goes beyond traditional limits and includes more nontraditional security activities associated with human security principles and objectives.

6.3.3 The BAF’s Peacekeeping and Human Security

The above analysis of the links between the peacekeeping and human security suggests that peacekeepers are now more likely to engage in activities

associated with human security principles and objectives. The same goes for the BAF. Rasul argued that the BAF's interposition role in UN peacekeeping operations is essentially a non-combativeway of addressing potential threats to peace, and is a human security approach (Rasul, 2010). This argument is stronger more in the case of 'transitional assistance' during peacekeeping. Fetherston explained that function of 'transitional assistance' is to change the status quo by assisting a state or group of states in executing an agreed political solution to a conflict (Fetherston, 1994b: 13). To perform these 'non-military' functions, the BAF has to work with civilian authorities. Ms. A³, a Bangladeshi peacekeeper, considered 'transitional assistance' as an avenue to work with the civil-political authority. She stated:

“the BAF's role in peacekeeping is basically during the peace transition. During the transition period we need to work closely with the civil and political authority so that the authority can gain reasonable scope for work for the peace” (Interviewed on February 12, 2010).

Another aspect of peacekeeping is 'humanitarian' support, which is similar to the 'freedom from want' aspect of human security. Berdal wrote: “the activities under 'humanitarian' intervention seek human security approach” (Berdal, 1993). Ramsbotham and Woodhouse explained the notion of 'humanitarian' further and stated that “the primary concern of the humanitarian intervention functions is to ease human suffering” (Ramsbotham, & Woodhouse, 1996: 12). Rasul linked this notion with the BAF's peacekeeping involvement. He stated that “in such way (humanitarian support) the BAF seeks to address the freedom from want of the affected people in the mission country during the peacekeeping” (Rasul, 2010). By improving the agricultural sector in several African peacekeeping missions, the BAF has basically supported the food and livelihood security of the people. The BAF also involved food distribution, which are associated with the human security principles and objectives.

In addition to that, peacekeeping essentially helps the troops involved in the peacekeeping to gain a practical understanding of the importance of the non-combative approach to peace. The same can be argued in the case of the BAF's

³ The interviewee is a member of the BAF and joined the UN peacekeeping. She has given her interview on several sensitive issues and requested not to disclose her name.

involvement in peacekeeping. Since peacekeeping has the potential to involve troops more in nontraditional security activities and inform them about the practical importance of such activities, the BAF will learn in the same way. As it is discussed earlier that one of the goals of the peacekeeping is to bring the experience and learning of the peacekeeping to the peacekeepers' country, the BAF learning of involvement in nontraditional security activities will influence the BAF's approach towards civil-political authority during the post-mission phase once they return to Bangladesh.

6.4 The Encouraging Factors for the BAF's Peacekeeping

Involvement

The BAF's involvement in peacekeeping is growing continuously. The BAF has joined in UN peacekeeping since 1988, since then it has played a significant role in UN peacekeeping activities (Economic & Political Weekly, 2010). One sign of the BAF's importance is its position in the UN peacekeeping. In 2010 Bangladesh became highest provider of to UN peacekeeping operations. (A detailed list of the BAF's peacekeeping missions is given in Annexure F) The Armed Force Division stated that on May 29, 2011 10,734 personnel of the Bangladeshi security forces and police were engaged in 13 missions in 12 countries (Armed Force Division, 2011b). Such leading participation in UN peacekeeping is an obvious indicator of its importance to Bangladesh. Thus, the growth of the BAF's peacekeeping involvement is a reality. The following table gives a fact-sheet concerning Bangladeshi participation.

Table 6.1: Facts of Bangladeshi Participation in UN Missions (Armed Force Division, 2011b)

Event	Army	Navy	Air force	Police	Total
Completed Missions	45 Missions in 35 Countries				
Missions Completed Peacekeepers	88,056	1,523	2,659	7,415	99,653

Current Missions	13 Missions in 12 Countries
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The above table shows that Bangladesh has contributed significantly to UN peacekeeping operations. This invites enquiry about what drives the BAF's huge participation? One key issue is the nature of peacekeeping that might be encouraging the BAF in its involvement. Iqbal links the issue with the nature of the mission and the success of the BAF. He wrote that the BAF's peacekeeping missions are all of a non-combative nature where the BAF has proved their success (Iqbal, 2010). Led by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Bangladeshi missions have earned high levels of respect among peacekeepers for their high professionalism and respectful attitude to the mission mandate in all circumstances (Melan, *et. al.*, 2003). UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has also praised Bangladesh's peacekeeping contributions (UN Foundation, 2001).

The BAF involves in difficult and challenging tasks in peacekeeping. In the UN official website the role of Bangladeshi peacekeepers is commented upon:

“peacekeepers from Bangladesh have been involved in operations ranging from demining in Eritrea or the transport of refugees in Somalia to the rehabilitation of schools and medical facilities in Sierra Leone” (UN, 2005c).

The BAF claims that Bangladeshi peacekeepers perform their duties in risky situations. In Somalia in 1995, in the complex and volatile environment when the fate of UN operation became uncertain, the Bangladeshi contingent displayed such unprecedented courage and determination until the end of the mission that enabled safe passage of the UN contingents (Armed Force Division, 2011b). The BAF expressed their determination by mentioning “[w]e reiterate our commitment to undertake any assignment for world peace under the aegis of the UN” (UN, 2005c). All these positive comments about the BAF's peacekeeping verify its own claim about its ability to respond with a nontraditional security approach, which is associated with human security principles and objectives. Such involvement is not just a matter of professional responsibility but it is a combination of professional encouragements as well as the presence of other associated factors. In other words, it can be said that the BAF's involvement in peacekeeping is encouraged by several internal and external

factors. The significant factors are causing the extended participation of the BAF in the peacekeeping are set out below.

6.4.1 Internal ‘Causal Factors’ of the BAF’s Participation in Peacekeeping

The generic argument of Bangladeshi participation in peacekeeping is idealistic. There are several internal institutional and legal issues contributing as ‘internal causal factors’ for the BAF’s growing participation in UN peacekeeping missions. Iqbal stated:

“the GoB often argues with positive attribution and expresses national responsibility towards peace and unity as fundamental for Bangladeshi participation” (Iqbal, 2010).

In addition to such idealistic argument there are several practical factors influencing the BAF’s participation in peacekeeping. These are:

A. The Constitutional Obligation to Defend the International Peace and Security: The preamble of the Bangladesh Constitution is expressed to support the international peace and that imposes on the BAF an obligation is to assist the international peace and security in addition to its obligation to protect Bangladeshi national sovereignty (GoB, 1972). Although the BAF primarily considers internal peace and security as its responsibility, the country’s commitment to international peace also constitutes a mandate (Iqbal, 2010). This legitimises the BAF’s engagement in peacekeeping, which mostly embraces human security principles and objectives. The BAF considers it applies a non-combative approach successfully and that is a significant contribution to the UN. The BAF explained:

“Bangladesh’s role got prominence in UN system through its constructive engagement . . . and contribution of UN peacekeepers at the operational level in the conflict zones in the world” (Armed Force Division, 2011b).

The national commitment to international peace and security is a factor in the engagement in peacekeeping and that being translated in such non-combat innovative approach.

But the constitutional obligation issue receives additional support from the government due to other associated motivations related to the outcome from peacekeeping. Berdal stated that peacekeeping provides an international presence which is related to the national interest (Berdal, 1993). One key motivation is the issue of improvement in foreign relations through peacekeeping participation. Mr. Mazher, a senior researcher of the BAF and regular critic on security issues, explained:

“the BAF's joining in peacekeeping has an international Public Relation issue. Bangladesh is a relatively small country with sizable population. The peacekeeping is one of the avenues to solidify the international relation” (Interviewed on April 11, 2011).

Critically this foreign relations issue is not covered by the constitutional obligation to international peace and security. But it is a practical outcome of any success in the peacekeeping. Question is how such remote outcome inspires to send national security force in a far and unknown territory. Mr. Ahmed, a senior researcher and critic of the BAF, explained the international relations issue as an obvious outcome rather than a factor of obligation. He said:

“it is not important whether the issue of improved international relation through peacekeeping is a motivation for the BAF or not. Being the top in peacekeeping has its natural significance for international relation” (Interviewed on September 8, 2010).

The linkage between the commitment to international peace and protection of the national interest is a reality. Perhaps this is the most striking feature that acts as the underlying strategic inspiration for the BAF's participation in peacekeeping. The constitutional commitment for international peace is realised through peacekeeping involvement, where the BAF's involvement is associated with human security principles and objectives works as an extension of its role to defend the national interest

B. The Non-combative Soft Approach to Peacekeeping: William argued that peacekeeping is characterised as a soft approach to international peace (William, J. 1993). From the 'Hard Man' (military) approach to the 'Soft Man' (humanitarian warrior) and then the 'New Man' (peace keeping) approach have taken consideration of fact that the mission participants would not be a party of the conflict (Chomsky, 1999;

Moskos, 1976). Peacekeeping has a solid characteristic termed as a softer approach in the conflict. In this sense, peacekeeping as humanitarianism helps to achieve the military goal mostly by non-military means. Enloe suggested:

“the form of military force that is inspiring perhaps the greatest hope is the UN peacekeeping force. It inspires optimism because it seems to perform military duties without being militaristic” (Enloe, 1993: 33).

In other words, peacekeeping favors a non-combative approach to maintain peace and allows peacekeepers to be closer to the stakeholders. Applying such an interactive process rather than depending heavily on patriarchal masculinity inspires the BAF to be involved in peacekeeping.

Such an approach is quite appropriate for a regular force to take in a conflict zone. The BAF as being a regular force practices not to endangering itself in a direct war. For example, the BAF was involved in the first gulf war where the international community had an overwhelming understanding. It also did not endanger its troops. But the same BAF did not join the second gulf war, which was more destructive and dangerous for the troops. Obviously the political and other strategic considerations were there. The BAF remains safer by not actively participating in the harder war. This is the view of Ms. Chowdhury, a leading researcher who has been doing research on the BAF for some time,:

“Bangladesh prefers not being politically and militarily damaged through the peacekeeping. The flexibility of the peacekeeping mandate allows the BAF to work with all the conflicting parties and act as referee in the conflict and peace monitoring” (Interviewed on September 11, 2010).

Thus, peacekeeping operations for the BAF are low risk engagements that inspire their involvement.

C. Peacekeeping Brings Personal Financial Benefit to the Members of the BAF: Since peacekeeping work is an additional duty for the regular security force it is additionally compensated by the UN (James, 1990). Malan explained that the salary package that the UN provides is international standard. He wrote that troops engaged in peacekeeping receive international standard financial benefits, which are higher

than their regular salaries (Malan, et. al., 2003). Ms. Lubna, a researcher on the BAF and civil society activist, stated:

“the additional financial support works as inspiration for the BAF's involvement in peacekeeping. This is also a motivation factor for the members of the BAF; enabling them to perform better during the mission” (Interviewed on September 11, 2010).

There is hardly any scope for the members of the BAF to earn extra money during their service period. In this context Rashid noted “thanks to the UN mission a good number of individuals have managed to improve their quality of life by earning from the mission” (Rashid, 2010). The mission money is in addition to the BAF's regular salary. Mr. Ahmed, a senior researcher, explained that “though in real term it is not a high paid job- but the accumulative sum can help the soldier's their family to a noteworthy extend” (Interviewed on September 8, 2010). Thus the financial benefit works as an inspiration factor for the BAF to be involved in peacekeeping.

D. Peace-time Engagement of the BAF Reduces Internal Pressure: The involvement of the BAF in peacekeeping is a function during peace time (Rasul, 2010). This aspect of peacekeeping contributes to the growing participation of the BAF. Peacekeeping gives certain involvement for the BAF during the peacetime. Malan argues that as the Bangladeshi security force is a regular and professional organisation its peace time role is very limited (Malan, et. al., 2003). Most of the members of the BAF have to undertake regular routines and drills, and work inside their bases and cantonments. These types of activities are military in nature. Mr. Alam, a member of the Bangladesh Law Commission and involved in the BAF Long Course, explained:

“the peace time military type activity creates un-necessary pressure among the members of the BAF. The BAF needs to be engaged in some activities. Importantly that should be ideal with their role and match with the training. Peacekeeping helps them to continue their training and exercise” (Interviewed on February 15, 2010).

The peacekeeping gives the BAF an opportunity to be in the field and practically engaged with real life situations. Rashid argued that such engagement enables the BAF to demonstrate their skill and capacity (Rashid, 2010). Ultimately, it works as

necessary exercise for the BAF. However, there is no official recognition of this aspect of the inspiration factor that pushing Bangladeshi engagement in peacekeeping. Ms. A⁴, a member of the BAF, argued:

“[e]ngaging in peacekeeping helps the BAF as a stable institution. Once the BAF is deployed in the mission country the pressure with the organisation reduces. This helps to maintenance smoothness within the institution” (Interviewed on February 15, 2010).

Such peacetime engagement allows the BAF not to become involved in institutional issues or even domestic politics simply because they remain engaged with a better purpose.

6.4.2 External Reasons for the BAF’s Participation in Peacekeeping

Growing Bangladeshi participation in UN Peacekeeping is not only due to the domestic causal factors. There are also certainly international or external reasons which inspire Bangladesh to participate in peacekeeping missions (Rasul, 2010). There are several arguments and important factual evidence shows that the peacekeeping is always not a clear cut issue. Yes, this has been an important avenue for much needed support for international peace and security. It is also true that valuable foreign currency comes to the country as a form of salary of the troops. But Mr. C⁵, a military member questioned such outcome as the factor for the BAF’s participation and argued about the presence of other issues as a factor for the BAF’s participation. He said:

“the fact of very few Bangladeshi in commanding position does not match with the total size of Bangladeshi contribution. Posting of Bangladeshi in the dangerous and risky areas shows the peacekeeping has its own internal complexity. There are issues that apparently do not come to discussion as the factor for the BAF’s involvement” (Interviewed on February 16, 2010).

His argument gives an insight dynamic of the authority who designs the peacekeeping. Several freelance writers and bloggers have given their opinion through website and

⁴ The interviewee is a member of the BAF and requested not to disclose her name on the ground of sensitivity.

⁵ The interviewee is a member of the BAF and requested not to disclose his name on the ground of sensitivity.

blog questioning the orientation and neutrality of UN Security Council resolutions mandating peacekeeping (Iqbal, 2010). The blog writing also questioned the neutrality and involvement of armed forces from certain countries. Ms. C⁶, a member of the BAF, further stressed:

“as the composition of Security Council favors the decision from the powerful west- there is a chance to pursue the hegemonic purpose of west through the UN Security Council. In that case the peacekeepers could actually end up working for the political gain of the imperialistic west wrongly believing that they are serving for greater peace” (Interviewed on February 16, 2010).

However, this opinion is one side of the story and has been contested by Ms. M⁷, a lawyer of the BAF. She argued:

“the mandate of the peacekeeping mission is subject to careful scrutiny and hardly breaching international customary norms. Although certain stronger nation can influence the Security Council but the resolution that mandates the peacekeeping come with majority vote and without veto. This means there is hardly any option for international conspiracy” (Interviewed on September 11, 2010).

Ghail's view was similar with Mr. M. He argued that though the debate about the western control over the UN Security Council is valid but the world is still exercising kind of balance of power, where west is not the only player in the international sphere (Ghali, 1997). Thus the suspicion of biasness in peacekeeping mandate by the UN Security Council hardly gets any justification.

Top of that Bangladesh enjoys a solid role in positioning its troops for peace keeping and thus maintains the command line even during mission. Arguably the opportunity to position its troops is helping to build a neutral image in peacekeeping and influences demand for Bangladeshi troops (Rasul, 2010). Importantly, there are numbers of command level Bangladeshi are playing significant

⁶ The interviewee is a member of the BAF and requested not to disclose his name on the ground of sensitivity.

⁷ The interviewee is a lawyer of the BAF and requested not to disclose her name on the ground of sensitivity.

role in very recent years. Those are not only in the missions participated by Army, but also for the independent observer as well as police force. Thus the fact of the BAF's growing participation is happening due to the match between the international context and the BAF's own role at international level. Other reasons those are inspiring the UN to involve more BAF members are briefly narrated bellow:

A. Neutral Position and Discipline: The BAF is serving neutrally and contributing towards international peace and security without compromising its national position and foreign policy priorities (Malan, 2003). On August 10, 2010, Mr. Momen, the permanent representative of Bangladesh to the United Nations, mentioned in the UN Security Council about the brave positioning of the BAF in peacekeeping by saying that:

“[w]e had to brave many odds and difficulties and endure many sacrifices in the process of the fulfillment of the commitment to international peace and security” (People's Daily Online, August 2010).

Such a claim is also similar to the opinion of Sanghera, Henry, and Higate. They argued that the role of the BAF was exemplary. They have narrated several examples from the Liberia mission. In their writing one aid worker mentioned about the BAF:

“I have personally interacted with the Bangladeshi and the Pakistani forces and I think they are among the best I have seen. They are polite and organised and they do engage with the local community” (Sanghera, Henry, and Higate, 2008).

The positive elements are common for Bangladeshi troops in most of the peacekeeping missions. Though these positive attributions cannot be the only feature but there is hardly any literature on the negative examples on the BAF in the peacekeeping. Arguably such characteristics can be termed as an external push factor for growing demand of the BAF.

B. Success in the Field Level Operation: Some policy makers argue that the most important aspect of the growing participation of the BAF is perhaps the record of success in its operation in the field (Rasul, 2010). Mr. C⁸, a member of the

⁸ The interviewee is a member of the BAF and requested not to disclose his name on the ground of sensitivity.

BAF, recognized that the role of the BAF during the mission is appreciable?. He stressed:

“The BAF is active and responsible to the mandate. Bangladesh has been playing a pioneer role through the activities of its peacekeeping force at the ground often that works successfully as peace-builder, where the BAF works closely with the people and help to create the environment to support the peace” (Interviewed on February 16, 2010).

The BAF mentioned that “the peacekeepers create environment for the local stakeholders and international community to conduct nation building activities” (Armed Force Division, 2011b). The BAF in its approach involves the locals. Such local participation gives wider acceptance of the operation and performance quality of the troops. The honorable president of Bangladesh, M. Zillur Rahman addressing a gathering of army officers in 2010 December said:

“[b]eing able to contribute the highest number of troops to UN peacekeeping missions is an international recognition and befitting evaluation of the performance of Bangladesh Army” (The Financial Express, 6 December 2010).

All the above explanation shows that the field level success of the BAF has been so far positive. This is very much possible that such positive attributions are stimulating factor for the BAF's growing recruitment.

C. Provide Complete Mission Support: Bangladesh is providing the missions with defense equipment and materials (Goulding, 1993). This indeed helps the mission requirement and deployment. Aquierre argued that with mounting difficulties in getting enough troops, the right equipment and adequate logistical support the peacekeeping has not kept pace with demand (Aquierre, 2009). The BAF viewed that in this context Bangladesh has provided three types of member in the mission, namely i) the contingent,? ii) the observer, and iii) the staff officers (Bangladesh Army, 2011). The composition makes the mission management easier. The BAF provides comprehensive and complete peacekeeping support. Mr. Alam, member of Bangladesh Law Commission and involved in the BAF Long Course, has

identified the complete support as the strength that makes growing demand for the BAF. He stressed:

“the BAF’s capacity to provide complete support is added with the capacity to quick deployment makes the BAF’s participation as desired. In addition to that, the BAF can establish warmer relation with local community, which makes the job easier” (Interviewed on February 15, 2010).

Ultimately, Bangladeshi troop’s adaptability helps their growing acceptability. Since most of the conflicts are taking place in countries with similar economic and social conditions as Bangladesh, the troops find it easy to cope with such condition.

6.5 BAF’s Community Development Engagement in Peacekeeping

It is widely viewed by the experts on the BAF that their service for the community during the peacekeeping is remarkable. Rasul is one of them who argued that the BAF has been keeping positive mark in international sphere due to its commendable role in supporting the community and their needs during peacekeeping (Rasul, 2010). The BAF claims that the success of the BAF is due to its quality to perform in line with the needs of the community, which it considers associated with human security approach (Bangladesh Army, 2010). How much of the claim is true is difficult to assess, since there is hardly any literature that makes the counter claim. However, in the case of the BAF it argued that as an armed force trained with solid military approach the BAF ideally has hardcore national security orientation but it performs dramatically excellent in nontraditional security. Mr. Alam, member of the Bangladesh Law Commission and involved in the BAF Long Course, explained:

“though the BAF is characterised as a regular and specialised force trained to follow the command for its every operation irrespective of the type of its activities; the BAF is quite adaptable with the changed need at the field” (Interviewed on March 15, 2010).

Thus it might be the quality of the troops and its command that has made the adaptation possible. Such success is always a contentious issue depending on specific nature of mission and its needs. Success in one peacekeeping mission might not reflect

in another. However, Khan viewed that the BAF's experience interfaces with its command and training results the high quality at the field (Khan, 2002). Mr. Mazher, a senior researcher and expert on military, explained:

“though the regular training or orientation of the BAF is different from the approach in UN peacekeeping mission, the training prior to the peacekeeping is quite successful to equip the BAF members with skill and technical knowhow necessary to adapt with the peacekeeping” (Interviewed on April 11, 2011).

From the argument it is clear that pre-deployment training is helping the BAF to be involved with the community. Their nontraditional security engagement to support community needs is closely associated with human security principles and objectives, which enables the BAF to perform with the evolving peace mission. Rasul acknowledged this crucial fact and viewed that the experience is giving the understanding about the linkage between the inclusiveness of protecting peace and human security approach necessary for protecting international peace and security (Rasul, 2010). Such understanding is potential to have a long-term effect on the BAF's national involvement. Ms. Lubna, a researcher on the BAF and civil society activist, claimed:

“the knowledge from peacekeeping has a long-term impact on the BAF in addressing the national peace and security. But it is not wise to expect such orientation would reflect through their activities in the home” (Interviewed on September 11, 2010).

The implementation of the activities associated with human security principles and objectives to support the community at home cannot be expected. The service for the community through the activities associated with human security principles and objectives is very much mission specific mode of function for the BAF. On this point the BAF's member Mr. C⁹ expressed that the chance for long-term impact of such community engagement is very limited. He mentioned:

“there could be very slim potential to create any impact on the mind-set of the BAF enabling them to be supportive towards wider human

⁹ The interviewee is a member of the BAF and joined peacekeeping. He requested not to disclose his name on the ground of sensitivity.

security application. In its practical term the BAF's engagement with the community boosts the public relation but that service does not have any intention for long-term orientation" (Interviewed on February 16, 2010).

However, the positive aspect of the community engagement provides the BAF better visibility. Sanghera, Henry, and Higate, explained that "Bangladeshi battalions worked hard to ensure that they were highly visible amongst the local community" (Sanghera, Henry, & Higate, 2008: 10). The visibility issue is a public relation matter, which increases the BAF's acceptability in the mission. Chomsky viewed that though the issue is closely related with the public relation factor but it is more of micro level participation (Chomsky, 1999). About this micro level participation Iqbal viewed that the participation of Bangladeshi peacekeepers in the community development work provides knowledge about the community, their culture, community needs and the true dimension of the conflict (Iqbal, 2010). This is a crucial gain for any armed force. In this case the BAF gains the insights about the community, which is potential to allow them sensible about the community needs. Factually, Bangladeshi troops have made the schools, roads, houses, and community center. Malan mentioned that the BAF has provided supports for the health care, trauma counseling, agricultural development, and professional trainings (Malan, 2003). Such extensive community engagement enables the conflicting parties to become closer. As a result the goal of achieving sustainable peace gets one step closer.

It is important to note that the involvement with community is not directed by the mission mandate (Norton1990). Thus it is natural to question the BAF's involvement with community, given that they are involved under the mission mandate. In answering to the query Malan viewed that the BAF takes the advantage of the 'flexibility' of the mission mandate and response to the real time needs (Malan, 2003). The experience of community development works is an encouraging for the BAF's moral and professional tie-up. Such engagement not only helps to be closer to the community but also brings better security to the people. The similar opinion viewed by a Monrovia-based Liberian female. Sanghera, Henry, and Higate referred the statement of the female and mentioned:

“the Bangladeshis have done exceptionally well. They forfeited one day's food per week and to give the local population. They've opened a clinic that provides health services and they provided over 350 soccer balls to the villages where young people are. Young people can play and there is a sense of fullness - that is security” (Sanghera, Henry, & Higate, 2008: 12).

The quote shows the BAF's close touch with the community people during the mission ultimately reaches the mission goal, which is to ensure security. Importantly, often these tasks are not directly mandated by the UN Security Council. UN viewed the BAF's community engagement positively in applying the mandate. UN explained the uniqueness of the BAF and viewed that they take the mandate seriously but goes beyond the mandate considering the flexible options within the mandate what positively contributes the peacekeeping (UN, 2005c). In its real term all these community development activities provide vital support to the individuals for securing the long term peace.

6.6 Impacts of the Peacekeeping on the BAF (Independent Case Study)

The examples are to analyse the potential impacts on the BAF due to its involvement. Though ideally the post mission example would be helpful to analyse the real impacts but to justify the outcome from the peacekeeping is often difficult. So the examples about the BAF's involvement in the peacekeeping are provided to understand the potentials from such involvement. The above discussion shows that the BAF's involvement in the peacekeeping is perceived mostly positively and their flexible approach illustrates their capacity for nontraditional security involvement. It is also viewed that the peacekeeping is mostly non-combat mission. Although the BAF is not duty-bound to serve the locals with community development but their community development service works as a means for sustainable peace. Ensuring people's need and relieving them from sense of threats associates the peacekeeping involvement with human security principles and objectives. The engagement modality also ensures the civil-political authorities at the driving seat. The peace monitoring activities helps the

BAF to work closely for the promotion of the democratic institutions. Considering these as the core dimensions of the peacekeeping the potential impacts on the BAF is crucial to assess. The query is whether peacekeeping changes the BAF's entire approach or gives some important aspiration that eventually helps them to value the civil-political institution back in home. Ideally, the institutional impact on the BAF due to their peacekeeping involvement, which is associated with human security principles and objectives, would keep the democratic process uninterrupted. To understand such assumption the following examples of the BAF's peacekeeping involvement describes the potential impact at individual and institutional level due to the peacekeeping.

6.6.1 Example One: Individual Member of the BAF and Orientation with Human Security

Commander S M Iqbal (G), psc, BN, is a male member of Bangladesh Navy. At his 39 he has been in regular service in Bangladesh Navy before selected for the UN mission. He served as military observer for one year in 2006 at Sudan. As a proud participant, his role was to monitor the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed between the government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army on 9 January 2005. The BAF were tasked with the functions related to humanitarian assistance and promotion and protection of human rights under the United Nations Missions in Sudan. Mr. Iqbal explained his experience in a special supplementary published by Bangladesh Armed Force Division in 29 May 2011. He described this experience as "one of the most fascinating in his life". Mr. Iqbal expressed his satisfaction of working with number of civilian personnel working in United Nations Missions in Sudan and various NGOs. He viewed the mission as a new way of working that has given the opportunity to learn and oriented to serve for peace.

A. Introduction to the Mission: Commander Mr. Iqbal joined the mission at Sudan. The Sudan has seen civil conflict for most of the period since it become independent on 1 January 1956. The north-south civil war began in 1983, following the breakdown of the 1972 Addis Ababa agreement. For more than two decades, the Sudan Government and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army fought over

the resource, power, the role of religion in the state, and self-determination. According to the information of United States State Department southern Sudan has been embroiled in conflict, resulting in major destruction and displacement since independence. The conflict has severely affected the population of the South, resulting in over 2 million deaths and more than 4 million people displaced between 1983 and 2005. Over the years, there were many attempts by neighboring States, concerned donors, other States and the parties themselves to bring peace. Security Council, by its resolution 1590 of 24 March 2005, decided to establish the United Nations Missions in Sudan to support implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Besides the regular function United Nations Missions in Sudan has been mandated to remain on the ground to provide good office and political support to the parties, monitor and verify their security arrangements and offer assistance in a number of areas, including governance, recovery and development.

B. Deployment at Area of Responsibility: Commander S M Iqbal was deployed in Sudan. After his pre-mission training he landed at Ad-Damazin Airport in the afternoon of 3 February 2006 along with others. Eight members from the UN mission received them and took them to the Sector Headquarter office. After preliminary introduction they were given an orientation about the Area of Responsibilities. Their Sector maintained three team sights. Those are Ad-Damazin, Baw and Kurmuk. Mr. Iqbal was deployed at the Ad-Damazin Team Sight. After about one month of his deployment, he was appointed as Sector G1 to maintain the personal records of United Nations Missions Officers of all three Team Sights, process their leave, medals, certificate of appreciation etc. His mission area Ad-Damazin is the capital city of Blue Nile State in Northern Sudan. Blue Nile is one of the 25 States of Sudan. Ad-Damazin is the Sector Headquarters of number 5 Sector of United Nations Missions in Sudan. The main Troop Contributing Country in this Sector was Pakistan. Several Bangladeshi United Nations Missions Officers were involved in some specific duties in the Sector. This ragged area is not easy to access from the Capital of Sudan.

C. Duties as Observer: Mr. Iqbal had to conduct several duties as observer. All the duties are non-combat in nature. Most of the activities allowed him to participate in the community and support the local civil administration. The activities are given bellow:

i. Patrolling: Their area of patrolling was extended to number of places at distances from 20 to 100 kilometer North, East, West and South of Ad-Damazin Sector Headquarters. They had the patrol program for almost every day with two teams consisted of four United Nations Missions Officers. One military officer from Sudanese Armed Forces, one military officer from Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army and a local interpreter in two UN vehicles. During patrol, their duty was to talk to the locals about the security situation, educational facilities of the children, activities of NGOs, availability of drinking water and medical facilities in the area. Importantly, his team helped the community by digging water facility and bringing the sick person to the mission medical clinic. Another type of duty was to verify numbers of troops and weapons during the movement of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army and Sudanese Armed Forces from one place to another, verify and investigate the ceasefire and security arrangements established in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and to assist the building confidence of the local population by their presence. There were places, which were not feasible to be reached by road, so arrangements were made for patrolling those areas by helicopter.

Learning from Patrol: The patrolling had huge scope to engage with the local population. The patrolling gave the opportunity not only to monitor the peace agreement but also to conduct activities those create an enabling environment to sustain the peace. Mr. Iqbal rejuvenated by the fact that the security force can be effective in conducting development activities for the local communities. His argued that though the emergency response activities of the BAF are well recognised but the opportunity of being practically involved with the conflicting parties in non-combat fashion was an exemplary experience for him. Patrolling had provided the scope for engaging different civil entities involved in the peace and community development process. Security force cooperating with NGO in the implementation of community service issues and providing health care or even reconstruction of the broken infrastructure worked effectively to embrace the confidence of the locals.

ii. Unique Activity of the Mission: The mission had a unique activity which hardly matches to other missions. The Area of Responsibilities has many Nomads communities. Nomads were not the major party at the conflict but they remained the significant factor in the conflict. Nomads constitute one third of the

population of Sudan and ethnically they are not similar with South or Northern population. Twice a year, they move with all their animals and possessions from North to South in dry season and again from South to North when the rains begin in South. Their society is quite hierarchical. Nomads often get into fights with various tribes on their migration routes. Those tribes are either allied with Northern or Southern fractions. Their position in the conflict was very tricky factor for peace. As a non-state actor the Nomads are subjected to innovative engagement that would enabled them to abide by the certain set of principles. To follow-up United Nations Missions in Sudan had to openly monitor their movements.

Learning from Monitoring Nomads: The important learning of monitoring the Nomads was prominently a capacity or skill issue. The unique circumstance of dealing the Nomads truly teaches the ways and approaches to deal the non-state actor in a conflict. Fundamentally, the learning is not to resolve by force but through working as middleman or peace broker helped the conflicting tribes and Nomads to respect the terms of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. This type of involvement is not found in the traditional combat training. Thus it was new lesson learning for Mr. Iqbal.

D. Post Mission Engagement: Commander S M Iqbal (G), psc, BN, ended his one year peacekeeping and returned to Bangladesh in early February 2007. Immediate after his return he reported to the Headquarter. After joining he has gone to his base and started regular function. It is the good memories and sense of accomplishment that gives him inspiration in his daily working. He maintains communication with all Ex United Nations Missions Officers from Ad-Damazin Tam Sight.

He believes that the mission has made him better capable in managing his routine duties. Since the return he can play better role in the regular meeting and planning. Of course, the capacity and experience has its say. But it is argued that the significance of the peacekeeping remains at personal level. Though the learning from the peacekeeping does not change the working approach of the Navy (Mr. Iqbal's wing of the BAF) but more and more officers are receiving similar experience and orientation. Their combine understanding about the value and effectiveness of the peacekeeping approach can play an indirect role to the BAF's general planning. Mr.

Iqbal viewed that such inspiration can be resolved sustainably through various alternative methods to avoid the combat means. However, once it comes down to the question of the protection of national security the basic approach would remain same for the BAF.

E. Conclusion: The example of Commander Iqbal, symbols the experience of a veteran ex-United Nations Missions Officer. His mission example elaborates the scope of the post mission impacts. As a representative character his role following the mission has multi-dimensional impacts ranging from public relation to service excellence. Just considering the scope of international exposure from peacekeeping, the BAF members are contributing to promote the national prestige. But the long lasting impacts are for the mission country and its people who receive the service of United Nations Missions Officers. However, the BAF learns various tools and approaches for sustainable peace. The knowledge and skill makes the United Nations Missions Officers better equipped, which substantively increases the capacity of the entire BAF. Mr. Iqbal's experience has the similar significance in the emergency response work, engagement with non-state actors, using updated technologies, and working with the civil-political authorities. His involvement in peacekeeping has provided inspiration for nontraditional security activities. Such spirit from the mission is supportive to include new method of nontraditional security for the BAF. As a result the BAF has introduced new training for creative capacity development. Besides, personal level financial benefit and professional recognition the peacekeeping has given Mr. Iqbal a boost in his duties. Most importantly, the understanding on the civil-political authority is potential to refresh his commitment not to intervene the civil-political system. Since the accumulative number of the BAF personnel in the peacekeeping is more than hundred thousand the orientation regarding the civil-political authority must have a significant influence on the entire BAF. The hoarding impact has the potential to influence the institutional mindset of the BAF, which allow the BAF to function within the space recognised for the BAF under a democratic system.

6.6.2 Example Two: Promotion of Democracy during the Peacekeeping

The BAF is joining peacekeeping since 1988. Some of the peacekeeping missions were highly complex and had to conduct in very dangerous circumstances. Sierra Leone mission is among those critical missions but marked by success for the BAF. The current example is the analysis of Sierra Leone mission where the BAF has effectively worked with the civil government and people. That has given the BAF certain acceptability in the Sierra Leone society. The recognition of the BAF's non-combat contribution is notable, which is the BAF's nontraditional security involvement. The success of the mission was measured through the changes in Sierra Leone. But the institutional impact on the BAF is equally important. The BAF as being an agent of peacekeeping supported to institute democratic system in a war-torn country, which is potential to influence the BAF with certain values. The example attempts to analyse such distinct influence and linked it with institutional position of the military disengagement from politics.

A. Introduction: The United Nations Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone was titled as United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, which was operated from 1999 to 2005. United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone was replaced the previous mission named United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone. The mission was established by the United Nation Security Council resolution 1270 on 22 October 1999. The purpose was to help with the implementation of the Lome' Peace Accord. The peace agreement was made with the intention to end the civil war in Sierra Leone. United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone was expanded several times in 2000 and 2001 in its size (Dupuy, & Binningsbo, 2008). The mission was concluded its mandate at the end of 2005 under the UN Security Council resolution 1610. However, the mandate of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone was notable for authorising to protect civilians within its capabilities and areas of deployment those who were under imminent threat of physical violence. The Verbatim Report Meeting termed it as "a return to a more proactive style of UN peacekeeping" (United Nations Security Council, 2000). With this proactive nature of the mission the international community has seriously contributed for the peace in Sierra Leone. According to a monograph by the Government of Norway "the international community has invested an enormous

amount of time, effort, and over US\$2 billion in an expensive, but presumably successful, peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone” (Malan, Rakate, & McIntyre, 2008).

Bangladesh was one of the major participatory nations in the Peacekeeping Operation. The BAF conducted the peace agreement monitoring, facilitated the process of election and initiated massive social and community development activities. Their contribution has praised by several UN officials as well as the leaders of Sierra Leone. Sierra Leone Defense Minister Hinga Norman has mentioned:

“it was only Bangladeshi troops who were prepared to go deep into rebel dominated areas in the vital diamond producing Kono district and persuade the rebels to disarm” (UN, 2004).

Notably the engagement of the BAF was constructive to provide support to the community and act as neutral force in the divided nation. The BAF also committed to the peace of Sierra Leone. The Bangladeshi Permanent Representative Ambassador at UN Mr. Chowdhury mentioned that “BAF is to continue its support at the United Nations for return of peace in Sierra Leone and regeneration of its economy” (UN, 2004). Bangladeshi troops have conducted its duties in a situation when the whole UN mission was in disarray. The BAF was involved closely with community. UN reported that Bangladeshi peacekeepers provided healthcare and participated in the cultural lives of the common Sierra Leoneans to win the hearts (UN, 2004). There are several comments suggested that though the active participation of the BAF goes beyond traditional role of the peacekeepers, but the religious and cultural closeness motivated the BAF. As a member of United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone Bangladesh had no vested interest in Sierra Leone but had convection for the protection of unarmed civilian.

B. Sequence of Events in Sierra Leone: The history of conflict goes back to 1990s. According to research of the Centre for the Study of Civil War, “Sierra Leone experienced an 11-year civil war in the 1990s, fought between the Revolutionary United Front and the government of Sierra Leone” (Dupuy, & Binningsbo, 2008). The Revolutionary United Front’s stated aims of overthrowing the government spoke to the long-running grievances of rural people against an overly

centralized, corrupt government. The civil war in Sierra Leone has its beginning in 1991. In the sequence of the war-

“the Revolutionary United Front adopted the brutal tactic of cutting off the hands of the population to maintain a rule of terror and instill discipline on its fighters. The Government of Sierra Leone used mercenaries and maintained a degree of control over the south of the country and on the capital, Freetown” (Abroad, 2006).

Ahmad Tejan Kabbah was elected President in 1996. Abroad further mentioned in the sequence of the conflict that:

“in 1997 a group of disaffected soldiers of the Sierra Leone Army mounted a coup, joined forces with the Revolutionary United Front, and called on Major Johnny Paul Koroma, who was serving a prison sentence for treason, to lead them. Koroma's military government drove President Kabbah into exile” (Abroad, 2006).

African nations rejected the military government. A Nigerian-led West African military force together with the Sierra Leone Civil Defence Force led by Sam Hinga Norman, stepped in to remove the military government and reinstated President Kabbah in March 1998.

The major turning of the situation was in January 1999, rebel groups attacked for the second time and occupying most of Freetown. Though eventually West African military forces expelled them, but by that time 5,000 people were killed. Finally the Lomé Peace Agreement signed in July 1999. An online article of Conciliation Resource mentioned that “the situation in Sierra Leone in the months following the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement clearly demonstrated that the road to peace was going to be long and tortuous” (Conciliation Resource, 2011). In October 1999, the Security Council established the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone to oversee the peace agreement and to assist with disarmament. The U.N. agreed to send 6,000 peacekeepers, which was later increased to 11,100 in Feb. 2000. But three months later violence erupted again as Revolutionary United Front rebels clashed with U.N. troops, taking 500 peacekeepers hostage and renouncing the ceasefire. Thousands fled as rebels advanced towards Freetown. The UN Security Council resolution 1270 has made the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone operative under

certain limitations (United Nations Security Council, 1999). Mudave explained that subsequently the mandate of United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone was extended that was encapsulated concisely as-

“the main objectives of United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone in Sierra Leone remain to assist the efforts of the Government of Sierra Leone to extend its authority, restore law and order and stabilise the situation progressively throughout the entire country, and to assist in the promotion of a political process” (Mudave, 2001).

Later on bold steps were taken by the international troops to assist and take the control over capital. The Owen Abroad blog mentioned that in September 2000, members of The Royal Irish Regiment and a Sierra Leonian Officer were taken hostage by a volatile maverick group known as the West Side Boys. The British rescue operation resulted in all the hostages being released unharmed (Abroad, 2006). Later the UN Security Council demanded rebels in March 2001 to allow U.N. peacekeepers into diamond mine areas they controlled. UN increased troops to 17,500. As the UN force increased in strength, and the Sierra Leone Army increased in capacity, rebels and pro-government militias started to hand over weapons to U.N. peacekeepers. In November 2000, the Kabbah Government and the Revolutionary United Front signed the Abuja Agreement. In January 2001 President Kabbah declared the war over.

C. Involvement of Bangladeshi Peacekeepers: The contribution of Bangladeshi troops in the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone was important. According to Brigadier General Rasul “achievement of the Bangladeshi peacekeepers is commendable in United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone” (Rasul, 2010). He described:

“when the rebels of Sierra Leone took peacekeepers as hostages and were closing in on the capital Free Town. At this juncture, two major Troops Contributing Countries withdrew their troops from the Mission but the lone Bangladeshi contingent which was guarding Freetown International Airport halted Revolutionary United Front advance” (Rasul, 2010).

The BAF’s engagement was triggered an enormous impact at the ground. The recognition came from the UN. Immediately UN sought an urgent deployment and

assistance from Bangladesh. In response to such reinforcement within a shortest period of time Bangladesh has trained and deployed a Brigade size troops and saved the entire mission from a possible collapse. As a matter of fact, followed by this Bangladesh troops has acted as the pioneer in taking full control of the rebel held territories, such as Kono, Mekini, Magbura, Mile 91, Lansar and Koinadugu. The BAF also disarmed the rebels at the diamond mine area, the epicenter of the conflict interest.

The role of the BAF was not limited in assisting implementation of the peace agreement but more importantly they had supported the nation building tasks. The BAF was able to win the hearts and minds of the local population. What attract the people most are the BAF's civic actions or Quick Impact Projects to improve the socio-economic condition of the people of the respective Area of Responsibility. Brigadier General Rasul stated:

“in fact, inspired by the good initiative of the Bangladeshi forces, UN missions have now programmed budget for Quick Impact Projects, these include construction of roads, schools, hospitals/clinics, poultry farms, vocational training centre etc.”
(Rasul, 2010).

Besides, the BAF was neutral, disciplined, and cordial with locals and maintained strict code of conduct. In recognition to that the President of Sierra Leone in his visit to Bangladesh in 2003 appreciated the significant contribution of the Bangladeshi troops in his country.

D. Achievement of the BAF: Bangladeshi Peacekeepers were the pioneer in starting assistance to the local community that brought the real success in the ground. In an article in Standard Times, Kanu mentioned:

“it's troops have taken the lead in several rural development initiatives, and appear to have easily replaced the government and/or NGOs in areas such as health, education, humanitarian relief and roads rehabilitation activities in the northern region” (Kanu, 2002).

Beside the regular task of the peacekeeping the related supports task brings better recognition for the BAF.

i. Supporting Health Service: The Medical wing of Contingent Bangladeshi (Ban-Med) is entirely funded by the GoB and responsible only to serve the BAF. However, the BAF extended this support for the local civilian population. Kanu noted:

“seeing the misery of the population and the high level of local medical requirements, Brig. Gen. Alie Hassan, the first Bangladeshi Sector Commander, instructed his military chief medical officer, Col. Sahid to expand Ban-Med services to cover the civilians, with special emphasis on the needs of women and children” (Kanu, 2000).

This was especially during the war when the entire medical facility in the area collapsed due to rebel incursions. Later it included all the northern five districts, Magburaka, Kabala, Kambia, Kamakwei and even Kono. Ban-Med also started to implement the program through mobile clinic aiming of bringing the medical services direct to the chiefdom headquarter towns/villages.

ii. Supporting the Education: The BAF took proactive initiative to address the crisis in education sector in the Tonkolili district. The Bangladesh/Sierra Leone Friendship Society, the Civil Affairs Unit of the Bangladeshi contingent in Magburaka has constructed new secondary school near Mototoka. That was to help the returnees and children of vulnerable groups. It was the first project of the newly formed friendship organisation. The school took only three months to construct and started in October 2002. Such initiative shows the seriousness of the BAF in their mission and their commitment for betterment of communities. The BAF had made the initiative sustainable by creating scholarship program from their money.

iii. Infrastructural Development: Bangladesh contingent has taken several initiatives for the infrastructural development and rehabilitation of Sierra Leone. One of those is the construction of major road. Kanu noted that the BAF constructed/rehabilitated the Mile91-Magburaka road, a major road linking Kono and Freetown, via Mile 91, reducing the distance by over 30 miles (Kanu, 2002). Mr. C¹⁰, a member of the peacekeeping, explained:

¹⁰ The interviewee is a member of the BAF and joined the peacekeeping requested not to disclose his name.

“the young Bangladeshi military engineers made something unimaginable in the war situation. They have virtually displaying their engineering talents by restoring the originality of the road within a very short period of time” (Interviewed on February 13, 2010).

Such activities have helped to improve the quality of life of the people in the north. The Bangladeshi troops helped the post-war recovery. The BAF was commonly known in the north as the 'humanitarian troops'. The contribution was recognised by the people of Sierra Leone. As a token of appreciation Sierra Leone has named Bengali; the language that Bangladeshi people commonly speak; an official language (Daily Times, 2002). It is a huge recognition of the contributions to the war-torn country by Bangladeshi peacekeepers.

E. Post Mission Impact: The above discussion clearly shows that the non-combat engagement of the Bangladeshi peacekeepers was the key to the success. During the mission and post mission recovery period was marked by activities with expertise and commitment. The engagements such as supporting education, health care, rehabilitation/ reconstruction are associated with human security principles and objectives. The BAF in Sierra Leone peacekeeping mission has successfully implemented activities associated with human security principles and objectives. Although the BAF has gained certain expertise on the nontraditional security matter it does not affect the domestic policies regarding the BAF. Mr. C¹¹, a member of the peacekeeping mission, mentioned:

“the success story in Sierra Leone much praised by the Defence Command. The mission has limited policy impact on the BAF. The most recognised change is the inclusion of the civilian rescue and rehabilitation matter in the BAF's training” (Interviewed on February 16, 2010).

Despite such limited impact of the peacekeeping the accumulative impact has the potential to influence the mindset of the larger BAF personnel.

¹¹ The Interviewee is a member of the BAF and joined the peacekeeping requested not to disclose his name.

i. Potential Impact of Mindset of the BAF and GoB: The BAF has not changed any policy in-line with success in nontraditional security matters in United Nations Peacekeeping Mission in Sierra Leone. But the BAF's response towards the political government is never be the same. All the BAF statement subsequent to the peacekeeping hardly has any mention about the internal political conditions. It is notable that, the attitude of the BAF after the major crisis in domestic politics remains within the constitutional framework. So far, the BAF maintains disengaged from politics. Often the BAF's statement refers their peacekeeping involvement once they response towards any internal situation. This remarkable trend shows a new aspect of the BAF's outlook towards the civil-political authority in Bangladesh. Obviously, such change cannot be the outcome of only the peacekeeping but peacekeeping has substantial contribute. In this case the Sierra Leone peacekeeping mission is one out of many BAF's success in peacekeeping. Thus the possibility of inflicting any influence over the BAF's mindset about the civil-political authority is minimum, but indispensable.

On the other hand, like any other peacekeeping the success of the Mission in Sierra Leone has a formidable impact on the GoB's approach and especially on its foreign policy. Barrister Rashid mentioned:

“Bangladesh's participation in the UN peacekeeping missions has become an important component of foreign policy and the country has attained a good standing in the comity of nations” (Rashid, 2011).

The BAF's one unique strength lies in creating better friendship with international communities. The Sierra Leone mission has influenced the GoB to strengthen its foreign relation in Africa. As a result of the positive image building in Africa through peacekeeping has helped the GoB to engage in trade and business following the mission.

ii. Increased Capacity in Emergency Response: The United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone has contributed the BAF's capacity in activities associated with human security principles and objectives, such as emergency responses. It has taught the BAF about the importance of humanitarian involvement and peace. Brigadier Ahssan mentioned that “stopping fighting was not only bringing peace, but

involvement in humanitarian projects had contributed towards consolidating peace” (Rashid, 2011).

The participation in community support activities have given an enormous expertise vital for the BAF to work effectively during the emergency in Bangladesh. Mr. C¹², a member of the BAF, mentioned:

“the experience from the Sierra Leone has contributed with a great deal of professional expertise to more than five thousands of Bangladeshi troops. The success of post mission engagement in the emergency response shows their strength in technical knowledge” (Interviewed on February 13, 2010).

The obvious call of the civil authority to support in the emergency response is encouraged by the performance of the BAF in peacekeeping, and especially in Sierra Leone. The policy impacts are also visual. Bangladesh Disaster Management Strategy, National Food Security Plan and Action (2008-15), and Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Plan of Action 2010 have incorporated clear provisions allowing the BAF as essential agency for emergency response.

F. Critical Learning: Bangladeshi Peacekeeping Mission in Sierra Leone was a critical achievement compare to the enormity of the task they had to accomplish. In all sense the operation guideline was complex and tremendously challenging due to its multi-stakeholders involvement. The safety and security of the UN mission in Sierra Leone was under serious threats many times. Hackett viewed that the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone was complex and it was to deploy progressively and robustly within a coherent operational structure (Hackett, 2001). Bangladeshi Peacekeeper has gone beyond their mandate to safe numerous civilian populations. The then Bangladeshi foreign minister mentioned in a speech given to the peacekeepers:

“you (BAF) have done beyond the mandate of the UN. You have provided security to the NGOs, contributed significantly to building confidence between the local communities and the rebel forces and

¹² The Interviewee is a member of the BAF and joined the peacekeeping requested not to disclose his name.

distributed food, blood and health services to the refugees when very much needed” (Khan, 2002).

Such enormity of the service has provided moral alignment for supporting the vulnerable. All the development activities took place at the field were to support the functioning of the democratic government of that country. The BAF’s experience of working closely with the civil-political authority has provided them the essential experience to support the democratic process. Though such learning does not have direct policy impact per say but it is acting as functional inspiration in maintaining military disengagement from politics in Bangladesh.

6.7 Post Mission Impact and Military Disengagement

The above analysis shows that by in large the BAF has been successful in their peacekeeping mission. It is understandable that the most of the missions are scoped not only as peacekeeping but also for peace building those include activities associated with human security (Berdal, 1993). Question is how far the activities associated with human security principles and objectives impact once the troops after return to their regular job. In this context it is important to note that the post mission impact also determines whether the peacekeeping impacts on the professional expertise. Rasul viewed that the post mission impact has certain degree of importance in the development of professional skills and expertise (Rasul, 2010). Undoubtedly, the orientation with human security principles and objectives from the peacekeeping makes the BAF better capacitated in functioning for emergency response or community development activities (Faizal, 2012). However, the institutional impact is not dramatic. The basic approach of the BAF remains same. Ms. A¹³, a member of the BAF, viewed the same and mentioned:

“BAF is a regular and specialised force that is oriented with protecting national sovereignty through military means. The training of the BAF has made them to follow the command structure in its total sense. With such strength the BAF performs in height degree of

¹³ The interviewee is a member of the BAF and requested not to disclose her name on the ground of sensitivity.

professionalism during the mission. So any approach during the mission is considered solely as mission specific task. Such approach does not change the policies of the BAF” (Interviewed on February 18, 2010).

However, the peacekeeping involvement has made several important changes in the BAF. These changes are indirect impacts. The interview revealed that the BAF's efficient engagement during disaster management explains changes. However, critics viewed that the disaster management has both the task of human security and national security. Guzman viewed that the disaster management role has evolved not just to response the human security needs but also the national security issues involve in the emergency (Guzman, 2001). Thus efficiency in disaster management cannot be characterised as the impact only from the peacekeeping. Mr. D¹⁴, member of the BAF, has described:

“the BAF has internalised the orientation for emergency response as both national and human security need. This is apparent in the fact that disaster management is now included in the BAF's training curricula. Involvement in peacekeeping has influenced the BAF to add the emergency management as training component” (Interviewed on February 18, 2010).

Thus the BAF's capacity for disaster management has strengthened where the peacekeeping is positively contributing. At the same time the BAF's role to assist the civil-political authority has rejuvenated due to the BAF's experience of working with civil-political authority during the peacekeeping.

But most important feature of peacekeeping impact on the BAF is its position towards national politics. Chowdhury argued that the cease of the trend of gruesome military take-over has (e.g. in 1975 and 1981) influenced by the BAF's practical position in peacekeeping (Chowdhury, 2012). In another word, the peacekeeping influences military disengagement from politics in Bangladesh. Earlier in chapter III it is analysed that the military disengagement from politics and participation in peacekeeping both have begun in the early 1990s. However, this is not

¹⁴ The interviewee is a member of the BAF and requested not to disclose his name on the ground of sensitivity.

agreed by everyone. Even with the BAF it is a contested view. Ms. A¹⁵, a member of the BAF, argued:

“the military disengagement in Bangladesh is not the intended outcome of peacekeeping. But the concern of losing the financial benefit of individuals in the BAF from the peacekeeping works as a motivation factor to remain out of State politics” (Interviewed on February 12, 2010).

The senior command apprehends of losing the opportunity of peacekeeping as a result of direct engagement with politics. That keeps them out of politics. Arguably, such apprehension is pushing the BAF out of active power circle and the obvious outcome is the military disengagement from politics in Bangladesh.

6.7.1 Capacity in Emergency Response

As discussed in chapter IV one of the key outcomes from peacekeeping is the BAF's enhanced capacity and skill in certain task associated with human security principles and objectives such as the emergency response. It is not only the BAF's official acknowledgement but the interviewees have agreed that the peacekeeping enhances the capacity of the BAF in activities that traditionally they are not involved. Mr. Mazher, a senior researcher on the BAF, particularly mentioned:

“the much needed capacity about the disaster response and emergency management has enhanced by the BAF's participation in peacekeeping” (Interviewed on April 11, 2010).

The nature of peacekeeping contributes in the capacity development for disaster response of the armed force (Rasul, 2010). The BAF has its long history to assist the people and civil administration during the emergency, especially during post disaster relief and recovery (Faizal, 2012). The Ministry of Defense in its website reaffirmed:

“the main role of the BAF is to defend the integrity and sovereignty of the country, But the BAF is often called upon in disaster relief operation during any natural calamity and nation building activities” (Ministry of Defence, 2011).

¹⁵ The interviewee is a member of the BAF and requested not to disclose her name on the ground of sensitivity.

The disaster response and recovery support is a part of the BAF's legal responsibility to assist the civil administration (GoB, 2010c). In disaster response, the BAF has to work with the civil authority, which is in similar modality as the BAF serves in a peacekeeping mission (Iqbal, 2010).

The BAF's expertise in disaster management developed through its participation in peacekeeping. UN also established institutional arrangement for developing such capacity. Wesis mentioned that the UN has created the Department of Humanitarian Affairs in 1992 to support the peacekeepers with the humanitarian issue (Wesis, 1999: 23). Such institutional makeup increased the scope for getting better knowledge for humanitarian issues including disaster management. Robert also explained that the peacekeeping provides the security force with necessary training to deal the emergency situation (Robert, 1994). The UN Disaster Management Training is such specialised training that runs by the United Nations Disaster Management Team in collaboration with UNDP. The training also helps the BAF to work with the community, support the relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction. Thus the BAF's skill and knowledge on emergency response have gained significant acceleration because of their experience in peacekeeping.

The disaster response work is characterised as the BAF's involvement in activities associated with human security principles and objectives. Dr. Siraj, a bureaucrat of the GoB, expressed similar view and mentioned:

“the task that Bangladeshi peacekeepers undertake is growingly similar with the human security nature. Disaster response involvement is one of such activities of the BAF in peacekeeping”

(Interviewed on March 9, 2010).

The GoB's newly adapted Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme recognises the BAF as essential party to implement the long term disaster response that includes precautionary measures to response against potential threats (GoB, 2008). (Detail discussed in chapter IV) In the Standing Order on Disaster Management mentioned that “traditionally, protection of national security in an emergency situation justifies the BAF's engagement. GoB's new approach to the emergency management emphasises BAF's involvement more structured way” (GoB, 2010). The Draft Disaster Management Act 2008 has laid the framework for the BAF to take part in the

disaster management work emphasising the role as noncombat and aiding the civilian authority. Alam mentioned that “the overall objective of the BAF to assist the disaster management is to strengthen the capacity of Bangladesh Disaster Management system” (Alam, 2010). To meet this objective the legal regime related with disaster response confirmed the role of the BAF, namely the Standing Order on Disaster (Revised in 2010), National Disaster Management Plan (2010-15), Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan 2009 and the Draft Disaster Management Act 2008. Importantly, the role of the BAF to assist the local administration managing the disaster resembles the engagement in peacekeeping mission where the BAF remains under the full control of the central command with an additional mission command involving civilian component (Norton, 1990). Thus the experience from the mission helps them to engage in emergency response with better knowledge and practical knowhow. The national acceptance of the BAF’s contribution in emergency response positively influences the public confidence on them. By keeping themselves disengaged from politics allows the sustainability of public confidence on the BAF.

6.7.2 The BAF’s Professional Skill

The above discussion explains that the peacekeeping significantly contributes the BAF’s emergency response capacity; hence the peacekeeping is strengthening the BAF’s capacity to involve in activities associated with human security principles and objectives. But the impact does not limit to the emergency response only. Peacekeeping mission also influences the BAF’s professional skill and capacity (Iqbal, 2010). Since the major focus of the BAF’s training is the combat capacity the peacekeeping is the scope for the improvement of noncombat capacity. However, peacekeeping is a continuation of the BAF’s professional engagement under the same command and control structure that is focused on combat manner. So peacekeeping does not provide negative impact on the BAF’s combat capacity. Regarding the continuity of the command Mr. C¹⁶, a member of the BAF, mentioned:

“the only exception of the command during the peacekeeping is the additional mission command for the BAF for a particular mission.

¹⁶ The interviewee is a member of the BAF and requested not to disclose his name on the ground of sensitivity.

Such additional command does not radically change the basic working line of the BAF during its mission” (Interviewed on February 12, 2010).

So peacekeepers engage in human security works but the internal command guides them for a mission specific involvement (Berdal, 1993). Goulding viewed that the BAF's peacekeeping provides better tools and skills for both combat and human security involvement (Goulding, 1993). Pramanik explanation was similar. He viewed that the practice (from the peacekeeping) enhanced the capacity and gives the BAF with better professional skills (Pramanik, 1991). Thus, the experience from the peacekeeping compliments the BAF's professional skills to conduct the regular functions. The Department of Peace Keeping Operation viewed that the multi-dimensional UN Peacekeeping within broader context, discharge the following core functions:

- i) Create a secure and stable environment while strengthening the State's ability to provide security, with full respect for the rule of law and human rights;
- ii) Facilitate the political process by promoting dialogue and reconciliation and supporting the establishment of legitimate and effective institutions of governance;
- iii) Provide a framework for ensuring that all United Nations and other international actors pursue their activities at the country-level in a coherent and coordinated manner (Department of Peace Keeping Operation, 2008).

UN has been providing pre-mission training to ensure that the troops would be conducting their above mentioned duties according to the mandate. Moreover, peacekeeping provides practical experience that remains lasting as the professional skill for military (Fetherston, 1994a). Disagreeing with this point Mr. Haque, a researcher on the BAF, argued:

“the pre-mission training has very little to do with the BAF's increased capacity. The real life experience of working in conflict allows the BAF to exercise better judgment, working under pressure and perform risky job during peacekeeping, which helps to improve professional capacity” (Interviewed on September 10, 2010).

If the accumulative impact of the peacekeeping on the capacity of the BAF is considered, it can be claimed that the peacekeeping is impacting significantly and forming better skills and professional expertise. Just the number of the BAF's participants in the UN peacekeeping was 92,225 in the year 2011 (Armed Force Division, 2011a) which crossed 100,000 in the same year. The returnee peacekeepers make a countable size in the total BAF. Any change in their capacity and orientation has to create a combine effect on the response of the total BAF.

6.7.3 Establishment of Security Institutions

Several specialised institutions under the civil and military administration are established and currently functioning in Bangladesh as a result of the BAF's participation in the UN peacekeeping (Iqbal, 2010). Most important among those is the Bangladesh Institute for Peace Support Operation Training established in 2002. Bangladesh Institute for Peace Support Operation Training is a prestigious institution of Bangladesh dedicated for training of the UN peacekeepers for deployment in all types of UN Peace Support Operations. This institute fulfills the requirement as per General Assembly resolution which outlines "the necessity and responsibility of every nation to train their armed forces before any deployment" (Bangladesh Institute for Peace Support Operation Training, 2011). To conduct such training the institution development cannot be the sole solution rather this has be combined with generating professional trainers. UN peacekeeping is helping to generate trainers. Mr. C¹⁷, member of the BAF and worked with the Bangladesh Institute for Peace Support Operation Training, viewed:

"the returnees are being functioning as better trainer in the training institute. It is also developing training skills through specific training. But most importantly the institute is providing a platform for sharing knowledge and skills among the returnees and new peacekeepers, which is a crucial part of training" (Interviewed on February 16, 2010).

¹⁷ The interviewee is a member of the BAF and joined peacekeeping. He requested not to disclose his name on the ground of sensitivity.

The mission experience is helping to run the institute with greater degree of professionalism. The United Nations Department for Peace Keeping Operation emphasised for appropriate training of the peacekeepers which up till now remains the responsibility of the member states. At this backdrop, Peace Keeping Operation Training Centre was established in Bangladesh on 24 June 1999; was the predecessor of Bangladesh Institute for Peace Support Operation Training; with a view to training officers and men prior to their deployment in mission area (Bangladesh Institute for Peace Support Operation Training, 2011). Very recently UN police chief Orlor said that “her organisation will consider a Bangladesh government’s proposal for setting up a regional UN Peacekeeping Training School in the country” (Daily Star, 2011). The school will provide necessary training to the members of United Nations Police and Formed Police Unit from home and abroad. *The Daily Star* report further mentioned that “this is one of the specialised institutions that have potential to build the capacity for Bangladesh police who would be joining the mission at an international level” (Daily Star, 2011).

Though Bangladesh is one of the top ranked nations among all UN peacekeepers contributing country, the number of officer level policemen is very few in it (UN, 2005c). Bangladesh has proposed the UN police chief for recruiting Deputy Inspector General and Additional Deputy Inspector General level police officers for the mission (Daily Star, 2011). The establishment of new institute will help to recruit more high ranked police officials for the mission. Top of that the growing number of institutes are engaging a good number of peacekeeping returnees as well as regular members from the BAF (Rashid, 2010). It is important to note that the involvement in those institutes is a peacetime involvement. If they were not involved in these types of institutions they would be involved in regular routine works. Thus the new institutions are providing the returnees a platform for engagement even after the peacekeeping mission.

6.7.4 Financial Benefit from Peacekeeping

Critics tend to link the BAF's participation in peacekeeping with the resource benefit from the mission. Krishnasamy viewed that the argument of Bangladesh's participation in UN peacekeeping for resource benefit has been the

critical challenge that significantly hamper its ability to perform in UN peace operations (Krishnasamy, 2003). Iqbal viewed slightly different from Krishnasamy and mentioned that the financial benefit for the individual members those participate in the UN peacekeeping operation has significant impact (Iqbal, 2010). In its real term this might not be considered a very high paid job but considering the government salary structure this is a big incentive for the individual peacekeepers (Rasul, 2010). Thus this personal level financial benefit is an encouraging factor for the peacekeeping. Mr. Razi, a security specialist, argued:

“individual financial benefit can make noteworthy difference in the motivation for joining the peacekeeping. But end of the day it is the decision of the political government, which hardly considers the fact of individual level earning to justify the mission participation” (Interviewed on February 23, 2010).

He viewed the joining in peacekeeping is political decision and the resource benefit is just an incidental outcome.

Although the resource benefit is an incidental outcome but the accumulative sum of foreign exchange generated from the peacekeeping is significant. “The budget for UN Peacekeeping operations for the fiscal year 1 July 2011-30 June 2012 is about \$7.26 billion” (UN General Assembly, 2011). UN peacekeeping remains huge financial opportunity for Bangladesh. Confirming the argument in an online article Major General Mohammad mentioned that “the BAF would be third in ranking in earning foreign exchange for the country after RMG and civilian manpower employed abroad” (Sikder, 2011).

Of course this carries significance in the politico-economy of Bangladesh. Although the political government is reluctant to recognize this as an inspiration but the sheer amount of foreign exchange earned by the peacekeeping has to be considered as important motivation factor. Politicians do not want to any risk that can harm the kind of income for the country as well as the BAF is eager to maintain this avenue of income for their individual and institutional benefit.

Indicating the misuse of the factor of financial benefit Iqbal viewed: “this economic aspect has the potential to be used to control the security forces” (Iqbal, 2010). In an article Hossain explained this notion in its critical form and expressed:

“due to the control aspect the army could be used even by UN and there is chance that can create the ‘UN-military regime’” (Hossain, 2007). Without going that far Mr. C¹⁸, a member of the BAF and joined the peacekeeping, explained:

“the financial dependency can inflict certain degree of control over the BAF. One such control can influence the military disengagement from politics” (Interviewed on February 16, 2010).

This shows the dependency on the financial benefit. That can have an elaborated impact on the political and military matter. However, the financial matter of the peacekeeping has implications at several levels.

A. Increased Defence Budget due to Peacekeeping: Financial issue not only involves the money receives by the BAF from the peacekeeping but the GoB has to spend an increased amount to prepare and send the troops in peacekeeping. Bangladesh deployed the BAF in the peacekeeping operation along with military equipment. UN pays separate compensation for the military equipment. But the country has to buy those from its own budget (AFD, 2011). Apparently it is costing a higher defense budget for the country but Mr. Haque, a researcher on the BAF, differs and explained:

“[c]ompensation from the UN for using military equipment is a support for the defense force. Due to the financial compensation the national defense budget leveraged in investing to purchase new equipment. Also the use of the defense equipment reduced opportunity cost. Thus the higher defense budget for the military equipment for the peacekeeping is a pressure for the nation cannot be justified” (Interviewed on September 10, 2010).

Responding to the need for peacekeeping the allocation for defense was BTK 64.080 billion for 2008-09, around BTK 1000 crore more than the previous year (The New Age, 2008). As the financial allocations are not mentioned or recorded in the budget as defense expenditure it is hard to get the income and expenditure ratio from peacekeeping. But the fact that GoB is interested for sending peacekeeper allows perceiving that the national financial interest is maintained. Top of that since the

¹⁸ The interviewee is a member of the BAF and requested not to disclose his name.

peacekeeping helps the BAF to be disengaged from politics the financial benefit is just an additional gain for the political government.

B. Benefit for the Corporate Sectors of the BAF: The BAF has its own corporate sector. The business entities of the BAF gives benefit to the BAF personnel as well as to their families (Bangladesh Army, 2010). Such sector has created a significant corporate interest for the total BAF. The returnees from peacekeeping invest some of their earning in such business entities. Bhattacharjee mentioned:

“the Sena Kalyan Sangstha, the corporate wing of the BAF, operates in the private sector and claims that it generates its own resources to carry out all its welfare, commercial and industrial activities. The revenue earned from the UN missions is a major fund source for Sena Kalyan Sangstha” (Bhattacharjee, 2101:19).

A report of *The Daily Star* explained similar notion of investing the earning of the returnees in the business and mentioned:

“[a] substantial portion of it (money earned from UN mission) is invested in various Sena Kalyan Sangstha projects. For instance, Radisson Water Garden, Dhaka, was built from the contributions made by members of Bangladesh Army from their earning of UN peace keeping missions” (Daily Star, 2006).

The investment in Sena Kalyan Sangstha is from the earning of individual member of the BAF. The benefit also goes to them and to their family. But the accumulative interest to keep the Sena Kalyan Sangstha running encourages the BAF members to continuing their contribution from peacekeeping. The BAF does not want to breach such flow of investment in Sena Kalyan Sangstha by engaging them in politics, which can negatively impact the BAF’s involvement in peacekeeping

C. Individual Financial Benefit: The members of the UN peacekeeping mission receive benefit that substantially helps the economic condition of individual members of the BAF. About the amount the peacekeepers receives Hossain, and Dutta mentioned that “[o]n such missions, a soldier, on an average, earns nearly 1100 US dollars monthly, i.e. 75,680 Bangladeshi Taka” (Hossain, & Dutta, 2009).

This sum is not very high but depending on the national level salary for the lower rang personnel this amount can be a encouraging factor. Top of that the

accumulative sum is obviously encouraging for the BAF. *Daily Prothom Alo* report explained “such payment depends on the rank. The BAF earns about 200 crores Bangladeshi Taka yearly from these operations” (Daily Prothom Alo, 2009), which is a sizable sum for the BAF. Mr. Haque, a researcher on the BAF, viewed such earning is important for the individual member of the BAF. He mentioned:

“earning from peacekeeping works as basic support for the servicing personnel. They can invest or ensure family support with this money. This also helps them during their retirement” (Interviewed on September 10, 2010).

Financial benefit acts as an inspiration factor and the accumulative result influences the institutional decision of the BAF. As stated earlier the interest for the individual financial benefit keeps the BAF disengaged from politics due to the reason of involvement in politics can stop the requirement in the peacekeeping.

6.8 Discontinue of Nontraditional Security Engagement

Although the peacekeeping provides the opportunity for the BAF to be engaged in nontraditional security activities, which are associated with human security principles and objects but that does not continue during the post mission phase. Khan viewed that the peacekeeping has a great degree of influences over the BAF's capacity in non-military matters (Khan, 2002). However, the influence of the nontraditional security capacity of the BAF gained from the peacekeeping leaves virtually no mark in the defense policy of the BAF. Mr. Razi, a security specialist on the BAF, viewed the similar and mentioned:

“peacekeeping has minimum influence on the defense policy of the BAF because the command structure of the BAF remains same. The command structure has designed to keep the BAF to protect the national sovereignty through combat fashion, where the nontraditional security expertise is not the major consideration” (Interviewed on February 23, 2010).

As mentioned earlier while the BAF serves in peacekeeping it remains under the same national command and its nontraditional security involvement is just mission specific task. The mission command of the UN does not dictate the BAF's core approach and

task. In an online article Iqbal explained the UN command issue in the peacekeeping and mentioned:

“[m]ost of these operations (peacekeeping) are established and implemented by the United Nations itself with troops serving under UN operational command. In these cases, peacekeepers remain members of their respective armed forces, and do not constitute an independent ‘UN Army’, as the UN does not have such a force” (Iqbal, 2010).

Mr. Haque, a researcher on the BAF, stressed the fact that the involvement of the BAF in peacekeeping involves an additional command that is purely missioned specific and hardly have any chance to impact the original national command. He mentioned:

“the only difference in the command during the peacekeeping is the presence of an additional command. The BAF works under an additional mission command in its peacekeeping mission. This neither changes their orientation nor adds anything new to the overall policy of the BAF” (Interviewed on February 23, 2010).

Moving from the above argument Major General Sikder explained the true nature of the peacekeeping for the BAF. He argued:

“UN-Bangladesh partnership in peacekeeping has been mutually rewarding. The experience and expertise gained by Bangladeshi contingents in different peacekeeping operations can now be profitably utilised elsewhere under similar circumstances” (Sikder, 2011a).

Thus his argument emphasized on the usefulness of the nontraditional security expertise for the similar peacekeeping designed by the UN. However, mission experience on nontraditional security is helpful in implementing GoB’s policy associated with the human security principles and objectives. Since the BAF learned and capacitated to perform the nontraditional security activities during its peacekeeping, it depends on the government decision to involve the BAF in human security activities (Khan, 2002). But the GoB viewed that the BAF has not formed to act in human security approach rather to protect the national sovereignty in combat fashion (GoB, 1972a). Thus there is always a risk to generate conflict about the role of

the BAF if the GoB increasingly directs the BAF to activities associated with human security principles and objectives.

Nevertheless, the indirect or unintended outcome from peacekeeping mission has positively contributed the BAF's policy to be involved in necessary nontraditional security issues. The BAF is showing their willingness to join in activities associated with human security principles and objectives by enhancing technical knowledge and training suitable for such activities. Ms. A¹⁹, a member of the BAF, explained:

“the BAF's ability to support the GoB in implementing the activities associated with human security principles and objectives is backed by its capacity from the peacekeeping. But it is important, to note that such involvement cannot be a permanent feature of the armed force” (Interviewed on February 12, 2010).

Thus it cannot be claimed that the BAF's training on nontraditional security matters are the continuation of the BAF's role in peacekeeping rather it is to ensure the BAF's support role for the GoB. However, BAF's incorporation of new training associated with human security principles and objectives inspires the GoB to involve the BAF more in nontraditional security activities, which is creating expected scope for military disengagement from politics.

6.9 Influence of Peacekeeping on Democracy

The democracy in Bangladesh has its ups and downs throughout the history of the country. After the independence of Bangladesh in 1971, democracy has hardly any smooth continuation till 1990 (Moeen, 2007). The inspiration of the Bangladesh constitution is to strengthen the democratic process and respect human rights. It is mentioned in the preamble of the constitution:

“[t]he fundamental aim of the State (Bangladesh) to realise through the democratic process to socialist society, free from exploitation-a society in which the rule of law, fundamental human rights and

¹⁹ The interviewee is a member of the BAF and requested not to disclose her name on the ground of sensitivity.

freedom, equality and justice, political, economic and social, will be secured for all citizens” (GoB, 1971: preamble).

The same spirit is vigorously present in the peacekeeping. Thus the involvement in the peacekeeping is an opportunity for the BAF to reorient with such spirit, which is potential to be expressed through the post mission engagement of the BAF.

In the case of Bangladesh the process of strengthening democracy often challenged by the extra-constitutional means. Factually, an indirect influence of the BAF is still visible to the nearer circle of the power politics. However, recently changes in the BAF’s action and inaction about democratic process in the country are noticeable. Earlier the research has analysed (in Chapter III) the coup history and explained that there has been no successful coup since the BAF has been joining the UN peacekeeping (Riaz, 1998). However, there are situation in 1997 and 2006 when the army’s political involvement was imminent (Khan, 2009). But the BAF managed to remain supportive towards the democratic process of the country. These events show the evolution of the institutional action of the BAF regarding democratic system of the country. A trend analysis of democratic development is obviously helpful to understand the post mission impact.

In many occasions armed forces have engaged with the domestic politics of the country until they have joined the UN peacekeeping. Ahmed narrated “the BAF has evolved as elite in politics scene since 1975 coup. The armed forces emerged as the ruling elite in Bangladesh in 1975” (Ahmed, 1988: 56). Following to that the institution was dictated by personal ambition of certain military leader rather than the collective wish. An individual like General Ershad had used the BAF to takeover and maintain the state power for his own benefit until he was thrown out by a popular movement in 1990. Bhattacharjee narrated General Ershad’s involvement in politics by mentioning that “in 1982, General Ershad took over the reign of the country by removing the elected government on charges of incompetence” (Bhattacharjee, 2010: 15). After the ousting of General Ershad from power in 1990 by a democratic movement, the BAF, by and large, decided to keep away from political matters. Mr. Razi, a security specialist on the BAF, explained:

“the BAF is continuing to support the democratic process since General Ershad was ousted in 1990, which is immediate after the

BAF's initial joining in peacekeeping in 1988" (Interviewed on February 23, 2010).

Since 1990s several conflict situations were created but the BAF continued supportive towards the democratic process. The BAF's peacekeeping involvement has certain degree of influence determining its role in maintaining disengagement from politics.

The most significant example in this regard is the BAF's noninvolvement in politics during the political vacuum in 2006. In 2006 the election under the Care-taker Government²⁰ had become nearly impossible because of the lack of consensus among the political parties about the head of the Care-taker Government (GoB, 1971: Art. 58B). So the whole country became politically standstill. In this circumstances, the only way in which the major powers/donors could exercise effective pressure was to target where she was most vulnerable – the support of the BAF. In an article at *Economic & Political Weekly*, the context of pressuring on the BAF as narrated. It was mentioned:

“[t]he only leverage they had on the army (the major wing of the BAF) was to threaten loss of opportunities to participate in UN peacekeeping missions, something which is highly coveted by the army in terms of both high status and considerable financial gain” (Economic & Political Weekly, 2010).

²⁰ Non-party care taker government is under Chapter IIA of Bangladesh Constitution. Article 58 B of the Chapter has Mentioned detail about the non-party caretaker government.

(1) There shall be a Non-Party Care-taker Government during the period from the date on which the Chief Adviser of such government enters upon office after Parliament is dissolved or stands dissolved by reason of expiration of its term till the date on which a new Prime Minister enters upon his office after the constitution of Parliament,

(2) The Non-Party Care-taker Government shall be collectively responsible to the President.

(3) The executive power of the Republic shall, during the period mentioned in clause (1), be exercised, subject to the provisions of article 58D(1), in accordance with this Constitution, by or on the authority of the Chief Adviser and shall be exercised by him in accordance with the advice of the Non-Party Care-taker Government.

(4) The provisions of article 55(4), (5) and (6) shall (with the necessary adaptations) apply to similar matters during the period mentioned in clause (1). However, it is worthy to mention that due to a constitutional amendment in 2011 this section has been removed from the Bangladesh Constitution.

It is further viewed that the participation in peacekeeping not only enhanced the prestige of the BAF abroad but also helped widen the range of its experience by exposing it to different societies as well as to the practices of the armed forces of different countries. Moreover, peacekeeping has provided a substantial addition to the income of the participating BAF's personnel. Mr. Razi, the security specialist on the BAF, argued:

“[b]ecause of the pressure the BAF had not take the risk of losing the opportunity of joining in peacekeeping by taking the political power of the country” (Interviewed on February 23, 2010).

Factually, as the situation became grave, President Ahmed resigned from the post of Chief of the caretaker government, creating a constitutional deadlock. Mostly the official explanation of the event shows that with no other alternative, the BAF stepped in and, instead of taking power into its own hand; it installed a civilian caretaker government. The then BAF chief Lieutenant General Ahmed, narrated the event of the constitutional deadlock and the BAF's step in his term. He stated:

“[t]he country had three options in front of it: the first was to go for elections that was scheduled on January 22, 2007; the second was to proclaim martial law and the third option was to protect the national existence by establishing an acceptable Caretaker Government by quickly promulgating emergency... everybody in the world including Bangladesh at that time was apprehending that martial law was imminent. But we decided not to follow the footsteps of our predecessors and the third option was adopted... ” (Datta, 2009:53).

There were some who believed that the Lieutenant General Ahmed was not interested in taking over power and others saw the influence of strong international pressure against a military takeover. Bhattacharjee has provided a different scenario where the international organisation has used threats of withdrawing the BAF from peacekeeping to stop it to disrupt the democratic process. He mentioned:

“the UN, for instance, indicated that all Bangladeshi troops in the UN Peace Keeping Operations would be withdrawn if the army took over power” (Bhattacharjee, 2010: 18).

Importantly he mentioned the word 'indicated' not 'threat'. But the indication was a threat for the BAF and as a result the BAF was not directly intervened the democratic process. The only published report which can be called authentic in this regard is the statement by the then BAF chief in his autobiography. There he narrated:

“[t]wo incidents: one in which important donor governments met and told him that if the army helped in the holding of elections under the then prevailing circumstances, they would ask the UN peacekeeping office to reconsider or bar the recruitment of Bangladesh army personnel in peacekeeping operations. The second incident took place subsequently on 10 January 2008, when the undersecretary general of the UN peacekeeping operations, Jean-Marie Guéhenno, conveyed the same ultimatum to the army chief, i.e., the participation of the Bangladesh army in peacekeeping operations would be jeopardised if they helped in the holding of elections under the circumstances then prevailing” (Ahmed, 2009: 331).

These statements of the BAF chief have neither been denied nor confirmed by the UN peacekeepers. It should be underlined that an undersecretary general of the UN could not have said this without the explicit approval of the UN secretary general. Mr. D²¹, a member of BAF, explained the opportunity of participating in peacekeeping was the leverage to restrain the BAF from involving in the politics in the 2007-8 events. He stated:

“[w]hatever was the inside story but the fact remains same—engagement in the peacekeeping was instrumental to restrain the BAF from conducting any military takeover. This could be termed as a deterrent factor that acts indirectly and helps democracy in the country” (Interviewed on February 18, 2010).

UN peacekeeping has influenced the BAF not to take active part in the democratic process of the country. However, it is not clear whether this role of the BAF is an impact of the peacekeeping or a result of changes of the BAF's attitude towards

²¹ The interviewee is a member of the BAF and requested not to disclose his name on the ground of sensitivity.

democracy. The inside pressure of the BAF for not to intervene the democratic process is obviously true, but the confusion is whether this pressure is a matter of ‘orientation’ or purely interest factor. The pressure from the donor or even from the institutional institutes at the level of higher decision makers shows that there is a combination of inside pressure as well as external one. Mr. Haque, a researcher on security and BAF, explained the combination of internal opposition and external pressure as the cause for not to be involved in the politics. He mentioned:

“in the context of 2007-8’s event the BAF’s internal pressure was significant. The BAF as an armed force do not follow only the external pressure but there is element within the armed force that clearly opposed the political intervention” (Interviewed on September 10, 2010).

In this case the growing opposition towards the political involvement has made the BAF to maintain disengaged from politics, which is added by its support from the external actors. The internal pressure is a significant state of the BAF’s position about political disengagement, which is gradually generated within the BAF since it has joined the peacekeeping in the 1990s.

6.10 Chapter Conclusion

This chapter analyses the BAF’s engagement in UN peacekeeping as important noncombat involvement. It refers the evolving peacekeeping has been critically contributing on the BAF’s capacity and orientation for the involvement in activities associated with human security principles and objectives. Analysing the BAF’s community and development involvement during the peacekeeping this chapter argues that the BAF’s flexible interpretation of mission mandate has allowed them to demonstrate their nontraditional security capability. Linking the internal and external push factor for the BAF’s involvement in peacekeeping it argues that the BAF is considered suitable for the peacekeeping by UN and it stands as the height troops providing agency. This gives the logical explanation that the BAF is suitable for the noncombat task which is associated with human security principles and objectives. Finally the central argument about the impact from the peacekeeping narrates that

though the approach in the peacekeeping is noncombat but the BAF's regular routine activities does not accommodate such approach. Despite a significant numbers of the BAF personnel are engaged in peacekeeping the discontinuity of the approach shows the critical nature of the BAF to pursue its general trend of protecting national sovereignty. However, this chapter explains that the political government is the ultimate beneficiary of the BAF's involvement in peacekeeping. The significant outcome from the peacekeeping is military disengagement from politics, which is supporting the continuation of democracy in Bangladesh. Mr. C²², a member of the BAF, argued:

“the BAF has been keeping distance from politics for quite some time. Peacekeeping is one big inspiration that influences political disengagement. The BAF's non-involvement with politics is considered a condition of any peacekeeping invitation” (Interviewed on February 16, 2010).

Though the outcome of military disengagement from politics has never intended but it happens as the consequence of its participation in UN mission. Thus the analysis shows major argument that the BAF remains out of politics to ensure uninterrupted mission participation. As the armed force of a 'small' state, BAF's contribution to the global peace and security through peacekeeping provides a greater degree moral strength. Such moral recognition results both in the BAF's proactive action and new orientation towards the political authority. Explaining the BAF's proactive action, Brigadier General Rasul viewed that the BAF's series of qualities have made them well accepted by African countries. The BAF's moral spirit has created long lasting acceptance (Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies, 2010). The BAF does not want to risk such acceptance by involving in politics.

This overall learning of this chapter is explained by the following figure. The figure shows that the greater impact of the BAF's UN peacekeeping directly contributed to its professional expertise. The expertise is overlapped by its capacity to emergency response and institutional development. It also shows the detail

²² The interviewee is a member of the BAF and requested not to disclose his name on the ground of sensitivity.

relationship of the outcomes from the BAF’s success in peacekeeping and relates it with military disengagement, which is critical for the sustain democracy.




Figure 6.2: Post UN Peacekeeping Mission Impact

This chapter notes that the financial benefit from the mission also contributes for the disengagement. Individual benefit influences the wider impact on the BAF’s disengagement from politics. Since many individual BAF members do not want to jeopardise the potential to work in UN mission they continued to express their reluctance about engaging with politics. The BAF’s involvement in activities associated with human security principles and objectives oblige the government to adopt policy to involve the BAF in the activities responding to the people’s need of freedom from want and fear at the domestic level. The dependent relationship between

the military disengagement in politics and sustenance of democratic political governance is potential to make the GoB responsive towards the people's need. It is also argued that such involvement orients the BAF with the importance of the performance of the civilian authority. The BAF's understanding about the position of an armed force in a democratic society allows not intervening regular democratic process. As a result of the continued democracy the government is motivated to integrate the human security.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

7.1 Summary Analysis

The BAF's engagement in the activities associated with human security principles and objectives are becoming visible in Bangladesh. In most of the cases the BAF is working to 'aid-civil-authority'. It is mentionable that such involvement is increasingly recognised by the GoB's regulatory and policy measures. Especially, regulatory non-combative involvement of the BAF is becoming a feature of GoB's disaster management and certain specialised activities sensitive to human security principles and objectives. Though the BAF terms such involvement as non-combative, the operational nature clearly resembles human security principles and objectives. The BAF's peacetime non-traditional involvement is providing familiarity with the human security principles and objectives, thus it can be termed as a human security informing process. However, the identification of the extent of the influence of the familiarity with human security principles and objectives is very critical. Most of these engagements are task and time specific. Moreover, the BAF's involvement in these kinds of activities remains under the strict central command, which is designed to keep the BAF actively a force for protecting national security in combative role. Thus the scope of the BAF's non-combative involvement provides limited room to filter the human security influence on the BAF's daily routine. Importantly, this process has introduced the BAF with the importance of the democratic institutions, especially with the local level civil-political authority. Once the question comes about the BAF's political disengagement, this micro level experience is potential to influence its macro level responses. This research analyses that there are several occasions when the BAF's political disengagement was credited to one of its non-combative involvements.

This critical influence has proved to be silent but important for the continuation of democratic practice in Bangladesh. Bangladesh has been experiencing

gradual maturity in democratic practice and political disengagement remains a reality. Until the democratic uprising of 1990, the BAF was active force in Bangladeshi politics. The research explains that there were various reasons of the BAF's political engagement, but focuses on the lack of civil-political control over the BAF as one of the key factors for its political engagement. This research discusses the BAF's involvement in activities associated with human security principles and objectives and political disengagement had happened simultaneously, showing the presence of mutual re-enforcing causal relationship between these two factors. Although it is explained that the interface between the BAF's strict service code and its motivation for positioning within a modern state has cushioned the BAF's involvement in the human security needs of the people. It has provided an opportunity for the advance thinker to adopt the potentials of the BAF in realising some of the critical national challenges to address the cross-cutting needs of the human survival, livelihood and dignity.

This research has argued that the integration of human security in the national policy is encouraged due to the presence of democratic governance in Bangladesh. Since the BAF's intervention has not only breached the democratic system but also hindered the process of policy response to the people's need, the re-emerged democratic governments have increasingly pursued the BAF to be involved in non-combative activities. But this can not run automatically. The long presence of military interest in Bangladeshi politics cannot be brushed under the carpet by the overnight achievement of the democratic movement of 1990. The change required a systematic structural response. The democratic governments of Bangladesh have introduced such changes by ensuring civilian control over the BAF. To do it the GoBs have appointed civilian officials at the Ministry of Defense, established effective monitoring by appointing three different intelligences for advising the Prime Minister on defense, and ensuring the functional parliamentary defense committee. However, this research shows the institutional control of the civilian authority is just one issue but the internal orientation of the BAF towards the civil-political authority has been a significant aspect that contributed the BAF's disengagement from politics. In this regard, the BAF's involvement in non-combative activities has been instrumental creating institutional orientation within the BAF for politically disengaged and providing independent breathing space for the political government.

This research has shown both positive and negative aspect of the BAF's involvement in non-combative activities. The analysis shows that the contribution of the BAF during the disaster period translates the civil administration into an active one. The process has motivated the local government and leded them ensuring their participation in the governing process. However, the biggest influence is on the local governance system that is directed towards more transparent and participatory. At the same time, the BAF's role for protecting internal security and conducting development activities in the CHT is analysed. As a negative example, this case study showed the BAF's involvement was inappropriate and continuation of counter insurgency activities. The scope of the BAF's involvement in the non-combative activities is critically assessed and identified the importance of serving under the civil-political authority. The distinction between the positive and negative influence is clearly based on the BAF's non-combative engagement modality. Once the BAF serves under the civil-political authority it is informed the importance of the service that the civil-political authority provides. The knowledge on the civil-political authority is potential to build confidence in the civil-military relationship, which is vital for the military disengagement. However, the research does not claim that the BAF's non-combative involvement is the sole reason for political disengagement but it is analysed as the important one.

7.2 General Findings

This research identifies the functional linkages between the integration of human security principles and objectives into Bangladeshi national policies, BAF's disengagement from politics and continuation of democracy in Bangladesh. It also explains the crucial conditions those are causing influence between one another.

Explaining the first relationship between the democracy and human security integration, this research identifies democracy as a political system that is a condition for the integration of human security principles and objectives in national policy. Under democracy, the government has to response to the needs of the people and also to ensure their protection and empowerment, the integration of human security principles and objectives has potential to serve as a viable tool for their goal. In the

case of Bangladesh, the democratic governments are increasingly approaching to human security principles and objectives in policies, not necessarily by naming the policies as human security, but the outcome of such policies is associated with human security.

The second relationship between the continuation of democracy and military disengagement is mutually re-enforced. The causal relationship does not solely depend on the single factor but the military disengagement is an important one that determines the continuation of democracy. In the case of Bangladesh, it is argued that the BAF was a regular player in the politics until it is pushed out from the politics by a popular democratic uprising. However, later history shows the BAF has been largely disengaged from politics partially due to ensured civilian control over the BAF but mainly due to the internal and external pressure that has generated from its involvement in non-combative activities associated with human security principle and objectives.

The third relationship between the BAF's involvement in non-combative activities is associated with human security and its military disengagement explained as relatively linked. Depending on the modality of the BAF's involvement in non-combative activities the impact can be completely reversed. As stated above the BAF's involvement under the civilian authority is a pre-condition for the positive influence on the local democracy and the BAF's motivation for military disengagement. To understand the outcomes those influence the local democracy following two conditions are identified:

A. Capacity of the Civilian Authority: The BAF's role in the disaster management has the mandate to work with or under the civil authority. The assistance to the civilian authority allows them to gain skill and knowledge for the disaster management. This research explains the BAF's engagement during the natural disaster management helps the civilian authority to do better performance. The acceleration in capacity helps the civilian authority to be empowered, which provides a condition for the military disengagement. Importantly, in the case of the BAF's involvement in internal security in CHT, it is identified that despite the 1997 Peace Accord the BAF is serving under the direct military command bypassing the authority of the civil administration. The working modality with the civil administration is rather parallel.

The research shows such working relationship does not contribute for the enhancement of the civil administration's capacity and negatively influencing the local democracy.

B. Governance of the Local Government: This research witnesses the potential competence of the BAF's support for the implementation of the activities associated with human security principles and objectives is promoting the good governance of the local government. At practical level, the BAF's close engagement with the local government during its involvement in activities associated with human security is potential to translate the knowledge on discipline and transparency. This knowledge helps to ensure the practices those are required by law to promote local level good governance, which empowers the local government. Paradoxically, the combined effort of the BAF and the civil administration often is not expressed in the same way regarding the empowerment of the local government. Local government, with their limited capacity, depends on the BAF and the civilian authority to support their needs. In this context this research shows the BAF's encouragement for steps such as placing the information display board for the public or involving locals in the disaster damage assessment increases the trustworthiness of the local government.

In addition to that, the functional gap between the civilian authority and the local government is noticeable due to the budgetary dependency and poor governance record of the local government. The involvement of the BAF at the local level helps to reduce the gaps and cushions the confidence of the local government. The BAF's involvement works as a catalyst to empower the local government by ensuring support for them from the civil authority. The BAF's knowledge form peacekeeping is potential to help them to link the civil administration and the local government, which ensures transparency of the local government. Oppositely, in CHT the BAF's independent involvement keeps the local government aloof from the development activities denying their opportunity to connect with the people. The isolation of the local government in CHT weakens the local governance, hence negatively influences the democratic conditions. Thus the research analyses the outcomes of the BAF's non-combative involvement can be both positive and negative depending on it involvement modality.

7.3 Critical Findings

The military disengagement from the politics or specifically from the democratic institutions of Bangladesh has been the key to keep democracy sustain. Over time the BAF has evolved as a state agency balancing their role in domestic affairs which is quite opposite from the earlier trend of its regular political engagement. Functional democracy provides strength to the sovereignty. “Democracy ... is not, and can never be, a matter of weakening the state” (Luckham, 1994). Rather democracy guarantees desired role for its armed forces. Democratic system defines space for all state agencies including the armed force. The popular pretext of committing coups to protect the country is becoming less logical under the functional democracy in Bangladesh. The disaster management and peacekeeping involvement of the BAF is preventing the intervention of the BAF in functional democracy. Undeniably, the BAF is inclined to their combative orientation. But in peace time non-combative involvement the BAF is legally obliged to assist the civilian authority on call.

The ego-centric organisational outlook often bars the BAF’s involvement in activities associated with human security principles and objectives but it cannot deter the BAF to be a competent force to support the civilian authority in such activities on call. The BAF’s involvement in human security provides the essential orientation about the value of functioning political and civilian authority. From the examples given in the research it is shown that with the increase of the BAF’s non-combative involvement in both inside and outside of Bangladesh the BAF is informed about human security as well as its’ position in a democratic country. Such orientation is vital to separate their role from politics. The human security informed process from disaster management or peacekeeping contributes the BAF’s role to strengthening the civil authority with better skills and empower the local government, which are essential conditions for promoting democracy. As a result the democratic process of Bangladesh is getting confidence and the BAF remains politically disengaged. Thus the sustenance of democracy and military disengagement is related as mutually re-enforced.

To understand this relation in the context of Bangladesh, a recent example is cited. In the recent event of the political crisis in 2007 it is seen that there were all

components of military takeover but that did not happen. The event often titled as infamous 'minus two formula'¹, efforts to launch new political parties and the arrest of the two major political leaders on various corruption charges. It is suggested that the army Chief's speech was, in fact, a blueprint for the future activities of the caretaker administration (Mark, 2008). The military takeover was so near that everyone were mentally prepared to accept that. But that did not happen. Thanks to the role of the BAF in UNKPO. It was the pressure on the BAF by the external and internal actors that the BAF might be excluded from peacekeeping were kept the BAF out of the politics in 2007. The second example is of allegedly plotted coup of December 2011. The BAF has come out first time ever in Bangladesh history to the public press to inform the incident. The BAF claimed it was a very small attempt of coup against the elected government and that was successfully stopped. During that period several military statements reiterated the position of the BAF not to intervene the political democracy in Bangladesh. This is a paramount shift of the BAF's traditional practice indicating the presumption that the BAF is functioning more within its constitutional mandate to follow the direction of the GoB rather interrupting.

7.4 Associated Findings

Apart from its answers of the questions the research analysis has generated discussion and theoretical issues those are considered as associated findings. Nevertheless, these findings are not intended but essential to have a balanced perception on the topic. A brief on such findings is given bellow:

A. No Contradiction between Strong Military and Human Security:

This research identifies the BAF's involvement in activities associated with human security does not contradict its relevance for the protection of national security. The research explains due to the BAF's involvement in non-combative approach there is no change in the BAF's internal policy, which is essentially combative way to protect the national sovereignty. However, it is observed that there are significant changes at

¹ During caretaker regime the government declared there was an effort to free Bangladesh politics of the two leading ladies of the country's politics Awami League President Sheikh Hasina and BNP Chairperson Begum Khaleda Zia. Both the leaders were arrested and were put behind bars for months on charges of corruption. This became famous as minus two formula.

the institutional approach to national politics. The BAF is showing its support for the democratic process of the country and maintaining the military disengagement from politics. In another word, the BAF as an agency still holds the prioritised role for protecting national sovereignty, but it has adjusted its peace time engagement for the development and humanitarian purpose.

B. Mutual Application of National and Human Security: This research explains that the BAF's simultaneous involvement in national and human security can be complimentary rather contradictory once the question of 'preparedness' comes in. The preparation for one approach can help to another. Though the response of these two approaches are different but common areas of preparation is potential for the smooth functioning of both.

C. The BAF is not the Alternative to the Civilian Agency: The analysis of the thesis explains the fact that the involvement of the BAF in the activities associated with human security principles and objectives cannot be permanent feature. The tasks approaching to human security principles and objectives are essentially implementable by the civilian agencies. The BAF can only play a supportive role in special circumstances. Excessive dependency on the BAF for such task will neither capacitate nor encourage the civilian authority. Thus a balance involvement of the BAF in non-combative task is essential.

D. Dependency on the BAF Weakens Democracy: Finally this research also indicates the dependency on the BAF's involvement in the activities associated with human security principles and objectives weakens democracy. If the democratic government starts depending on the BAF for the implementation of its policy related with human security the BAF would hold the upper position defining the term of such engagement. The chance of re-election of the government to some extent depends on the realisation of the development policies. Thus excessive dependency on the BAF for the implementation of such policy allows the BAF to determine the course of democracy in the country, which obviously weakens the democratic government. Thus cautious involvement of the BAF in activities associated with human security is a necessary condition to ensure positive outcomes.

7.5 Recommendations

Based on the above analysis it is imperative that the integration of human security needs a clearer policy commitment at the national level backed by a proper budgetary lineup as well as an institutional setup. This research describes the practical gap between the inspiration and real integration of human security into the policy requires more than a single-handed framework. Rather a comprehensive integration is needed where all the related policy would be addressed with an equal weight. Involving the BAF to apply the human security policies is complex. In the application it is imperative to keep the basic institutional structure of the BAF intact so that it can protect the national sovereignty, if necessary by military means. Concern remains on the impact of such involvement on the BAF's capacity to response the national security needs. Thus a mixed form of preparation can provide confidence to response to both national and human security needs. In serving such function the political leadership must be able to control all aspects of the BAF. Thus the obvious requirement is to maintain the conditions for continuing the democratic system. Intending to achieve the desired state of the BAF's involvement in human security and sustenance of democracy following steps are suggested:

A. For the Government: The first and foremost important task for the GoB is to ensure that the right agency is doing the right task. In this regard the civil agencies need to be capacitated to discharge the task associated with human security principles and objectives. Secondly, the GoB needs to ensure that the BAF is recognised for its contribution in the nontraditional security activities.

B. Bangladesh Armed Forces: The nontraditional security involvement of the BAF is now part of GoB's several policies and regulations. Until there is any real alternative the BAF needs to support the GoB in its peace time involvement. Thus to be efficient in such service the BAF needs to better prepared through training and creating institutional setup.

C. Planning Agencies: The BAF's involvement in activities associated with human security principles and objectives is now a reality. There are gaps in regulation to define the working modality, monitoring and relationship with other agencies. Considering such facts the planning agencies shall provide clear guideline

with suggestions of necessary regulations. In addition to that consolidation of related policies is vital.

D. Parliament: The overseeing of the BAF needs more scrutiny once it comes in touch with the civilian agencies. In many occasions civilian agencies seek nonintervention in their affairs. Thus the parliament needs to enact laws protecting the civilian agencies as well as ensuring effective overseeing mechanisms for the BAF.

E. NGOs and Civil Society: As the concern section of the society the NGO and the civil society needs to be constantly vigilant about the state of the BAF's involvement. Besides regular monitoring they need to provide recommendation to the GoB for better service of the involved agencies. The NGO shall initiate training to relevant agencies to reduce the necessity BAF's involvement in human security.

However, while these are being done it shall be considered that the BAF is not the agency for human security application. Only in certain cases and in certain situations the BAF can play an active role implementing activities associated with human security. The overall applicability of human security depends on the greater political functioning of the country. This thesis identifies in its framework that the key influence of the BAF's involvement in human security is the internal orientation about the importance of functioning democracy. Importantly, all those are context specific. Thus the GoB needs to adopt the context specific steps to ensure efficient outcome from the BAF's involvement in activities associated with human security principles and objectives.

Another aspect of the recommendation is to increase the flexibility in the armed force's domestic involvement. The extended access of civilian to the military service does not mean to hinder the internal issues of armed forces. Rather it is a key for the better civil military relationship. The flexibility can allow better access of the civilian institutes to the military, which does not mean to bring all civilian component integrated with the armed force but to have a qualified limit. Even such introduction of access might be a boost-up factor to strengthen the civil military relationship, thus potential to empower the democracy. The role of civil society organisation and social movements need to be recognised, which still does not receive sufficient assertion from the military.

Basically, a political correction in Bangladesh is a must. It has been four decades since the country has become independent. But the political parties are still competing for petty issues. There is no intra-party democratic practice. This needs to have an end. For effective human security integration the solid democratic practice needs to be restored. Armed force as being the part of the state is needs to be responsive by not taking chance of such loopholes in the political practice. Rather they should keep a distance when such political process takes place. The armed force shall continue to be the implementing agency for the specific responsibility related with development or humanitarian activities and shall not consider them as the policy agency. Finally, the political involvement of the armed forces is a crucial issue. Though constitutionally it is not barred and cannot be restricted. But the code of conduct for the x-officio must be there to guaranteeing the non-involvement of armed forces in the political process.

7.6 Concluding Clause

This research has a clear scope to analyse the influence of the BAF on integration of human security in national policy. Though both issues seem disconnected, the inter-linkage of democratisation of the country and influence of security forces over the pace of democratisation by ensuring its political disengagement rationally puts the issue in context. Bangladesh, having a brutal liberation war in its history, means that the armed forces are regarded as saver of the country. This regard has been exploited over time through military coups. Bangladesh has great challenges with its resources and population; the political leadership cannot afford the conservative approach to development. Contrary to this, the country is gradually moving towards a mature democracy due to the growing demands from its vibrant population. This is indeed a positive sign where armed forces are finding their position as not being a policy agency rather an implementing agency with the primary responsibility to protect the sovereignty. The establishment of democracy is parallel with the shift of the military's approach in accepting its involvement in activities associated with human security principles and objectives.

The BAF as a regular security force in Bangladesh has been assisting the civil administration in various occasions, but never before in the present degree and manner. This support is directed by specific laws and termed as BAF's role to aid the civilian authority. The indirect impact of such a role empowers the civil governance system and influences the sustenance of democracy in Bangladesh. Importantly, such impacts are context specific depending on the modality of the BAF's involvement. This shows the requirement of balancing the BAF's involvement by placing it under the civilian authority and keeping such engagement limited. The engagement of The BAF in a non-combative approach is appreciated but also its core activities need to be protected for the very survival of the state's sovereignty. This is another balancing issue. In order to maintain the balance, it needs to be dictated by democratic values and not by the aversive egocentric approach to the BAF.

That the BAF is not part of the state's political affairs does not mean it shall be out of all functional and institutional structure of the state. But its involvement shall be guided by the effective civilian control. Here is the importance of functional democratic system, which ensures the BAF as a partner to the civilian administration for its development task as well as to protect the sovereignty. Thus the improved civil-military relationship is the key where mutual confidence allows the armed forces to be the development partner. This process needs to be inclusiveness and not exclusive; it can be trigger the enhanced civil-military cooperation and the institutionalisation of democracy. This can ultimately improve the key conditions for the integration of human security into national policy.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A
SELECTED DESCRIPTIONS OF HUMAN SECURITY

Human Security in Major Reports of International Institutions	
<i>Human Development Report by the United Nations Development Program (1994)</i>	The UNDP 1994 <i>Human Development Report</i> articulated a universal, preventive, people-centred approach to human security that focused on “freedom from fear and freedom from want.” The Report defined human security as- 1) <i>Safety from chronic threats</i> and 2) <i>Protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions</i> in the patterns of daily life.
<i>Human Security Now by the Commission on Human Security (2003)</i>	The Commission clarified the concept of human security while retaining its people-centred focus, and its concentration on threats from <i>both</i> poverty and violence. The <i>Report</i> defined the objective of human security as “ <i>to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfillment.</i> ”
<i>Millennium Report by Kofi A. Annan (2000)</i>	Human security in its broadest sense, embraces far more <i>than the absence of violent conflict</i> . It encompasses human rights, good governance, access to education and health care and ensuring that each individual has opportunities and choices to fulfill his or her own potential.
<i>Responsibility to Protect by the Intl. Com. on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2002)</i>	Human security means the <i>security of people – their physical safety, their economic and social well-being</i> , respect for their dignity and worth as human beings, and the protection of their human rights and fundamental freedoms.
<i>World Development Report by the</i>	Security comprises two interrelated concepts: the state’s role in <i>protecting its borders from external threats</i> and its role in

World Bank (2000/2001)	<i>ensuring ‘human security’</i> for its citizens under the broader umbrella of human rights.
Human Security in Nationals and NGOs	
Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs	Human Security is a <i>people-centred approach to foreign policy</i> which recognizes that lasting stability cannot be achieved until people are protected from violent threats to their rights, safety or lives.
Global Environmental Change and Human Security Project	Human security is achieved when and where individuals and communities have the options necessary to end, mitigate, or adapt to threats to their human, and social rights; and actively participate in attaining rights.
Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1999	Human Security comprehensively covers all the menaces that threaten human survival, daily life and dignity.
Human Security in Current Literature	
Lloyd Axworthy 1999.	Safety for people from both violent and non-violent threats.
Fen Hampson <i>et al.</i> <i>Madness in the Multitude</i> 2002	The concept of ‘security’ can be defined as the absence of threat to core human values, including the most basic human value, the physical safety of the individual.
Jessica Mathews “Power Shift”	Human security “is creeping around the edges of official thinking, suggesting that security be viewed as emerging.”
Rob McRae in <i>Human Security and the New Diplomacy</i> 2001.	The concept of human security is, in principle, quite broad. At its most basic level, human security means freedom from fear.
Caroline Thomas. <i>Global Governance development and human security.</i> 2000.	Human security describes a condition of existence in which basic material needs are met and in which human dignity, including meaningful participation in the life of the community, can be met.

APPENDIX B

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS RELATED TO THE ARMED FORCE

PART II (FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF STATE POLICY)

25. Promotion of international peace, security and solidarity.

14[(1)] The State shall base its international relations on the principles of respect for national sovereignty and equality, non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, peaceful settlement of international disputes, and respect for international law and the principles enunciated in the United Nations Charter, and on the basis of the principle shall-

- a. Strive for the renunciation of the use of force in international relations and for general and complete disarmament;
- b. uphold the right of every people freely to determine and build up its own economic and political system by ways and means of its own free choice; and
- c. support oppressed peoples throughout the world waging a just struggle against imperialism, colonialism or racialism.

[(2) The State shall endeavour to consolidate, preserve and strengthen fraternal relations among Muslim countries based on Islamic solidarity.]

CHAPTER IV OF PART IV OF BANGLADESH CONSTITUTION- THE DEFENCE SERVICES

61. Supreme Command

The supreme command of the defence services of Bangladesh shall vest in the President and the exercise thereof shall be regulated by law 27cand such law shall, during the period in which there is a Non-Party Care-taker Government under article 58B, be administered by the President.

62. Recruitment, etc., of defence services

(1) Parliament shall by law provide for regulating-

- a. the raising and maintaining of the defence services of Bangladesh and of

their reserves;

- b. the grant of commissions therein;
- c. the appointment of Chief of Staff of the defence services, and their salaries and allowances; and
- d. the discipline and other matters relating to those services and reserves.

(2) Until Parliament by law provides for the matters specified in clause (1) the President may, by order, provide for such of them as are not already subject to existing law.

63. War

(1) War shall not be declared and the Republic shall not participate in any war except with the assent of Parliament.

APPENDIX C

**INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS AND COMMITTEES FOR
DISASTER RISK REDUCTION**

Levels	Description of the Structure
National Level	<p>National Disaster Management Council (NDMC) headed by the Prime Minister to formulate and review the disaster management policies and issue directives.</p> <p>Inter-Ministerial Disaster Management Co-ordination Committee (IMDMCC) headed by the Minister for Food and Disaster Management to implement disaster management policies and decisions of NDMC/Government.</p> <p>National Disaster Management Advisory Committee (NDMAC) headed by an experienced person nominated by the Prime Minister.</p> <p>Cyclone Preparedness Programme Implementation Board (CPPIB) headed by the Secretary, MoFDM, to review the preparedness activities at the initial stage of an impending cyclone.</p> <p>Disaster Management Training and Public Awareness Building Task Force (DMTATF) headed by the Director General of the Disaster Management Bureau (DMB) to co-ordinate disaster related training and public awareness activities of the government, NGOs and other organisations.</p> <p>Focal Point Operation Coordination Group of Disaster Management (FPOCG) headed by the Director General of the DMB to review and co-ordinate the activities of various departments and agencies working on disaster management and also to review the Contingency Plan prepared by relevant departments.</p> <p>NGO Coordination Committee on Disaster Management (NGOCC) headed by the Director General of the DMB to review and co-ordinate the</p>

	<p>activities of NGOs working on disaster management.</p> <p>Committee for Speedy Dissemination of Disaster Related Warning/Signals (CSDDWS) headed by the Director General of the DMB to examine, ensure and identify the ways and means for speedy dissemination of warnings and signals to the population at risk</p>
<p>Sub-National Level Bodies</p>	<p>District Disaster Management Committee (DDMC) headed by the Deputy Commissioner (DC) to co-ordinate and review the disaster management activities at the district level.</p> <p>Upazilla Disaster Management Committee (UZDMC) headed by the Upazilla Nirbahi Officer (UNO) to co-ordinate and review the disaster management activities at the Upazilla level.</p> <p>Union Disaster Management Committee (UDMC) headed by the Chairman of the Union Parishad to co-ordinate, review and implement the disaster management activities of the concerned union.</p> <p>Pourashava Disaster Management Committee (PDMC) headed by the Chairman of Pourashava (municipality) to co-ordinate, review and implement the disaster management activities within its area of jurisdiction.</p> <p>City Corporation Disaster Management Committee (CCDMC) headed by the Mayor of City Corporations to co-ordinate, review and implement the disaster management activities within its area of jurisdiction.</p>

APPENDIX D
IMPORTANT PROVISIONS OF THE CHITTAGONG HILL
TRACTS PEACE ACCORD OF 1997

**B) (Kha) CHITTAGONG HILL TRACTS LOCAL GOVERNMENT COUNCIL/
HILL DISTRICT COUNCIL**

Both sides have reached agreement with regard to changing, amending, incorporating and omitting the Hill District Local Government Council Acts 1989 (Rangamati Hill District Local Government Council Act 1989, Bandarban Hill District Local Government Council Act 1989, Khagrachhari Hill District Local Government Council Act 1989) and its different sections which were in existence before this agreement came into being, as below:

1. The word “tribal” used in different sections of the Council Acts shall stay.

2. The name “Hill District Local Government Council” shall be amended and the name of council shall be “Hill District Council.”

3. “Non-tribal permanent residents” shall mean a person who is not a tribal but has legal land in the hill district and generally lives in the hill district at a specific address.

34. The following subjects shall be added in the functions and responsibilities of the Hill District Council:

a) Land and land management, b) Police (local), c) Tribal law and social justice, d) Youth Welfare, e) Environment preservation and development, f) Local tourism, g) Improvement trust and other local government institutions except Pourasabha and Union Councils, h) Licensing for local trade and business, i) Proper utilization of water resources of rivulets, canals, ponds and irrigation except Kaptai lake, j) Preservation of death and birth and other statistics, k) Money lending and trade, l) Jhum Cultivation.

35. The following sectors and sources shall be included in the taxes, rates, tolls and fees to be imposed by the Council as stated in the second schedule:

a) Registration fee from non-mechanical transports; b) Tax on sale and purchase of goods; c) Holding tax from land and buildings; d) Tax on sale of domestic animals; e) Fees from cases of social justice; f) Holding tax on government and non-government industries; g) Part of royalty from forest resources; h) Supplementary tax from cinema, theatre and circus, etc.; i) Part of royalty from license or lease given by the government for exploration and extraction of mineral resources; j) Tax from business; k) Tax from lottery and l) Tax from fishing

C) (Ga) THE CHITTAGONG HILL TRACTS REGIONAL COUNCIL

1. A Regional Council shall be formed in coordination with the 3 Hill District Local Government Councils provided that various sections of the Hill District Local Government Council Act 1989 (Act No. 19,20 and 21 of 1989) shall be amended with an aim to make the three Hill District Local Government Councils more powerful and effective.

2. Chairman of this Council shall be elected indirectly by the elected members of the Hill District Councils, his status shall be equivalent to that of a State Minister and he must be a tribal.

3. The Council shall be formed with 22(twenty-two) members including the Chairman. Two-thirds of the members shall be elected from among the tribals. The Council shall determine its procedure of functioning. Composition of the Council shall be as follows: Chairman- 1, Members Tribal- 12, Members Tribal (women)- 2, Members non-tribal- 6, Members non-tribal(women)-1.

D) (Gha) REHABILITATION, GENERAL AMNESTY AND OTHER MATTERS

2. After signing and implementation of the agreement between the government and the Jana Sanghati Samiti, and after rehabilitation of the tribal refugees and internally displaced tribal people, the government, in consultation with the Regional Council to be formed as per this agreement, shall start cadastral survey in CHT as soon as possible and after finalization of land ownership of tribal people by settlement of land dispute through proper verification, shall record their land and ensure their land rights.

3. The government, to ensure the land rights of the tribal families which are landless or possess less than 2 acres of land, shall provide two acres of land to each such family, provided that lands are available in the locality. If requisite lands are not available then grove land shall be provided.

4. A commission (Land Commission) headed by a retired justice shall be formed for settling land disputes. This commission, in addition to settling disputes of lands of the rehabilitated tribal refugees, shall have full power for cancellation of ownership of those lands and hills which have been so far illegally settled and occupied. No appeal can be made against the judgement of this commission and decision of this commission shall be final. This shall also be applicable in case of fringe land.

10. Quota reservation and scholarships: Until development equals that of other regions of the country the government shall continue reservation of quota system in government services and educational institutions for the tribals. For this purpose, the government shall grant more scholarships for the tribal students in the educational institutions. The government shall provide necessary scholarships for research works and higher education abroad.

17. a) After signing of the agreement between the government and the Jana Sanghati Samiti and immediately after the return of the JSS members to normal life, all the temporary camps of military, Ansar and Village Defence Party shall be taken back to permanent installations except the border security force and permanent cantonments (three at the three District Headquarters and Alikadam, Ruma and Dighinala) by phases and with this in view, the time limit shall be determined. In case of deterioration of the law and order situation, natural calamity and such other works the army can be deployed under the civil administration like all other parts of the country as per relevant laws and rules. In this case, the Regional Council may, according to the necessity or time, request the proper authority for the purpose of getting assistance.

b) The lands of camps and cantonments to be abandoned by military or para-military forces shall be either returned to the original owners or to the Hill District Councils.

18. The permanent residents of Chittagong Hill Tracts with priority to the tribals shall be given appointment to all categories of officers and employees of all government, semi-government, councils and autonomous bodies of Chittagong Hill Tracts. In case of non-availability of eligible persons from among the permanent residents of Chittagong Hill Tracts for a particular post, the government may give appointment on lien or for a definite period to such posts.

19. A ministry on Chittagong Hill Tracts Affairs shall be established by appointing a Minister from among the tribals. An Advisory Council shall be formed to assist this ministry with the persons stated below:

a) Minister on CHT Affairs; b) Chairman/representative, Regional Council; c) Chairman/representative, Rangamati Hill District Council; d) Chairman/representative, Bandarban Hill District Council; e) Chairman/representative, Khagrachari Hill District Council; f) Member of Parliament, Rangamati; g) Member of Parliament, Bandarban; h) Member of Parliament, Khagrachari; i) Chakma Raja; j) Bohmang Raja; k) Mong Raja;

l) Three members from non-tribal permanent residents of hilly areas nominated by the government from three Hill Districts.

APPENDIX E
LIST OF MAJOR POLITICAL EVENTS AND MILITARY COUPS
IN BANGLADESH

No	Date	Description
1	1971	i) Independence of Bangladesh
2	1972	- Return of Sheikh Mujib and became Prime Minister of Bangladesh - Start of nationalisation
3	15 August 1975	- Introduction of one party system - First military coup organised by officers of junior members of Bangladesh Army and was led by Major Syed Faruque Rahman and Major Rashid. - The coup resulted in the assassination of the country's president Sheikh Mujibur Rahman
4	3 November 1975	- The government set up by Faruque, Rashid was overthrown by coup. - This was organised by General Khaled Mosharraf, who seen as supporter of pre-August government
5	7 November 1975	- General Mosharraf's 3 day coup ended due to revolt by soldiers - They freed General Ziaur Rahman from house arrest and killed the coup leader Gen Khaled Mosharraf and his associates.
6	Coups 1977- 1980	- General Ziaur Rahman survived as many as 21 coups during his five years until succumbing to the 22nd one
7	1977	- General Zia became president and started the process for

		Election
8	1978	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - National election was held - Zia was elected as president, martial law was lifted
9	30 May 1981	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - A coup was led by Abul Manzoor, who had earlier been a senior army commander and had been transferred to Chittagong in 1977. - They killed President Ziaur but then Chief of Army Staff Lieutenant General Ersad remained loyal.
10	24 March 1982	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Ershad removed the civilian government and came to power in a bloodless coup on 24 March 1982 and proclaimed himself Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA) - He took over as president on 11 December 1983.
11	1990	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - General Ersad removed from power by a popular democratic uprising.

APPENDIX F
LIST OF BANGLADESHI PEACE KEEPING TEAM IN UN
MISSION

Bangladesh Army started its journey in the UN peacekeeping mission in 1988 with 15 observers in UNIMOG (Iraq-Iran). Since then it is maintaining its dominance as a leading troop contributor country in UN peacekeeping. Bangladesh Armed Forces has so far participated in **45** peacekeeping missions in **32** countries. A total of **92,252** members from Bangladesh Armed Forces have participated in the noble task of peacekeeping. A consolidated list is appended below:

Country	Name of the Mission	Army	Nav y	Air	Total
Afganistan	UNAMA	3	4	1	8
Afganistan - Pakistan	UNSMA/UNGOMAP	2	0	0	2
Angola	UNAVEM	0	0	9	9
	UNAVEM III	470	9	0	479
Burundi	BINUB	1	5	0	6
Cambodia	UNAMIC / UNTAC	1002	0	0	1002
	UNMLT	1	0	0	1
Congo	MONUC, MONUSCO	8805	223	1745	10,773
East Slovenia	UNTAES	17	0	0	17
East Timor	UNAMET / UNTAET / UNMISSET	1305	3	71	1409
Ethiopia/ Eritrea	UNMEE	1093	6	9	1108
Georgia	UNOMIG	94	19	18	129
Haiti	UNMIH / MNF	2023	50	52	2125
Iraq	UNGCI	90	18	13	121

Iran/Iraq	UNIIMOG	31	0	0	31
Iraq	UNMOVIC	0	2	1	3
Ivory Coast	MINUCI/ONUCI/UNOCI	18598	287	167	19052
Kosovo	UNMIK	12	0	0	12
Kuwait	UNIKOM	7911	46	281	8238
Liberia	UNOMIL	129	19	40	188
	UNMIL	18606	151	48	18805
Macedonia	UNPREDEP	4	0	3	7
Mozambique	ONUMOZ	2468	15	39	2522
Namibia	UNTAG	25	0	0	25
Rawanda	UNAMIR	990	7	15	1012
Sierra Leone	UNAMSIL	11908	17	14	11939
Somalia	UNOSOM-I	5	0	2	7
	UNOSOM II	1967	0	0	1967
Sudan	UNMIS	7998	571	71	8640
Tajiskistan	UNMOT	34	3	3	40
Uganda/ Rawanda	UNOMUR	20	0	0	20
Westen Sahara	MINURSO	100	17	2	119
Yugoslavia(For mer)	UNPROFOR / UNMOP	1381	18	24	1423
Sierra Leone	UNIOSIL	3	0	0	3
CAR & Chad	MINURCAT	9	1	43	53
Darfur	UNAMID	949	11	25	985
G/Total		88,054	1502	2696	92252

Source: Armed Force Division (AFD), Archive, Foreign Affairs Section.

BIOGRAPHY

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